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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A STUDY OF PERSPECTIVE IN SOCIAL STUDIES

by

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A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A Study of Perspective in Social Studies" submitted by Walter Harold Werner in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to develop an ideal type of perspective which could provide a framework for the identification, clarification, comparison, and justification of perspectives within social studies curricula. Words such as viewpoint, point of view, views, position, angle of vision, framework, orientation, outlook, frame of reference, way of seeing things, and mode of thought are evident within literature when authors refer to the way in which educators and students selectively interpret and act upon the social world from various perspectives. Although perspective is referred to variously in literature and is experienced in social studies classrooms, it was difficult to find educational authors who, instead of taking-for-granted the phenomenon of perspective, attempt to clarify it conceptually. Since perspectives on man and on the social world are central to social studies education, a clarification of perspective itself was deemed necessary.

The approach of the study was conceptual. Selected notions of perspective used by authors in various fields of study were examined in order to elicit some common structures which define perspective. These structures were developed in the study within a theoretical context of phenomenology. The social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz was found to be particularly relevant because he sought to describe what constitutes our "natural attitude": how we order, interpret and act within a life-world which is taken-for-granted by us.

To be compatible with phenomenology, the ideal type of perspective was grounded in a view of consciousness. It was argued that

the phenomenon of perspective is possible because the intentionality which characterizes consciousness and experience is directed always towards an object from determined standpoints. With a shift in these standpoints the individual places himself in a different relationship to an object, and the reality of an object appears in changed perspective to him. Essentially, then, a perspective was defined as a subject-object relationship in which the subject selectively apprehends an object from the standpoints of his unique context, purposes, and ongoing history. In addition to developing an ideal type which could be used to identify perspective within curricula, chapters were devoted to tracing a relationship of perspective to curriculum development, to defining ways in which the perspectives of teachers and students are influenced through social studies curricula, and to suggesting some criteria for validating perspectives within curricula.

The study concluded with suggestions as to how the ideal type may be further applied through ethnomethodology in classroom research situations, as well as applied in practical situations of curriculum development, implementation, instruction, and evaluation. Such applications could make educators and students more critically aware of the influence of perspective upon social studies activities and education.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Ideas have a history. They emerge in part out of and are shaped within someone's experiences, while at the same time they influence his experiences. The idea to study perspective developed from the writer's teaching of the Alberta Social Studies Program within a high school (Responding to Change, 1974). Students were encouraged in accordance with the program to pursue problems of mutual interest within one-third of the time allotted to social studies. Many of them attempted to experience issues from frames of reference not normally their own, and to get into situations representing realities foreign to them. In wanting to see through the eyes of others, as it were, some students did volunteer service in senior citizen institutions, halfway houses, friendship centers, and elementary schools, participated in diverse ethnic, religious, and occupational communities, conducted surveys within shopping centers and from house-to-house, staged ethnographic disturbances on downtown sidewalks and in school hallways, joined policemen on their inner-city routes, defined and compared attitudes within small towns, among age and professional groups, and within their own school clubs, fraternities, academic streams, and sport teams, and accounted for the perspectives underlying advertisements, popular songs, and television programs. They interviewed, surveyed, observed, filmed, made notes, kept diaries, wrote poetry, and collected stories to reconstruct the perspectives through which other individuals define the world, and to determine why there are differences in feeling and definition on social issues among various groups. Still other students isolated the viewpoint of particular historians, politicians, and religious leaders to use these perspectives to examine and to compare social phenomena in different ways.

It became apparent to some students that a study of perspectives is like a knife which cuts both ways. They questioned their own perspectives and those of their teachers, and they became interested in critically defining and comparing the views underlying school subjects. And so it became evident to them that perspective is not only a central feature of the social world, but that it is also inherent within social studies programs. A program is itself a perspective on man, and this perspective tends to encapsulate the thinking and to restrict the outlooks students and teachers develop.

When students began to deal with the phenomenon of perspective explicitly, questions were raised concerning what perspectives are and how they can be identified. However, Responding to Change (1974) gave no guidance as to how students were to carry out projects in which the identification and utilization of perspective were of interest, nor did the program identify and account for its own perspective on man. Its developers appeared to have taken-for-granted the phenomenon. Consequently, some social studies teachers began seminars among themselves, with disciplinarians, and with education professors to examine how students could identify and choose among perspective alternatives when studying social issues, and more specifically, to discuss possible perspectives on man upon which programs could be developed. The desirability of having students explore other views of man in their study of social issues was agreed upon, but a question remained on how to identify and justify the perspectives encountered and utilized in social studies programs.

Perspective identification, therefore, was a theme in need of study. And when one goes to educational literature, this theme emerges as a problem applicable to secondary social studies in general.

PART I. MAKING PERSPECTIVE PROBLEMATIC

> Man is condemned to viewing from one (or more) perspectives or angles, as reality is infinitely complex and no observer can see it all. In 'truth', all observation then takes on a biased hue (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973:55).

Problems arise when individuals define a discrepancy between their interpretations of a situation and their ideal of what that situation should be (Dawe, 1970). Problem defining is a recognition and specification of a gap between what one believes is the case and what one believes should be the case. The phenomenon of perspective arises as a problem because on the one hand social studies is a study of perspective and is itself a perspective on man, whereas on the other hand authors claim that educators and students should be able to identify perspective within the social world and within programs. Yet educational literature gives very little clarification concerning the phenomenon of perspective and of how it is to be identified in programs or elsewhere. Perspective is made problematic when one asks the question: How can perspectives on man be identified within social studies?

A. PERSPECTIVE AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES

That man exists implies some basic questions: Who is man? What is his relation to the world and to other men? What is the meaning of existence and of history? These and similar questions may be asked whenever man reflects upon himself. Every study of social facts implies an outlook. A person cannot apply a theory to man, cannot write about man, and cannot teach fellowmen without basing such activities upon an image of what it is to be human. Whenever he thinks about man he is operating within a more or less coherent framework for thinking. He must adopt one position or another, for to be confronted with man is more than recognizing that something is there, but also to recognize what that something is (Sire, 1976:17). And here is where perspectives on man begin to diverge. The social world is characterized by a pluralism and a competition of ideas about man. Advertisement, religion, political parties, literature, theatre, and schools are avenues through which images of man are distributed.

When students engage in a study of social issues, they are confronted with different perspectives on man. They are called upon to detect and choose among perspectives, and even to determine why in the light of so many options they think certain perspectives are valid. To enter social studies discourse and inquiry is to encounter perspectives on man, and to come to terms in some way with a mosaic of interpretations which make up the thinking of actors within a pluralistic society. As such, social studies is implicitly or explicitly in part a study of perspectives on man.

Further, social studies programs are themselves a perspective on man.[1] It would be an illusion to consider programs as neutral artifacts, techniques, and knowledge arrangements which convey any message depending upon the teacher. A program is an instrument of men in their orientation to the social world and is premised upon interests, presuppositions, approaches, relevances, and choices which betray a view of man (Freire, 1970a:206; Hall, 1972:2). What is to be taught, how it is to be taught, and why it is to be taught reflect a conception of what man is or what he should be. As such, an implicit or explicit perspective on man through which the social world and the student are interpreted is basic to any social studies program. Different programs may represent conflicting perspectives because each view is fashioned by the words, values, presuppositions, and beliefs of its developers.

The phenomenon of perspective is worth studying because it is a central feature of social studies discourse and programs.[2] This premise is further justified by the literature.

B. PERSPECTIVE AND THE LITERATURE

> All educational practice implies a theoretical stance on the educator's part. This stance in turn implies—sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly—an interpretation of man and the world. It could not be otherwise (Freire, 1970a:205-206).

There is a premise supported in educational literature that educators and students should be able to identify explicitly the perspectives on man they encounter within the social world and within programs. Interest in critical inquiry into the underlying presuppositions, interests, and approaches of programs tends to place the phenomenon of perspective in question and to make its identification problematic (e.g., Apple, 1974:8; Speizman, 1974:193; Joyce, 1975). Critical inquiry examines the commonsense realities which educators and students may take-for-granted, and attempts to make explicit the underlying perspectives and the latent consequences such perspectives may have (Apple, 1974:4). As such, a number of authors argue that perspectives on man should be identified and critically reflected upon, not only because they underlie educational reality, but also because of the implications such perspectives have.

Views of man underlying educational phenomena affect our observation, interpretation, and consequent action upon the social world and upon the student (e.g., Horton, 1966; Freire, 1970a,d; Greene, 1973:3-21). Educators and students need to be critically reflective of the images of man they construct because they tend to act on the basis of the beliefs they implicitly hold. Instructional and curricular choices, student treatment, and whatever is done in the name of social studies education implies a conception of the nature of man, of the student, and of society. As such, an issue in secondary education specified by some authors is perspective on man (Combs, 1976; Harman, 1976; Metcalf, 1976; Van Til, 1976b).

Authors argue that perspectives on man should be identified and critically reflected upon because of implications for alternative futures.[3] Their central thesis is simply that "all education springs from images of the future and all education creates images of the future" (Toffler, 1974:3). Educational practice necessary for achieving alternative futures is not dependent only upon a choice of values, but more basically

> . . . on a conception of the nature of man, his potentialities, and the possibilities for their realization. That is to say, the choice between the two alternative futures we have described is also in a sense a choice between two images of man (Harman, 1972: 21).

Alternative futures to which programs contribute are based in part upon alternative outlooks on what man is and what he should become. Consequently, educators should be able to identify and justify the images of man which underlie social studies programs.

The substantive content and issues of social studies often require that perspectives on man be identified and critically reflected upon. The current yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education focusses on issues in secondary education (Van Til, 1976a). In asking "what should be taught and learned," Van Til isolates sixteen "major clusters of content" which he defines as the sources of a "significant program of secondary education today" (1976b:197-212). Most of these content areas are based upon a premise that students and educators should be able to identify and choose among alternative perspectives on what are the good life and the nature of man. Indeed, Van Til not only states that conflicting perspectives (political, religious, philosophical, or whatever) should be studied explicitly, but also makes the social studies a major arena for such study (1976b:203; c.f., Martin, et al., 1966; Roden, 1973; Fersh, 1974; Harman, 1976a:111-119). Students and educators should be able to identify, choose among, and utilize conflicting and complementary perspectives because the reality of man is too varied to be expressed in any one perspective.

Perspectives on man should be identified and critically reflected upon because of the nature of our society. There is an expressed interest within educational literature for accommodating social pluralism within schools and program development, for of concern to many authors is the treatment that the perspectives and realities of various ethnic, religious, occupational, geographical, and age groups receive within programs.[4] North American society represents a plurality of groups, life-styles, and reality views. And because the school is a "meeting place" of individuals representing these various groups and perspectives, the phenomenon of perspective should be recognized and clarified by educators in terms of educational contexts, and should be recognized and identified by students. For example, such concern is evident in a report of Canadian ethnic and multicultural content in program guides for social science, social studies, and history prescribed by the provincial and territorial departments of education (Aoki, et al., 1974). A manifest lack of regard for ethnic perspective pluralism is shown within these program guides by the manner in which program developers identify and interpret ethnic reality views.

A notable trend is evident in the literature on program development towards alternative starting points for guiding thinking concerning educational phenomena. Although the structure of the disciplines was a major source for program planning during the 1960's, the student in relation to his social, political, and existential world was becoming a focus and an alternative starting point for many educators during the 1970's.[5] They argued that students should be confronted with the question "Who am I?" in relation to social issues, changes, uncertainties, and value conflicts evident in their life-world. Perspectives on man through which students understand themselves and interpret their social world should be critically identified because this is a step towards greater self-awareness.

C. PERSPECTIVE AS PROBLEMATIC

A question arises concerning how perspective on man can be identified in social studies. On the one hand authors recognize that perspectives should be identified, yet on the other hand they fail to explicate how to do so. If perspective on man is a phenomenon in social studies, and if educators and students should be able to identify such viewpoints, then studies are needed to clarify what perspective is and how it is to be identified. Further, once the notion of perspective identification is made problematic, three other themes become relevant.

First, why are programs perspectivable and how is it that one perspective on man and not another characterizes a program? Identifying program viewpoints presupposes that perspective is within the program and that all programs do not have the same perspective. Rather than taking-for-granted the perspectivity of programs, how a program comes to have a perspective can be clarified by tracing how an ongoing act of program development is perspective guided. The perspectives of program developers guide their acts of program development. Because any act is biased by the point of view employed, the reality constructed by such an act reflects the underlying perspective.

Inherent within the programs which they produce are their particular ways of ordering, interpreting, and acting upon some aspect of the world. In short, an accounting for how perspective is related to programs is needed because the relationship is presupposed in perspective identification.

Second, an assumption is made that perspectives are worth identifying because they manage in some way the perspectives of teachers and students by influencing how they observe, interpret, and act towards man and the social world.[6] How are the perspectives of teachers and students managed through the program perspective? A relationship of program perspective to the perspectives of program users needs to be accounted for because such a relationship is presupposed in perspective identification.

Third, identifying perspectives is not sufficient for appraisively oriented social studies. Perspectives of programs are not assumed to be homogeneous in scope, accuracy, and suitability for all purposes. When faced with alternative views on man, teachers and students should be able to choose among them and validate the claims made for them. How can perspectives on man be validated in social studies programs? Criteria for choosing and for judging among perspectives in social studies are needed.

Therefore, a problem for study is to define an ideal type of the phenomenon of perspective in response to the question: How can perspectives on man be identified in social studies programs? Prior to identifying a viewpoint one must have some conception of what the phenomenon is for which he is looking. A metaperspective (ideal type) which defines perspective is needed in order that it can be applied by educators and students to identify concrete points of view in programs or elsewhere. However, the theme of perspective identification implies three other themes which cannot be ignored in social studies: the relation of perspective to programs (How is it that programs are perspectivable?), the management of perspective through programs (How are the perspectives of teachers and students managed?), and the validation of perspective (How can perspectives on man be validated?). The purposes of the study are derived from these four themes.

PART II. PURPOSES OF THE STUDY

The purposes of the study are (1) to develop an ideal type of perspective which can be used to identify perspective, (2) to trace a relationship of perspective to program development which would account for perspective on man in social studies programs, (3) to define ways in which the perspectives of teachers and students are subject to management through social studies programs, and (4) to suggest some criteria for validating perspectives. The following questions provide a framework for the investigation:

1. How can perspectives on man be identified in social studies programs? (Chapter II. IDENTIFYING PERSPECTIVE IN PROGRAMS).
2. How do perspectives on man become a part of social studies programs? (Chapter III. RELATING PERSPECTIVE TO PROGRAMS).

3. How are perspectives on man held by teachers and students managed through social studies programs? (Chapter IV. MANAGING PERSPECTIVE THROUGH PROGRAMS).
4. How can perspectives on man be validated in social studies programs? (Chapter V. VALIDATING PERSPECTIVE IN PROGRAMS).

Each of these four questions is responded to within a separate chapter rather than concurrently throughout the study. They provide direction and general parameters for selecting and examining literature related to the phenomenon of perspective.

PART III. STYLE AND PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY

Terms are defined in context throughout the study rather than in isolation. Footnotes are provided at the end of each chapter for the reader who seeks further clarification of selected ideas. A glossary of major phenomenological terms is available in Schutz (1970a:316-323). Words such as viewpoint, point of view, position, angle of vision, framework, orientation, outlook, the light in which it appears, frame of reference, way of seeing, interpretation of the world, mode of thought, and views are used interchangeably with perspective in the study. The ideal type developed in Chapter II represents a meaning of these terms.

Parameters are placed on the four questions. The general psychology literature on the phenomenon of attitude, the sociological and political literature on ideology, the methodological literature on models and theories, as well as other literature and concepts are deliberately neglected, not because these lack relevance, but rather in the interest of establishing limits for the study.

The context of the study is secondary social studies (grades seven to twelve) as this represents the writer's professional biography. Consequently, reference is made to "perspectives on man and the social world" because these are fundamental to social studies. This does not imply that perspectives on man are unique to social studies. On the contrary, the discussion is directed towards the phenomenon of perspective rather than to a number of specific social studies perspectives; hence the study could be applied to other subject areas by writers with different interests.

We are not asking the question concerning what specific perspectives on man are found in social studies programs. That would entail a different study than is represented here, and would be an appropriate follow-up to the present study. It is perspective as a phenomenon which is of interest, rather than a typology of various kinds of perspectives, or a catalog of specific perspectives on man utilized in social studies. Once the phenomenon itself is explicated, then it can be applied to the constructing of specific typologies and to the comparing of concrete perspectives. As such, the study is limited to being a perspective on the phenomenon of perspective.[7]

The use of the term "phenomenology" must be clarified. The study is not a phenomenology of perspective in any specific social studies program, nor is it a description of how perspective is experienced. Rather, it is an exploration of the phenomenon of perspective primarily as portrayed in selected literature whose authors claim to practice phenomenology directly in their research or else purport to discuss phenomenology theoretically. Ideas of these phenomenologists are used in the study to discuss perspective. In this sense, "phenomenology" is a superordinate term (much as "psychology" or "sociology") representing a certain body of literature, a set of methods and presuppositions, and an intellectual tradition.

PART IV. CONTEXTS OF THE STUDY

> It has become widely recognized that each intellectual stance one takes to a particular problem provides but a limited perspective upon the problem under consideration. Each stance discloses certain features against which other features are seen (Apple, 1970:18).

The investigator recognizes that any study of perspective is itself perspective guided, that even in arguing for point-of-viewism one cannot presume himself free of a viewpoint (Zaner, 1973:27). One cannot study the phenomenon of perspective without acknowledging that he has a particular perspective which guides his study. One way to deal with this dilemma is to make explicit the (A) theoretical, (B) biographical, and (C) methodological contexts within which one's thinking is situated.

A. THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Phenomenology provides a theoretical context within which to study the phenomenon of perspective. More specifically, the study is based upon the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. Central to Schutz's phenomenology is the phenomenon of perspective because he sought to describe what constitutes our "natural attitude": how we order, interpret, and act within a life-world which is taken-for-granted by us.

What is phenomenology? Though many educators may need to ask this question, it is neither the purpose nor within the scope of the present study to summarize what authors have discussed in detail concerning phenomenology. On the assumption that "the phenomena curriculists are properly concerned with are so unlike the phenomena studied by natural scientists as to cast doubt on the relevance of their methods to our phenomena" (Walker, 1974:8; c.f., Chapter II, Part III), a number of educators have expressed interest in applying phenomenological literature and modes of inquiry to studies of program development and programs.[8] The writings of Schutz have received attention by educators (e.g., Apple, 1970; van Manen, 1973, 1974b), and it is to be expected that his influence will increase.[9] There are four premises which determine in part Schutz's hermeneutic of the life-world.

Intentionality

Phenomenology is premised upon a theory of consciousness and its primary structure of intentionality. Every consciousness is of something, man stands in some relationship to the world, actors act with respect to an object. This directedness implies an ontology of mind as a subject-object relationship rather than as a self-contained entity in which subject is separate from object. Though consciousness is of something, the subject can be related to the object in various ways, and thereby can impose selected meanings upon its referent. Meaning is imposed upon the world by ordering and by interpreting it through differing schemes and by acting upon it according to differing projects. In various acts of consciousness an object is presented in this way or in that way to consciousness; consequently, this intentional character of experience makes the phenomenon of perspective possible.

This premise of intentionality implies that an actor does not simply have perspectives, but perspectives in relation to some object of intention. Because perspective is defined by the subject-object relation in which the subject is directed towards an object of intention and apprehends it from some context and in accord with some schemes of reference, one cannot identify or speak of an actor's point of view without also referring to the object of his outlook at the same time. He has a viewpoint about something, an orientation that is directed to an aspect of the world, an ongoing ordering, interpreting, and acting upon an object in a variety of ways depending upon the frame of reference he adopts.

This premise of intentionality also implies that a social studies program embodies a subject-object relation. Just as consciousness is always related to some object of intention, so a program's schemes of reference refer to something also. And since any object of intention can be experienced as real in various ways depending upon the frames of reference used for ordering, interpreting, and acting upon it, the implication is that man can be defined and approached differently within social studies programs. What distinguishes among programs is the viewpoint each provides to teachers and to students for constructing reality concerning man. The particular view of man encountered within a program is defined in relation to some observer located in a time and a place. In other words, a program's view of man is just that, a point of view.

Reality

A concomitant premise to intentionality is that of reality (Chapter II, Part II; Chapter III, Footnote 4). Reality is for the actor the object of his intention and that which is experienced from varying perspectives, rather than that which is in itself independent of human consciousness which apprehends and gives it meaning. The premise of reality is not a denial or a lack of confidence in the existence of the world, but is a recognition that it is ordered and interpreted in differing subject-object relationships, that experience of it is influenced by language and group-specific assumptions, and that the situation is always defined by someone. Indeed, to posit the intentionality of experience is to say that consciousness has a referent, that it is related to objects "out there" which present themselves to man through his acts of consciousness.

Acts

The inseparable premises of intentionality and reality imply a third premise which is basic to social phenomenology: it is through intentional acts that the individual constructs and maintains multiple realities. By acting he imposes his meaning upon objects and situations (Chapter III, Part I and Footnote 2). This premise has implications for one's hermeneutic of the social world: any social thing must be interpreted in terms of the acts whereby it is constructed and maintained as meaningful; a social act must be interpreted in terms of the motives (intentions) upon which it is based; a motive must be interpreted in terms of the larger meaning contexts (perspectives) in which it is located (Coulter, 1970; Dawe, 1970; Schutz, 1971:3-19; Filmer, *et al.*, 1972).

Context

Consciousness, reality, and acts are perspectivable because they are bounded by horizons. No human experience is isolated from its socio-historical location, but arises within and is influenced by a time and a place from which it cannot be separated (Chapter II, Part II). Acts are in the world; selectivity of consciousness is within an awareness of a background context; experience is bounded by biography. In other words, being context bound means that intentionality and acts are characterized by, and that reality is apprehended from, standpoints.

These four premises—intentionality, reality, acts, and context—implicitly underlie the present study. In Chapter II a notion of perspective is developed based upon a premise that intentionality is characterized by standpoints. Social phenomena such as social studies programs and program development are understood in Chapter III by reducing them to human acts and contexts, to the perspectivity of human consciousness, and to the realities and meaning actors experience and impose upon their world and upon one another.

B. BIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

Phenomenology requires that one make his own predisposition explicit to some extent. The writer's interest comes out of his academic background in the area of religious studies. This background raises a question for him concerning why the phenomenon of man has multifaceted reality within various religious traditions. Further, as is described in the introduction to this chapter, social studies is an arena in which cross-perspective differences, understanding, and communication are encountered in the classroom and in the study of the social world. The phenomenon of perspective, therefore, became problematic for the writer in terms of his interest in religious studies and his teaching of social studies.

In turning to the literature, the writer encountered a wide array of notions of perspective developed and applied by authors in various fields to describe how actors order and interpret the world, or as Esland says, "to explore the understandings and interpretations by which an individual organizes his daily life" (1971b:67).[10] Mannheim (1936), Kuhn (1970), van Manen (1973), and Maruyama (1974c) were influential especially in the initial stages of the study to direct the writer's thinking.[11] Although these authors are quoted in the study, this is not to be construed as support for all of their ideas. Rather, the notions these authors have of cross-perspective relationships (e.g., communication and interpretation) and the structures by which they define perspective were of interest in the study as one source from which to develop an ideal type of perspective (Chapter II). In other words, their characterizations of the phenomenon of perspective were utilized, without necessarily supporting their views of history, society, or method.

C. METHODOLOGICAL CONTE[illegible]

> Whenever we come upon any ordering of past experience under interpretive schemes, any act of abstraction, generalization, formalization, or idealization, whatever the object involved, there we shall find this process in which a moment of living experience is lifted out of its setting and then, through a synthesis of recognition, frozen into a hard and fast "ideal type" (Schutz, 1972:187).

Social reality is constructed and maintained in part because actors intersubjectively interpret experience, order phenomena, and act upon the world in terms of various typifications (ideal types). For example, through such ideal types as postman, program, school, communist, and perspective, actors construe that which they uniquely encounter in terms of typical structures which can be shared with other actors. They identify one phenomenon as being like a class of phenomena on the basis of certain typicalities rather than in terms of uniqueness (Schutz, 1975:93-115).

In similar manner, phenomenologists construct ideal types to clarify the structures (components and relationships) typically encountered in experiencing a class of phenomena.[12] These types help researchers to grasp and to make sense of unique life-world phenomena on the basis of their typical characteristics rather than their unique characteristics (Grathoff, 1970:13). To illustrate, Schutz described an ideal type of a typical act in terms of such structures as projects, motives, activities, and contexts after he observed many unique acts in different situations (1972; c.f., Chapter III, Part I). By means of these structures which are typical of any unique act and yet abstract enough to have generalizability to all acts, his ideal type specified those components and characteristics by which acts can be defined, identified in concrete situations, and compared with one another. His ideal type was not designed to mirror any one act in its uniqueness but in its typicalness.

The ideal type of perspective developed in Chapter II provides categories for observation and for description which allow an investigator to identify and describe the perspective of a program or an actor. The ideal type is phenomenological in the sense that its components are grounded in selected structures of consciousness (e.g., standpoints of the Here, Now, and Thus) identified by Schutz, rather than being based in a starting point which presupposes consciousness (e.g., general systems theory). When applied to a study of a particular program's or individual's perspective, the ideal type can be used to identify and compare views on man in terms of the perspective structures specified as typical in the ideal type.

It would be difficult to explicate that which may be implicit and taken-for-granted within programs if there were no ideal type to give direction and to specify some typical structures of perspective. The reality of a perspective to a researcher is dependent in part upon the methodology used and the prior conception of perspective which he holds. In other words, identifying perspectives by means of an ideal type shapes the outcome of the study. In any ideal type the author defines features which he considers to be observable indications and typical structures of a point of view; when such types are applied, the perspectives which are identified remain in part the product of the researcher's methods. Ideal types and notions of perspective are themselves a way of interpreting experience.

How is one to construct an ideal type of something so pervasive and taken-for-granted as is perspective within our daily experience and within social studies programs? Naturally, one must delimit the range of possible sources for study, and select a method to guide examination of these selected sources.

One primary and three secondary sources were chosen from which to construct an ideal type of perspective. First, the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz provided the major direction and source for specifying the structures of perspective. Second, the Alberta Social Studies Program was utilized as another source (Responding to Change, 1974). Third, literature was selected in which authors representing various theoretical and disciplinary frameworks, and for diverse purposes, discuss the phenomenon of perspective in general or specific perspectives in particular (Chapter I, Footnote 10). Fourth, some books comparing and discussing perspectives on man were examined (Chapter I, Footnote 2). These four sources refer to or utilize perspective from differing standpoints, thereby providing a basis upon which the investigator could enlarge his own point of view on perspective and could identify structures which appear to be common to the phenomenon. An ideal type of perspective was developed from these various sources by means of dialectics.

Dialectics is a general method which requires an investigator to use diverse sources and viewpoints from which to clarify and describe any phenomenon (whether an issue, object, idea, event, or person) on which there are many points of view possible.[13] This method does not define a strict number of steps or procedures to follow in order to achieve efficiently a prespecified end, but provides direction to clarifying human phenomena. A dialectic approach requires that an investigator compare similarities and differences among the various stances vis-à-vis perspective evident in the four sources discussed above, thereby identifying structures which appear to be essential to the phenomenon of perspective. However, because dialectics is an ongoing method whereby actors clarify that which they continuously encounter in the life-world, the structures of perspective defined by anyone would represent a stage of his thinking to that particular point in time. Any ideal type developed through dialectics is simply one of many which could be defined depending upon the sources used, the purpose of the investigator, and the investigator himself. Petz argues that

> Dialectical thinking insists that no thought, concept, idea, method, system, can grasp, comprehend fully and do justice to anything, any matter. All these are generalizations and abstractions from the particular and individual, as well as impositions on it (1974:113).

As such, the ideal type (Chapter II) represents the author's thinking to this point in time and will doubtless shift as new sources of and experience with the phenomenon of perspective occur. Similarly, for the reader the ideal type becomes just another source for his own thinking dialectically about what it means to have a point of view in social studies programs or elsewhere.

SUMMARY

Although the phenomenon of perspective on man is referred to variously in the literature and is experienced in social studies classrooms, it is difficult to find educational authors who, instead of taking-for-granted the phenomenon, attempt to clarify it. An account of perspective needs to be specified, therefore, both to define what it means to have a point of view on man, and to provide a basis upon which outlooks can be identified in social studies. To be compatible with phenomenology, any notion of perspective developed by theoreticians must be grounded in those structures which characterize consciousness. Common-sense or social studies perspectives on man are accounted for in the following chapter in terms of an ideal type based upon the standpoints of intentionality which characterize experience as perspectivable.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1] The term "program" is used in the sense of Aoki (1970, 1971, 1974a). A social studies program includes intended outcomes (ends, aims, goals, objectives), teaching-learning strategies (means, activities, methods), and display material with which the student is to interact.

[2] Writers in various fields have emphasized that underlying a study of that which is social is a view of man: e.g., Beck (1964), Laing (1965:22; 1967:45), Baumer (1970), Coulter (1970), Dawe (1970: 207), Radnitzky (1970), Combs, et al. (1971), Chein (1972), Skinner (1972:175-206), Wertheimer (1972), Tennessen (n.d.). Besides Freire (1970a,d), educators have also argued that an image of man is central to educational practice: e.g., Lewis (1965:65-91), Berman (1968:9), Rich (1968:155-159), Brameld (1970), Huebner (1970), Metcalf and Hunt (1970:359-361), Peters (1970:227-234), Shane (1970:390), Silberman (1970:5), Harman (1972, 1976), Joyce and Weil (1972:5), Hawkins (1972), Marquardt (1972:5), Strike (1972), Kliebard (1975b), Naherny and Rosario (1975), Walberg (1975), Combs (1976), Metcalf (1976). Numerous authors have outlined different perspectives on man which were useful in the present study as one source from which to develop an ideal type (Chapter II): e.g., Nicholls (1966), Fromm and Xirau (1968), Nash (1968), Shinn (1968), Kitwood (1970), Drews and Lipson (1971:5-17), Burke (1972), Joyce (1975).

[3] Shane (1970, 1976), Harman (1972, 1976a,b), Worth (1972), Toffler (1974), Amara (1976), Bundy (1976), Clift and Shane (1976), Van Til (1976b:211-212).

[4] Kitchen (1967), Simpson (1971), Oswald and Spitzer (1973), Epps (1974), Kopan and Walberg (1974), Havighurst and Dreyer (1975), Clift and Shane (1976:311), Van Til (1976b).

[5] Brameld (1970), Foshay (1970, 1976), Freire (1970a,b,c,d, 1973), Huebner (1970), Metcalf and Hunt (1970), Shane (1970), Aoki (1971:2), Bruner (1971), Simpson (1971), Phenix (1974), Combs (1976), Metcalf (1976), Van Til (1976b:205-206).

[6] Yamamoto (1969), Freire (1970d), Bourdieu (1971), Cosin, et al. (1971), Davies (1971), Esland (1971a,b), Hopper (1971), Keddie (1971), Young (1971a,b), Greene (1973).

[7] Authors attempt to identify perspectives in one of two overlapping ways (typologies or metaperspectives), depending upon their particular purpose. The present study purports to be a metaperspective (Chapter II).

Perspective typologies. Typologies or classification schemes have been developed to bring order into the array of views one encounters within the literature on program development or instruction.

Such typologies tend to define a number of groupings into which specific perspectives can be classified. The development of these schemes by theoreticians within different fields of study has not only underscored the importance of orientations held by researchers and educators for influencing the practice and the outcomes of their endeavours, but has demonstrated that it is possible to identify and compare outlooks on the basis of certain structures (e.g., values, assumptions, goals). In constructing a typology, one has to determine what specific components can be used for identifying, differentiating among, classifying, and comparing views. Numerous examples of perspective typologies could be given: Pepper (1942, 1966, 1970, 1972), Kluckholn and Strodtbeck (1961), Fromm (1967:34-54,96-115), Radnitzky (1969), Dawe (1970), Churchman (1971), Rubington and Weinberg (1971), Thompson and Tunstall (1971), Willer (1971), Hagedorn and Labovitz (1973), Henshel and Henshel (1973), Schatzman and Strauss (1973:4-9), Maruyama (1974c), Pirsig (1974), Sutherland (1974), Sire (1976). See Footnote 2 (Chapter I) for selected typologies of perspectives on man. Perspective typologies are evident in education: e.g., Dahlke (1958), Lamm (1969), Becher (1971), Harman (1972), Kohlberg and Mayer (1972), Joyce and Weil (1972), Stewart (1973), Aoki (1974a,b), Blaney (1974), Schmidtlein (1974), van Manen (1974b), Ledgerwood (1975), Macdonald (1975).

Typologies are useful if one's primary purpose is to classify the array of perspectives encountered. However, they tend to be inadequate if one's purpose is to explicate the phenomenon of perspective itself rather than to catalog concrete perspectives. They tend to force all outlooks into the confines of the categories specified by the typology. For example, Eisner and Vallance have isolated and compared five orientations to program development, and have attempted to determine how these perspectives held by educators influence their practice (1974). However, Eisner and Vallance are vague on what is the phenomenon of orientation itself, stating that an orientation reflects implicit goals, values, assumptions, and approaches embedded within them (1974:1-3), and that conflicting orientations have implications for controversy in educational discourse.

Metaperspectives. Unlike typologies which tend to emphasize classification schemes for comparing perspectives, a metaperspective is a perspective on the phenomenon of perspective. These ideal types describe some structures deemed to define perspective in general (e.g., Mannheim, 1936:264-311). Metaperspectives are prior to perspective typologies, and can be used not only to understand the phenomenon of perspective, but also to construct specific typologies. Though metaperspectives tend to be more abstract than are typologies, they may be of greater use in social studies. These ideal types could be applied to identifying perspectives of a host of things (e.g., man, events, social issues, objects), could be used to construct a typology for classifying and comparing concrete perspectives on one thing (e.g., man), or could be used just to understand the phenomenon of perspective itself (e.g., a perspective on perspective).

[8] Interest in phenomenology was evidenced at the American Educational Research Association symposium on program development in the topic ("Toward Disciplined Inquiry in Curriculum: Breaking with Conventional Modes"; Chicago, April 1974) and in the papers presented (e.g., Apple, 1974; Pinar, 1975b; Walker, 1974). The study and application of phenomenology has been advocated by various educators (e.g., Chamberlin, 1969, 1974; Apple, 1970; Cosin, et al., 1971; Esland, 1971a,b, 1973; Vandenberg, 1971; Beittel, 1973; Dale, 1973; Greene, 1973, 1974, 1975; van Manen, 1973, 1974a; Greenfield, 1974; Denton, 1974; Phenix, 1974; Pinar, 1974, 1975b; Weinberg, 1974; Friesen, 1975; Huebner, 1975; Riffel, 1975; Willis and Allen, 1976).

[9] Michael Apple indicated that the works of Schutz are becoming of increased interest to educators (conversation, August 1976). Reasons for this interest lie in a current search by educators for new theoretical bases (Walker, 1974; Pinar, 1974, 1975) and an increased publication of Schutz's writings and of commentaries on those works (e.g., Filmer, et al., 1972).

[10] Notions of perspective are applied by authors in various fields to describe how actors or groups order and interpret the world. For example, these are variously referred to as perspective (Mannheim, 1936; Merton, 1949; Peters, 1970:30-31; Schermerhorn, 1970; Kaplan, 1971; Geertz, 1972, 1973:108-125; Dale, 1972, Cusick, 1973), theoretical perspective (Radnitzky, 1969; Dawe, 1970; Schatzman and Strauss, 1973), orientation (van Manen, 1973), paradigm (Calder, 1969; Kuhn, 1970, Harman, 1972), mode of apprehending the world (Morgan, 1970), cognitive style (Cohen, 1964), standpoint of the thinker (Kaufman, 1960; Palmer, 1969), model (Belth, 1965), archtype (Black, 1962), world hypotheses (Pepper, 1942, 1966, 1970, 1972), world-view, imageries of nature (Churchman, 1971), being-in-his-world (Laing, 1965, 1967), phenomenological field (Combs and Snygg, 1959; Combs, et al., 1971), frame of reference, vantage point, outlook (Schutz, 1972), expression of life (Bultmann, 1965; Perrin, 1974; Ricoeur, 1974). These notions certainly are not equivalent in meaning and in the purposes to which they are applied. However, many of these authors agree that individuals or groups are characterized by points of view which can be identified on the basis of certain structures. In attempting to specify conceptually what they mean by a point of view, however, many writers tend to use broad terms which have minor heuristic relevance for anyone in social studies who needs a tool for identifying and clarifying outlooks in specific situations and programs. The primary value of their writings for social studies educators is to be found in the directions they suggest for further study.

Writers do not always emphasize the same aspects of perspective, but tend to stress different structures of an outlook. Three general structures or components appear to constitute a point of view: frameworks, contexts, and intentions. First, a perspective is characterized by a framework (a matrix of elements and relationships among them) through which man is interpreted. Second, it is a context from which the particular profile on man is obtained. Third, it is an ongoing intentionality (an active interpreting) directed to man, a process of constructing reality and of experiencing the social world.

Framework structures. Numerous authors see a perspective as a framework, only they tend to do so in two major ways. For example, Shibutani mentions a propositional and a matrix aspect of an outlook:

> A perspective is an ordered view of one's world; what is taken for granted about the attributes of various objects, events and human nature. It is an order of things remembered and expected as well as actually perceived, an organized conception of what is plausible and what is possible; it constitutes a matrix through which one perceives his environment (1967:76).

First, some writers focus on the propositional aspect of a point of view, clarifying and identifying its communicative content. The content or propositions about an object of intention are the most obvious aspect of a perspective. For example, two or more perspectives may be compared in terms of specific dogmas or beliefs, the accounts given by individuals who saw a particular situation may be contrasted, or as done in Downey, et al. (1975:66-87), the propositional content concerning man in the Alberta Social Studies Program may be identified. When emphasizing this aspect of an outlook, writers tend to use such words as world-view and ethos (Geertz, 1972:185), belief system (Willer, 1971), theory sketch (Kaplan, 1971:120), definitions of reality and what is known about the world (Berger, 1969). C.f., Rubington and Weinberg (1971), Henshel and Henshel (1973).

Second, other writers focus not on the content framework of a perspective, but on the matrix of components which makes up that framework. Implicit within a viewpoint (indeed what makes up the framework of the view) are constellations of components such as beliefs about man, assumptions upon which these beliefs are based, logics through which these beliefs are ordered, interests which guide the applications of these beliefs, relationships imposed upon beliefs, commitments to them, and so on. These frameworks are one's epistemology and ontology which are applied to the world, "one's frames of perception, (one's) symbolic screens through which experience is interpreted . . . (one's) blueprints for conduct" (Geertz, 1972:185). C.f., Kuhn (1970, 1972a,b,c), Peters (1970:30-31), Harman (1972), Greene (1973:3-21), Geertz (1973), Macdonald (1975).

Contextual structures. Other authors tend to emphasize the perspectivity of human endeavours because of context. They do not view the individual in isolation from his ongoing relation with some context from which he is forced to see the world (Dewey and Bentley, 1949; Handy, 1964; Aoki, 1971:4). The phrase sitz im leben (i.e., situation in life) is used by writers in hermeneutics to emphasize the perspectivity of thought and the futility of understanding any thought detached from its context (Mickelsen, 1963:162-164; Ladd, 1967). Metaphorically, an actor's thinking and acting are bounded by horizons which limit what he sees and does. All that he is aware of is circumscribed and organized within a definite context, a phenomenological or perceptual field (Combs and Snygg, 1959; Merleau-Ponty, 1962), and a field of relevances (Schutz, 1970b). What one believes is in part a function of the groups of which he is a part, his background experiences and education, and the thought models he is located within. The world can be understood from different angles of vision determined in part by socio-historical location, biographical situation, place in time and space, discipline vantage point, role outlook, and position in life. Therefore, views on man in social studies are partial because they are limited to vantage points and bounded by horizons which define someone's context. In short, one is always a being-in-relation-to-the-world (Freire, 1970a,d; Greene, 1973:3-21).

Intentional structures. Further, writers emphasize the intentional or experiential aspect of having a perspective rather than just the contextual or framework structures which may tend to be viewed as if they were static. Such authors emphasize the active aspect of an outlook and the ongoing relation between the subject and object:

> A perspective is a mode of seeing, in that extended sense of 'see' in which it means to discern, apprehend, understand, or grasp. It is a particular way of looking at life, a particular manner of construing the world, as when we speak of an historical perspective, a scientific perspective, an aesthetic perspective, a common-sense perspective, or even the bizarre perspectives embodied in dreams or in hallucinations (Geertz, 1973:110).

Actors are engaged in continuous and selective processes of defining the world, of responding to something, of interpreting experience, of searching for and imposing meaning, of dealing with new situations, or orienting themselves, of pattern making; consciousness intends and grasps variously. The question becomes not just one of what consciousness attends to, but how. There are various ways of apprehending the world, of making sense, of looking at objects, of taking a stance with respect to something, of ordering what is perceived (Morgan, 1970; Greene, 1973:3-25; Schatzman and Strauss, 1973:55). Reality depends upon the manner in which the actor mediates and codifies the world in the ongoing stream of his consciousness. Consequently, perspective can be viewed in this active sense as "a particular manner of interpreting experience, a certain way of going at the world as opposed to other ways" (Geertz, 1972:184). C.f., Bruner (1962:6), Allport (1965:264-265), Anastasi (1966:605), Aschner (1969:25), Laszlo (1973:203).

What is a relationship among these three components of perspective? They are inseparably the one and same thing in the experience one has of perspective. As such, they define one's total frame of reference, and are separated by authors for discussion purposes only and in terms of their particular interests. An actor uses a framework within some context as his basis for ordering, interpreting, and acting upon the social world. He defines his situation through some schemes of reference. Therefore, perspectives do not refer only to knowledge about something, for two individuals may have similar knowledge of an issue and yet interpret that issue differently. Rather, an outlook refers to the way in which the subject is related to the object: the way he organizes that knowledge, the context he uses it within, and the manner he applies it. A perspective gives order to experience by providing a framework and a context in which to relate apprehensions of the world. This frame of reference allows one to interpret, make sense of, routinize, and give significance to the events of everyday life. Without these orienting parameters (e.g., frameworks, contexts, intentions) the world would become unintelligible, the individual's taken-for-granted realities would be threatened with chaos, and he would experience metaphysical terror (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:97-104). From a perspective an actor can place things in relationship and can systematize the facts of experience; perspectives give coherence to experience, enabling one to decide, to predict, and to focus attention on some things and screen out other things. As such, they are regulative of an actor's ordering, interpreting, and acting by providing a "model of" and a "model for" his experiences of something (Dahlke, 1958:5).

Kinds of perspective. Schatzman and Strauss observe that for social researchers,

> The difficulty in defining perspective is compounded by the fact that several perspectives can be used simultaneously: the perspective of a stated sub-unit or any single actor, of the leadership or the entire organization, and so on. Then, there are perspectives inherent in the observer that probably relate closely to his personal view of man and human life as tragic, humorous, ridiculous, pathetic, and the like. These too will undoubtedly influence not only what he will attend to, but how he will conceptualize. Also, the researcher can look at his activities artistically, scientifically, or philosophically, and these break down into sub-perspectives. Within the scientific perspective further shifts can be made; he can observe as an economist, political scientist, or anthropologist. What he sees from each of these will significantly vary from the others (1973:55).

Within the literature the phenomenon of perspective is attributed by authors to individuals, groups, and subject-content areas. Every individual is characterized by being oriented in a particular manner to the world; on the level of an individual, whether he be a teacher, or student, the phenomenon is especially relevant to instruction because the classroom is a meeting place of many differing individual outlooks (Esland, 1971a). Groups of various kinds are defined by their group-specific viewpoints (Chapter II, Part II); on the level of a group, the study of perspective is particularly relevant to program development because a group embodies their views within the programs which they develop. For example, groups of varying sizes and kinds may intersubjectively share a viewpoint (Mannheim, 1936; Dahlke, 1958:41-68; Shibutani, 1967; Kitchen, 1967; Geertz, 1970, 1972, 1973; Dale, 1972:16-36; Cusick, 1973); writers speak of the perspectives which characterize school subjects (Esland, 1971a, 1971b:66-70; Seamen, et al., 1972), program development (Eisner and Vallance, 1974), sub-disciplines (Merton, 1949:85; Horton, 1966; Silverman, 1970:215-232), and teaching styles (Esland, 1971a, 1971b: 66-67).

[11] Although a wide range of terminology is utilized by the diversity of authors who, though representing various theoretical orientations, recognize that individuals give meaning to the world in accordance with differing frames of reference, the views of such writers can be categorized into two general groups. First, there are those authors who take-for-granted the notion of an outlook, using the term in their discussions without ever describing what it means to have a point of view or how it can be identified. It would appear that they assume their readers understand and experience the phenomenon as they do. A second group of writers does not use the notion of perspective in a taken-for-granted manner, but attempts to define what the phenomenon is and how it can be identified. Four writers representing this latter group were especially influential in the initial stages of the study to help make perspective problematic in the mind of the investigator.

Mannheim's notion of perspective. Mannheim attempted to deal in a systematic fashion with a notion of perspective and of cross-perspective relationships (e.g., communication and interpretation). Defined as "the subject's whole mode of conceiving things as determined by historical and social setting," a perspective signifies "the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his thinking"; a perspective consists of "the constitutive categories of thought in terms of which an individual . . . attempts to grasp the nature of the world" (1936: 266,272,244). For Mannheim an outlook does not refer to thinking in a general sense, but rather to the direction and the structure of thought which is qualitatively and organizationally influenced by the thinker's socio-historical context, and in terms of which an individual or a group interprets and acts upon the social world. The social development and location of a perspective means that individual points of view on the same event or object may differ substantially (Mannheim, 1936:272). He attempted to clarify certain structures by which perspectives generally could be identified (Mannheim, 1936:272-279). Selective traits which he considered to characterize a position and which help in the identification of group perspectives are expanded in part in Chapter II. Mannheim's notions of ideology, utopia, and his historicism are rejected in part.

Van Manen's notion of orientation. An individual's orientation consists of a web of epistemological, axiological, and ontological beliefs. It is his unique "way of looking at the world," the fundamental attitude or direction taken by him to phenomena (van Manen, 1973:16,18). Van Manen suggests that

> . . . each orientation constitutes a specific mode of being-in-

> the-world, each with its own particular reality, beliefs, and fields of relevances. An individual is always characterized by being oriented toward a specific part of his world in a special way. In other words, there are different modes of being oriented and every one of us participates some of the time in such different modes of orientation (1973:194).

Based in part upon Schutz's discussion of orientation, van Manen's notion lacks specificity in terms of identifiable structures which could be applied to social studies programs primarily because the purpose of his study was not the development of an ideal type of orientation.

Maruyama's notion of structure of reasoning. One of the most extensive and explicit developments of typologies for clarifying and identifying perspectives in disciplines, professions, religions, or any other social group of interest to a researcher, is to be found in the writings of Maruyama (see bibliography). Basing his description of structures of reasoning in part on Mannheim (1936), Kuhn (1970), and many others, Maruyama refers to his work as paradigmatiology, i.e., the "science of structures of reasoning which vary from discipline to discipline, from profession to profession, from culture to culture, and sometimes even from individual to individual" (1974c:4). Defined as "the framework and internal structure of the process of reasoning," Maruyama refers to a structure of reasoning as a particular logic shared by a group for ordering, interpreting, and acting upon the world (1971:5). His typologies not only have wide applicability for identifying outlooks, but are helpful for clarifying conceptually what it means to have a viewpoint and what some of the structures of perspective are. His development of typologies, his explication of cross-perspective relationships, and his discussion of epistemology were influential on this study.

Kuhn's notion of paradigm. As evidenced by its popularity within the literature, Kuhn's use of the term paradigm has received wide application in different contexts and for diverse purposes by authors. In its primary sense, a paradigm refers to a scientific achievement which gains the status of being an exemplar from which a scientific community can base its subsequent problems, solutions, and methods. This is more than a static model or pattern for replication, but an ongoing world-view whose structures are abstracted from the exemplar upon which it is based and which guides tacitly the manner in which a community perceives, defines, and orders what they consider to be legitimate reality. It is like an accepted judicial decision open for further refining, out of which legal practice is implicitly defined and which itself becomes "an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions" (Kuhn, 1970:23). In this sense a paradigm is an ongoing outlook based upon an exemplar. Although basic to his thesis that scientists are paradigm bound and that scientific advancement occurs via paradigm revolutions, i.e., by a "succession of tradition-bound periods punctuated by non-cumulative breaks" rather than by linear accretion (Kuhn, 1970:208), his original notion of paradigm was vague and elicited considerable confusion and criticism (Shapere, 1971; Barnes, 1972; Baum, 1974; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1972; Masterman, 1972; Stephens, 1973). The notion has been clarified in various ways. A paradigm as a matrix of ordered elements is one of the secondary senses of the term which is useful for clarifying the phenomenon of perspective.

In a secondary sense a paradigm refers to a disciplinary frame of reference (or perspective) consisting of a matrix of ordered elements: the rules, concepts, reality definitions, approaches, beliefs, commitments to certain procedural criteria, heuristic and ontological models whose function is to "supply the group with preferred or permissible analogies and metaphors" for determining "what will be accepted as an explanation and as a puzzle-solution," symbolic generalizations (statements of law, principle, and theory), techniques of logical and mathematical manipulation, and values all implicitly derived through time from a research exemplar (Kuhn, 1970: 182-184). These structures of the matrix form an internally consistent outlook for a scientific community. Ontologically, such a perspective is a framework through which reality is defined, interpreted, and acted upon; epistemologically, it is a framework which defines how that reality is to be known and what is to be believed concerning it; axiologically, it is a framework for determining and evaluating goals and values. This fundamental outlook is taken-for-granted and therefore can be employed by a community without question or dissent because the practitioners of a particular discipline have committed themselves to a matrix and share its schemes of reference as their common possession, thus accounting for the "relative fulness of their professional communication and the relative unanimity of their professional judgements" (Kuhn, 1970:175,182). His various clarifications of the notion of paradigm are helpful for clarifying general structures of perspective and for understanding cross-perspective relationships, perspective directed knowledge constructing, and perspective management (Kuhn, 1972a,b,c).

The manner in which this (matrix) secondary notion of paradigm has been explicated by other writers demonstrates that it is similar to a perspective. Ben-David argues that for scientists there is the immanent logic of their own systems of thought," their orientation towards theory and procedure derived from what they consider to be "structure of natural events" (1971:1,5). Barnes refers to this perspective as an "elaborately prepared conceptual and procedural frame of reference" for guiding interpretation and procedure, and for evaluating research (1972:63). Stating that the concept of "cognitive domain" has close affinity to Kuhn's idea of paradigm, Stehr refers to it as the socio-culturally developed "scientific theories, conceptual schemes, methodology, and techniques of inference . . . adhered to and produced by the practitioners of a scientific discipline" (1973:2). As a group perspective, a paradigm is a structure of components which implicitly directs the thought and practice of a scientific community; as such, it is analogous to the perspectives of program developers, to their unique disciplinary matrices derived from their experience and used for guiding and for interpreting their acts and realities.

Other similar terms are utilized by disciplinarians. The notions of cognitive structures, styles, domains, models, and systems are evident within psychologically oriented literature when reference is made to how individuals order and interpret phenomena (Allport, 1965:271). Each of these ideas in a general sense denotes

> . . . the image of map of the world held by the individual person. His responses to persons, things, and events are shaped in part by the way they look to him. These cognitions are selectively organized and integrated into a system which provides meaning and stability for the individual person as he goes about his business in the everyday world (Cohen, 1964:62-63).

Differences in the way individuals impose meaning, organization, integration, and reasonableness on their experiental world, as well as the manner in which they select and process information about the world, demonstrates that there are a variety of cognitive structures—"each referring to a characteristic and consistent way in which people perceive, remember, and think about aspects of themselves and the world around them" (Cohen, 1964:49)—which can be identified. One of the most commonly used notions within literature is that of a frame of reference—those conceptual schemes consisting of one's beliefs and the relations among them, of organizing principles for selecting and ordering the data of experience into larger coherent patterns, of standards of appraisal, of concepts for labelling aspects of our reality—which uniquely characterizes an individual's or a group's way of looking at things (Combs and Snygg, 1959:7; Peters, 1970:30-31). However, although various cognitive styles and frames of reference are identified in the literature of psychology and anthropology, many of the descriptions are so general as to be of little use as metaperspectives; an important implication of such studies for program development, though, is that even among program developers having similar expertise and motivation, individuals may hold to dissimilar cognitive structures.

[12] Phenomenology is not characterized by a single set of methodological steps clearly articulated for describing phenomena (Spiegelberg, 1965; Chamberlin, 1974:127). Though methodology is dictated by the subject-matter and by the intent of the author, a methodological dictum is to describe the "essence" (i.e., the essential structures or meaning) of a phenomenon. This description may take the form of an ideal type of the phenomenon under study. Ideal type construction is an attempt to resolve the question concerning how an actor's "subjective point of view" (i.e., the meaning he gives to his acts and to the world) can be identified by an observer in "objective conceptual categories" (i.e., typical categories of meaning which can be utilized intersubjectively by observers) which remain honest to the viewpoint of the actor (Schutz, 1971:16). Ideal types supply categories for observation and for description which allow an investigator to describe the experience and to maintain the

viewpoint of the actor (i.e., to describe how he orders, interprets, and acts upon the world). This is not a translation of his meaning into categories which can be used primarily with other observers, but into categories which can be validated with the actor himself. To illustrate, if an observer translates an actor's experience in terms of systems theory, normal curves, and labels of deviance, the resultant information is meaningful primarily to the observer and can be validated with other observers who share his schemes of observation and interpretation. However, if the actor's views and experience are described in terms of the structures of his own schemes of reference (e.g., interests, presuppositions, approaches) and acts (e.g., projects, motives), then a greater similarity between the observer's description and the actor's own experience is possible. Therefore, phenomenologists utilize ideal types in order to be faithful to the actor's subjective viewpoint, and yet to describe his view and meanings in terms which more than the actor can share.

An aim of ideal type construction is to facilitate interpretation and description rather than to facilitate control in the predictive sense. As such an ideal type "specifies something with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for explication of certain of its significant components" (Kaplan, 1964:83). Types are heuristic devices, in the sense of serving to discover or reveal, for making explicit social phenomena which are taken-for-granted, implicit, complex in meaning, and initially vague and ambiguous to the researcher. Their conceptual categories allow him to delimit observation in the social world, and then to compare and to clarify what he observes.

Many ideal types of the same phenomenon could be constructed depending upon an investigator's purpose. Types may describe in extreme or in perfection. For example, an "ideal democracy" or an "ideal gas" is a description of an extremity on a continuum, and is defined on the basis of controlled norms, conditions, and assumptions. Simulations and games define simplified situations on the basis of selected variables and premises which help researchers study that which the type represents in ideal. Clarification of social phenomena by comparing them with ideal states may be a useful method of understanding. For example,

> . . . to understand how a war is conducted, it is necessary to imagine an ideal commander-in-chief for each side. . . . Each of these commanders must know the total fighting resources of each side and all the possibilities arising there from of attaining the concretely unambiguous goal, namely, the destruction of the enemy's military power. On the basis of this knowledge, they must act entirely without error and in a logically 'perfect' way. For only then can the consequences of the fact that the real commanders neither had the knowledge nor were they free from error, and that they were not purely rational thinking machines, be unambiguously established (Weber, 1949:42).

Against such ideal types actual situations can be compared and contrasted in order that similarities and differences in reference to the type can be established. Other ideal types may be defined as an average, a normal curve, a group consensus, or someone's value position concerning "what should be" or "what should be done" (in the sense of a "model for" something). However, within phenomenological research an ideal type is a reconstruction of some aspect of the social world, in the sense of a "model of" life-world experience rather than a description of hypothetical, statistical, or utopian realities. Observing phenomena via dialectics, one constructs a type which defines components useful to describe phenomena as they are experienced typically.

Validity of an ideal type consists of the type's meaningfulness to both actor and observer for making explicit what was before a part of the unquestioned life-world. Description of an actor's perspective obtained by an ideal type can be checked by direct access to the actor himself, by having him either validate whether the description does in fact describe his outlook or whether the categories of the type do in fact refer to structures of outlooks as he experiences the phenomenon (Schutz, 1971:17). Objectivity refers to the fact that the categories of the ideal type may be used by various observers with similar results (c.f., Filmer, et al., 1972).

The methodology of ideal type construction is based primarily upon the discussions and examples provided by Schutz (1970a:275-293; 1971:16-19,81-88,232-238; 1972; 1973). C.f., Merton (1949:221-225), Weber (1949:42-47), Brown (1963:177-185), Kaplan (1964:82-83), Filmer, et al., (1972), Ledgerwood (1975). The quality of Schutz's types depended to a large extent upon his own genius rather than upon the methodological rules which he may have followed. A difficulty involved in the activity of ideal type construction is the time involved, and a danger associated with types is that they may become reified for the observer.

[13] General descriptions of dialectics are provided by Kaufman (1960), Strasser (1963:245-259), Spiegelberg (1965b:684-688), Schermerhorn (1970:234), Kaplan (1971:93-97), Lonergan (1972:128-130, 235-266), Greene (1973:3-21), Schatzman and Strauss (1973), van Manen (1973:170-180), Maruyama (1974c). An aim of using dialectics is to develop a comprehensive viewpoint from which to clarify an issue (such as the phenomenon of perspective on man) which has many opinions and sources related to it (Lonergan, 1972:129). An observer makes explicit the various views related to his topic of interest, expands his own perspective, and systematically unveils the "covered-up-ness" of the topic by deliberately adopting a variety of viewpoints for approaching that which may have been initially vague, and even contradictory, for him (Strasser, 1963:256). Observing from different angles allows him to describe aspects of the phenomenon, to formulate new questions, to make comparisons, and to clarify his own view at the same time. Such description based upon a dialectic approach has a self-corrective and a cumulative character, for the changes of standpoint are deliberate and orderly rather than random and implicit,

thus allowing an individual "in his striving for meaning to neutralize systematically one-sided perspectives and limiting horizons" (Strasser, 1963:257).

Dialectics is based on the belief that "although I am always tied to some perspective, constituted by my way of being-present-in-the-world, I am not tied to any one perspective but can change my point of view" (van Manen, 1973:173). That one can change explicitly his standpoint for the purpose of overcoming the limitations of one perspective does not mean that this change takes place in an arbitrary fashion—"there is always a principle of order present; for instance, a spatial, temporal or pragmatic principle" (Strasser, 1963:257). The theoretical base and the framework of questions chosen by an investigator give a unifying context and a direction to his examination of diverse sources. "Dialectics seeks some single base or some single set of related bases from which it can proceed to an understanding of the character, the oppositions, and the relations of the many viewpoints exhibited in conflicting movements, their conflicting histories, and their conflicting interpretations" (Lonergan, 1972:129). For example, the theoretical base of Schutz's phenomenology provides a theoretical base and the four major questions (Part II) provide a principle of order from which to examine the various uses and conceptions of perspective found in the four sources discussed (Part IV, C), and from which to develop an ideal type of perspective (Chapter II).

The necessity of dialectics in a study of phenomena on which many viewpoints are possible is underscored because any one perspective is partial and may have an encapsulating effect upon an investigator, whereas comparisons by means of different points of view allow him to make corrections in the larger outlook he is developing (Chapter IV, Part III). Depending upon one taken-for-granted orientation, he may recognize only those aspects of a situation which are related directly to the perspective in which he is encapsulated. Merton suggests that an investigator

> . . . may or may not be aware that he is ignoring possible alternatives in his research, by focusing on the consequences or modes of implementing limited alternatives which have been presented to him. He may overlook the fact that a way of seeing also implies a way of not seeing: that limiting one's purview to alternatives A and B means ignoring alternatives C and D (1949:168).

Implicit within a commitment to a single perspective is a restriction of one's vision, a resistance to perspective change, a failure to recognize standpoints which differ from one's own, and a suspension of doubt concerning the partialness of one's reality constructing in research (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:64; Barnes, 1972:62; Maruyama, 1974c). Rather than be encapsulated by one outlook upon which to depend exclusively in describing phenomena, phenomologists recognize the necessity for adopting various (and often conflicting) viewpoints for clarifying that which they experience. Therefore, dialectics and multiple sources are necessary in any study of the phenomenon of perspective.

A premise of value free, presuppositionless, or observer neutrality is rejected in dialectics on the alternative premise that all human activity and description is essentially a subject-object relation in which the human factor is present always (Walsh, 1972b). It is precisely because every description must be from someone's viewpoint that dialectics is necessary. Greater objectivity in any subject-object relation is achieved as one adopts various angles for observation, develops a larger viewpoint for clarifying the phenomenon under study, and makes explicit the sources and viewpoints he uses (Chapter V, Part III). All of this makes intersubjectivity with other observers possible.

Chapter II

IDENTIFYING PERSPECTIVE IN PROGRAMS

> None of you should think only
> of his own affairs, but should
> learn to see things from other
> people's point of view (Paul of Tarsus).

Though spoken nearly two thousand years ago in a Greek city whose intellectual climate was that of varied and competing ideas about man and the social world, this admonition has application today to Canadian society in which a pluralism of groups and reality views is evident also. And because the school is a meeting place of individuals representing these various points of view, the phenomenon of perspective not only needs to be recognized but also clarified in terms of educational contexts. Although there is recognition by social studies educators that members of various groups utilize different interpretive schemes for making sense of man and of their social world, clarification of what a perspective is and of how it is related to programs appears generally to be neglected by authors in educational literature. Because what it means to have a point of view on man is taken-for-granted by such writers, a question arises concerning how to clarify and identify the phenomenon.

Coming from the Latin perspicere, "to look through," perspective is a term used generally by authors in referring to perceived relationships among objects when viewed from a particular vantage point. The metaphor of a rock climber is illustrative of the meaning of this word. A climber has a differing perspective of the valley as his elevation point of view changes. From a position at the bottom of a rock face, a climber views the trees, rocks, and other aspects of the valley in a particular relationship to one another and to his own vantage point. However, as he ascends, the relationship he views among objects changes. As his standpoint shifts, new objects and events come into view, former ones are obscured, and the horizon changes. His outlook on the valley-world has different referential points which change through time in terms of his own elevation position. The relationship between his 'here' and any 'there' to which he focuses his attention is always from a particular standpoint. At any one time and place, only an aspect of the valley can be seen; a non-perspective point of view is impossible. Similarly, one's view within social studies programs of the social world of man is from some perspective. As in a climbing situation, so in program development one finds himself bound by standpoints, aspects, horizons, and perceived relationships.

How can perspectives on man be identified? In order to identify the perspectives of individuals, groups, or social studies programs, the phenomenon of an outlook needs to be accounted for (clarified conceptually). Consequently, in this chapter an ideal type of perspective is constructed specifying the phenomenological structures of what it means to hold an outlook on man. This phenomenological description not only specifies a definition of what a point of view essentially is, but also provides a conceptual basis specifically suited for identifying viewpoints on man both within the paramount life-world reality in which we all must live, and within the specialized social studies reality in which we temporarily participate by suspending the life-world.

The metaphor of 'looking' or 'seeing' is misleading when applied to man's relation to the world, for it implies a passive receptiveness (Grabau, 1965:152). Man is not simply a passive agent on whom that which is external to him operates. He participates in the world as an actor pursuing his own ends; he organizes it and projects value upon its objects from some frame of reference; he comes to terms with all that confronts him through his power to interpret and to act upon it; he constructs and maintains continuously various realities within it; he defines the events he encounters and negotiates the uncertainties of his life. In short, his consciousness is always an active imposition of meaning upon the world.

All experience is defined as a subject-object relationship because the subject is involved essentially in constructing the meaning and reality of the object he encounters. The manner in which the world presents itself is not independent of the subject and of the context; the subject can be related in one way or another to an object, and it is this relation which determines how the object is apprehended. An object can never be known as it is somehow in itself apart from the subject, but only through the instrumentality of human consciousness, through his experiencing (ordering, interpreting, and acting) of it in various ways, and through the context of every subject-object relationship which influences the way in which the object presents itself to the subject. As both contexts and that which subjects bring with them to an object vary over time, the same object may be interpreted differently from changing times, places, and purposes. The world is not unified by inherent meaningful structures which are merely observed by the actor from a detached point of view, for this fails to account for the human factor that is present in all observing and thinking (Wild, 1964:22). Rather, the actor experiences himself as subject (consciousness) and the world as object (reality) as related inseparably, as an ongoing totality of acting and being acted upon. This totality of being-in-the world is dichotomized by him into 'subject' and 'object' for descriptive purposes only through the medium of language. To be compatible within phenomenological investigation, therefore, the phenomenon of perspective must be accounted for in terms of those structures which characterize any subject-object relationship.

Perspective refers to this contextually located and influenced subject-object relationship in which the subject selectively orders, interprets, and acts upon an object from the standpoint of a Here, Now, and Thus (Figure I).[1]


SUBJECT:
Here, Now, and Thus standpoint of consciousness
RELATION:
Reality as experienced by consciousness
OBJECT:
The world as it is in itself

Figure I

Perspective as a Subject-Object Relationship

Central to any account of perspective must be consciousness itself, the structures of which limit the manner in which a subject relates to the world, thereby making the phenomenon of perspective possible. (Consciousness, intentionality, experience, and subject-object relationship are terms used inter-changeably in phenomenological literature.) Consciousness is perspectivable because intentionality is directed always to an object from a standpoint.

An adequate phenomenological account for perspective can be given by describing the standpoint structures which characterize "intentionality" of consciousness: intentionality is directed always from three simultaneous standpoints referred to by Schutz as (I) the standpoint of the Thus, (II) the standpoint of the Here, and (III) the standpoint of the Now.[2] Consciousness is part and parcel of the body—"all consciousness is founded upon the body, localized upon it, and coordinated with it in time" (Schutz, 1975:27)—and therefore its intents are located in and bounded always by lived-time (Now), lived-place (Here), and lived-purpose (Thus). The phenomenon of perspective is possible because these standpoints provide the individual with a point of view from which to order, interpret, and act upon the world, and consequently in turn provide the perspective appearance of the world for him.

A perspective, therefore, includes three aspects. First, it is a matrix consisting of schemes of reference through which intentionality is directed towards an object (standpoint of the Thus). Second, it includes a context within which these schemes are located and from which intentionality is directed (standpoint of the Here). Third, it is the ongoing application of these schemes to the world, acts of consciousness based upon and guided by the schemes of reference and the context (standpoint of the Now). Together these schemes of reference (interests, presuppositions, and approaches) and context (social locations, reality coordinates, and plausibility structures) are used for apprehending (ordering, interpreting, and acting upon) the world and for orienting the individual's thought and action towards some object (c.f., Fromm, 1967:22). The totality of these three standpoints defines what an actor experiences as his outlook on man at any given moment, as well as defines the perspectivity of consciousness (and hence the possibility of the phenomenon of an outlook). Figure II summarizes an ideal type of perspective developed in this chapter.

Premise: Consciousness and programs are perspectivable because they are characterized by standpoints. Intentionality is directed from three standpoints.

Part I. The Standpoint of the Thus

- A. Interests in Man
- B. Presuppositions about Man
- C. Approaches toward Man

Part II. The Standpoint of the Here

- A. Social Locations
- B. Reality Coordinates
- C. Plausibility Structures

Part III. The Standpoint of the Now

- A. Stream of Intentionality
- B. Acts of Intentionality
    - 1. Ordering
    - 2. Interpreting

Figure II

Summary of an Ideal Type of Perspective

PART I. THE STANDPOINT OF THE THUS (PERSPECTIVE SCHEMES OF REFERENCE)

> Man finds himself in the world and seeks to grasp it. Only by drawing its baffling complexity into some kind of order can he orient himself, act, and live. Moreover, man feels that the apprehension of reality is essential to meaningful experience (Morgan, 1970:222).

To grasp the world in its wholeness or to know exhaustively its totality would require an ahistorical, acosmic, and absolute standpoint. Man is not able to transcend the partialness of his spacio-temporal standpoint. Yet he seeks from his own limited location to relate and to orient himself to that larger whole of which he is a part, to place himself in some relation to the universe and to its manifold aspects as he understands them from his own location. He searches for purpose, meaning, explanation, unity, and harmony in what he encounters (Fromm, 1967:28). In this quest for knowing the world, he is obliged to construct "pictures of the world" and of his position in it. He recognizes that though these pictures are merely larger or smaller angles of vision, they are necessary for guiding his acting, ordering, and interpreting. These pictures are constructed by means of selected schemes of reference which he has at hand. His total stock of schemes defines the standpoint of the Thus from which he apprehends the world.

Intentionality, therefore, is directed to an object from the standpoint of the subject's Thus: his lived-purposes and schemes of reference which allow him to make sense of the world and to relate himself to it from his finite and limited standpoint. Through this standpoint of the Thus, intentionality is directed towards man in social studies and in the life-world. Various schemes of reference are utilized together as a matrix for apprehending (ordering, interpreting, and acting upon) man and the social world at any given moment in time.[3]

From an examination of literature on perspective, it would appear that three schemes of reference representing the standpoint of the Thus are significant for identifying a view on man within social studies programs: (A) interests in man, (B) presuppositions about man, and (C) approaches toward man. In the relationship between subject and object, the subject actively interprets man and the social world by means of these schemes; therefore, one's interests, presuppositions, and approaches determine in part the profiles and horizons obtained on the object of attention. By means of such schemes the social world is made meaningful, and when sharing these schemes with other men, actors together construct social reality. Because the social world and man can be interpreted in so many different ways, the program developer's choice of schemes is of no little consequence in shaping his act of program development and in managing the reality views of teachers and students. With a shift of these schemes one's entire orientation towards man is modified.

A. INTERESTS IN MAN

Various authors have argued that all subject-object relationships are constituted in part by, and in turn serve, underlying human interests.[4] As Wirth says, the "object emerges for the subject when, in the course of experience, the interest of the subject is focussed upon that particular aspect of the world" (1936:xvii). Having an interest denotes that one is always in the midst of a situation, that one cannot help but take notice purposefully and direct oneself selectively in some way within that situation, that this intentionality relates him in an active rather than in a passive manner to his context (i.e., he has a share and concern in, he takes part and has a claim in, he wants to know)—therefore, to be disinterested or neutral in the sense of having the world act upon consciousness, or of being free from partiality and motive, is not possible because consciousness is an active selecting, constructing, and giving of meaning to something in terms of the actor's position in time and place, his aim, and his benefit (Pelz, 1974:121). Consciousness 'grasps' the object in a selective and interpretive manner, so that to be conscious of something is to be interested in it. And since his living concerns (aims, ideals, commitments, motives, plans, and the like) direct his attention from some time and place, orientate him in one way rather than in another way, and generate the ends of his activities, interests must be considered to be a basic structure of the phenomenon of perspective.

Within social studies programs, therefore, interests are schemes of reference representing someone's standpoint of the Thus from which man and the social world are interpreted. A viewpoint on man is influenced by and serves some interest. Though these interests are manifested in programs in varying degrees of implicitness to explicitness, they are identifiable as (1) interests at hand and as consequent (2) interest relevancy systems related to man.

Interests at Hand Directed to Man

Interests at hand refer to one's motives and plans, anticipations and commitments, hopes and fears, as well as the questions and problems which make him selective in his study and views of man.[5] To be interested is to be selective; consequently, an interest in man in social studies programs can be referred to as a scheme of reference which imputes relevance to selected aspects of the social world.

Interest Relevancy System Related to Man

> One sees a plant and asks, "Why does this plant need sunlight
> to grow?"
> Another, seeing the same thing, says, "How beautiful is the
> sunlight on the flower" (Anonymous).

Relevance is not inherent in the object as such, but is imputed to it through the selective and purposeful intents of the subject; it refers to the usefulness as either means or as ends given to something by an actor in terms of his specific purpose and acts (Schutz, 1973:5). For example, in terms of a climber's immediate interest to cross a rock face of high exposure his reality of the moment is structured: certain tools and knowledge become relevant over those which were relevant for an interest of a few minutes ago; different features and contours of the rock are now noticed and given meaning in terms of those tools and knowledge ; activities suitable for achieving his goal are planned and justified in his mind, and so on. The climber experiences his life-world in terms of the projects of his actual or possible acts on the rock face. He singles out aspects of that life-world which may contribute to the realization of his project. He groups his tools and knowledge at hand into zones around himself as the center in terms of their relevance as means to his actions in fulfilling the project (Schutz, 1970a:111-112; 1971:92-93). To illustrate further, a student's anticipation of an examination gives him a basis for defining a problem, and for formulating plans related to overcoming this problem. His interest in passing the exam and his presupposition that he can pass it makes certain events such as classes, objects such as books, and persons such as the teacher or librarian relevant to his plans, whereas other ideas, objects, persons, and events are defined as irrelevant for the moment. In similar manner to the climber and the student, it is up to the program developer to determine and select which aspects of the social world are relevant to his purposes, which profiles and events concerning man are useful in terms of his plans, which objects and ideas are suited to his interest for social studies inquiry.

Once interests are established there is an entire relevancy system implied from them and applied to the actor's phenomenological field (i.e., all that of which he is aware at the moment). Around the actor's undertaking (his act or purpose) as center, aspects of the world are arranged in zones: from problematic to irrelevant, from useful to not useful, from clear to vague, from strange to familiar, and so on, all in varying degree from the center outwards in terms of the chosen interest. Thus the relevance of aspects of the world in terms of his interest at hand is never homogeneous:

> He groups the world around himself (as the center) as a field of domination and is therefore especially interested in that

> segment which is within his actual or potential reach. He singles out those of its elements which may serve as means or ends for his "use and enjoyment," for furthering his purposes, and for overcoming obstacles. His interest in these elements is of different degrees, and for this reason he does not aspire to become acquainted with all of them with equal thoroughness. What he wants is graduated knowledge of relevant elements, the degree of desired knowledge being correlated with their relevance. Otherwise stated, the world seems to him at any given moment as stratified in different layers of relevance, each of them requiring a different degree of knowledge (Schutz, 1971:93).

The contours of these zones, and hence the structuring of the life-world itself, shift as interests change.

The importance of interests to a perspective on man in social studies is simply that these determine the particular system of relevancy applied within a program to the study of man. Once established, a problem or a question directed to man carves up the entire social studies world into contours of relevance in a manner analogous to a topographic map (Schutz, 1971:92-93). This metaphor of contour lines on a map illustrates how the distribution, intensity, and scope of what one sees and knows about man is organized into various strata of relevancy in accord with an initial interest. Some aspects of man, as well as certain knowledge, events, tools, and methodologies related to such study are selected as being highly relevant, whereas other aspects are neglected and fade into varying degrees of irrelevance, all in relation to how closely they relate to one's interest at hand.

The very structuring of these contours of relevancy within a program represents a perspective on man. Through an interest an entire view of man can be constructed by means of selected relevances and the zoning of these relevances. The resulting profile of man is linked directly to the initial interest which both set a direction and established the parameters for selecting certain stocks of knowledge, methodologies, and roles applied to man within a social studies program. Naturally, the profile of man which emerges as a product of the knowledge , roles, and methods is a very selective view, and is linked to someone's interest and resulting relevances.

To identify a perspective within a program where the interest in man is not explicitly stated, therefore, one can examine the contours of relevancy which structure the program. Not only what is selected concerning man, but also the extent to which it is stressed, imply an interest of some kind.[6] Further, since knowledge , methodologies, and roles applied to man and to the social world are not disinterested, one should be able to identify within their application an underlying interest scheme of reference through which the program developer is interpreting fellowman (Chapter II, Part IC).

In summary, an interest in man is a scheme of reference for interpreting man and his world within social studies simply because it establishes the shape of the relevance contours applied to selected knowledge , methodologies, and roles utilized within a program. As such, a completed program represents a limited perspective on man. Besides interests, however, presuppositions are another scheme of reference representing the standpoint of the Thus from which intentionality is directed to man.

B. PRESUPPOSITIONS ABOUT MAN

> The world is differently defined in different places. It is not only that people have different customs; it is not only that people believe in different gods and expect different post-mortem fates. It is, rather, that the worlds of different peoples have different shapes. The very metaphysical presuppositions differ: space does not conform to Euclidean geometry, time does not form a continuous unidirectional flow, causation does not conform to Aristotelian logic, man is not differentiated from non-man or life from death, as in our world (Goldschmidt, 1968:viii).

Reality rests upon a foundation of interrelated metaphysical, psychological, ethical, political, and other presuppositions on the basis of which men structure their experiences, select their projects, and construct their multiple realities (Walsh, 1972). The manner in which men order, interpret, and act upon the world is never without presuppositions, but only possible because prior beliefs define what reality and knowledge are and how both are to be legitimately formulated. To apprehend any aspect of the world requires that an actor have a set of commitments and assumptions as his starting point and as his parameters for making sense of his varied experience. As such, presuppositions are a basic structure of any perspective on man.

It is to be expected that social studies program development is possible only on the basis of presuppositions that define the nature of man and of social reality. The very methods, techniques, concepts, models, and theories applied to man rest upon presuppositions. Following are two general presuppositional categories that are a part of perspectives and are implicit within acts of program development: the (1) of-course assumptions and the consequent

(2) presuppositional relevancy systems which provide a fundamental orientation to perceiving and structuring the social world. In applying these categories to social studies programs one may be able to identify those stances on man that are held by program developers.

Of-course Assumptions About Man

> The world is a mystery. This, what you're looking at, is not all there is to it. There is much more to the world, so much more in fact, that it is endless. So when you're trying to figure it out, all you're really doing is trying to make the world familiar. You and I are right here, in the world that you call real, simply because we both know it (Castaneda, 1972:168).

Don Juan attempted to teach Castaneda that reality is at all times for the individual the object of his belief. Further, what is believed about phenomena is the context for one's experiences and for the meaning attributed to them. So pervasive are one's beliefs for his experience and the meaning of phenomena that phenomenologists refer to belief as a structure of reality itself. Belief is the arbitrary point at which everyone, including scientists and program developers, must stop in defining that which they experience as being real. For example,

> Although my account of the nature and justification of science includes the whole life of thought in society, the ultimate justification of my scientific convictions lies always in myself. At some point I can only answer, 'For I believe so' (Polanyi, 1964:9).

Since belief may be defined as a sense of reality, a feeling of conviction and assurance, a consent that the object to which one is attending is there, an actor's belief and reality are inseparable.[7] He acts upon what he believes to be true and real. However, an object is accepted and maintained as real in his beliefs only under certain conditions. Consequently, that which a program inspires belief in is for teachers and for students accounted as reality and remains unproblematic as long as the program is able to maintain belief (plausibility structures are discussed in Chapter II, Part IIC).

One's "thinking as usual" is dependent upon the maintenance of many of-course assumptions which characterize the outlook of his social group and are taken-for-granted by them (Schutz, 1970a:81-82; 1971:96). It is in these unquestioned presuppositions that the shape of the world and of man as experienced is to be found. Three basic areas of all life-world and philosophic thought on man can be identified as (a) metaphysical, (b) appraisive, and (c) epistemological beliefs.

Metaphysical beliefs. The fact of his own existence (or for that matter, the fact that anything exists at all) is a most fundamental philosophic question for man everywhere simply because his own being is presupposed in all he does and thinks (Fromm, 1967:ii-iii; Schaeffer, 1972). Because things exist, man holds metaphysical premises concerning that existence: he attempts to explain that existence and to give its form and complexity meaning on the basis of beliefs concerning his own finiteness, personhood, and distinction from non-man. Answers to fundamental questions raised by the fact of existence in turn direct and color his experience of the world and of himself. Any view on man within social studies, therefore, presupposes certain things about his being-in-the-world, about the meaning of existence. Assertions about social reality and man are situated in the larger context of beliefs concerning reality itself.

Reality views are based upon ontological assumptions to which an individual or a group is committed.[8] Reality and perspectives are presupposed on a substratum of beliefs, rarely made explicit or questioned, that define for the actor what reality is, how he knows that it is real, and how it is to be apprehended. Reality is never the world as it is in itself but always one's experience of the world that is grounded and structured in his presupposed ontologies, referred to by Mannheim as "fundamentally significant for thinking and perceiving" (1936:278). There can be no perspective or activity directed to anything that is not predicated on a view of what the world is like, for as Polanyi states, "every interpretation of nature, whether scientific, non-scientific or anti-scientific, is based on some intuitive conception of the general nature of things" (1964:10). On the premise that the world in which he lives and acts is meaningful in the sense that it has order, harmony, and continuity, he ties his acts and experiences into larger interpretive schemes of constructed ontologies, identifiable in the belief systems, whether political, religious, scientific, or whatever, to which he subscribes. These overarching schemes function both as a weltanschauung—a way of looking at the world and of trying to see it entire, a wholistic view into which particulars may be organized and made meaningful (Natanson, 1963:14)—and as systems of relevances from which "situationally specific goals and definitions" are derived, biographical episodes are interpreted, and different situations integrated by the actor (Dawe, 1970:213).

Social studies programs, therefore, are constructed on a basis of ontological beliefs concerning the reality of man and of the social world, and within a set of concepts derived from such assumptions (Goldmark, 1968:71). The legitimacy of questions asked, problems defined, theories and methods selected, procedures and rules applied, and criteria for evidence and truth established within programs must ultimately be argued within the context of some ontology (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:5). Usually this ontology is embedded within the educational psychology or philosophy adopted, as well as those prior religious or political biases program developers bring with them (Strike, 1974). A psychology or a sociology used for interpreting any phenomena related to the student and the social world has as its background a theory of both human and non-human reality: "put simply, psychology always presupposes cosmology" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:175). Naturally since a psychology is usually an internally consistent matrix for interpreting man, programs based upon different psychologies may be incompatible on the level of presuppositions (Lewis, 1965; Reese and Overton, 1970).

Terminology used within programs often tends to reflect underlying models of man which are linked to particular traditions, disciplines, political movements, or religious groups to which program developers subscribe. For example, Lee identifies and questions the of-course assumption of basic needs of man which so many social studies programs presume as a starting point for interpreting the social world, and which define social-studies-thinking-as-usual for teacher and students (1969).

Within the thesis of the natural standpoint program developers do not hold their presupposed ontologies as models, but assume these as-if metaphors to be man and the social world as they are in themselves. As long as this foundation is unquestioned a program can be used routinely in classrooms and be taken-for-granted by teachers and students. Only at that point where the implicit beliefs of a program concerning man fail to be maintained as routine in experience or are made problematic by the acts and outlooks of someone who holds to differing presuppositions concerning the social world do these basic perspective structures tend to be clarified. Such perspective differences are identifiable and clarified with difficulty usually at the level of contrasting and irreconcilable metaphysical commitments and assumptions about man.

Appraisive beliefs. Secondly, of-course assumptions are defined by one's basic appraisive presuppositions, those prior beliefs concerning the worth, goodness, equality, and ideal of man which underly social studies discourse. Ethical principles concerning what should be done are often hidden guides for interpreting and acting upon man.

Epistemological beliefs. A third area of one's of-course assumptions include those presuppositions concerning how man is to be known, and how one knows that he knows. Epistemological beliefs held by actors in the life-world can be referred to generally as principles used for ordering and interpreting social life as usual. In their ongoing application these principles broadly represent the "framework and internal structure of the process of reasoning" characteristic of a person in his approach to the world and his constructing of social reality (Maruyama, 1973c). The epistemological logics used by men in their everyday thinking, however, is an area largely unexplored by phenomenologists as yet, for as Schutz concludes, the study of the logics of science and philosophy as specialized realities does not correspond necessarily to the logic of the life-world (1971:95). Whether studied or not, presupposed in all man-world relationships are those ordering principles utilized by actors as their epistemological logic.

That each individual organizes relationships among the data of his experiences and his life-world according to an implicit logic system that characterizes the group to which he belongs is argued by various authors. Although Mannheim was an important sociologist to identify what he referred to as "basic categories of thought" or "principles of organization" used by groups for ordering their experiences (1936:274-275), it is in the works of Maruyama that the ongoing application of these principles of organization are explicated (Bibliography). Throughout his various studies and writings, Maruyama's thesis is simply that:

> Our universe is the universe constructed within the framework of our logic. When our logic undergoes some change, our universe alters some of its character (1960a:251).

In the opinion of the present writer, the epistemological paradigms outlined by such authors as Pepper, Maruyama, Willer, and others, are applicable to the study of how man is viewed within programs and program development.[9]

Any perspective on man presupposes these three areas of metaphysical, appraisive, and epistemological of-course assumptions. It is impossible to make any statement about man and the social world without taking-for-granted certain questions about his existence or being, his worth, and about the way to know him. Though these presuppositional categories overlap one another, and at times are hard to differentiate or identify, they help to define a social studies program's orientation. They establish a presuppositional relevancy system within which to interpret man.

Presuppositional Relevancy System Related to Man

> The influence of these premises on the pursuit of discovery is great and indispensable. They indicate to scientists the kind of questions which seem reasonable and interesting to explore, the kind of conceptions and relations that should be upheld as possible, even when some evidence seems to contradict them, or that, on the contrary, should be rejected as unlikely, even though there was evidence which would favour them (Polanyi, 1964:11).

Just as a relevancy system is implied from an interest, so a relevancy system tends to follow from one's of-course assumptions. Assumptions imply a topography of contours concerning which things about man are probable, true, good, possible, legitimate, and to what degree, in social studies program development.[10]

This topography establishes parameters upon the viewpoint constructed in social studies, for "the way actors define situations, the meanings they attach to them, are not chosen from an infinite menu of all possible definitions of that situation, but are restricted by the range of presuppositions they bring to the situation as products of their personal biographies" (Dale, 1973:180). Observation of man presupposes a belief system which inevitably restricts the phenomenological field accessible for social studies inquiry at any given time, for so pervasive is belief that it has a restricting and directing effect upon all of one's discourses, projects, questions, hypotheses, and interpretations directed towards fellowman (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:60-61; Strike, 1974). Indeed, without being constrained by of-course and methodological assumptions and expectations, there could be no social studies, for everything would be legitimate and applicable in the study of man. A social fact concerning man in social studies is that which is consistent with the presuppositions which define both that-it-is and what-it-is for program developers, teachers, or students. Any novelty concerning man not accountable and any problems not definable on the basis of the taken-for-granted presuppositions are rejected as the concern of some other area of study because such novelty or problems are subversive to the accepted viewpoint and cast doubt upon that which is believed concerning the social world and man.

In summary, a presupposition about man is a scheme of reference for interpreting the social world. As such, presuppositions have implications for the outlooks on man and the interpretations of the social world students develop through the use of social studies programs. Further, because all educational practice implies presuppositions concerning man and his relation to the world, programs have consequences also for the treatment of students themselves. Dahrendorf warns that

> . . . it is both dangerous and irresponsible to ignore the implications of one's assumptions, even if these are philosophical rather than scientific in the technical sense. The models with which we work, apart from being useful tools, determine to no

> small extent our general perspectives, our selection of problems, and the emphasis in our explanations . . . (1967:477).

Within social studies many of the issues considered to be controversial or pressing depend upon the underlying images of the world, man, and man's relations to the world held by developers. To paraphrase Wirth's conclusion concerning social groups, "the most important thing . . . that we can know about a (program) is what it takes for granted, and the most elemental and important facts about a (program) are those that are seldom debated and generally regarded as settled" (1936:xxiii).

Besides interests and presuppositions, another scheme of reference representing the standpoint of the Thus from which intentionality is directed to man are the approaches used for apprehending man and the social world.

C. APPROACHES TO MAN

> To apprehend is to be aware, to perceive, to grasp with the understanding. It is to express in a pattern of words, colors, or sounds. It is to discern sense and recognize meaning through order, relationships, contrasts, and harmonies. Apprehension is a dimension of existence through which we are not merely alive in the world but are conscious of the world, conscious of being and of being who we are and conscious of what it is other than ourselves. Apprehension is every movement of our self that brings us to awareness of reality. Apprehension is present in art and in science, in history and in philosophy, in our everyday confrontation with things and in many other areas. What is apprehended and the way it is apprehended vary greatly—and often there is conflict between different approaches (Morgan, 1970:270-271).

Man and the social world are as manifold as are one's modes of apprehending (approaching) them, for each approach one uses in apprehending a situation represents a different subject-object relation and a new source of knowledge.[11] When an approach becomes consistent over time, is characterized by typical stocks of knowledge, methods, and roles, it may be referred to as a discipline, ideology, philosophy, and so on. In this sense, an approach may become a socially legitimized and maintained mode of apprehending man in social studies.

Any approach to man is defined by its (1) stocks of knowledge, (2) methodologies, and (3) characteristic roles by which reality is carved up selectively and actively in one way or another. To carry the metaphor further, these stocks of knowledge are the surgeon's knives which he selects for his purpose at hand, whereas the methods and roles are the particular pattern and style of slicing. Each mode of approach has its characteristic tools and its particular manner of acting. Similarly, the approach to man and to the social world in programs is characterized by certain stocks of knowledge, methods, and roles which together define a mode of apprehending (i.e., they determine what and how one observes man).

An important implication of interests in man is that the approach towards man (knowledge , methodologies, and roles) utilized in social studies is not disinterested. Once defined, a problem or question directed towards man has the same significance for social studies classroom activities as any other interests have for actors in their life-world: the problem determines the limits within which certain knowledge , methods, and roles become relevant to the inquiry (Schutz, 1970a:278). These three aspects of any social studies program's approach are singled out here because the underlying interests whereby they are selected and organized may be identified.

Relevant Stocks of Knowledge

One's approach to man in social studies is influenced largely by the stocks of knowledge selected and utilized as interpretive schemes. All knowledge of the social world and all views of man in social studies thinking involve mental constructs such as generalizations, formalizations, and idealizations of various kinds. Indeed, all beliefs and most of what passes for knowledge in the life-world are structured into stocks of knowledge representing generally those commonsense (i.e., unreflected upon and taken-for-granted) and immediate (i.e., at hand in the sense that a person can draw upon them at any given moment) knowledges through which man is interpreted (Schutz, 1970a:74-76,80-82,236-242,271-273; 1971:72-74,281-293; 1972: 176-207; Wagner, 1973). As a consequence, not only are these typifications basic to any perspective on man within a program, but they are primarily what a program is composed of in terms of content. In comparing two programs, one would find their perspectives differing because those schemes concerning man are not shared equally by program developers as a group and are relevant to different presuppositions and interests at hand.

Each stock of knowledge about the social world, man, and the student within a social studies program has a unique history of its own defined by the prior experiences of both the program developer and his fellow-actors:

> . . . my stock of knowledge at hand does not consist exclusively of experiences lived through directly and originally by me. The greater portion of it is rather socially derived: it consists,

> that is, of experiences lived through directly and originally by my fellow-men, who communicated them to me. Hence I assume—or better, I take it for granted in the practice of everyday life—that other people's knowledge at hand is to some extent congruent with mine, and that this holds good not only with respect to knowledge of the world of nature, common to all of us, but also with respect to knowledge of the social and cultural world I am living in (Schutz, 1971:282).

As experience from the Here, Now, and Thus accumulates and changes, the range and structuring of stocks of knowledge is in flux, being enlarged and modified for the individual. However, even though for the program developer himself the content and range of these schemes of knowledge about man will continue to shift in accord with his ongoing experiences, projects, and interests at hand, static stocks of knowledge are transmitted to teachers and students as part of the secondary socialization which occurs through social studies programs. For the student encountering a program in which these fixed knowledges are transmitted, his own experiences and immediate stocks of knowledge combine with those ready-made interpretations of man handed to him through the program, resulting in enlarged horizons or to some degree a shift of perspective for him. The image of man and of the social world provided to him by a program's knowledge schemes are revised when interpreted from his own experience (Wagner, 1973:66-67).

Whether transmitted to actors during primary or secondary socialization and reformulated in their ongoing experience, the process whereby stocks of knowledge are formulated and come to characterize their way of seeing man and the social world is typification: construing objects, events, persons, experiences, and ideas as typical in terms of repeatable and homogeneous classes rather than in terms of uniqueness (Schutz, 1970a:116-122). James' recognition that man organizes his experience into typical and shared schemes of ideal objects and ideal relations (1904:316) is a premise basic to those social phenomenologists who attempt to describe how the life-world is possible (e.g., Schutz, Holzner, Berger, Psathas). That actors recognize and identify any object of intention in accordance with "generalized knowledge of the type of these objects or of the typical style in which they manifest themselves" allows them to make familiar the unique, to lend stability and continuity to experience, to interpret and order the world in intersubjective and socially acceptable ways, and to share a common meaning. Schutz concludes that "in other words, we experience the world from the outset not as a 'blooming, buzzing confusion' of sensory data, or as a set of individual insulated objects without relation to one another, or as isolated events that could be detached from their context, but in its structurization according to types and typical relations of types" (1971:284,285). Because stocks of knowledge define experience typically, emerging experience is interpreted in terms of its similarity and familiarity with the type: experience is familiar if it is similar to the typicalness defined. Conversely, it is strange if it cannot be fitted to the type. In social studies progams the stocks of knowledge concerning man provide generalized types of the way in which man and social relations are to appear in the experience of teachers and students.

In accordance with particular interest and presuppositional relevance systems defined by the program developers' problem or question, certain stocks of knowledge of man rather than others become relevant, are selected from the large body of knowledge which program developers have potentially at hand, and are organized within social studies programs into different degrees or zones of relevance and irrelevance, distinctness and vagueness, clarity and obscurity, precision and ambiguity suitable for solving the problem or question (Schutz, 1971:283-284). Interests and presuppositions determine relevance, and relevance determines the structurization of the knowledge used for understanding man. Certain stocks of knowledge are stressed with a large degree of clarity and consistency, whereas others are merely mentioned, taken-for-granted, implied, or completely ignored. In this way a picture of man emerges in programs in terms of the developers' purpose at hand.

Since it is the interest directed to man which determines the particular schemes of interpretation deemed relevant, implicit interests may be identified within the knowledge which a program applies to students or has students apply to their study of the social world. Not only is knowledge constructed according to some interest inherent within the methodology used, but knowledge in turn serves the interest upon which it was constructed (Finch, 1967; Habermas, 1971; Davies, 1971:129). That is, knowledge is constituted in accordance with someone's interest and has exploitability in accordance with some human purpose. It is exploitable because it can be used as an instrument of someone's intents when applied to understanding man. Much as a photographer composes a picture not randomly but according to his interest and other intents, so knowledge is selected and applied by program developers in accord with their interests. As a result, man can be interpreted differently with programs depending upon the knowledge applied and the interests that knowledge is designed to serve.

Within a program, therefore, one can identify contours of relevance: some knowledges are stressed; some are merely mentioned; some are implied or assumed; some are neglected or purposefully left out. The result is a perspective on man.

Some of the overlapping and generalized stocks of knowledge which program developers use in constructing their images of man and of the social world, and which are transmitted to students within social studies programs, are social recipes, value schemes, symbols, metaphors, labels, reifications, exemplars, and expectations applied to man.[12] When identified within a program, these typifications help to define the approach taken to man, and hence the overall perspective.

Whereas stocks of knowledge represent the characteristic content applied in an approach to man, the methodologies represent the manner in which these knowledges are applied.

Relevant Methodologies

The particular chosen interest in man determines the schemes of observation utilized within social studies programs also. Implicit interests may be identified within the methodologies which a program applies to students or has students apply to his study of man within the social world. As a component of any human act, a method is a selected means justified by the actor's motive and utilized by him to realize his project (Chapter III includes a discussion of an act).

Any strategy is a man-world relationship directed by the human aim or interest embodied within the method itself. Various authors have identified methodologically based interests. The Habermas thesis that all knowledge is constituted by and serves fundamental human interests embedded within the rules and procedures applied to knowledge construction certainly deserves further application to the methods and knowledge applied to man within social studies programs (1971). The methods through which social studies knowledge is constructed are themselves at the service of the program developer's interest. Why and how is a particular method used? (Macdonald, 1975). When this question is applied to programs, interest as a scheme of reference through which man and his social world are interpreted can be made explicit.

Relevant Roles

Transmitted within a role is a typified, though often general, way of experiencing and interpreting the world (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:72-79). When initiated, an actor takes on a perspective relevant to the role, including not only those reciprocal expectations defined in the patterns of action and standards of performance appropriate to the role, but also the schemes of reference which he takes-for-granted as being role specific (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:77). Through division of roles there is a social distribution and transmission of perspectives, each role specific viewpoint being legitimized and maintained by the shared expectations and knowledge typifications of the group who defines the role. As the same individual moves from one role to another, he experiences a shift of interests, commitments, and specialized knowledge (Schutz, 1971: 94-95).

Further, contours of relevance may be centered around the roles and role specific acts vis-à-vis man which a program encourages students to engage in. Acts directed towards man within a program structure the social world into relevancy zones simply because not all aspects of that world are relevant as means or as ends for realizing the projects and tasks assigned to a student in his study of man. Because interests and presuppositions appropriate to fulfilling role expectations and definitions differ, zones of relevancy centered around a particular role may be restructured as the role shifts. To illustrate, Schutz observes that

> The interests I have in the same situation as a father, a citizen, a member of my church or of my profession, may not only be different but even incompatible with one another. I have, then, to decide which of these disparate interests I must choose in order to define the situation from which to start inquiry (1971:125).

Similarly, program developers on the basis of their interests and presuppositions present students and teachers with certain roles and acts in the study of man and of the social world. The roles and acts the student is to take on immediately define certain things about man and his world as more relevant than other things. Students who are to take, for example, the role of an anthropologist, a behavioral psychologist, a historian, or a political decision-maker (such as occurs in some inquiry projects or in simulation gaming) when pursuing any question related to man, may establish differing zones of relevancy concerning what aspects of man are relevant to the question.

Because interests are inherent within any subject-object relation, they can be identified within the knowledge , methodologies, and roles used by a program to relate students to some aspect of their world. These three areas defining an approach to man can be examined specifically in order to infer the motive by which they were selected.

In summary, the standpoint of the Thus is defined in part by the approaches taken toward man in social studies programs. The stocks of knowledge, methodologies, and the roles utilized together provide a mode of apprehending man, of selectively constructing a certain image of what it means to be human. Because ordering the physical world and interpreting the social world both are intentional acts guided by interest and presuppositional schemes of reference, as well as by those stocks of knowledge which define perspective at any moment of acting, similar social situations may have differing meanings for actors who do not share the same approach to man.

The relationship among these three schemes of reference (interests, presuppositions, and approaches) which define the standpoint of the Thus are not necessarily linear in influence; that is, interests and presuppositions do not always set up systems of relevances which imply certain approaches to man. They may be co-determinous, influencing and implying one another in the actor's ongoing stream of consciousness. In relation to a particular context (Here), the approach taken may modify one's interest and presuppositions. However, in general it is the interests and presuppositions which define the field of relevances and hence the perspective on man which emerges.

The standpoint of the Thus is situated in a context defined as the standpoint of the Here within which a particular subject-object relation is developed, maintained, and transmitted for actors. Context is therefore an integral component of perspective. In Part II some aspects of the standpoint of the Here are specified in terms of social studies programs.

PART II. THE STANDPOINT OF THE HERE (PERSPECTIVE CONTEXT)

> Reality is socially defined. But the definitions are always embodied, that is, concrete individuals and groups of individuals serve as definers of reality. To understand the state of the socially-constructed universe at any given time, or its change over time, one must understand the social organization that permits the definers to do their defining (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:116).

Intentionality is directed to an object from the standpoint of the subject's Here, the lived-place in which he is situated and from which he orders, interprets, and acts upon fellowman and the social world. Because consciousness is located always in some context, this standpoint of the Here has particular importance in accounting for the variety of perspectives on man which are possible and evident with the life-world. Integral to any description of an outlook is the context within which the subject-object relation is situated.

Berger and Luckmann's thesis that all ideas are developed, transmitted, and maintained within the Here of social contexts can be applied to program perspectives on man and the social world (1967:3). Just as consciousness is located in a life-world context which influences the development and maintenance of perspective, so the schemes of reference (Standpoint of the Thus) directed towards man within a social studies program are developed, transmitted, and maintained also within an identifiable program context. A program has presupposed (A) social locations and (B) reality coordinates within whose boundaries a view of man is developed and transmitted to students and teachers, and (C) plausibility structures designed to maintain as credible a point of view over that of other possible views teachers and students may encounter. These overlapping contextual structures defining the standpoint of the Here are a part of a program's position on man.

A. SOCIAL LOCATIONS (PERSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENT)

> . . . the different perspectives are not merely particular in that they presuppose different ranges of vision and different sectors of the total reality, but also in that the interests and the powers of perception of the different perspectives are conditioned by the social situations in which they arose and to which they are relevant (Mannheim, 1936:284).

A premise basic to phenomenology, hermeneutics, and sociology of knowledge is that all thought is influenced to varying extents by its socio-historical context. For example, Mannheim's thesis that there are "varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to the differences in social setting" implies that an actor's socio-historical life-world context affects the genesis of his ideas and is reflective in the content of his assertions (1936:265). Consciousness is perspectivable because of the shaping influence which one's location socially has upon ideas and outlooks. Various perspectives are possible because individuals relate themselves to objects from locations which differ in varying extents from one another.

The Here of one's situation consists of multiple overlapping social locations in which he is located contemporaneously: (1) group locations, (2) symbolic locations, (3) biographical locations, and (4) body locations. Intentionality is directed and perspectives on man developed variously within these various structures of the life-world context.

Group Location

Perspectives are always developed, transmitted, and maintained within the boundaries of social locations referred to here as the various groups in which program developers share degrees of membership.[13] For example, groups differentiated on the basis of religion (Mann, 1972; Berger, 1969), political persuasion (Mannheim, 1952:191-229; Kaplan, 1971), disciplines and professions (Maruyama, 1974c), occupations (Dibble, 1970), generations (Mannheim, 1952:276-322; Ortega, 1962; Ryder, 1965), geography (Kitchen, 1967), and rural-urban location (Mannheim, 1936), develop their own perspectives and may transmit these in the process of initiating members. Perspective differences are evident because such groups pursue goals, encounter problems, hold to relevances, and are aware of ideas that differ in some degree with those of other groups. A person orientated towards a more or less defined social group not only accommodates his schemes of reference to that held by the group, but also tends to have his own outlooks shaped by the reality definitions and expectations of the position he occupies within the group itself (Merton, 1949:168).

In this sense perspectives as subject-object relations are influenced by social location, whether that of a group or of a position within a group. Because a pluralistic society contains differentiated groupings of people whose acts and beliefs an actor variously shares, he can hold to a large number of perspectives whose horizons are socially located. That is, although the totality of any outlook is unique to the individual, in varying degrees his views have been developed and are transmitted to him and maintained as plausible within the boundaries of specific groups.

Symbolic Locations

> Words are not name-tags which we attach to concepts already fully there in consciousness only in order to utter them. They are symbols in terms of which experience is articulated. Our thought is what it is because of the language we use to structure it . . . Symbols are created by men in concrete historical situations in the effort to come to grips with and orient themselves in the world (Grabau, 1965:152).

Perspectives on man are developed and transmitted within a symbolic location of ready made typifications (Berger, 1970:376-377). Everyday life is to a large extent made possible because language provides us with a means for intersubjectively constructing and maintaining various realities, for mediating and objectifying the world, for thematizing and interpreting the unique data of our experience, for selectively focussing our intentions, for patterning the life-world in predictable ways, for defining objects as meaningful by placing them in larger schemes and sets of relations, and for providing us with a foundation for a shared world of taken-for-granted joint-actions (Berger, 1970:376). Consciousness is situated within this symbolic context of language broadly conceived as signs, symbols, recipes for action, and even those carriers of human meaning referred to as art and myth (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:35).

How is this symbolic location which defines in part the program developers' standpoint of the Here related to their perspectives on man? First, perspectives on man are obviously dependent in part upon language. The language which a person adopts through primary and secondary socialization shapes his outlooks. Although Whorf's hypothesis (1956) is not accepted in its totality within sociology of knowledge literature (Currie, 1970), his observations have underscored the coloring which language categories have upon the shape of reality and perspective. Words and their relationships within language schemes provide actors with *à priori* frameworks for objectifying experiences in a particular manner rather than in other ways. Consequently, any typification utilized by individuals selectively shapes their reality by influencing both the type of discriminations they make when observing something, and the type of meaning imposed upon their observations. Categories of language become instruments of reality control because once actors objectify observations and experiences by means of a specific typification, they then tend to ignore those similarities, differences, or properties not defined as criterial (Anastasi, 1966:619). Although language and its inherent typified meanings have been developed for different human purposes and are a necessary way of intentionally dealing with the social world, these labels structure consciousness of objects and limit possible subject-object relations. Individuals are predisposed to certain ways of arranging experience through language (Bruner, 1962:137). Having invented various schemes to fulfil pragmatic motives, men find that the categories and logic of these schemes act back upon the inventors by structuring reality and focussing perception (Cherry, 1966:262; Berger, 1970:377).

Second, language not only shapes consciousness but may also reflect and transmit a perspective on man (Jenkins, 1969). The meaning of language in part reflects a group's experience because words have fringes or halos of emotional values, implications, connotations, and shades of meaning which depend upon the particular context in which they are used and upon the background literature, history, and experiences of the group (Schutz, 1970a:96-110; 1971: 100-101). Words used to describe man may carry with them their own particular group-specific meanings and assumptions. Also, word meaning through which social realities are interpreted may be rooted within a particular sociology or psychology, and thereby betray a perspective on man (Dawe, 1970:207; Reese and Overton, 1970). For example, terms such as behaviors and acts, adjustments and intentionalities, or needs and projects either suggest or are linked directly with underlying images of the human. Various authors have shown that implicit within the language used are unconscious ontological assumptions which subtly influence and identify reality views.[14] Mannheim goes further and argues that even the absence of certain concepts may be indicative of a point of view (1936:274). Therefore, if it is not possible to separate a perspective from the very language in which it is embedded and shaped, then the emphasis upon written and oral forms of expression in schooling situations make the word a major source for inferring positions on man within programs.

Third, the typifications included in language allow the individual to formulate diverse perspectives. Through language he transcends that which is in immediate view, detaches himself from his mundane involvements and direct experiences in the life-world, and deals meaningfully with those realms of nature and social life which stretch far beyond his Here and Now (Wagner, 1973:66). Language allows him to formulate and build diverse perspectives (in various degrees of clarity or vagueness) on times other than the present (e.g., interpretations of the past and projections on the future), on places other than the immediate life-world (e.g., distant locations and fictional realities), on persons or objects never seen, and in a reflexive manner to turn upon his own perspectives. Morris illustrates how language makes it possible for consciousness to utilize diverse perspectives for describing the same object or for actualizing different realities at any moment:

> An old Buddhist technique was to imagine himself as small as an insect, and to view things from this perspective; and then immediately to become in imagination as large as a mountain and to survey insect and man from this perpsective. . . . [Perspectives] permit us, symbolically, to juxtapose the most diverse orders and dimensions of the cosmos, to look from below and above, to be inside and outside simultaneously (1971:466).

Without the transcending and diverse viewpoints that language makes available to consciousness, it would not be possible to utilize and to reflect upon various images of man as schemes for interpreting social life within programs. For program developers the Here is in part a symbolic location in which their consciousness of man is situated.

Biographical Location

Subject-object relationships which characterize experience are to some extent biographically determined because consciousness is cumulative.[15] Past experiences organized and sedimented in stocks of knowledge at hand are important factors through which an actor defines and interprets situations he encounters. These biographical factors make a person selective in what he attends to, influence what meaning the situation has for him, and guide his decision concerning possible courses of action to take in that situation (van Manen, 1973:143-144; Wagner, 1973:71). Two individuals never share the same situation because their different vantage points present them with slightly or radically different definitions of what would appear to a third individual to be the same situation (van Mahen, 1973:144). Their various histories result in divergent views of an event, and hence different situations, even though actors share similar positions in terms of outer time and physical space.

Any perspective on man, therefore, is rooted not only in the person's awareness of and participation in his immediate situation, but is rooted also in his background experiences and his continuing awareness that his context itself is historical and temporal (Kaplan, 1971:99). To say that intentionalities and perspectives are biographically colored is to say that they have histories, that they have been developed through previous situations, that they bear the mark of having been modified by experience, and as such are the individual's "unique possession, given to him and to him alone" (Schutz, 1973:9). What was experienced by an actor influences that which he presently experiences or anticipates, and what was believed by an actor in turn influences what and how he sees from his Here and Now.

A program developer's perspective on man (the subject-object relation) has a history which includes his past professional training, former experiences with students in particular contexts, acquired philosophical and religious stocks of knowledge, and other schemes of reference developed in former situations. His outlooks for interpreting man within programs have been formed through the course of his ongoing experiences and are, therefore, biographically limited in their scope.

Body Location

Within phenomenological literature the actor is referred to as the "O" or "null point" of the social world he experiences because he orients, organizes, and experiences that world spacially and temporally always with regard to his body as the referential center (Schutz, 1967:470). He structures around himself and holds the central place in what Combs and Snygg (1959) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) metaphorically refer to as an ever changing phenomenological field consisting of

> . . . independent things, events, and forces which also exist with him in the world. It is by the intentional movements of this active body that he constitutes a spatio-temporal field, and organizes a meaningful world around his projects. Many alternatives are always open but certain conditions, laid down by the structure of the conscious, active body, remain fixed. These conditions are not purely physical. They are psycho-physical, and they determine _à priori_, both the general pattern of bodily action and that of the awareness which dwells in this action (Wild, 1964:23).

The world into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to his central position for interpretation, is not experienced merely as a geographical concept in which all directions are alike and all points are of equal importance. In terms of the different directions and places the lived body is able to move, an actor orients the world from the standpoint of his bodily Here, a position in space from which things, events, persons, and ideas appear to be near and far, immediate and remote, out and in, up and down, here and there, back and forward, right and left, foreign and home (Wild, 1964: 23; Schutz, 1967:466). Through bodily movements and acts, and with ongoing lived time, the spacio-temporal coordinates of this life-field shift. The lived-body as the center of one's life-world is an important idea in phenomenology, therefore, because rather than mind-body dualism or an objective body which is observed in a detached manner, actors experience themselves generally as an integrated whole: "I am my body . . . my active body as I feel it and live it from the inside" (Wild, 1964:20).

Bodily location is a part of the larger social location in which perspectives on man are developed by program developers. Certain groups of man, ideas about man, and experiences of man are spacially immediate, and therefore influence the thinking of program developers. Other groups, ideas, books, and experiences are remote and are rarely encountered, and consequently remain on the edge of the horizons of consciousness. That program developers will know more about certain groups and have greater access to certain ideas influences in part the perspective on man they develop. The spacial structuring of whatever they are aware of is presupposed in their interpreting and acting upon the social world. Existence is rooted in a position in space and is organized from there.

In summary, it is within these social locations (i.e., group, symbolic, biographical, and body locations) that relevances, stocks of knowledge, and images of man are acquired by actors, that the subtle meaning nuances shared within particular social realities are internalized and made the individual's way of seeing his fellowman. And since no one can escape the dense social reality of which he is a part, program developers bring their socially influenced views with them to program development. Perspectives on man within programs, consequently, are socially and historically situated. Unfortunately, these social locations in which program developers have developed their perspectives on man are not readily identifiable in programs. Once outlooks on man are developed and are included in social studies programs, however, there are identifiable structures within the program itself for transmitting and for maintaining these viewpoints for teachers and students.

B. REALITY COORDINATES (PERSPECTIVE TRANSMISSION)

> Imagine a tree. The carpenter sees it in terms of the number of planks which can be cut out of it to build a house; the boy sees it as a place to build his play house; the biologist sees it as a living organism; the ecologist sees it in terms of its relations to other plants and animals in the area; and the artist sees it in terms of its aesthetic values. There is no doubt that the same thing is always involved—the same real tree. What differs among these perspectives is not the object of the various interests but simply the interests themselves. Certain properties or aspects of the tree are taken into account by the separate observers, while other aspects are neglected. The whole tree still stands; only what is said about

it changes (Mercer and Wanderer, 1970:3).

Those perspectives on man developed within the social locations inhabited by program developers are transmitted to teachers and students within programs through identifiable reality coordinates (reality parameters, boundary points, or limitations) which confine the extent of a reality view. These coordinates provide the outer survey pegs, as it were, within which legitimate reality concerning man is to be constructed with classrooms and according to which the student's experience of the social world is to be oriented.

What are the coordinates of reality within which teachers and students are to experience man and the social world? A program's view of man is situated within one of (1) multiple realities which are possible as a context (Standpoint of the Here) for defining man. Within this particular reality chosen by program developers as a broad definition of the social world, there are more specific (2) thought models provided in social studies for constraining the thinking of teachers and students. Further, the silent background of the selected reality and thought model is (3) the general awareness horizon which unifies all experience of man. Each of these is a reality coordinate which program developers provide (implicitly or explicitly) as a boundary within which to transmit a view of man. These reality coordinates constrain discussion teachers and students may have concerning man.

Multiple Realities

The notion of multiple realities is grounded in two observations:

> . . . first that we are liable to think differently of the same object; and secondly, that when we have done so, we can choose, which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard. The origin and fountainhead of all reality . . . is thus subjective, is ourselves. Consequently, there exist several, probably an infinite number of various orders of reality, each with its own special and separate style of existence (Schutz, 1971:135).

If one accepts the phenomenological premise that reality is a quality which we endow upon the object in terms of the attention and belief we give to it, then it follows that reality as apprehended by us changes as our concern and attention is modified (Holzner, 1972:5).[16] Our sense of reality and the particular mode-of-being-in-the-world we participate in both undergo modification with shifts in perspective. Though one must stand in some relation to an object, that relation can vary as we experience and define its meaning differently.

It is not that the object changes somehow, but rather that the actor's experience of it differs with a shift in reality. Multiple realities are not a denial of 'the world out there.' They are an affirmation that the world is known only through someone's perspective, that reality is always the world as experienced selectively in one way or another through acts, plans, beliefs, and cumulative experience. The world remains though the actor's apprehension of it varies in accord with his changing intentionalities. Each reality is the same world experienced by someone from different angles, and differentiated from other realities on the basis of the schemes of reference which are brought to it and which guide one's experience of it (Schutz, 1944; van Manen, 1973; Castaneda, 1972). In other words, "Each world whilst it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention" (James, 1904:293).

Formalized school programs such as social studies, chemistry, or biology are characterized by their particular organization of the world and are thereby representative of multiple realities within which actors participate. These realities can be experienced in repeatable, predictable, and intersubjective ways when those perspectives teachers and students use for organizing their intentions become characteristic of particular times and places and are socially legitimized in some manner. Moving throughout the day from one classroom to another may be experienced by the student as a series of reality shifts as he is required to appropriate various frameworks for making sense of the world and as he is required to shift into realities based upon bodies of knowledge, populated with objects and events, and maintained by plausibility structures to some degree disconnected from those of previous classes. A student who leaves the common-sense world of the coffee shop and suddenly enters the theoretical realities of chemistry or social studies experiences the shift between these variously constructed modes of interpretation. In the first reality his act of coffee drinking has a meaning intersubjectively shared with friends, whereas in the latter realities his taken-for-granted experience of a few minutes earlier in the coffee shop is mediated and interpreted through theoretical schemes, textbooks, and laboratory assignments. Another outlook allows him to reinterpret his former experience in ways recognized as appropriate and legitimate by the people who also share that particular context. Not to shift into the appropriate perspective is a disorienting experience for the individual (similar to the lostness experienced when he walks late into an ongoing classroom discussion) because he lacks the schemes of reference suitable for experiencing that particular reality in the same manner as other students.

Social studies programs present an image of man within the parameters of some reality context. With each of the multiple realities that may be encountered by students and teachers within a program there is an associated general perspective—"a specific cognitive style" (Schutz, 1944:552)—which is internally consistent in itself and which represents a way of interpreting the social world in a meaningful manner to those who have adopted the point of view. Each perspective represents in Geertz's terms a "model of" reality and a "model for" reality constructing, serving as both a conception of some aspect of the world and of acting upon it (1973:123). As such, views on man must be transmitted within the coordinates of a general reality definition selected by program developers.

Phenomenologists have described multiple realities, each defined by its own characteristic parameters (e.g., phenomena, meanings, experiences, belief systems, and various schemes of observation and interpretation), which may be deemed legitimate by program developers for viewing man. Apart from the paramount reality of everyday life are those specialized sub-worlds of theory, religion, science, daydreams, play, drugs, theatre, illusion, fable, art, madness, and others, in which an individual participates by suspending temporarily his paramount common-sense perspective and by appropriating another standpoint and mode of experience. With a change of intentionality and perspective it is possible to affect these different ways of looking at the social world.

The social world and man are experienced always within the confines of multiple realities. To identify a program's perspective on man, therefore, one needs to take into account the particular reality context in which that outlook is grounded and by which it is circumscribed. Following are selected multiple realities which may be identified within social studies programs as a context from which man is interpreted by teachers and students.

Paramount realities. The reality of the life-world is not accepted generally by program developers as a coordinate for viewing man. The student is asked to suspend temporarily the interests, stocks of knowledge, relevances, hopes and fears, personal motives and projects, and logics which characterize his everyday world in favour of theoretic schemes to be found in textbooks for defining legitimate social problems and adequate solutions. Though the realities characteristic of different school subjects have some overlap, they are constructed and are experienced in terms of schemes which are different in degree from those of the paramount life-world reality. However, from the enclaves of specialized interests, knowledge , and approaches the student returns always to the experience, language, and outlook of his common-sense world which remains prior to all other multiple realities. That is, "he continues to eat on tables (and not aggregates of molecules), turn on lights (and not streams of photons), and to speak to people (and not complex homeostatic biosystems)" (Laszlo, 1973:206). He suspends for the time being his taken-for-granted views about man while taking on those outlooks and experiencing these circumscribed sub-worlds of meaning which may very well be discordant with experience of paramount reality.

Technological realities. Man and the social world can be observed and described in terms of ends-means relations of various kinds. Within technological realities the emphasis is on those schemes of interpretation related primarily to means: procedures, methods, treatments, remedial acts, and rules based upon the interests of control, certainty, efficiency, and predictability of outcomes (Downey, 1975:66-87). Man may internalize and view himself in terms of the metaphors and language which he applies to his machines and to his theoretically defined cybernetic systems. Any technologically oriented perspective associated with technological realities in the study of man is referred to by authors as a "technocratic consciousness" (Habermas, 1972:367-369), a "technological rationality" (Marcuse, 1966), or a "prosaic mentality" (Morgan, 1970; c.f., Ellul, 1964; Lewis, 1965; Apple, 1974).

Theoretic realities. Theoretic reality coordinates used in social studies as a context for viewing man are derived primarily from the general domains of science, philosophy, and history. For example, the reality of social science is experienced by students in terms of laws, formulae, correlations and causal relations, maps, historical exemplars, specialized languages, textbooks, methodological rules, and typologies, rather than lived-body, lived-time, pragmatic interests, and common-sense definitions, for defining relevant problems and approaches in the study of man. A student viewing man within a social science reality finds that:

> Any problem emerging within the scientific field has to partake of the universal style of this field and has to be compatible with the preconstituted problems and their solution by either accepting or refuting them. Thus, the latitude for the discretion of the scientist in stating the problem is in fact a very small one (Schutz, 1944:568).

He must orient himself within a set of coordinates which teachers and program developers may define as more valid for studying man than are other frameworks. In the attempt to grasp man and the social world scientifically, he describes fellowman in terms of "formal concepts whose relationship to the informal conceptions of common-sense become increasingly problematic" (Geertz, 1973:111).

Religious realities. Man is also apprehended within the parameters of religious realities located in myth, ritual, symbol, song, and theology. Within these coordinates the reality of everyday life and of theory may be suspended as a mode of understanding man. A religious perspective

> . . . moves beyond the realities of everyday life to wider ones, and its defining concern is not action upon those wider realities but acceptance of them, faith in them. It differs from the scientific perspective in that it questions the realities of everyday life not out of an institutionalized scepticism which dissolves the world's giveness into a swirl of probabilistic hypotheses, but in terms of what it takes to be wider, nonhypothetical truths. Rather than detachment, its watchword is commitment; rather than analysis, encounter (Geertz, 1973:112).

Religious realities are evident within social studies classrooms and programs because actors encounter in current movies, best-seller paperbacks, and competing denominations a variety of religious frameworks for defining man.

Ideal realities. The realities of ideal relations are experienced in mathematics, formal logics, music, ideal types and metaphysical systems (James, 1904:292). For example, students within social studies encounter ideal political systems which are experienced as definitions of ideal relations among ideal actors within ideal situations. Man and the social world are defined in terms of ideal types within those simulation games or novels which portray under controlled conditions what man is or should be. Similarly, the aesthetic realities of a symphony, poem, drama, painting, or sculpture can be used to convey and to experience an image of man.

Illusionary realities. Images of man are also portrayed in social studies through the realities of deliberate fable to be found in the realms of fiction, theatre, novels, comics, play, certain simulations, and much of television. These realities are populated with objects not subject to the actor's concern for facticity which he manifests in the paramount reality:

> While absorbed in a novel, we turn our backs on all other worlds, and, for the time, the Ivanhoe-world remains our absolute reality. When we wake from the spell, however, we find a still more real world, which reduces Ivanhoe, and all things connected with him, to the fictive status, and relegates them to one of the sub-universes (James, 1904:293).

These multiple realities are experienced more or less disconnectedly because each sub-world has "its own special and separate style of existence" (James, 1904:291). What is believable in one reality may be held in disbelief in another realm because each of the sub-worlds may be populated with objects and characterized by points of view which are incompatible with that of other realities.

To avoid contradiction among realities, individuals experience them separately. In taking on one reality, others are dropped for the time being and for purposes at hand. Whatever is accountable with a perspective appropriate to a particular sub-universe is accepted by them as real in the sense that such objects and events have relevance and meaning within the framework they are utilizing. The conditions upon which actors give belief to objects as real differ within the coordinates of each reality. Mythological men and objects which populate the world of fable constructed by a Tolkien or a Lewis are not appropriate or real within the world of biology or social studies because the schemes used for orientation and for defining the world differ. From the paramount world of common-sense which is usually held to be most real by actors, other sub-worlds exist with different degrees of certainty and relevancy. They choose which of these multiple realities to participate in and with what degree of belief. Since belief is always one of degree, some realities have a greater sense of permanence and coerciveness for actors than do other realities.

In summary, social studies programs themselves represent multiple realities from which to apprehend man. Any reality selected by program developers is a coordinate within which a view of the social world can be transmitted and developed. This reality constrains student and teacher thinking by providing them with one mode-of-being among many which are possible. Further, within these broad reality definitions are more specific thought models which also are reality coordinates within social studies programs.

Thought Models

> . . . If we wish to make pictures of the world according to a particular scheme, then we must follow the rules of that scheme. This is not to say that the scheme determines what must be the form of the actual pictures we draw, but it does decide what pictures are possible (Watson, 1960:238).

Other reality coordinates which define in part the program developers' standpoint of the Here are general thought models used within programs. Any one of the multiple realities selected by program developers may consist of multiple thought models which constrain how teachers and students will interpret man and the social world (e.g., Feldman and Seifman, 1969:167-250). Mannheim contends that an individual reflects upon any object or event via some thought model—"behind every definite question and answer is implicitly or explicitly to be found a model of how fruitful thinking can be carried out" (1936:275-276). Considerable support and expansion for this contention is found in Belth's thesis which states that all thinking (e.g., acts of consciousness such as describing, explaining, inferring, interpreting) must occur within the constraining context of socially constructed models (1965, 1966). These thought models differ from the stocks of knowledge, methodologies, and roles discussed under approaches to man (Chapter II, Part I) because the latter are used to actively carve up the social world, whereas thought models are the constraints (e.g., boundary conditions) within which this thinking and describing occurs. Programs are based upon and provide students with a variety of thought models derived from various sources such as social science disciplines, psychological theories, religious traditions, national goals, and even the political aspirations of program developers. Three such thought models are selected as illustrations.

Subject organization. The organizing context of a program (e.g., interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, unidisciplinary) provides a thought model for constraining experiences of man. Needless to say, the manner in which the subject-matter about man is organized in a program not only reflects the program developers' orientation to the social world, but is a contextual parameter imposed upon the thinking of students and teachers. Maruyama argues that underlying any conceptualization and organization of information is a logic or thought model which in turn organizes the individual's mental universe and structures his perception (1965; 1972a; 1974c; c.f., Kaufman, 1960:3). Further, authors such as Bernstein (1971), Young (1971b,c), and Keddie (1971) have emphasized the reality control factor inherent within various program organizations, on the assumption that through subject organization the actor's consciousness is

> . . . structured into symbolic zones. This is essentially what happens when children are introduced to the 'mapped out' theoretical zones of knowledge called 'subjects.' These are particular theoretical relevance systems which contain certain questions and assumptions about phenomena and a preference system for the testing of reality (Esland, 1971a:80).

Subject organization is both a conceptual and an operational thought model for organizing the social world. As a conceptual model, it provides a "conception of the general nature of things" upon which an individual's perception of social reality may come to be based (Polanyi, 1964:10). It is a taken-for-granted structure which is imposed upon the reality experienced by teachers and students. As an operational model, it provides a general approach which governs reality constructing. In other words, a subject organization provides to actors 'a picture' of the social world as well as a conceptual tool concerning how that world should be acted upon.

Rules of inference and description. Thought models within programs include typologies, classification systems, and methods which provide rules for description (i.e., explanation and interpretation) and for inference, acceptable procedures for verifying knowledge about man, frameworks for organizing and interpreting experience of the social world, and the specialized language necessary for describing man in terms of social studies discourse. Descriptions of man and of events within the social world are the products of inferences and descriptions, which in turn are based upon

> . . . a set of ideas about the nature of the world and the relationships in it. Systems of knowledge are collections of explanations of the relatedness of A and B . . . which have been needed either to explain or predict B or to determine what to do to get from circumstance A to B. Individual explanations of events will differ according to the different systems of knowledge (Willer, 1971:18).

Explanation occurs when a student relates observed relations in the social world with a set of theoretic relations (i.e., statements of causal, functional, or structural relationships which 'explain' or 'predict' the observable relationships) (De Gré, 1970:664; Willer, 1971:33). However, the way in which data are interrelated (i.e., the connections imposed upon A and B) may differ depending upon the thought model accepted as legitimate or relevant. For example, different invented classification schemes are used to organize data in terms of regularity, uniformity, rank, and interrelationships of various kinds in order to treat data in terms of equivalences rather than uniqueness. "Facts are first constituted in relation to the standards that establish them" (Habermas, 1971:309), for a student can only define a social fact as seen from some thought model (Horton, 1970a:602). The fact emerges in relation to a method, a rule, a theory, an ordering category, or a set of relationships. Schutz concludes that:

> All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artifical abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. . . . This does not mean that, in daily life or in science, we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that we grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant to use either for carrying on our business of living or from the point of view of a body of accepted rules of procedure of thinking called the method of science (1973:5).

In short, underlying any conception of man within social studies are the taken-for-granted schemes of observation and the socially constructed methods which determine in part the coordinates for how the social world is to be experienced, what inferences can be made, and what descriptions are possible.

Guiding questions. Programs provide thought models by the overarching questions imposed on social phenomena. Such questions give directions to students and teachers, and may also imply certain methods (i.e., ends-mean relationships) and an acceptable range of answers. For example, just to ask the question "why" is to presuppose explanations, reasons, relationships, criteria, and rules which are imputed to social situations in the course of answering the question and drawing conclusions. The question selected, therefore, establishes coordinates within which to observe, interpret, and act upon fellowman.

In summary, within any one of the multiple realities selected as a general coordinate for viewing man (e.g., science, religion, fable) there are multiple thought models (e.g., subject organization, rules, questions) which are also selected by program developers. These thought models are reality coordinates within programs by providing actors with limiting categories for perceiving and thinking about social reality.

Horizon of Awareness

> The explicit and inarticulate awareness of the world pervades all our activities and enters into them as their most general, though unformulated, 'premise' or 'presupposition.' Correspondingly, the world, silently accepted as a matter of course, proves to be the ground upon which we pursue all our activities, whatever their orientation (Gurwitsch, 1966:351).

Another reality coordinate which defines in part the standpoint of the Here for actors is the horizon of awareness of man and the social world which they have.[17] A world-conception underlies all discourse and is presupposed by individuals in any immediate act directed towards specific things, events, people, or ideas (Combs and Snygg, 1959; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Chapman, 1966). Although they experience changes in attention to man and the social world, and even momentary disorientation, actors do so with a sense of a wholistic social world which undergirds their experience of selected aspects of it and which is continuous though their orientations toward it shift.

A social studies program in its entirety presents to teachers and students a horizon of awareness concerning man and the social world. This horizon provides unity and meaning to the multiple realities and thought models used in social studies, for though subject-object relations shift, the actor's world-conception does not. Indeed, if it were not for the horizon of awareness which an entire program represents (and which actors bring with them to a program), the multiple realities, thought models, and perspectives applied to the study of man would result in utter chaos, to say the least. Different perspectives can be developed and adopted over time because the background horizon of the social world provides a basis for and a unity among the manifold intentions and outlooks that an actor may adopt in social studies. The consequence of this awareness of an all-embracing whole and unity of the world is that immediate social studies experiences and viewpoints need not be random, but may be merged together and cumulative.

This horizon is the implicit background coordinate of the multiple realities and thought models selected and used as parameters for a view on man, and as a result, cannot be identified specifically because of its all-encompassing character. It is the general symbolic universe which is presupposed in all programs and which in very broad strokes defines social reality in its entirety for actors (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:92-128). It is the widest reality coordinate in which program developers, teachers, and students not only practice social studies, but live and die.

In summary, the standpoint of the Here consists of reality coordinates within which a program's particular view of man are situated and transmitted. Reality coordinates defined as multiple realities, thought models, and a horizon of awareness within social studies programs set limits upon that which appears as the phenomenon of man, that which is experienced of man, and the meaning which is attributed to man by teachers and students. Legitimate social reality is defined and transmitted within these coordinates by program developers.

A question can now be asked as to why transmitted perspectives are accepted and believed by teachers and students (Schutz, 1971:131-134). Unlike reality coordinates which tend to provide boundaries within which views on man are to be developed by teachers and students, plausibility structures are designed to still the doubts of the questioners and to help them accept as taken-for-granted the viewpoint of a program.

C. PLAUSIBILITY STRUCTURES (PERSPECTIVE MAINTENANCE)

> As long as he remains within the plausibility structure, the individual feels himself to be ridiculous whenever doubts about the reality concerned arise subjectively. He knows that others would smile at him if he voiced them. He can silently smile at himself, mentally shrug his shoulders—and continue to exist within the world thus sanctioned (Berger, 1967:155).

The Here of one's situation not only consists of multiple social locations and reality coordinates within which perspectives on man are developed and transmitted, but also consists of plausibility structures designed to maintain the legitimacy and credibility of those viewpoints.[18] Without social support for a point of view, a person tends to doubt the certitude of any position which he formerly had taken-for-granted, especially at those times when he is confronted with strangers whose perspectives differ from his own, or when he encounters novelty (e.g., some situation which is not accountable from his perspective) to such an extent that a perspective breakdown occurs (e.g., Kuhn, 1970; Castaneda, 1972, 1974). Actors do not hold all of their viewpoints with equal certainty because the degree of perspective plausibility depends upon the strength of its supporting structures. Some of their views are tenuous and vague, whereas others are rooted in certainty to the degree that there is consistent and continuous support provided. On the basis of its continuing plausibility, therefore, a social studies program is implemented by teachers, supported by parents, and considered to be important by students.

Program developers utilize supporting structures to maintain the program's view of man for teachers and students who both are confronted with alternative views. It is not enough to provide reality coordinates within which to transmit an outlook to teachers and students without also providing plausibility for that viewpoint. If there is no guard against other views, then the perspective of a program becomes just one more point of view within a society characterized by pluralism. With a degree of support the reality view may attain the status of an unquestioned certainty for those group members who share a particular program.

There are two life-world theses upon which the plausibility of reality views concerning man, or any other view for that matter, depend: (1) the thesis of the natural standpoint and (2) the thesis of the intersubjective standpoint. Both theses underly social studies programs and account for why views on man are so rarely questioned by teachers and students. Plausibility structures identifiable within a program are designed to maintain as real and unquestioned both the naturalness and intersubjectivity of certain perspectives for teachers and students over that of other, and possibly competing, outlooks.

Plausibility Structures to Maintain the Thesis of the Natural Standpoint

> Doubts, fears, anxieties, questions, hypotheses all presuppose the thesis of the natural attitude because, in varying ways, they all take-for-granted the being of the world-totality of which some special part arises to be questioned, doubted, interrogated. But the doubting, inquiring, researching is itself within the world investigated and the investigation is always into something (Natanson, 1966a:4).

The premise which undergirds an individual's acts, views, and realities in daily life is what Husserl first called "the thesis of the natural standpoint" (1962:91-100), and is referred to variously by other phenomenologists as "the universal presupposition" (Gurwitsch, 1966:419) and "the natural attitude" (Schutz, 1944:551; 1972:3; 1975:27-28; Natanson, 1966a; Berger and Luckman, 1967:19-28). This general thesis states that the social world as experienced by the actor, and his interpretations of it, are to be accepted in general without question on the belief that the world is as it appears. It is the taken-for-granted and even unformulated acceptance of the world in which he finds himself; it is the belief that objects are experienced as they are in themselves, unaffected by human intentionality and perspective (Gurwitsch, 1966:351). It is difficult to make this presupposition problematic in order to examine reflectively the basis of the actor's views and experience because he is rooted in the social world primarily as a participant rather than as an observer (Psathos, 1973:14). Only when the world's giveness as-it-appears-to-me is disrupted in some way, as Garfinkel (1967) and other ethnomethodologists have demonstrated, is this thesis no longer operative and does reality and perspective become problematic for the individual.

This thesis constitutes a fundamental premise for social studies program development. Such activity is presupposed on someone's belief that the social world is as he experiences it with his fellowman, and as the various disciplines describe it for him. The construction of programs on the basis of someone's interests, presuppositions, and approaches directed to man is not made explicit, and the concepts and methods utilized for describing man tend to remain unquestioned as if these structures were somehow in the world apart from the activity of man. Doubt concerning the nature of educational realities is suspended within the natural attitude. For example, beliefs defined within educational literature concerning the nature of the student, knowledge, and society (or any other phenomena for that matter) are accepted without question often by program developers as the starting point for their activities. It is not suprising, then, that within social studies programs this thesis of the natural standpoint is extended to views concerning man himself. The image of man presented may be assumed within a program to be man himself rather than some group's perspective on man.

A program's perspective will be accepted as natural initially because teachers and students bring the thesis of the natural standpoint into the classroom. The program is simply there to be unquestionably accepted by them. However, identifiable plausibility structures designed to maintain as natural an outlook on man over time are (a) legitimizations, (b) isolation from alternative views, (c) reifications of knowledge , and (d) appeals to significant others.

Legitimizations. Legitimizations are a major plausibility structure utilized to maintain as natural a particular point of view on man. Defined as the "more or less systematized explanations, justifications, and theories in support of the conception in question," legitimizations are specifically "designed to convince people that what they are being told to do is not only the prudent thing, but also the only right and salutory one" (Berger, 1969:51). As classroom practice is legitimized often on a particular view of the student that supposedly informs teachers why certain activities should be performed in favour of other activities, so program perspectives on man may themselves be legitimized by more encompassing reality and society definitions which explain why man is as such. Program developers justify their perspectives also by appealing to what are variously referred to in their programs as psychological theories, educational philosophies, theologies, political and national goals, societal trends and needs, evaluation reports, curriculum rationales, student typologies, discipline knowledge , norm-bases testing and measurement, and social research. Such sources for legitimizations serve to justify the way in which man is defined and apprehended by program developers and to support their views as being more plausible than the points of view of others. A perspective may attain a reasonableness and naturalness for teachers and students when supported by these legitimizations.

Legitimizations do not only help to maintain the plausibility of a program's perspective, but also serve the interests and reflect the presuppositions inherent within the program. Psychological legitimizations, for example, may be selected by program developers to justify a viewpoint because these serve the developers' interest and fit with his beliefs (Lee, 1969; Macdonald, 1975). Legitimizations within a program are themselves socially constructed on the basis of a value position concerning what man and society should be and how this ideal should be achieved.

Isolation from alternative views. Plausibility may also be maintained through isolation from alternative and potentially competing viewpoints. Especially if the program developers themselves represent a cognitive minority, a program may present one perspective only and not admit the possibility or legitimacy of other positions. A cognitive minority is

> . . . a group of people whose view of the world differs significantly from the one generally taken-for-granted in their society. Put differently, a cognitive minority is a group formed around a body of deviant 'knowledge' (Berger, 1969:19).

For example, in Alberta a program developer could represent a religious, political, or philosophical cognitive minority vis-à-vis a view on man. Isolation may be necessary if the plausibility of a viewpoint considered by the majority to be deviant is to be maintained, because students and teachers may doubt and compromise the program's beliefs concerning man when faced with those outlooks which do not support the cognitive minority.

Whether program developers represent a cognitive minority or majority, the presentation of one perspective on man within a program, and the consequent isolation from alternative views, maintains thinking-as-usual for teachers and students. Obviously, this isolation has an important implication for teachers and students: to see in one way is also at the same time a way of not seeing (Pirsig, 1974:4). For the sake of maintaining its plausibility, a program must represent some degree of commitment on the part of the developers to seeing the social world in a particular manner and to not seeing man in other ways.

James says that as long as beliefs about an object remain uncontradicted, that object "is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality"; conversely, objects are disbelieved if they are in contradiction with other viewpoints or with those presuppositions which an actor holds strongly (1904:298). In either case, belief and disbelief are both stable senses of reality. It is difficult for him to doubt anything that has a continuing coerciveness and that captures his attention because it persists uncontradicted over various acts of consciousness. This stability is maintained as long as he does not encounter alternatives. As such, his perspective is considered to be adequate as long as it allows him to make sense of the social world and to share that lived-world with others in terms of the particular purposes at hand which he may have. The discovery of anomaly (i.e., competing perspectives or else something in the situation with which the perspective is inadequate to account for) breaks the actor's thinking-as-usual and places his schemes of reference in question for him. Consequently, the methodologies and knowledge within a program may be selected in such a way as to present one viewpoint and to keep actors from experiencing other contradictory points of view.[19]

Reifications of knowledge. Isolation from alternative views may tend to provide plausibility for perspective on man by means of reification.[20] Teachers and students may take-for-granted to such an extent the one outlook of a program that they absolutize it, that is, make it either the world as it is in itself, or else the only possible legitimate interpretation of the social world. This absolutizing of a viewpoint not only causes actors to fail to recognize other perspectives, but also to resist such a possibility. Assuming that all other individuals hold to the same outlook, actors judge everything in terms of their own truths, authorities, methods, and schemes of reference conceived by them as being universally applicable. It is thus difficult for them to recognize perspectivism as an aspect of the life-world.

To refer to ideas about man within programs as scientific or sociological, without describing also what is meant by such terms, is to mystify for students particular reality organizations, and even to facilitate the reification of knowledge for them. This reification obscures the social origins of ideas and outlooks (i.e., beliefs are developed, transmitted, and maintained in groups) and thereby imputes to them an unquestioned and absolute status (Esland, 1971a:99). As a consequence, various views of man which students bring with them to a program may be subordinated to and fitted within the dominating program perspective because it represents a more legitimate way of organizing reality. A vicious circle ensues. The reified outlooks and knowledge , though themselves socially constructed, tend to be self-verifying for students when applied to defining and describing social data. Berger argues that in psychology "if the model corresponds to the psychological reality as socially defined and produced, it will quite naturally be verified by empirical investigation of this reality" (1970:380). A perspective becomes self-fulfilling in the actor's experience because he uses it not only to define what a phenomenon is, but also as a scheme of observation and interpretation for the phenomenon. To illustrate, if the schemes used for viewing man within social studies programs are general systems or Freudian metaphors, then that which is deemed relevant concerning man, as well as how it is to be defined and investigated, support one another. What he sees is what his framework allows him to see. The solution of a problem, or the answer to a question, strengthens the underlying point of view in the experience of teacher and student because reality and outlook have come into closer agreement for them. On the assumption of the truth and trustworthiness of a program's perspective, teachers and students do their social studies with confidence, and thereby confirm the program's reality view in experience.

Appeals to significant others. Individuals who in some way have significance for an actor are depended upon for reaffirming his notions about the social world. For example, the maintenance of a student's view on war may depend upon a teacher, his position on music upon a certain group of friends, and his outlook on the meaning of man upon a religious group. Within each of these groups with whom he shares membership, ongoing conversation reaffirms the naturalness of his reality and keeps him from being attracted to deviant realities. Many of a student's perspectives are developed in varying degree on the authority of other people, and are maintained as natural because these significant others continuously confirm his views (Cohen, 1964: 101; Berger and Luckmann, 1967:150-151; Berger, 1969:19,53).

A supporting community may be directly invoked or implicitly assumed by program developers to lend credibility to an interpretation of man within a program. Sundry experts (e.g., those official reality definers such as pilot teachers, educational psychologists, disciplinarians, authors of best selling books, and politicians) are appealed to in bibliographies, quotations and references, and methods utilized within a program. Because of the language (e.g., scientific terminology and technical jargon) which experts use, the institutions (e.g., government, universities, foundations) which they represent, and the labels (e.g., titles and degrees) which they carry, the "weight and prestige given to their expertise is considerable" (Apple, 1974:15). When appealed to within a program, experts appear to lend support and authority to the position taken by program developers. Without this supporting community of authorities who seem to confirm a program's perspective on man, the taken-for-grantedness of its reality views would be threatened over time by alternative viewpoints.

Regardless of the supporting community chosen by program developers, the plausibility of a program's reality definitions will never be equally as strong for all students and teachers simply because significant others are not the same for everyone. Significant others differ depending upon the reality in question and the individual doing the questioning; consequently, whom a program appeals to for support may have little significance to a teacher whose own viewpoint may be maintained by a different community.

Plausibility Structures to Maintain the Thesis of the Intersubjective Standpoint

> I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural attitude of others, that they also comprehend the objectifications by which this world is ordered. . . . I know that there is an ongoing correspondence between my meanings and their meanings in this world, that we share a common sense about its reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:23).

Not only are there plausibility structures designed to maintain the naturalness (i.e., to keep a viewpoint unquestioned) of a social studies program's perspective on man, but also to maintain the intersubjectivity (i.e., to keep a viewpoint shared) of that perspective among those actors who encounter the program. A premise of men in the life-world is that it exists as common for all: "World-experience is not my private, but shared experience" (Schutz, 1975:54). Members of any group share reality in an unproblematic fashion only when their beliefs rest on sets of typifications acquired and held intersubjectively. As long as these reciprocal typifications through which the everyday commonsense world is set.

constructed can be continuously shared with fellowmen, experience is routine and taken-for-granted (Walsh, 1972b:18).

The sharing of similar perspectives and realities within a group, however, needs to be initially developed and continuously maintained. As such, there are plausibility structures designed to suspend doubt and thereby to keep unquestioned for group members the thesis of the intersubjective standpoint. Similarly, there needs to be structures within a social studies program to facilitate the development of intersubjectivity among actors vis-à-vis the program's outlook. Once this intersubjectivity is developed to some extent, there need to be structures which keep actors from emigrating from that group shared viewpoint. Plausibility structures within a program referred to here as (a) controlled conversation networks and (b) the development of commitment are designed to develop the intersubjectivity of a viewpoint among teachers and students, whereas plausibility structures referred to as (c) therapy and (d) nihilism are designed specifically to keep ongoing the shared viewpoint. The primary plausibility structure for any program viewpoint, however, is (e) the relevance of plausibility itself to the actor. Plausibility structures designed to keep a program's view as natural and intersubjective do overlap and do serve the same purpose of suspending the doubts of teachers and students, should questions arise concerning its perspective on man.

Controlled conversation networks. Central to phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge is the premise that perspectives are continuously clarified, affirmed, and modified through the ongoing conversational networks actors share with members of various groups (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:152-154; Berger and Kellner, 1971; Schutz, 1970a:163-244). Berger comments that:

> Plausibility, in the sense of what people actually find credible, of views of reality depends upon the social support these receive. . . . We obtain our notions about the world originally from other human beings, and these notions continue to be plausible to us in a very large measure because others continue to affirm them. . . . It is in conversation, in the broadest sense of the word, that we build up and keep going our view of the world. It follows that this view will depend upon the continuity and consistency of such conversation and that it will change as we change conversation partners (1969:50).

To maintain a reality which has been constructed or imposed within a group, conversation is necessary, for if something is never talked about, the sense of reality it has for group members tends to become vague. Reality is thus changed as certain things are stressed and other things are neglected in ongoing conversation.

Program developers initially come together as strangers because of unshared biographies and outlooks; however, through conversation during the act of program development they may reinterpret their own definitions of man and develop to some degree a shared view (Cosin, et al., 1971:1). A position on man and on the social world is implicitly defined and upheld by them because conversation among actors must presuppose a reality within which the conversation itself makes sense to each participant. "Most conversation does not in so many words define the nature of the world," state Berger and Luckmann, because conversation "takes place against the background of a world that is silently taken-for-granted" (1967:153). Within a view shared through conversation, they select and justify their projects and activities which comprise program development (Chapter III).

Part of a program's plausibility structure, therefore, are the means designed for controlling the conversational networks in which teachers and students negotiate reality definitions. Maintenance of a program's perspective on man depends in part upon what transpires in the communication channels among those who utilize the program. Thus program developers may specify the vocabulary and the schemes of reference through which reality is to be verbally negotiated and defined by teachers and students, the topics for dicussions, the definition of problems and solutions, the search-methods and questions for approaching the social world, the groups to interact with, and the sources from which to seek information. Kuhn's description of science education as paradigm bound illustrates controlled conversation networks in which a student's conversation partners and information sources are limited in order to insure that the legitimate reality views are transmitted and maintained (1970; 1972c). Similarly, few program developers, as evidenced by many Canadian provincial program guides and by some commercially prepared programs, appear to be willing to include a plausibility structure in programs which encourages students to examine various perspectives on man, to clarify and to modify their own positions, and even to develop alternatives to that presented within a program (Aoki, et al., 1974). The implicit rules for conversation would appear to favour conversation networks which transmit and maintain a point of view deemed legitimate by program developers rather than those which tend to clarify or develop pluralism.

Program developers may also control the conversation networks among teachers through inservice workshops, professional journals and newsletters, conferences, and suggested background readings. Implementation activities are attempts to have teachers share the same ways of seeing man and the social world, and of practicing social studies within it, as do the program developers (c.f., Kuhn, 1970:4). Display material and techniques suggested or prescribed within a program tend to unify the ongoing reality definitions which occur in classroom communication among teachers and students.

Development of commitment. Implicit within plausibility structures is the aim of securing commitment on the part of teachers and students to seeing and acting in the social world in a particular way. If any program is to be utilized as designed by program developers, a commitment is required to the mode of apprehending man the program represents, and to the silent background presuppositions, interests, and approaches within which the program is to be taken-for-granted by actors. A shared program perspective provides cohesiveness and social control to the classroom community of social studies students and teachers simply because a relative unanimity of schemes of reference allows them to get on with the job rather than considering competing outlooks and questioning constantly the interpretations applied to man by a program. If unanimous commitment were obtained the result would be a very closed community insulated from external cognitive universes.

How does commitment to a program's outlook develop? The relationship between a perspective and the group in which it is developed and maintained is intrinsically circular. That is, a perspective is what group members share, and conversely, a group is characterized by those who share a perspective.[21] Without the stocks of knowledge provided by a program there could be no immediately shared social studies experience, for these schemes initially unify students and teachers in studying man by providing typifications for focussing their attention and for construing their experience of the social world in a similar manner. Over time a view of man is developed and shared within the group through their ongoing conversation; however, this shared perspective acts back upon the group by providing a cohesiveness to the group. It may be difficult for an actor to distinguish between perspective and group when called upon to give reasons for the viewpoint he holds. In a sense, he is being asked to justify the character of the group of which he is a member and of which he is committed to in some degree because of shared reality views.

An example of the development and the role of commitment as a plausibility structure is to be found in Kuhn's description of a scientific community's commitment to the paradigm underlying their activity and thought (1970). Such commitment provides the community with the certainty of success and the motivation necessary for engaging in minute puzzle-solving problems. Only by committing themselves to the paradigmatic presuppositions and taking them for granted, can the group construct the elaborate problem-specific instrumentation and conceptualization needed. In similar manner, over time a social studies program may provide increasingly a degree of unity and control to a group of students, for as they utilize a program they may tend to share similar ways of seeing the social world and of practicing social studies within it. Common interests, presuppositions, and approaches related to man may develop among them, especially if teachers accept the premise that "teaching essentially involves the intention of changing the consciousness of pupils towards acceptance of the realities marked out in curricula" (Esland, 1971a:71).

Therapy: Further plausibility structures within a program are the use of therapy and nihilism by program developers (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:108-116). As long as a program's perspective is socially shared and taken-for-granted within a classroom, students and teachers can utilize with some degree of confidence the program's schemes of reference for interpreting social life. However, because programs are placed often within situations comprising various conversational networks and contradictory or competing viewpoints on man, the taken-for-grantedness of the program's reality definitions may be threatened unless there exists within the program certain structures to counteract deviance. In other words, because no one reality definition related to the social world is universally accepted, structures such as therapy and nihilism are necessary to counteract the influence of alternative perspectives.

Therapy refers to practices used to suspend doubt which has already occurred and to curb further deviance from the program's perspective. Such activities are designed "to ensure that actual or potential deviants stay within the institutionalized definitions of reality, or, in other words, to prevent the inhabitants of a given universe from emigrating" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:113; c.f., Berger, 1969:51; Schutz, 1970a:87). Included in these therapeutic practices are techniques such as value clarification (Stewart, 1975), selected textbooks and assigned readings which support a program and minimize deviance, diagnostic testing and evaluations which specify clear-cut conditions and criteria for defining and detecting deviance, and numerous cybernetic (i.e., in the general systems sense of a "steermanship" metaphor) practices such as awards and marks, programmed instruction, and behavioral objectives designed to structure a student's perspective so that the legitimate program views are maintained under minimal threat. For teachers a program's outlook may be reinforced and given superior status over other points of view by means of such therapeutic rituals as inservice workshops in which program developers still teacher doubts, school visits and program evaluations from personnel whose titles denote expertise and hence who appear to lend credibility to the program, and by membership in specialized teacher groups which give a program's position consistent and continuous support. For the community at large, including parents and various interest groups, the credibility of a program's views are assured by public evaluation reports. These rituals aimed at treating and eliminating a loss of plausibility differ very little from the practices used by scientific or religious groups for maintaining their realities (c.f., Berger, 1969; Kuhn, 1970).

Nihilism. Against these deviant perspectives to which a program's therapy cannot be successfully applied, program developers may employ nihilism and thereby attempt to abolish any threat which they suppose such competing positions may provide to the program. Competitive perspectives can be 'explained away' by either being incorporated into the dominant perspective of the program, or failing that, more subtly assigned an "inferior ontological status, and thereby a not-to-be-taken-seriously cognitive status" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:121,115). Defining alternative views as being of no real consequence tends to neutralize threat to program definitions of reality and tends to maintain these as superior.[22]

Methods of nihilism whereby alternative reality interpretations are given a negative status and are set apart as deviant are based generally on the assumption that anyone who does not hold to a particular belief is in some way inferior or suspect. A program may contain terminology which suggests that the outlooks of other programs or social groups are in some way related to philosophical or psychological error, ignorance of current research, ambiguity, out-datedness, incompleteness, irrationality, and so forth (Mannheim, 1936:7; Schutz, 1970a:86-87). Maruyama says that because actors do not doubt generally the correctness of their own positions (and even sometimes are not aware that various perspectives can be brought to any issue), it is a natural response for each person to blame the other for being immoral, unethical, illogical, deceptive, insincere, or superstitious when communication difficulties arise (1962a; 1963b; 1971:13; 1974c:3). Such reactions can be expected, conclude Combs and Snygg, because anyone's perspective represents a view partial to particular interests, presuppositions, approaches, and background experiences:

> So strong is our feeling of reality with respect to our perceptual field that we seldom question it. We accept that how it seems

> to us must truly be so. When others do not see things as we do, we are quite likely to jump to the conclusion that they must be either stupid or perverse; for what is right and proper seems to us so clear with respect to our own observation that no other conclusion seems warranted (1959:22).

If it is unlikely that the reality assumed about man by program developers will be uniform in all classrooms, then nihilism may be utilized in programs to help maintain plausibility in the face of perspective pluralism.

It is not enough for a program to contain therapeutic and nihilistic practices for treating deviance without also an explanation as to why it should be recognized. In other words, the program's own perspective on man needs to be accounted for in some way in order to show it to be superior and to justify the need for therapy or nihilism when its definitions are threatened by pluralism (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:113). How a program accounts for its own perspective requires a conceptual basis referred to already in this section as legitimizations.

Relevance of plausibility to the actor. One can still ask a question concerning what motives prompt teachers and students to accept unquestionably as natural and intersubjective some or all aspects of a program's perspective, whereas at rare times to suspend these two theses and to subject part of the program's view to question. Simply put, an actor isolates some aspect of his world and subjects it to inquiry only to the degree which is relevant in terms of his interest at hand:

> It is our interest at hand that motivates all our thinking, projecting, acting, and therewith establishes the problems to be solved by our thoughts and the goals to be attained by our

> actions. In other words, it is our interest that breaks asunder the unproblematic field of the unknown into various zones of various relevance with respect to such interest, each of them requiring a different degree of precision of knowledge (Schutz, 1971:124).

Similarly, James asks the question "Under what circumstances do we think things real?" and then goes on to specify the conditions of belief:

> (1) Coerciveness over attention, or the mere power to possess consciousness;
> (2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in the way of exciting pleasure or pain;
> (3) Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to arouse active impulses, the more instinctive the better;
> (4) Emotional interest, as object of love, dread, admiration, desire, etc.;
> (5) Congruity with certain favorite forms of contemplation— unity, simplicity, permanence, and the like;
> (6) Independence of other causes, and its own causal importance (1904:300).

Both James and Schutz emphasized that plausibility (i.e., not being subject to doubt) of anything depends in large part upon the actor's interests and consequent relevances.

The degree of plausibility required by the actor also depends upon his interest at hand. That which has emotional interest and importance (such as objects of love, admiration, fear, pleasure, pain, dread, blame, hope, faith, hate) and that which is related to his acts as either means or as ends inspires belief and a strong sense of reality (James, 1904:295-300). As such, some objects have more reality than others for him because they are of more interest and value and he gives his attention to them:

> . . . whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our minds with it, or practically take account of it, so far it is real for us, and we believe it. Whenever, on the contrary, we ignore it, fail to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject it, forget it, so far it is unreal for

> us and disbelieved (James, 1904:295).

For example, all that has little emotional significance or immediate interest fades into a sense of unreality and finally into oblivion:

> The thought of falling when we walk along a curbstone awakens no emotion of dread; so no sense of reality attaches to it, and we are sure we shall not fall. On a precipice's edge, however, the sickening emotion which the notion of a possible fall engenders makes us believe in the latter's imminent reality, and quite unfits us to proceed (James, 1904:307).

In other words, "whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt," says James, and "whatever things fail to establish this connection are things which are practically no better for me than if they existed not at all" (1904:298).

Therefore, the plausibility of a program's view of man will finally depend upon the teachers and students themselves. It is their relevances which are the final plausibility structure. To carry on social-studies-as-usual does not require teachers to hold clear ideas concerning that which underlies a program. Rather, they only need enough knowledge of it and enough plausibility for it to carry on a class, to get through the day, to fulfill their immediate plans. For example, in terms of a teacher's practical purposes of keeping students occupied for eighty-two minutes and for 'covering' a particular social issue with them, certain relevances are established. Understanding or questioning of a program perspective on man may be highly irrelevant, whereas finding activities for students may be highly relevant. At his level of interest, that which is relevant may be

> . . . a knowledge of recipes indicating how to bring forth in typical situations typical results by typical means. The recipes

> indicate procedures which can be trusted even though they are not clearly understood. By following the prescription as if it were a ritual, the desired result can be attained without questioning why the single procedural steps have to be taken and taken exactly in the sequence prescribed. This vagueness is still sufficiently precise for the practical purpose at hand (Schutz, 1971:122).

However, if a parent should question the outlook on man taken-for-granted by the teacher, or if a student should question the approach taken to the social world, immediately the contours of relevance shift for the teacher. What was formerly highly irrelevant now becomes of primary importance, whereas the trustworthy recipes of a few moments ago and the vague awareness of the program perspective on man may be no longer relevant to the purpose at hand. He needs to find not what the program's view is typically, but what its specific presuppositions and plausibility are. He may use other recipe knowledge to inform him where to go for information at times such as this. He need only telephone the department of education consultants, those typical experts typically available who can be trusted to solve typically such typical problems. Therefore, a program perspective on man is questioned only when the teachers' or students' interests shift so that more knowledge concerning the outlook is deemed relevant by them for maintaining plausibility.

In summary, the theses of the natural and the intersubjective standpoints are assumed rather than explicitly formulated in both life-world and social studies realities. There are plausibility structures designed to keep actors from questioning the established routines and interpretations of situations based upon these theses (Schutz, 1972:3; Apple, 1973:5). As long as a program's viewpoint on man is maintained as natural and intersubjective by these plausibility structures, there need be no justification for the interests, presuppositions, and approaches directed to man, and social studies experience remains taken-for-granted by teachers and students.

In Part II (The Standpoint of the Here) it was argued that the standpoint of the Thus (Part I) is situated within a context defined as the standpoint of the Here. The schemes of reference (interests, presuppositions, and approaches) used within social studies programs for interpreting man and the social world are developed, transmitted, and maintained within the general contextual structures of a perspective briefly described as social locations, reality coordinates, and plausibility structures. When identifying perspectives within social studies programs, therefore, one needs to ask what are those structures within which the schemes of reference used in the program for defining man are rooted. Besides the standpoint of the Here, a further context which is integral to any point of view on man is the standpoint of the Now (Part III).

PART III. THE STANDPOINT OF THE NOW
(PERSPECTIVE INTENTIONALITY)

> The future is what I face with my body ahead of me, before me. As I move ahead towards this future, I am passing by things, and what I have passed by lies behind me in the past (Wild, 1964:23).

Consciousness is perspectivable because intentionality is directed to an object from the standpoint of the subject's Now, the lived-time in which he is situated.[23] Reality is not interpreted in the same way by all because the ongoing temporal dimension of consciousness forces each actor to bring order into and to interpret continuously the world. Lived-time makes the subject-object relation a continuous, variable, and changing experience because intentionality consists of moment by moment reality constructing and maintaining activities. It is from his Now that he makes coherent that which is being presented to his consciousness. In short, it is time which provides an active component to what it means to have a perspective.

Consequently, a perspective on man is not a static framework of schemes (Thus) located in some context (Here), but is an active and selective intentionality directed to man through time. An actor can give meaning to the world by imposing reasonableness upon it, defining its relationships, interpreting its events, and describing its varied aspects because his acts of consciousness apply schemes of reference. Consciousness defines reality and perceives and organizes the ongoing data of experience as intentionality is directed through frameworks (Thus) and from contexts (Here). The ever-present Now both unifies and "puts into motion" the Here and Thus by means of a stream of intentional acts. Man's experience of this standpoint of the Now can be explicated in terms of (A) a stream of intentionality and (B) selected acts of intentionality which constitute that stream.

A. STREAM OF INTENTIONALITY

The ongoing lived-time which characterizes the standpoint of the Now is referred to in the literature as a stream of consciousness (James, 1904:224-290; Schutz, 1970a:56-62; 1975:1-14), a sense of inner duration (James, 1904:605-642), and an awareness of growing older (Schutz, 1971:115). The Here, Now, and Thus are inseparable in experience. However, it is the stream of intentionality (i.e., stream of consciousness) which gives continuity to the various Heres from one moment to the next, and which allows the schemes of reference (Thus) to be applied in interpreting the social world. Consciousness merges the Here and the Thus in an imposition of meaning upon the world. According to Kaufman the standpoint of the thinker is the individual's immediate present into which his experiences of the past and of the anticipated future are transcended by being brought together into an unified outlook (1960:118). The stream of consciousness is what makes a perspective a changing and a continuous defining of the world.

The ever-present and ongoing Now which the metaphor of a stream is meant to convey has important implications for the phenomenon of perspective. This standpoint makes an outlook (1) irreversible, (2) cumulative, (3) unfinished, and (4) dialectical.

Perspective as Irreversible

> The mere fact that we grow older, that novel experiences emerge continuously within our stream of thought, that previous experiences are permanently receiving additional interpretive meanings in the light of these supervenient experiences, which have, more or less, changed our state of mind—all these basic features of our mental life bar a recurrence of the same. Being recurrent, the recurrent is not the same any more. Repetition might be aimed at and longed for: what belongs to the past can never be reinstated in another present exactly as it was (Schutz, 1971:115; c.f., 1970a:60-62).

An actor is aware that his experiences are irreversible, that his choices and acts accomplish something which cannot be changed by wishes and desires, that time provides a finality to what was once his present but now is his past, that his past cannot be returned to but can only be reflected upon, that he grows older, and that the continuous flow of inner time and the unidirectionality of all experience takes him along relentlessly toward the final project of death. In short, the Now constrains and compels him. He experiences his own consciousness as ongoing and his experience as irreversible (Wagner, 1973:65).

Perspective as Cumulative

> Consciousness never begins at a beginning, but with a mass of intentions which it inherits from the past and which are the result of previous conscious construction. It develops these further in the light of the urgencies of the situation in which it finds itself, and passes on its results to the future, where the work of the present construction is the starting-point for another act of consciousness (Grabau, 1965:153).

Consciousness cumulatively builds up schemes of reference and characteristic ways of interpreting and ordering the world because the Now includes that which was just past. Former experience receives added meaning by virtue of new experience and by virtue of reinterpretation. Experience of man and of the social world can be structured variously over time into regularities and patterns as an actor benefits from his past experience.

Perspective as Unfinished

The temporality of consciousness means that it has an unfinished character and that its views and ideas change. An actor is required by the Now to define and to interpret continuously the actions of others, to attach meanings to objects and to events, to anticipate situations, to reinterpret the past, and to intersubjectively negotiate the life-world via ongoing projects and typification schemes, because at any given moment his present, past, and anticipated future are never quite the same as that which was a moment before his present, past, or anticipated future.

Therefore, perspectives on man are constantly being made in the ongoing subject-object relation referred to as experience.[24] An actor's schemes of reference and his contexts are redefined and shifted because his experiences are cumulative and the situations he finds himself in are never more than typically similar. A viewpoint does not legislate a fixed way of experiencing an object, but is open-ended or unfinished as it emerges in the very midst of experience and as it is shaped in the stream of intentionality. As a combination of a person's past, present, and anticipated experiences, a point of view is progressively modified to suit the Here, Now, and Thus (Schutz, 1971:291; Wach, 1958:17-18). Ongoing subject-object relations disallow static outlooks.

Perspective as Dialectical

The relationship between consciousness and its context, as well as the relationship between subject and object, are dialectical.[25] Actors objectify their life-world via various typifications and projects through which they define its situations, order its objects, and interpret the actions of others. However, the object and the world thus objectified act back upon the individual, for he must now reckon with what he has constructed. Realities he defines in turn constrain his experiences and serve to modify or maintain his outlooks. In other words, the intentional act and the object of intention shape one another dialectically; past beliefs and accumulated experience form present belief and experience; the question of a questioner is shaped in the process of pursuing the question; points of view of individuals in dialogue appear constantly to each other in a different light; the perspective from which an actor defines reality is further influenced by the reality which is defined. This dialectical relation between subject and object is illustrated in the writing of a dissertation. A writer initially has a perspective on perspective; however, in the ensuing research and writing his perspective is shifted and at times drastically altered by what he reads and writes, which in turn changes what he writes and reads. An individual's outlook emerges continuously in the dialectical relation between subject and object.

A completed social studies program represents a "frozen slide" in the film, as it were, of the program developers' streams of intentionality. Their own perspectives on man continue to develop, whereas the outlook within a program remains static and open to reinterpretation over time by students, teachers, and program developers. However, evidence of program developers' streams of consciousness (i.e., the standpoint of the Now) is to be found in the particular acts of consciousness employed to make sense of man and the social world. These acts are fixed in the written language of a program.

B. ACTS OF INTENTIONALITY

A stream of consciousness consists of a continuous series of acts of consciousness. Reality is defined and constructed from some context (Here) and through selected schemes of reference (Thus) in a stream of intentional acts (Now). Though in this stream the boundaries among such intentional acts as judging, reflecting, choosing, ordering, and interpreting are indeterminate and in flux, two ideal types of such acts (i.e., typical modes of apprehending man and defining the social world) can be isolated as being relevant for social studies programs: (1) interpreting and (2) ordering that which appears concerning man and the social world.[26] Man can be related to within social studies programs in these fundamentally different ways with respect to reality outcomes. The premise underlying this distinction is that, as Grathoff states, "the intentionality of perceiving social objects has a structure different from the perceiving of visual (physical) objects" because social objects have inherent meaning which needs to be interpreted, whereas non-social objects need to be given meaning (1970:14). The social world includes man and the objects (e.g tools) which he makes according to some project, the ideas and situations he defines, and the social relations (e.g., roles and institutions) by which he organizes experience. The non-social world is that which man encounters as already there prior to the meaning he imposes upon it. Though the object of intention is different when one is considering the human as compared to the non-human, it is possible within a social studies program to view man through any perspective which program developers may wish, and thereby to blur this distinction. They can apprehend the social through the same modes and outlooks as they do the physical non-social world, or through viewpoints which distinguish between the social and the physical.

Ordering the Physical World

> We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may 'conquer' them. We are always conquering Nature, because 'Nature' is the name for what we have, to some extent, conquered. The price of conquest is to treat a thing as mere Nature. . . . As long as this process stops short of the final stage we may well hold that the gain outweighs the loss. But as soon as we take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the being who stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed are one and the same. This is one of the many instances where to carry a principle to what seems its logical conclusion produces absurdity (Lewis, 1965:83).

The physical world would be a chaotic pattern of events and objects if actors did not impose order upon it (Laszlo, 1972:15). Man must use various time and space coordinates, classification schemes, and explanations within which to organize his experience of things into consistent patterns, relationships, contrasts, harmonies, and comparisons because meaning is not inherent within the physical world prior to his acting upon it through projects and his defining it through language (Holzner, 1972:6). In perceiving an object such as a rock, an actor may impose any variety of typifications, as, for example, "quartz" or "diamond," which specifies typical meaning structures of color, hardness, composition, and social worth. Imposing a socially constructed typification gives order and meaning to an object which in itself has no inherent human meaning. Another simple illustration of ordering that which is non-human is a topographic map: by schemes of reference representing boundary, distance, contour, elevation, scale, by names given to mountains, valleys, rivers, and specified areas, by colors and numbers, and by location within larger contexts such as national topographic and grid systems, a geographer establishes coordinates for orienting himself and for imposing meaning upon an aspect of the world. Many different kinds of meanings could be imposed upon the same thing. A mountain which in itself has no meaning apart from that which is imposed upon it by typifications and acts may become the mountain-which-I-climbed-upon, the mountain-which-is-skiable, the mountain-which-looks-like-a-castle, or the mountain-of-the-gods. Similarly, program developers endow the physical world with human meaning and significance, and thereby construct out of it multiple realities, in relation to their projects and schemes.

The social world may be studied in the same manner as is the physical world. Wirth says that there are

> . . . some aspects of all social events that can be viewed externally as if they were things. But this should not lead to the inference that only those manifestations of social life which find expression in material things are real (1936:xix).

Students can search for external uniformities and regularities in social phenomena without regard primarily for inherent social meaning. They can reduce man to statistics or to broad typifications (e.g., middle-class or Afro-Asian), and they can impose meaning upon social objects apart from the perspectives, acts, and categories of meaning associated with the actors who constructed and maintain such objects. As such, ordering tends to neglect what the social world means to the actors who inhabit it, and tends to focus upon what it means to the observer in terms of his own acts and perspectives.

Interpreting the Human World

> I cannot understand a social thing without reducing it to the human activity which has created it and, beyond it, without referring this human activity to the motives out of which it springs. I do not understand a tool without knowing the purpose

> for which it was designed, a sign or a symbol without knowing what it stands for, an institution if I am unfamiliar with its goals, a work of art if I neglect the intentions of the artist which it realizes (Schutz, 1971:10).

Unlike the physical world to which man must give meaning, social things have been constructed according to projects and are imbued with meaning as they are acted upon. "Since social reality always originates in meaningful human actions, it continues to carry meaning even if it is opaque to the individual at a given time" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:197). As such, the significance of social phenomena is to be found in the projects and motives by which they are constructed and/or maintained in human acts. Only in accounting for social facts in this manner can they be interpreted differently than physical phenomena. To illustrate, a rock as an object of nature is made meaningful by ordering it in various ways depending upon the observer's purpose, whereas a piton embedded within the rock is understood as it is interpreted in terms of the intents and acts through which it was designed and constructed for some specific purpose. Similarly, carriers of meaning within the social world such as art, gestures, writing, artifacts, and social studies programs are expressions of man-world relationships in which men impose meaning upon situations in terms of multiple perspectives and from varying socio-historical contexts (Bultmann, 1955; Wach, 1958; Lonergan, 1972). To study such phenomena, one attempts to bracket in part his own perspective (or at least be aware of his bias) and to interpret the acts and viewpoints through which social reality was constituted as meaningful to other actors. In short, interpretation of meaning inherent within social things is an attempt to understand the acts and intents of fellowman (Chapter III, Part II).

Interpreting involves understanding the meaning which social constructions have for those who do the constructing. Social factors (whether tools, acts, or programs) are based upon motives according to which they were constructed and are maintained. Because one cannot understand always the in-order-to and because-of motives of actors as they do (this would require that interpreter and actors share the same stream of consciousness), and also become motives are never isolated (they remain part and parcel of larger plans and of more encompassing motives), interpretation is one of degree and generally is accomplished by imputing typical motives suitable for typical situations by typical actors. Schutz suggests that sometimes in order to understand the meaning of social realities,

> . . . it is sufficient to find typical motives of typical actors which explain the act as a typical one arising out of a typical situation. There is a certain conformity in the acts and motives of priests, soldiers, servants, farmers everywhere and at every-time. Moreover, there are acts of such a general type that it is sufficient to reduce them to 'somebody's' typical motives for making them understandable (1971:13).

Interpreting is an attempt to impute motive to social facts.

A question arises concerning why interpreting is a preferable approach for apprehending man and the social world than is ordering. Use of ordering or interpreting in social studies depends upon the purpose program developers, teachers, or students bring to the task. However, from a phenomenological standpoint interpreting remains more honest to the social world because it is an attempt to understand the meaning phenomena have for actors in their experience rather than in the experience of the observer alone. It is possible in describing the social world to substitute a fictional world (i.e., a world of the observer's own construction) for the world of common-sense experience, and to use schemes of reference which do not honestly describe human acts and meanings (Schutz, 1971:5). If the purpose of social studies is to interpret that which is "social," then the methods and the schemes utilized in so doing should be appropriate for understanding man's experience in the social world. However, if the mode of apprehending man and the social world largely disregards this difference between ordering and interpreting, then the social world may be distorted, and man may cease to be viewed as an intentional actor who constructs his realities through different projects and perspectives. Man then becomes a "black-box" to be processed rather than understood; teachers and program developers may tend to become experts in efficiently programming the black-box, in feeding inputs by means of proper technique, in processing throughputs, and in measuring outputs.[27]

Further, the use in social studies of ordering to the possible exclusion of interpreting tends to disregard that which makes the very acts of ordering and interpreting possible in the first place: consciousness and its constructing of meaning. Fromm argues, for example, that

> Academic psychology, trying to imitate the natural sciences and laboratory methods of weighing and counting, dealt with everything except the soul. It tried to understand those aspects of man which can be examined in the laboratory and claimed that conscience, value judgments, the knowledge of good and evil are metaphysical concepts, outside the problems of psychology; it was more often concerned with insignificant problems which fitted an alleged scientific method than with devising new methods to study the significant problems of man. Psychology thus became a science lacking its main subject matter, the soul; it was

> concerned with mechanisms, reaction formations, instincts, but not with the most specifically human phenomena: love, reason, conscience, values (1967:6).

When ordering the social world through methods and schemes similar to those used in the natural sciences, students need not concern themselves always with such notions as intent, mind, will, consciousness, meaning (even though their very activities in social studies must presume these ideas). That is, while ordering social phenomena, students are themselves assuming that they understand one another's communicative intent in writing and speech, that they share common meaning, that they make decisions and value judgments concerning data, and that language does make sense as an expression of consciousness or mind. Without assuming these phenomena, their very acts of ordering would not be possible. By weighing, counting, measuring, and imposing schemes of observation which tend to neglect the meaning inherent within social phenomena, students may reduce that which is uniquely human (and even man himself) to the level of physical phenomena. Zaner warns that

> . . . taking persons as things to be manipulated, dissected, and variously studied as no more than pieces of physicochemical nature invariably forces the hand that holds that knife into the same shape. . . . We see ourselves as we see others, and to the extent that others are taken as mere things, so are we to ourselves (1973:41).

The human becomes an object whose observable behavior can be ordered and manipulated in any way the observer wishes, without regard for understanding meaning and consciousness which underly the social world, if the view and experience of man within a social studies program is imitated from the way natural scientists view and experience the physical world (c.f., Lewis, 1965; Schatzman and Strauss, 1973: 4-5).

In summary, an outlook includes not only schemes of reference (Thus) and contexts (Here) from which intentionality is directed, but also ongoing acts of consciousness (Now) in which those schemes of reference are applied variously to an object. Through various schemes program developers order in programs the world of nature around them, and interpret the social world in which they live. These two intentional acts of ordering and interpreting are differentiated because the former is directed to referents which have no inherent meaning, whereas the latter is related to those objects and events which have been endowed with meaning through the acts of fellowman. In the act of ordering, man tends to be viewed as an object (i.e., as qualitatively the same as non-man, and as a thing which can be manipulated as one does a machine) and social phenomena tend to be viewed as that which is devoid of meaning. In the act of interpreting, man tends to be regarded as a being who is the subject with regard to the world (i.e., one who is potentially the namer of his world and who is aware of his own intentionalities, history, and projects) and social phenomena as that which has inherent human meaning which needs to be taken seriously. This distinction between ordering the physical world in order to make it meaningful in relation to the observer's acts, and interpreting the social world in terms of its own meaning, is fundamental for social studies programs because it has implications for that which would be considered important or unimportant in a study of man (Byrne and Maziarz, 1969:7). Each act represents differing subject-object relations for apprehending man and the social world. Depending upon the actor's purpose at hand, one act may not be as suitable as the other would be for understanding man.

SUMMARY

A premise underlying this chapter is that consciousness is perspectivable because it is characterized by standpoints. Intentionality is directed from the standpoints of the actor's Here, Now, and Thus. He orients himself from these coordinates, organizes his phenomenological field meaningfully in terms of these reference points, and with a shift in these standpoints places himself in a different relationship to an object. That standpoints determine in part a subject's relation to an object suggests that there can be no absolute (i.e., ahistorical or acosmic) point of view. A viewpoint is to some extent historically, socially, and geographically partial and relative because it is largely a product of primary and secondary socializations and of experiences located within a time and a place. Confined to one set of standpoints at any moment, an actor cannot see from all possible perspectives at once. Indeed, only if he could attain a total world picture which includes all human points of view would his own viewpoint be something other than limited (De Gré, 1970: 666). Therefore, perspective remains a subject-object relation in which the subject apprehends the object from the standpoints of Here, Now, and Thus.

A further premise of the chapter is that perspectives held by individuals, groups, and social studies programs may be identified once the phenomenon has been accounted for conceptually in terms of an ideal type. Phenomenological accounting for perspective must take its beginning in the standpoint structures of consciousness. Therefore, outlooks can be identified by means of an ideal type which specifies the standpoints of the Here, Now, and Thus concretely in terms of what it means in the life-world or in social studies programs to have a viewpoint on man. First, man is interpreted through a framework consisting of various schemes of reference which define a standpoint of the Thus. Different perspectives represent various matrices through which meaning is defined and imposed, through which the social world is interpreted and observed, through which acts are selected and guided, and through which reality is experienced at any given moment. Second, these schemes are developed, transmitted, and maintained within contexts which define a standpoint of the Here. Third, the schemes of reference are applied to man in ongoing acts of consciousness which define a standpoint of the Now. Reality is not interpreted in the same way by all because the temporal dimension of consciousness forces actors to bring order into and to interpret continuously the world. Together these three standpoints define a perspective and are the coordinates for one's orientation towards man in social studies. In terms of these standpoints the social world is interpreted. Therefore, one can identify, describe, and compare outlooks on man in terms of the schemes (interests, presuppositions, and approaches) by which man is apprehended (Thus), in terms of the contexts (social locations, reality coordinates, and plausibility structures) in which these schemes are situated (Here), and in terms of the ongoing experiences (acts of intentionality such as ordering and interpreting) by which reality is defined (Now).

In the next chapter a relation of perspective to programs and to program development is defined. Just as consciousness is characterized by the standpoints of Here, Now, and Thus, so social studies programs are constructed according to and embody these standpoints. Program developers are not just passive receivers of random impressions that impinge upon them from the outside of their bodies, but rather have standpoints from which they actively and selectively focus their attention upon some things and neglect other things (Wild, 1964:25; Schutz, 1971:83). Whether asking a question or pursuing a problem, their intentions make activities and views in program development partial and perspectivable. Because any approach taken by a group or by an individual to program development is biased by the perspective employed, the reality constructed by such acts reflects the underlying point of view. Inherent within programs are the program developer's particular ways of ordering, interpreting, and acting upon man and the social world.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1] The term perspective is used in reference to any subject-object relationship. For example, a geologist examining a particular quartz vein on a mountain side has entered into a relationship between himself as subject and the mineral as object in terms of the specific act of consciousness he employs (e.g., analysis of the quartz's constituents and properties). As his attention shifts to other aspects of the mineral vein, or as his activities toward it change, the relationship between that man and a part of his world undergoes modification. The meaning he attributes to his experience of the quartz is progressively enlarged as he interprets his experience within a horizon which includes more than the surrounding veins and the valley, but also the thematic field of specialized geologic knowledge and associations of which he is a part. At any given moment, his consciousness is always consciousness of the rock which he identifies as this or as that, which he interprets in terms of his past experience with similar quartz veins and in terms of different symbolic systems (e.g., chemistry, physical geography) and which he judges in relation to his tools and projects at hand. He thereby constructs and experiences over time a human reality out of that which simply is before him. Because the frames of reference (e.g., interests, presuppositions, approaches), context, and the former experiences which all characterize him as a geologist in that time and place influence this subject-object relationship, the particular profile of the object which appears to the subject, as well as that which he writes in his field notes, represents a perspective on the quartz vein. This perspective may be quite different from that of a climber who is attempting to negotiate that part of the mountain because the climber brings with him a different frame of reference, another set of experiences, and tools and knowledges related to his own project at hand. Consequently, the reality which he experiences and the perspective he holds would be defined differently from that of the geologist. The subject-object relationship differs for each man.

A perspective is defined as a contextually located and influenced subject-object relationship. This relationship has its basis in the nature of consciousness itself, for that one can be conscious of man (or of anything) in various ways makes the phenomenon of a point of view possible. Central to phenomenology, therefore, is not just a list of concepts and procedures (variation is evident markedly among phenomenologists), but what Natanson refers to as the grounding of all theory and description in the structures of consciousness and in the actor's experience of reality (1966). In constructing a theory that is phenomenological one must both account for the manner in which the world presents itself to the actor and also do so in categories which an actor can verify as being descriptive of his experience.

The active role of consciousness in apprehending the world is supported by authors from various theoretical frameworks: e.g., Dewey and Bentley (1949), Laing (1965:19-20), Freire (1970a:212), Morgan (1970:222), Laszlo (1973:197). Man is the "knowing" subject who actively constructs knowledge of the object to which he is related from a Here, Now, and Thus. That knowing is perspectivable is to say that we cannot embrace the cosmos at once (Handy, 1964:61).

[2] The actor's standpoint of Here, Now, and Thus is explicated by Schutz:

> This world, built around my own I, presents itself for interpretation to me, a being living naively within it. From this standpoint everything has reference to my actual historical situation, or as we can also say, to my pragmatic interests which belong to the situation in which I find myself now and thus. The place in which I am living has not significance for me as a geographical concept, but as my home. The objects of my daily use have significance as my implements, and the men to whom I stand in relationships are my kin , my friends, or strangers. Language is not a substratum of philosophical or grammatical consideration for me, but a means to express my intentions or to understand the intentions of others, etc. Only in reference to me does that relation to others obtain its specific meaning which I designate with the word "We." In reference to Us whose center I am, others stand out as "You," and in reference to You, who refer back to me, third parties stand out as "They." My social world with the alter egos in it is arranged, around me as the center, into associates . . . contemporaries . . . predecessors . . . and successors . . . whereby I and my different attitudes to others institute these manifold relationships (1967:466-467).

The lived world is centered around the actor's lived-body (Here), lived-time (Now), and lived-purposes (Thus). This lived world has significance and meaning first of all by him and for him, because from his central position unique to him he encounters the world as a given, orients himself in it, constructs frameworks for ordering and interpreting it, expresses his meaning through its language, uses tools to realize his projects within it, and through bodily movements and acts constitutes continuously a spacio-temporal structure within it. From the standpoint of his "I" an actor organizes and experiences his life-field by means of the three primary standpoints of Here, Now, and Thus.

This discussion on the standpoint partialness of perspective follows James (1904:297), Kaufman (1960), Wild (1964), Gurwitsch (1965), Berger and Luckmann (1967:22,45), De Gré (1970), Kaplan (1971), van Manen (1973:12-13), Wagner (1973), and especially Schutz (1967, 1970a, 1971, 1972, 1973).

[3] Man is in the midst of the world, not as a spectator, but as a being-in-the-world who encounters it through various man-world relationships because he actively interprets and orders the world by

means of different schemes of reference. He does not relate to the world through a 'blank mind' nor does he experience the life-world randomly, but in accordance with 'mental maps' and 'blueprints':

> . . . the ability to think and to act depends upon the existence of a framework within which acts are meaningful and productive. No framework can be changed except through the employment of some other framework (Kaplan, 1971:80-81).

The schemes he uses determine in part the profiles and horizons obtained on the world. As when hammering a nail, an actor experiences himself 'dwelling' in the hammerhead which has become an extension of his own body, so the conceptual tools he brings to the world guide his relationship to it. He is obliged to use various schemes of reference in his quest for making sense of the world for different purposes. An important component, therefore, of any perspective on man within social studies programs can be identified in those schemes of reference used for interpreting the social world. Such schemes are referred to variously by authors as frames of reference, schemes of orientation, schemes of interpretation, schemes of observation, or schemes of expression which guide the actor's relationship with the world (Fromm, 1967:22; Kaplan, 1971:82; Ricoeur, 1974:74).

Schemes of reference are what define the standpoint of the Thus. An actor brings to the object of his intention certain schemes in order to interpret, order, and act upon it in various ways, placing the object in reference to other objects and to himself. These schemes provide him with categories of meaning into which the ongoing and unique data of experience are made homogeneous in the sense of "being like" one another. These "at hand" frameworks provide him with the intersubjective beliefs which allow inhabitants of a group to act jointly and to share a common world. As Pirsig (1974) and Castaneda (1972, 1974) so graphically illustrate in their novels, these schemes are the surgeon's knife with which reality is sliced and carved in characteristic ways deemed appropriate by actors (including program developers). The particular 'color' of a group's world depends upon the character and combination of the various premises, models, metaphors, commitments, expectations, logics, rules, symbols, recipes, motives, relevances, definitions, and so on, which they use for organizing the facts of their experience and for guiding their acting.

Schemes of reference are not discrete categories, but are interrelated in the actor's experience into larger matrices (combinations of schemes and relations among them) through which he can select his observations and define the world (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:182). They flow together and are interrelated depending upon the situation encountered and the actor's purpose at hand. As such, he experiences his standpoint of the Thus at any moment not as a classification system composed of various schemes, but as a gestalt or 'picture' of some aspect of the world. The schemes are

> . . . combined to a mosaic of a loosely comprehensive picture

> of Nature and given the accent of reality in detail and as a whole. . . . There is the effort to fix social realities into the picture, to impose sense-giving meanings on the totality of the social and natural features of one's world and to transcend its pragmatic discreteness by 'higher meanings' which unify the pieces into a whole of moral-esthetic-ontological significance (Wagner, 1973:70).

Facts of experience are organized into various frames of reference which are in turn organized into larger frameworks. The consequent web of schemes (relationships among them) held by the actor provides him with a coherent definition of the way an object is and is related to other things. The meaningfulness of any particular situation at any given moment depends upon this combination of such schemes for providing the individual with an overall framework for interpreting his experience.

A perspective, therefore, is not defined by one isolated scheme which may be identified within a social studies program. When taken together, various schemes imply a particular outlook held relative to man, and provide a basis for inferring an orientation of the program. Since inference is involved in any perspective identification, one needs to examine the interrelatedness of various components used within a program.

Outlooks change because they are a flexible combination of schemes which are reinterpreted, applied variously, adapted, and interrelated over the course of the actor's ongoing life experience (Wagner, 1973:70). His mental universe built of a framework of schemes is much like a scaffolding which is constantly being remade as purpose and context shift. (A non-phenomenological, though helpful, way of portraying a perspective matrix of the Thus standpoint is via general systems theory. As a system, a perspective is a set of elements and relationships among elements. A change in any element mutually changes the entire system structure, and thereby the individual's reality. Some elements may be considered leading parts within the system.) New matrices or gestalts appear as the web of schemes undergo periodic or constant modification in terms of the actor's cumulative experience or changed purposes.

Because there are various combinations of schemes which can be used for reality constructing (ordering, interpreting, and acting upon the world) and for structuring experience, reality is multiple. Each sub-universe of meaning has its own characteristic schemes which provide categories through which inhabitants of a group can act. As the schemes shift, so the reality changes. For example, though confronted with the same physical feature, a climber and a mining geologist may experience a mountain as different realities because each person brings schemes which may be inappropriate for structuring the other's experience. Similarly, a social reality such as a school can be ordered and interpreted variously, depending upon the actor's Thus. The meaning of a school for a teacher and for a student differs because of dissimilar standpoints from which to experience (Cusick, 1973). As long as schemes are consensually held and used by members of a group, their lived-world is maintained as taken-for-granted through common interpretations, ways of seeing things, and methods of handling situations.

Presupposed in the actor's use of schemes is that he is the center of the lived-world, for it is in reference to himself that he interprets, orders, and acts (Schutz, 1971:99). His life-world is interpreted and organized purposefully in terms of his acts; it is divided into zones of relevancy and experienced in terms of differing degrees of intimacy and anonymity, closeness and remoteness, and familiarity and strangeness in terms of his interests, plans, and problems under examination; its objects are dominated and modified to suit and realize his purposes, and are endowed with meaning and value in accord with his projects; its inhabitants are interpreted through the schemes of we, you, they, associates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors in terms of himself; its situations are defined from his stocks of knowledge at hand; its spacio-temporal structures are established around his lived-time and lived-body (Schutz, 1944:534; 1967:466-467; Berger and Luckmann, 1967:34-46). The world is both the scene and the object of his acts, and he orients ("takes a bearing") himself within it from his own standpoints.

Schemes of reference vary in their degree of specificity and generality, as well as explicitness and implicitness, in terms of one another and in terms of the actor's awareness of them. Some schemes are more encompassing frameworks applied by an actor in making general sense of his life and world, whereas other schemes are related to specific issues and objects and have narrow applicability. Those that are implicit tend to be hidden and taken-for-granted within other schemes, whereas explicit schemes tend to be at hand and readily identifiable by the actor himself. This characteristic of schemes of reference would suggest that perspectives also can be held and defined by actors at various levels of generality and explicitness.

Although thinking and feeling are inseparable aspects of consciousness, the discussion in Part I of interests, presuppositions, approaches as schemes of reference for ordering and interpreting the social world tends not to emphasize affective schemes. Not all feelings about man are expressible in verbal schemes of reference, yet these inner experiences are a part of one's frame of interpreting. A sense of unease, fright, anger, doubt, cynicism, love, devotion, anxiety, and so on are intentionalities that color the world for us. However, for purposes of the present study, affective schemes for orientation are not explicitly delineated because of time and space factors, and because they are not as easily identifiable within social studies programs as are interests, presuppositions, and approaches to man.

[4] For a discussion of underlying interests in subject-object relations, see Mannheim (1936:268), Wirth (1936:xx), Kaufman (1960:3), Morris (1964), Finch (1967), Gerbner (1968), Dawe (1970), Horton (1970b), Morgan (1970), Habermas (1971, 1972), Kaplan (1971), Kuhn (1972b:238), Schutz (1972:3), Vita (1973), Pelz (1974), Sutherland (1974). Although there may be debate as to the number of interests which can be identified, the phenomenological premise that interest is a basic intentionality is well founded in the literature. Implications of such interests for program development are discussed by Blum (1971), Davies (1971), Young (1971c), Goodlad (1973:3-19), Macdonald and Clark (1973:407), Apple (1974, 1975), Macdonald (1975).

Various typologies have been constructed by writers and are useful for identifying interests used as schemes of reference for interpreting man within social studies programs. Illustrative are Mannheim's ideology and utopia (1936), Gerbner's art, science, and power (1968), Habermas' control, consensus, and emancipation (1971), Vita's saving and enlightening interests (1973), and Aoki's dominance, detachment, and interdependence (1974b).

Habermas' typology has been applied extensively to general program development (Apple, 1974, 1975; Ledgerwood, 1975; Macdonald, 1975) and to social studies in particular (van Manen, 1974b). Since several useful typologies already exist, another one is not developed in this chapter.

[5] Interests at hand are schemes of reference used by actors to determine and to justify the goals by which they direct and give purpose to their activities, to construe their reality in terms of relevances, and to guide their selective attention to aspects of the world (Apple, 1970:101). Certain interests are implicit within programs (in the sense of being unquestioned and unstated), whereas other interests are explicitly provided to students and teachers. The following schemes which may be identifiable within social studies programs are interests actors use in their interpretations of man.

Motives. Primary interests are those in-order-to and because-of motives which direct and give meaning to acts. These interests are basic to one's perspective because through them the life-world is meaningfully ordered and interpreted. In-order-to motives are what gives direction to acts and are referred to variously as the goal, aim, purpose, end, objective, or project of the act. Because-of motives are what gives justification and reason for the act. These motives are organized under plans of various kinds (e.g., plans of work and leisure, plans for professional gain, plans suitable for a particular social role) and under various hierarchies of plans (e.g., long and short term plans, life and immediate plans, plans which are suitable as means for the attainment of other plans). Because both motives and plans are interests which determine the various degrees of relevance of knowledge and objects selected within program development acts, they are discussed further in

Chapter III.

Anticipations. Anticipations are based upon the stocks of knowledge one has at hand which allow him to predict, to make "if-then" connections, to assume that I-can-do-it-again. On the basis of past experiences, and until counter-evidence appears, anticipations can be made on the premise that the world as known will continue unchanged in its typicalness. As such, anticipations (referred to by Schutz in his essay "Tiresias" as knowledge of future events and of possible relations of such events to the present) are schemes of reference which influence one's projects, plans, and motives:

> Man, in daily life, is eminently interested in what he anticipates. He has to be prepared to meet or to avoid the anticipated events; he has to come to terms with them, either by enduring what is imposed upon him or, if it is within his power, by influencing their course. Thus his anticipations are determinative for his plans, projects, and motives (1971:282; c.f., 1970a:137-142).

On the belief that anticipated situations and trends are relevant to their Here and Now, actors attempt to influence the outcome of what they envision. They initiate projects and actions in order to avert or to make certain what is anticipated. To illustrate, program developers who anticipate that the future may be characterized by increased leisure time for all may use this as a scheme of reference for developing programs designed to prepare students to live in a shorter work week, to reinterpret work and leisure for students, or even more basically to define man differently. One certainly need not go to religion for examples of how an anticipated future is a pervasive hermeneutic for the life-world, but to the literature on social studies program development. For example, anticipated futures as a scheme of reference for interpreting the present social world in social studies programs are illustrated by such authors as Shane (1970, 1974) and Toffler (1974). For program developers, their present experience is ordered and interpreted, and actions are guided by, anticipations.

Commitments. Commitments to certain goals, values, beliefs, or whatever, are as central to perspective in social studies programs as they are in social science (Natanson, 1963:20-23), natural science (Kuhn, 1970), or religious realities (Geertz, 1972:185) because an outlook is not defined only in doctrine but also in the conviction that this doctrine is in harmony with the inherent structure of the world. The existence of one's life-world depends upon a certainty that there is a connection between what one believes and the truth of those beliefs in their correspondence to the way the world is. Such commitments are fundamental to any confident interpreting and acting upon the social world. Underlying commitment to specific schemes of reference within a program are further commitments to finding order and meaning in the social world, as well as prior commitments to method, to the worthwhileness of knowledge, and to assumptions which define the way reality is thought to be structured.

Ultimately the basis is a commitment to commitment itself, Natanson argues, because commitment rests upon "a value framework whose criteria must rest upon a fundamental commitment" (1963:21). Certainties and convictions concerning man and the social world within programs can be argued and supported only on the basis of other prior certainties and convictions which themselves finally rest upon a commitment to commitment. One is left with either a pragmatic reason for defining man in a certain way, or with what Polanyi refers to as an article of faith—"For I believe so" (1964:9). In the market place of alternative and competing images of man, program developers are called upon to choose and to commit themselves to certain presuppositions and values over others. In the choices they make concerning intents, content, and strategies, as well as the legitimizations ordinarily used to support these choices, fundamental commitments to particular viewpoints are already made. Commitments, therefore, are an important interest around which the world is ordered and interpreted.

Hopes and fears. Other interests refer to the hope and fears, whether immediate or larger networks of hopes and fears, used by actors as schemes for interpreting their experience (Schutz, 1971: 92). Because the realization that "I shall die, and I fear to die" is man's ultimate project, argues Schutz, this fundamental anxiety is an implicit premise that underlies all acts within the life-world (1944:550; 1973:228-229). Although man attempts to suspend knowledge of his own temporality and finiteness, this anxiety remains a basic anticipation that motivates (because-of and in-order-to motives) and that undergirds choices, risks, fears, hopes, and projects. The fundamental anxiety is taken seriously within phenomenological literature because man in his experience is "essentially oriented toward transcendence, and this orientation cannot be explained by means of the empirical sciences" (Strasser, 1963:229). Consequently, a primary meaning of an individual's life is embedded within those presuppositions based upon and designed to transcend his anxiety (c.f., Landsberg, 1966; Berger, 1969; Koestenbaum, 1971; Phenix, 1974). Because man's temporality is a fundamental meaning context of life, his desire and capability to interpret his own being through metaphysics, and thereby to transcend his temporality, cannot be disregarded as a basis for program development. Programs are essentially oriented towards transcendence because they interpret man and his social world within larger frameworks of in-order-to and because-of motives that not only impose meaning upon the phenomenon of man in general, but also help the student to place his own life projects within larger meaning systems.

[6] Program developers are selective in what they attend to because all aspects of the social world or of man himself are neither equally appropriate nor relevant in terms of their particular interests or presuppositions. Consequently, within programs are established zones or fields of relevancy which define certain things about man as being relevant or irrelevant considerations for social studies. Each zone defines the degree of relevance something has from the perspective of a program developer. For a discussion of relevance

see Schutz (1970b) and Apple (1970).

Schutz's typology of four zones of relevancy into which actors structure the life-world in terms of their interests is applicable to identifying a perspective on man within programs (1944:549-550; 1971:124-125). The zone of primary relevance includes our immediate situation that we act upon and change in realizing projects and that we have the greatest knowledge of. Within a program this primary zone is to be identified in those aspects of man explicitly selected for attention and which, when examined in total, present to students a particular picture of man and of the social world. Emphasis upon certain aspects of man over that of other considerations in the assigned readings, questions, topics, and methods of the program not only betrays a point of view, but also suggests to students and teachers in a subtle manner that certain images of man are of more importance than other images. Further, Schutz says that the zone of minor relevance and the zone of the relatively irrelevant include those aspects of the life-world which have secondary influence upon our projects or of which we have little information. Those aspects of man considered briefly within a program, or mentioned in such a way so as to show them to be only of minor importance, can be identified in these two zones. The last zone Schutz defines, that of the absolutely irrelevant, includes the world which has no place in our interests and plans, which is beyond the scope of our actions, and of which all we need to know is that it is absolutely irrelevant. Those things not said about man or the social world within a social studies program represent this zone. That which is neglected may be considered absolutely irrelevant from the viewpoint of those who developed the program; however, Dawe (1970) suggests that the absence of certain ideas and concepts may be as significant for identifying a perspective as the ideas and concepts which are explicitly stated. When applied in totality to a program, therefore, this typology of zones of relevancy may help one to identify a perspective on man. Within any given orientation that which is apprehended concerning man and the social world is structured into zones, which themselves then become schemes of reference for assigning meaning to objects and for interpreting situations encountered.

[7] Phenomenologically, belief is defined as:

> . . . the feeling of rationality . . . a feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment, of its absoluteness—the absence of all need to explain it, account for it or justify it. It is at the point at which we cease asking questions, at which we are at ease, at peace, at rest in our (implicit or explicit) present view of things. Normally, it is the taken-for-grantedness of the world and of our lives, the very precarious state of equilibrium, of intellectual and emotional repose in which we remain until the next question is posed, until the next obstacle is met, until our state of belief is challenged or begins again to cause us perplexity (Edie, 1965b:123).

Our experience assures us that merely to think about an object differs from believing in its existence, argues James, for it is to the latter that we attribute the quality of reality:

> Everyone knows the difference between imagining a thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its worth. In the case of acquiescence or belief, the object is not only apprehended by the mind, but is held to have reality. . . . Belief will mean every degree of assurance, including the highest possible certainty and connection (1904: 283).

[8] Ontologies have been discussed variously as world perspectives (Mannheim, 1936:275), archtypes (Black, 1962), fundamental outlooks (Natanson, 1963:10-18), meta-assumptions (Maruyama, 1966), paradigms (Kuhn, 1970), systems (Laszlo, 1972, 1973). Further, Pepper defines five world hypotheses: mechanism, contextualism, organism, formism, systems (1942, 1966, 1970, 1972); Handy explains self-action, inter-action, and trans-action (1964); Buckley (1967) and Maruyama (1963d) define self-maintaining and self-generating systems; Reese and Overton show the incompatibility of the mechanistic and organismic meta-physical models in psychology (1970); Churchman describes three imageries of nature: Democritean mechanism, Aristotelian teleology, and Carneadean probability (1971); Willer describes four basic belief systems: magical, mystical, religious, and scientific (1971); Harman refers to fundamental belief and value paradigms (1972). These are examples of ideal types of ontologies which may be useful for identifying how men interpret their world. One of the best identifications of ontologies is to be found in Maruyama (see Bibliography).

[9] If a completed social studies program is a product of a particular epistemology, then Maruyama's argument (that the organization of our universe and the conceptualization of information in our thinking depends upon the principles we choose in formulating our epistemology) identifies a basic structure of any perspective on man (1960a:251; 1965:224; 1972a). The principles used for ordering the world and for interpreting man and the social world within social studies programs not only identify in part what the outlook is, but how meaning is made through that framework. Although Maruyama's discussions of ordering principles have been applied to program development (Aoki, 1974a; Ledgerwood, 1975), it would appear that much more research attention is needed because of the implications underlying principles have for social reality (Harman, 1972). For example, Wangler argues that different epistemological principles have implications for instruction, especially if there are Native Canadians in the classroom. The problem is not simply one of differing ideas of "time, property, child rearing, family organization, work, religion, sexual conduct, nature . . .," but rather with the school's dependence upon scientific methods and interpretations for its epistemological principles: "We seem to regard scientific explanations as the most natural and realistic way of looking at the world and are puzzled when others do not share in our preconceived notions of the proper

way of coming to grips with reality" (Wangler, 1973:1-2). A basis for cross-perspective communication difficulties occurs because students may bring different ordering principles to the classroom. How information is conceptualized by students depends upon the epistemology developed from their experiential backgrounds (Maruyama, 1972a:51).

Although many different structures of reasoning have been identified in the literature, the following two examples show underlying logics which differ generally from that of the Alberta Social Studies Program. Campbell writes for the Alberta Native Communication Society and illustrates a mutualistic rather than a hierarchical principle for ordering the world:

> To take a flower from a field of many and say it is more beautiful than another in size, colour, or feeling, is discrimination. The flower is no longer seen for what it really is. . . . A white lily is no better than a tiger lily. They are both flowers. . . . Nature did not intend the flowers to make signs of the cross or sing praises to a manufacturer supposedly higher than themselves to survive. A flower must take its place in a field as a brother and sister to the growing around it as a part of the whole. One flower is not more beautiful than another—it is just a flower—no more, no less (1973).

Similarly, don Juan's logic of random relationships and individualism represents another way of ordering and interpreting the universe:

> For me the world is weird because it is stupendous, awesome, mysterious, unfathomable; my interest has been to convince you that you must assume responsibility for being here, in this marvelous world in this marvelous desert, in this marvelous time. I wanted to convince you that you must learn to make every act count, since you are going to be here for only a short while; in fact, too short for witnessing all the marvels of it (Castaneda, 1972:107).

To counteract these descriptions (which tend to be based upon relational or random logics) with a description of the world based upon a hierarchical and classificatory logic is simply to pit one epistemology against another. They represent different frameworks of logic and organizations of the universe based upon underlying principles which are related to different experiental backgrounds. Epistemologies need to be grasped in terms of the different realities they represent, for Blue (a Native professor) suggests that how individuals make meaning and sense of their world is as important as what meaning they make (1972:6; c.f., Evans, 1972).

For discussions of general logics by which groups structure their universes and conceptualize information see Maruyama (Bibliography). C.f., Mannheim (1936), Pepper (1942, 1966, 1970, 1972), Kluckhohn (1949), Morgan (1970), Willer (1971), Harman (1972), Needham (1972), Schmidtleim (1974), and footnote number 8 (Chapter II).

[10] Polanyi emphasized the restrictive role of presuppositions in human activities such as science (1972:11). Similarly, the daily routines of teachers and students (Cusick, 1973:56), of program developers (Young, 1971c), and of evaluators (Speizman, 1974) are based upon implicit presuppositions and relevances.

[11] To illustrate the idea that man's relationship to the world is manifold, three general subject-object relationships have been defined by Otto in the following simile:

> A man enters a lofty Gothic cathedral. If he be technically proficient he can establish a "theoretical relationship" with the cathedral; he can calculate its length and breadth; he can ascertain the principles according to which it has been constructed and its special characteristics of style; he may compute its cubic content. And if he had a practical eye, faults in it will not escape him and he will consider how it could be restored, made serviceable to practical purposes, altered and adapted; he may, indeed, himself set about the work. Thus he would establish a "practical" relationship. . . . [Or he may sit quietly and] "experience" the cathedral in receptive contemplation. It may be half ruin, or it may be an unfinished building, but he will be seized of its essential idea, which in the execution may even be concealed rather than expressed; to this spirit it will be revealed in its entirety and unity, in its mystery and sublimity, in its profound symbolism—all those unspeakable impressions which escape the man in the relationships of theory and of practice . . . and in which alone the real meaning and nature of the building is manifest. If our visitor to the cathedral be innocent of this third "relationship," though he be a great man in the relationships of theory and practice, he is fundamentally wanting (1972:23).

Similarly, a program may establish different approaches through which students and teachers are to relate themselves to an object, topic, event, or person which is under study.

For those school situations in which a "theoretical" mode of apprehending the world is appropriate for students and teachers, Otto argues that the actor's approach is characterized in a general sense by attempts to define, order, analyze, predict, describe, simplify, criticize, classify, and systematize primarily by means of predetermined principles, laws, formulas, proofs, systems, generalizations, cause-effect relationships, and so on. The questions, methods, and validation procedures are directed towards achieving "knowledge about" something. Understanding is defined as exactness in observation and reduction in explanation. This relationship between subject and object is one of detachment, for by various category systems and methodologies the student tends to remove himself (his own common-sense perspectives and past experiences) and to objectify the social world. Such distancing of the student from the object is encouraged, says Morgan, when "the individual stands apart from the things he seeks to understand; he analyzes, controls, and observes them in a spirit that eliminates any relation between them and himself other than that of his cognizing a few of their generic properties" (1970:115).

On the other hand, in those approaches that Otto would refer to as "practical," the relationship of subject to object is one of dominance, for in seeking to master, influence, improve, or alter the social world, a student's motive is basically one of dominating in accordance with his project at hand. The student is encouraged to become involved with an object to deliberately change it, says Otto, by making it the "formative material for his ideals" and "an expression of his will and action" (1972:22).

In contrast with the "theoretical" and "practical" approaches towards things, Otto's third mode of apprehending neither makes the world an arena for a student's pragmatic motives and actions nor is it made the object of theoretical understanding and thereby reduced by analysis to the matter-of-fact, to parts and aspects, or to the generalizable and predictable. Rather, the relation of subject to object may be that of experiencing interdependence and belonging, a sense of sharing, oneness, and wholeness, and even a feeling of awe, wonder, hope, humility, infinity, and mystery (Otto, 1972:23; Buber, 1970; Phenix, 1974). Concern is expressed for that unique ability of man to apprehend the world in terms of personal meaning and encounter.

Various other modes of apprehending man have been identified by authors: I-I, I-It, It-It, We-We, Us-Them, I-You (Kaufman, 1970; c.f., Buber, 1970); romantic and classical (Pirsig, 1974), art, history, and science (Morgan, 1970); technical, interpretive, and critical (Habermas, 1971); emic and etic (Pike, 1967), designative, appraisive, prescriptive (Aoki, 1974b); c.f., footnotes 8 and 9 (Chapter II). Each of these defines man-world relationships established by actors in their projects and acts. These authors argue that we need various modes of apprehending the world instead of tending to depend upon one approach. The nearly exclusive dependence upon a popularized interpretation of what is considered to be the scientific method has resulted in a narrow view of the world; knowledge production within this method constitutes a reality view and approach referred to by Morgan as the "prosaic mentality" (1970:81).

[12] Stocks of knowledge are basic for a view of man within social studies programs because

> We do not approach the world with blank minds. We have codes for identification and implicit hypotheses with which we approach the world. We attempt to give meaning to our life by encompassing such elements within a coherent explanatory framework (Kaplan, 1971:82).

Students selectively interpret, anticipate, and act upon the social world through the preorganized schemes provided by a program. Following is a discussion of some overlapping stocks of knowledge which may be used for interpreting man.

Social recipes. Recipes define typical means and solutions for typical problems available to typical actors under typical situations (Schutz, 1971:102,122). Such knowledge provides prescriptions for responding to other actors in normally encountered situations, and provides a degree of success in realizing projects as long as the recipe is followed. Standardized formulas assure the individual of greater efficiency in acting, certainty of outcomes, and standardized results. Knowledge of roles, appropriate rules of conduct and etiquette, common-sense principles, morals, myths, customs, fashions, conceptions of natural order, stereotypes, and formulas which group members accept unquestioningly and use for orientation in and interpretation of typical situations, define some of the life-world recipes (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:65; Schutz, 1970a:81,115; 1971: 72-74, 92, 95; Cusick, 1973). James refers to these recipes as pre-theoretical "knowledge of acquaintance" because they are ready-made, taken-for-granted, and need not be understood beyond their application for practical and immediate purposes; in contrast, theoretical "knowledge about" refers to the well defined and analytic knowledges of the disciplines (1904:221).

Social studies programs may transmit to students standardized recipe knowledge which can be applied instantly to man as schemes of observation and interpretation. For example, the meaning associated with Afro-Asian man, psychopath, prime minister, slow student, Native Indian, or welfare recipient provides a student with recipe knowledge of how to respond to and what to expect from an individual who fits the interpretive scheme. A student need not relate to an individual person as a unique subject, but as a typical case or as a repeatable experience of a general class. He can act upon the other as an anonymous performer or a typical function who is defined in terms of homogeneous characteristics. Schutz comments that in the use of recipe knowledges and types,

> The subjective meaning-context has been abandoned as a tool of interpretation. It has been replaced by a series of highly complex and systematically interrelated objective meaning-contexts. The result is that the contemporary is anonymized . . . Furthermore, the synthesis of recognition does not apprehend the unique person as he exists within his living present. Instead it pictures him as always the same and homogeneous, leaving out of account all the changes and rough edges that go along with individuality. Therefore, no matter how many people are subsumed under the ideal type, it corresponds to no one in particular (1972:184).

Typical roles and typical groups are interpreted through typical goals, characteristics, attitudes, needs, actions, ways of social interaction, expectations, and so on. In short, social studies programs may provide students with recipes and types as a means for viewing and acting upon man and the social world in typical ways.

Transmitted to teachers within social studies programs may be recipe knowledge for interpreting and acting upon students. The intent of recipe knowledges applied to students is to provide teachers with procedures (of observing, interpreting, and acting) which can be trusted, even though not necessarily understood, for handling typical classroom situations such as organizing, disciplining, evaluating, and motivating students. Recipes can be used

> . . . in order to obtain the best results in every situation with a minimum of effort by avoiding undesirable consequences. The recipe works, on the one hand, as a precept for actions and thus serves as a scheme of expression: whoever wants to obtain a certain result has to proceed as indicated by the recipe provided for this purpose. On the other hand, the recipe serves as a scheme of interpretation: whoever proceeds as indicated by a specific recipe is supposed to intend the correlated result (Schutz, 1971:95).

Such recipes include stereotyped actions attributed to roles or labels, typified ways of social interaction with students, typified expectations concerning how they will react to typical teacher acts, and typical means for assuring typical results under typical situations.

Metaphors. Metaphors (in the general sense of models and similes) are stocks of knowledge used for interpreting man and the social world within programs. What is not directly observable in social studies must be studied through metaphorical analogies. For example, program developers find it useful to describe society as an organism or a system, war in terms of a game, learning as bricklaying, mind as a computer, teaching as diagnosis and therapy, classrooms as climates, and so on. Though a test of metaphors within social studies is their usefulness for describing analogously and for defining relationships among phenomena, any choice of metaphor applied to man tends to shape reality subtly by focussing a student's observations on particular things and by suggesting to him certain meanings over that of other possible meanings. For example,

> How shall we talk about the "human mind" and our always imperfect attempts to do something to it? Shall we put on the lights or dump fertilizer or keep it busy or toughen it up or pump it full . . . [or] mold the mind . . . [or] feed it . . . [or] provide it with a sturdy foundation? Why the mind? Why a noun? Why a "thing"? . . . we come much closer to actuality if we spoke of "minding" (as a process) rather than of "the mind" (as a thing) (Postman and Weingartner, 1969:83).

A further difficulty associated with metaphors is that these schemes may become reified, statements of the way man is, rather than "as if" descriptions. Models of man are useful assumptions for certain purposes and within particular contexts, yet they can be given an ontological status beyond the operational merely in the manner in which they are used and taken-for-granted.

Labels. Labels applied to students (e.g., slow learner, academic student, behavior problem, delinquent, well adjusted) or to groups (e.g., third-world, middle-class, poor, fundamentalist) are a construction of social reality, and may define perspective for teachers and students by providing them with schemes for interpreting man within social studies. "Slow-learner" or a "behavior problem" are classification schemes which impose a reality on the actor and a means for interpreting him which may be different from his own being-in-the-world. Laing says that

> One may see his behavior as 'signs' of a 'disease'; one may see his behavior as expressive of his existence. . . . We cannot help but see the person in one way or other and place our constructions or interpretations on 'his' behavior, as soon as we are in relationship with him (1965:31).

Any label is an interpretation and is a function of a perspective brought to the other person:

> To look and to listen to a patient and to see 'signs' of schizophrenia (as a 'disease') and to look and to listen to him simply as a human being are to see and to hear in as radically different ways as when one sees, first the vase, then the faces in the ambiguous picture (Laing, 1965:33).

If labels used by program developers for interpreting students or by students for interpreting fellowman, are objectified to the extent that distinctions between the schemes and man himself are obscured, then these typifications become reified. Social-psychology labels and clinical models may be taken in social studies classrooms and programs as descriptions of man as he is somehow in himself. C.f., Laing (1965, 1967), Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968), Reese and Overton (1970), Keddie (1971), Apple (1974).

Exemplars. As evidenced by its popularity within the literature, the notion of exemplar (or even more commonly, paradigm) is utilized for diverse purposes and, consequently, has been assigned multiple meanings which remain largely implicit. Traditional usage within grammar is that of a characteristic pattern from which a rule for declining nouns and for conjugating verbs could be deduced; as such, a paradigm or exemplar was an example upon which similar verbs or nouns could be modelled. Its etymological Greek root, "to show side by side," is similar to an analogue or an accepted model, whether model is considered to be a conceptual analogy, a norm, or a replica (Higginson, 1973:18). An individual can deduce from an exemplar an ordered set of propositions, characteristics, assumptions, or principles which have heuristic or propaedeutic value. For example, Merton's paradigm for the sociology of knowledge provides concepts and propositions in order to facilitate further understanding and application of that discipline (1949:460-461). In this sense an exemplar is a root metaphor or analogy used by an individual to pattern his thinking and to clarify the structures of something. An exemplar suggests something more than it is itself, thereby encouraging its further application.

Further, in Kuhn's major use of the term, an exemplar is a scientific achievement prior to the commitments, concepts and beliefs implied and abstracted from it. As an open-ended achievement which suggests further research to be done, an exemplar can be extended and exploited in a variety of ways under better defined or new conditions, much as an accepted judicial decision is further articulated and specified over time as it is applied to legal situations (Kuhn, 1970: 23,91). An exemplar guides subsequent research, for from the initial theory and applications which it suggests, practitioners abstract an outlook on the world and a framework for their scientific activity. From the exemplar a frame of reference consisting of interrelated concepts, laws, theories, applications, and instrumentations is developed. Although this exemplar is not a static pattern for replication, but a model for further refining and for developing of a community's views, it does provide reality coordinates to practitioners, and commitment to the exemplar is prerequisite for initiation into the community. Consequently, members of a scientific group do not search for alternatives for it, they accept as legitimate the problems, methods, beliefs, and solutions of the discipline which are defined and developed from it, and they exclude innovations or new viewpoints which would result in a shift within the entire framework built upon it (Calder, 1969:31; Kuhn, 1970:187; 1972c:85,91). An exemplar provides direction for thought and action, for it guides the manner in which a community of scientists perceives and defines reality.

Exemplars may transmit to teachers and students a view of man. Within a program an exemplar may be a person, event, idea, or object which suggests a particular perspective and upon which teachers and students are to pattern and further develop their own outlooks for interpreting man and the social world. Analogies, illustrations, metaphors, novels, television programs, heroes, movies, and a variety of literature (whether comics or philosophical works) utilized or recommended within a program supply exemplars from which images of the social world and approaches to man can be abstracted and applied (Schutz, 1971:101). Although an exemplar may only suggest a perspective, when applied and further articulated by an individual it can shape his point of view and his interpretations of experience; in other words, an exemplar provides boundary conditions within which people develop their ideas. To illustrate, when arguing an issue such as capital punishment, a student may pattern his perspective on a novel he has read recently, from which basic ideas are abstracted and further articulated to the new situation. This exemplar supplies him with a basis for developing a frame of reference and with beliefs for interpreting the issue at hand. Students and teachers who work from the same exemplar provided by a program may develop a shared perspective on man.

Symbols. Symbols do not have one-to-one correspondence with concrete referents, but point to vague referents beyond themselves, to "a set of meanings that can neither be exhausted nor adequately expressed by any one referent" (Perrin, 1974:11). Rather than defining a referent's meaning explicitly, they suggest meaning and evoke a response from an individual who must clarify the meaning in terms of his own experience. The meaning of an open-ended situation provided by a symbol cannot be adequately defined without the individual himself doing so. In other words, a symbol provides the stage and the direction for man to define meaning for himself. For example, the meaning of a poem is not always to be found in a literal translation of words, but in the power of the entire poem to combine with the reader's experience and thereby to suggest new meaning to him (Palmer, 1969; Ricoeur, 1960, 1969; Langer, 1972). Within programs students may encounter symbols in analogies, myth, art, novel, poetry, and other display material which are schemes for interpreting human experience and for suggesting a particular orientation to man. Dali's art, Landsberg's "Intermezzo in the Bull Ring" (1966:219-222), and don Genaro's "Ixtlan " (Castaneda, 1972:303-315) are intended to place man in a larger context, suggesting to readers reality definitions and significances for man which cannot be gained in perceptual experience alone. As such, symbols are stocks of knowledge which may be used for defining man in social studies.

Values. Value schemes such as ideals are stocks of knowledge which provide criteria for judging worth. In agreement with such schemes actors select their perceptions, determine and justify their acts, and when applied to fellowman, utilize value categories to interpret in typical ways his acts, beliefs, and person (Allport, 1963:75-76). Beliefs concerning the worth of man, of some men in particular, or of certain aspects of man may be embedded in the criteria utilized for judging and choosing, methods, goals, display material, commitments, psychological and philosophical bases, and language of a program.

Expectations. Expectations are typifications used by actors to interpret the actions of fellowman. On the basis of his past experience and on his perception of what the shared rules are for defining typical situations, an actor expects the actions of other actors to be predictable within a defined range of alternatives. Expectations provide him with a means for predicting outcomes and for orienting himself. Similarly, expectations within a program placed upon students, teachers, and man in general may betray certain beliefs concerning man.

[13] A primary thesis of Mannheim is that

> . . . there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured. It is indeed true that only the individual is capable of thinking. There is no such metaphysical entity as a group mind which thinks over and above the heads of individuals, or whose ideas the individual merely reproduces. Nevertheless it would be false to deduce from this that all the ideas and sentiments which motivate an individual have their origin in him alone, and can be adequately explained solely on the basis of his own life-experience (1936:2).

Underlying a perspective is a social situation from which it arises and within which it is shaped. The individual shares an intersubjective world with various groups. Thought is not an isolated act, but takes place in a context colored by prior values, language, thought modes, meanings, patterns of conduct, and interaction which define a concrete socio-historical situation and which gives a group its solidarity (i.e., a common focus because of shared history and experience) (Mannheim, 1936:3-5). C.f., Wirth (1936:xxiv), Merton (1949:168), Berger and Luckmann (1967:8,125,129-183), Schutz (1967:466), Berger (1969:60), Castaneda (1972:9), Dale (1972), Cusick (1973).

[14] For a discussion of embedded assumptions within language, see Chase (1954), Bultmann (1955), Jenkins (1969), De Gré (1970:664), Morgan (1970), Taschdjian (1970). An application of this insight to schooling contexts is made by Postman and Weingartner (1969:85-86), Evans (1972), Esland (1973).

[15] As experience occurs, memories are accumulated and sedimented into stocks of knowledge which an actor then uses for interpreting the present and for guiding his actions (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:67-72; Schutz, 1970a:73-74,98; Wagner, 1973).

[16] One of the first analyses of multiple realities is to be found in James (1904:283-324). His reference to "sub-universes," "orders of reality," and "sub-worlds" is a basis for Schutz's phenomenology of multiple realities (1944; 1970a:245-252; 1971:135-158; 1972; 1973). Multiple realities are referred to as "finite provinces of meaning" because the mode of experience and the meaning associated with each one is circumscribed in comparison to the paramount reality of the life-world (Schutz, 1944; 1973:231; Berger and Luckmann, 1967:25). Other authors refer to multiple realities as "enclaves within the paramount reality" and "sets of constructed worlds" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:25; Laszlo, 1973:205). For discussions of multiple realities other than the writings of James and Schutz, see Wach (1958), Combs and Snygg (1959), Wild (1964), Laing (1965, 1967), Morgan (1970), Willer (1971), Holzner (1972:1-19), Castaneda (1971, 1972, 1974), Geertz (1970, 1972, 1973:110-125), Laszlo (1973:205-213), Schatzman and Strauss (1973:52-66), van Manen (1973:194-205). Various authors have defined specific realities: James identifies the worlds of sense experience, science, ideal relations, idols of the tribe, supernaturalism, deliberate fable, individual opinion, and madness (1904:291-293); Schutz, in modifying James, speaks of the worlds of daily-life, dreams, religious experience, art, scientific contemplation, play, insanity, and phantasms (1944); Schleiermacher defines the theoretic, practical, and experiential relations to the world (Otto, 1972).

[17] When an actor focusses attention upon some aspect of the world, he has an awareness of a background context from which the object of attention has been selected. Consciousness is not only immediate intentionalities and an ongoing relation between subject

and object expressed in various acts of consciousness, but is at the same time an awareness of a larger context (the immediate, past, and anticipated world) within which one's varied experiences occur and are unified. This awareness goes beyond the given (the objects of the present surroundings) to that which is far-off, merely possible, impossible, past, and future. This horizon is generally a combination of religious, political, professional, discipline, common-sense, and biographical knowledges which provide an actor with a sense of adequately being aware of the cosmos and relations within it for his purposes at hand. As such, this horizon of awareness is not identifiable in social studies programs in the same sense as are multiple realities and thought models. Rather, each individual brings his own unique horizon to a program and interprets it against this background awareness.

This awareness which characterizes consciousness is essential for the phenomenon of perspective within social studies. First, a background awareness of the social world makes multiple viewpoints and realities possible. Actors utilize different modes of experiencing the world and attribute different meanings to it because they know that it is the same unitary social world which remains stable though orientations to it shift. Against such a background man interrelates experiences, compares multiple realities and outlooks, shifts perspectives purposefully, and develops more encompassing standpoints from which to reflect upon his experience of the social world. Without this awareness of a world more enduring and encompassing than that which is immediately given to consciousness, individuals would have no reference points from which to define various realities and to transcend that which is their immediate Now and Here.

Second, a background awareness of the social world provides a basis for reflection. A distinguishing feature of man is his ability to be aware that he is conscious in various ways of things. He can make consciousness and its various modes of intentionality the object of intentionality, he can experience his own experiencing, he can develop perspectives on his own perspectives, and he can reflect upon his acts and outlooks and thereby change both (Graumann, 1974). Laing's intriguing book entitled Knots illustrates man's capacity to expand the horizon of attention so as to include within it different levels of metaperspectives and experiences of experience (1966, c.f., Laing, et al., 1973). This transcending of and reflecting upon experience is possible because there is an awareness of the social world which underlies specific subject-object relations.

Third, a background awareness of the social world unifies immediate experiences, perspectives, and multiple realities. Outlooks can be shifted and developed over time because the background awareness of the social world provides a unity among the manifold intentions and views an actor may adopt in social studies. Though specific subject-object relations shift, the subject's conception of a larger world does not. Chapman says,

> This awareness of the world is not an incident or passing thought in the stream of consciousness but is the presiding attitude through which this unremitting stream itself acquires unity and wholeness and takes on the cumulative and contextual character of a single consciousness or experience of the world. As the basic frame of mind or "natural attitude" of life itself, our awareness of the world embraces and unifies the vast stream of experience with all its profusion of detail, binding it into one living whole. I say "living" because, although it has the static fixity of a framework, it has also the dynamical quality of an organic structure ever absorbing into itself fresh contents—our daily experiencings and doings—appropriating these in every instant of our lives and adding them to the accumulated store of past experiences. . . . And so it comes to pass that human experience despite its temporal dispersion, its transcience and flux yet accumulates, through our presiding awareness of the world, into one living whole of experience (1966:80-81).

Immediate experiences and perspectives need not be random, but may be cumulative into larger frameworks, as a consequence of this awareness of an all-embracing whole and unity of the world.

The outlooks and practices directed to man and to the social world in a program would be threatened by meaninglessness unless firmly rooted in an overarching cognitive universe of awareness (Berger, 1969:28). Man not only acts in the world, but is aware of his doing so and expresses this awareness in his philosophy, science, religion, and other frameworks through which he attempts to experience the world in a larger degree of wholeness. Within such frameworks that which is immediate, specific, and unique is rendered meaningful by being placed into a context.

[18] Plausibility structures are emphasized in the writings of Berger (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:147-163; Berger, 1969:52-60; 1970:376-377; Berger and Kellner, 1971). C.f., James (1904:283-324), Schutz (1971:135-158), Borhek and Curtis (1975).

[19] Kuhn's discussion of scientific education illustrates how a program may maintain a reality view by transmitting an isolated perspective to students. Once a scientific achievement attains paradigm status, it becomes the exclusive content of textbooks, thereby inducing strong mental set within students:

> . . . these books exhibit, from the very start, concrete problem-situations that the profession has come to accept as paradigms, and they ask the student, either with a pencil and paper, or in the laboratory, to solve for himself problems closely modelled in method and substance upon those which the text has led him (Kuhn, 1972c:84).

The knowledge, perspective, and rules are thus acquired, not directly by studying the theory, but by doing concrete problems which apply the theory. By practicing an exemplar, the student sees resemblances among and analogies to other problem situations, thereby gaining a perspective for approaching nature and for determining similarities among problems. Having "assimilated a time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing," he can solve puzzles by seeing their resemblance to other puzzle-solutions "often with only minimal recourse to symbolic generalizations" (Kuhn, 1970:189-190). This effective and dogmatic initiation into the pre-established tradition does not allow the student to study alternative approaches or conceptual structures, neither does it invite nor equip him to evaluate the tradition itself (Kuhn, 1972c:85). The classics of his field, the research reports which make him aware of difficulties in the field, and the competing solutions to problems are not provided because the student would not only "encounter other ways of regarding the questions discussed in his text, but . . . he would also meet problems, concepts, and standards of solution that his future profession had long since discarded and replaced" (Kuhn, 1972c:83). The student comes to see the same way as the community because the perspective is perpetuated in isolation.

[20] For a discussion of reification see Berger and Luckmann (1967:88-92), Dahrendorf (1967:477), Silverman (1970). Berger and Luckmann state that:

> Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms. Another way of saying this is that reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products—such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized world (1967:89).

For example, within social studies programs various "curriculum rationales," "learning theories," "educational goals," "mind" metaphors, roles and institutions, and the status of knowledge itself may be apprehended and utilized by developers as something more than socially constructed realities through which educational phenomena are defined and interpreted. Program development models tend to be reified when viewed as objects subject to laws in a sense similar to natural phenomena, rather than as complexes of human meaning and intention which are subject to change and interpretation. Reification bestows "an ontological status independent of human activity and signification" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:90). It is perhaps inevitable that the labels, models, and imageries utilized for describing man within programs tend to "acquire a life of their own, divorced from the specific purposes for which they have originally been constructed" (Dahrendorf, 1967:477). Language provides typification by which program developers can refer to the multiple aspects of man; however, unless they are treated as socially constructed and as conveyers of human purpose, the labels and models utilized in programs may be endowed with volitional qualities and may be mistaken for man himself (Wagner, 1973:67).

[21] An example of a circular relationship between perspective (e.g., the paradigm) and community (e.g., a scientific group) is given by Kuhn: "a paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, and conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm" (1970:176). By providing a basis for a world-view and for guiding research, a paradigm defines certain characteristics of the community. First, the paradigm defines the boundaries of the community, for its members have undergone the same education, belong to the same societies, read similar journals, are involved in the same formal and informal communication networks, and are committed to the same subject matter. They pursue similar goals, work under similar norms, and take responsibility for educating prospective initiates.

Second, the paradigm provides cohesiveness and social control to the community because members share the same "ways of seeing the world and of practicing science within it" (Kuhn, 1970:4). There is relative unanimity of goals, norms, and judgments. Ben-David says that such communities are of interest to sociologists because

> . . . these communities can serve as an example of an extreme case of effective social control by a minimum of informal sanctions. They comprise one of the interesting instances where a group of people is held together by a common purpose and shared norms without the need of reinforcement by familial, ecological, or political ties (1971:4-5).

Group reliance upon a paradigm results in a closed community, insulated from external social influence, for its tradition of theories and skills is derived from the exemplar unique to them. Necessity for unanimous commitment denies competing paradigms and constant questioning of presuppositions, aims, standards, and interpretations. A consequence of taking-for-granted the paradigm allows the community to get on with the job. Since the work of the community is addressed to and evaluated by the community rather than by the demands and beliefs of laity, the problems and standards chosen need not be defended in terms of social importance, but only in terms of the shared paradigm.

Third, implicit in such commitment is an attitude of scientific dogmatism, change resistance and rigidity, for paradigm-bound research

> . . . calls for the construction of elaborate equipment, the development of an esoteric vocabulary and skills, and a refinement of concepts that increasingly lessens their resemblance to their visual common-sense prototypes. That professionalization leads, on the one hand, to an immense restriction of the scientist's vision, and to a considerable resistance to paradigm change. The science has become increasingly rigid (Kuhn, 1970: 64).

Without these technical and esoteric models of procedure and interpretation, research cannot develop. Hence, Barnes concludes that

> . . . the open rational mind is not the ideal instrument for recognizing a scientific truth, as empiricist philosophers and sociologists would have it, rather an elaborately prepared conceptual and procedural frame of reference is essential (1972:62).

Maruyama has noted also that individuals within disciplines, professions and cultural groups become resistant to change (1974c).

Four, this commitment results in conformity to the community's tradition. Without being constrained by the paradigmatic standards, tools, and techniques there could not be "normal science." Any novelty implies a change of rules, is subversive to the accepted world-view, and casts doubt upon former research achievements. Hence the community will deny, ignore, or not even perceive phenomena which the paradigm does not admit as scientific. A "scientific fact" is that which fulfills paradigm-expectations, for both the "that-it-is" and the "what-it-is" are defined by the paradigm relevant conceptual categories. That observation and conceptualization are paradigm-bound inevitably "restricts the phenomenological field accessible for scientific investigation at any given time" (Kuhn, 1970:60-61). Problems which are not statable in the conceptual and methodological terms derived from the paradigm are rejected as metaphysical or as the concern of another discipline.

The commitment to the exclusiveness of one paradigm and the resultant isolation from competing world-views is necessary since paradigms are often incompatible with one another. The community can only practice and have its interpretations legitimized under one outlook. For example, the achievements and assumptions of Ptolemy's Almagest (geocentric solar system) were based upon incompatible presuppositions than that of Copernicus' heliocentric solar system; scientists had no alternative but to choose one over the other as a general perspective for guiding their acts. Also, such commitment provides the community with the certainty of success and the motivation necessary for engaging in minute puzzle-solving problems. The elaborate problem-specific instrumentation presupposes a firm paradigmatic solution guarantee. Once a problem of fit between paradigm and nature has been solved, the community can commit itself to the belief that it need not be solved again. Taking-for-granted the paradigmatic presuppositions and the guarantee of a stable solution, a community can build upon its achievements and further articulate its perspective.

[22] Nihilism is illustrated within those scientific communities which have experienced a change of paradigm perspective (Kuhn, 1970). Members of such groups may regard the reasoning and assumptions of predecessors or competitors as error or even superstition (Calder, 1969:26-28) in a manner similar to nihilation among religious communities (Miller, 1974). This phenomenon can be noted in the

Origin of Species, for example, where Darwin complained about the problem of misrepresentation and lack of communication among different points of view. Since he was "fully convinced of the truth of the views" he held and could "see no good reason" why his perspective was resisted by some people, he resorted to terms such as "ignorance" and "prejudice" in characterizing other positions (1958:442-444). Having thus legitimized his own standpoint, Darwin concluded that lack of understanding on the part of other naturalists was inevitable because the points of view contrary to his own had been deeply entrenched over years within the community of naturalists. Similar nihilism can be identified among educators in their deprecation of competing perspectives. To illustrate, Stewart's (1975) critique of value clarification in social studies brought the following nihilation of the threatening viewpoint from Sidney Simon:

> If John Stewart had been less petulant and cranky, I might be willing to listen to him, but as it is, I don't trust him. I don't think he is really concerned with making this life better for teacher and children. His real interest seems to be with dazzling his academic, ivory tower peer group. I find that a useless recreation and reactive rather than directive. It is like the kid in the neighborhood who can't play baseball and so stands two streets away mumbling deprecations out of earshot at the kids who are having a marvelous, joyful, fun-filled ball game. On the other hand, perhaps he is envious about the many ways in which we in the value clarification movement have been useful to thousands of teachers. Our popularity makes some stuffy people rage for our jugular veins. More likely it is simply his propensity for splitting hairs. Well, while he mouths his philosophic pretentions, I will continue to devote my energies to inventing more and more creative ways for people to look at their lives and for making this world better for kids who have to go to school (1975:688).

From a sociology of knowledge viewpoint, the examples of Darwin and Simon demonstrate how nihilism operates to protect that which is taken-for-granted. An individual eliminates the threatening reality definitions on the assumption that anyone who does not hold to a particular belief is in someway inferior or suspect.

[23] The standpoint of the Now includes various dimensions of experienced time which help to define the perspectivity of consciousness. There is the subject's own inner-time in whose flux experiences have their place; there is intersubjective-time which cuts across inner-time and forms a basis for a shared Now, thereby allowing actors to coordinate projects in terms of clock and calendar time, and especially in terms of language through which streams of consciousness and events in the external world are synchronized; there is space-time in which individuals orient themselves in terms of such relationships as before and after, future and past, or faster and slower; and there is lived-time in which the relationship among these various time dimensions mentioned above are experienced together as the ever-present and unified Now (Schutz, 1975:29-30,88). One's life-field

is structured temporally by anticipations, hopes and fears, bodily movement, and by a sense of inner-time. To say the least, a study of the perspectivity of consciousness in terms of time would be complex.

[24] The ongoing and unfinished character of a perspective can be illustrated by various authors. Kuhn's description of a scientific paradigm (a fundamental perspective governing a group of scientists) as being fitted with nature means that the problems, rules, methodologies, and interpretations which guide scientific activity are never static but open-ended (1970:10). Combs and Snygg use the metaphor of a fluid phenomenological field: with a degree of fluidity in outlook an individual can modify his own acts in response to a changing environment (1959:23). Piaget's notions of assimilation and accommodation (as processes of an individual's adaptation to his environment) are analogous to the ongoing character of a perspective (1970). As an individual assimilates an environment to his cognitive structure, and accommodates his cognitive structure to his environment, an organization of his cognitive structure emerges through time. Dewey and Bentley stress a transactional relationship between knower and known (1949).

[25] A dialectical relation between subject and object is described by Berger and Luckmann (1967:174-180). They define society as "made by men, inhabited by men, and, in turn, making men in an ongoing historical process" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:189). One of the clearest illustrations of this dialectical relation between subject and object is given by Strasser:

> In 1084 Saint Bruno went to establish himself as a hermit in a savage region of the French Alps. The term "environment" seems eminently suitable to indicate this inhospitable massif, which can be described only in terms borrowed from physical geography. By the very fact, however, that Saint Bruno seeks a place where he and his companions can devote themselves undisturbed to their pious meditations, the environment ceases to be an environment. The saint asks the mountains and valleys a question: "Where can I establish myself as a hermit?" The mountains and valleys reply, albeit wordlessly. They reply by what they are. Thus there begins a dialectics, in which the things are involved negatively and positively. They are opposed to, or in favor of a certain human intention. They are "useful," "safe," "harmful," "unsuitable," "dangerous." Precisely because things arrange themselves, as it were, around an intention, a situation is born.
>
> What, then, is the meaning of "environment"? It means that man addresses his question to something, that he speaks with someone, or negatively, that he does not call the situation into being from nothing. Thus the concept "environment" indicates a boundary of human freedom, it tells us that this freedom has to depend on other things, which it is able to produce, elevate and ennoble but cannot create in the absolute sense. . . .

> However, there is more. Let us revert to the year 1084 in the French Alps and assume that Saint Bruno has found a place where he and his companions can establish themselves. Their first question has now been answered. The landscape of the Chartreuse massif has become again "environment," i.e., surrounding reality without explicit meaning. But it does not remain such very long. The first reply has affected the questioner. From a man looking for a place where he can establish himself he has now become one looking for building materials. From the first reply there arises the second question: "Where do we find the materials for our cabins?" Thus the "environment" that had become situation Number One changes into situation Number Two. The Chartreuse landscape is no longer the same landscape, it is no longer a peaceful valley, suitable for hermits, but a landscape rich or poor in wood, it contains "useless" and "useful" wood, construction lumber or firewood.
>
> In this way we could reconstruct the dialectic course of history from the year 1084 to the present time, in which an important intention of Saint Bruno's followers is to get rid of troublesome tourists. This intention, of course, gives rise to an entirely new situation (1963:282-284).

Strasser uses the term environment in this example as the world prior to human meaning having been imposed upon it, whereas situation refers to that which is meaningful through human intention.

[26] Various social scientists, besides Schutz (1970a:265-293; 1971:3-19; 1973:5-7), argue that unlike physical phenomena to which investigators impose meaning, social phenomena must be interpreted in terms of its inherent meaning established by the acts and perspectives of actors: e.g., Strasser (1963:145-147), Fromm (1967), Dawe (1970), Filmer, et al. (1972), Zaner (1973), Schatzman and Strauss (1973). Educators advocating this distinction for educational research are evident: Lewis (1965), Bantock (1969), Greenfield (1974), Shulman (1974), Walker (1974).

[27] Maruyama describes black-box analysis in engineering:

> A black box is a transductor (or a processing system) which processes a given input into an output different from the input. The processing operation inside the black box is unknown. It is not open for inspection. All one can do is to examine the relationships between various forms of input and their related outputs. One has to infer the nature of the operation inside the box from these relationships (1961b:52).

In contrast to a black-box view of man, phenomenologists argue that the social world can be understood in terms of intents (meanings and motives) and consciousness (mind). Indeed, Schutz defines the social world as

> . . . an intersubjective connection of motives. If I imagine, projecting my act, that you will understand my act and that this

> understanding will induce you to react on your part in a certain way, I anticipate that the in-order-to-motives of my own acting will become because motives of your reaction, and vice versa (1971:14)

C.f., Laing (1965, 1967), Schatzman and Strauss (1973:4-5).

Chapter III

RELATING PERSPECTIVE TO PROGRAMS

The phenomenon of perspective is possible because intentionality is directed from the standpoints of Here, Now, and Thus which place the actor at the center of his life-world (Chapter II). It may be obvious to most social studies educators and program developers that their existence is rooted historically, socially, biographically, and geographically (i.e., they are bound to some time, place, and purpose from which to think and act), yet the consequence of being forced by existence to see the social world from a vantage point has rarely been explored and applied in the literature to an understanding of social studies program development and programs.[1] Such an exploration and application is possible from a phenomenological framework.

How are perspectives on man related to social studies programs? The perspectivity of programs can be clarified by analyzing the inseparable phenomenological relation of perspective to act. Two observations underly this relation between perspective and act within phenomenological literature. In the first place, acts are perspective guided. Individuals act always on their interpretations of reality, they structure their ongoing experience by means of selected schemes of reference, they define projects from a viewpoint situated in time and place, they orient themselves to situations in terms of a frame of orientation, and they imbue objects with meaning through their projects. In the second place, a completed act represents a particular perspective relationship between the subject and the object. The constructed reality is an actor's expression of life. Inherent within the reality defined by his act is his way of interpreting experience and of orienting himself to the world.

Program development can be characterized as an intentional act guided by the perspective on man developers employ; a program can be characterized as the completed act which embodies a perspective on man. A phenomenological view of programs allows writers to clarify this educational phenomenon as experienced rather than as defined by _à priori_ starting points (e.g., models, theories, psychologies, or theologies which presuppose the perspectivity of consciousness and acts). This focus upon experience takes such authors to the life-world roots of programs and program development, to the world of everyday acts and perspectives through which social phenomena are constructed and given meaning by actors. Because social phenomena are always expressions of human meaning and outcomes of human acts, these two structures (acts and perspectives) of human experience are the point of departure in accounting for programs. Programs are no different than any other human creation brought about by perspective guided human action—"working is action in the outer world, based upon a project and characterized by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by bodily movement" (Schutz, 1944:537)—and therefore programs have their basis in someone's acts and perspectives. Thus, to describe phenomenologically how social studies programs are constructed, investigators can do so in terms of experience: the perspective guided acts of program development through which actors impose their meanings upon their socio-historical situation.

In this chapter a relation of perspective to the ongoing act (i.e., program development) and to the completed act (i.e., program) is suggested in response to the question: How are perspectives on man related to social studies programs? (Part I). Once this question of the relation of perspective to programs is examined, then a complex question can be raised concerning the relation of a program's perspective to the context of cross-perspective relationships (e.g., the perspectives on man of teachers, students, parents, and evaluators) of which the completed act becomes a part in the school: How is a program perspective related to the larger context of cross-perspective relationships of which it becomes a part? (Part II).

PART I. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RELATION OF PERSPECTIVE TO ACT

How are perspectives on man related to social studies programs? Phenomenological analysis of this relationship depends upon two factors: (1) role standpoint and (2) time standpoint. First, how a relation of perspective to programs is experienced depends upon who is experiencing the program: whether (1a) a program developer or (1b) a program user (e.g., teacher, student, evaluator, or layman). The nature of the relation of perspective to program depends upon the typical role standpoint vis-à-vis a program the actor has adopted from which to experience a program perspective. Each actor experiences a program in terms of his own interests, presuppositions, approaches, contexts, and relevances, in short, his own role specific perspective. Second, how a relation of perspective to program is experienced depends upon when over the course of an act the experiencing occurs: whether (2a) an ongoing or (2b) a completed act. The nature of this relationship depends upon the typical time standpoint from which the actor experiences a program perspective.

By combining role standpoint (program developer or user) with time standpoint (ongoing or completed act), two theses concerning a relation of perspective to programs can be formulated:

> Thesis I: From the standpoint of a program developer's role, the ongoing act of program development is perspective guided (A. PERSPECTIVITY OF PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AS AN ONGOING ACT).
>
> Thesis II: From the standpoint of a program user's role, programs as completed acts embody perspective (B. PERSPECTIVITY OF PROGRAMS AS COMPLETED ACTS).

These theses can be supported by examining the phenomenological structures of an ongoing and a completed act, thereby establishing the perspectivity of program development and of programs.

Anticipating the conclusion of Part I, it can be said that perspective guides all ongoing acts of social studies program development and is inherent in all social studies programs as completed acts (Figure III). Conceptualizing program development as an ongoing act and programs as completed acts show that programs are designed according to and embody perspective: program development is perspective guided because this ongoing act consists of motivated projecting and acting both from someone's perspective standpoints of Here, Now, and Thus. Recognizing with phenomenologists that acts are intentional, it can be stated that program development as an ongoing act is a subject-object relation guided by someone's perspective (i.e., acts guided by beliefs concerning who is man). By examining the structures

Premise: Perspective on man is related to social studies programs in two ways.

A. Perspective guides the ongoing act of program development
   1. Project of an Act
   2. Motives of an Act
   3. Actions of an Act
   4. Context of an Act
   5. Logic-in-use of an Act

B. Perspective is inherent within a program as a completed act
   1. Imposition of Reality
   2. Imposition of Relevance

Figure III

Summary of a Relation of Perspective to Programs (project, motives, actions, context, and logic-in-use) of an ongoing act of program development, therefore, a relation of perspective to programs is clarified conceptually. Further, each of the structures (reality and relevance) of a completed act shows a program to be the way someone has ordered, interpreted, and acted upon the social world. In other words, a program as a completed act represents someone's point of view at a particular time and place, and in terms of a particular purpose.

A. PERSPECTIVITY OF PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AS AN ONGOING ACT

> Their paradigm tells them about the sorts of entities with which the universe is populated and about the way the members of that population behave; in addition, it informs them of the questions that may be legitimately asked about nature and of the techniques that can properly be used in the search for answers to them (Kuhn, 1972c:93).

It is as impossible to be without a perspective on man in social studies program development as it is for normal science to be without a paradigm. Simply because the social world is too complex and vast to be explored at random, every program developer needs a commitment to a perspective on man through which he can define and investigate social reality within programs. In the absence of a perspective all phenomena would seem equally important for inclusion within programs. By defining the nature of the social world and of man from a particular viewpoint, the point of view held by developers thereby implies the nature of social studies itself by constituting what the legitimate problems, methods, solutions, and other schemes of interpretation and observation are to be in a study of fellowmen. Without this map of the social world provided by their outlooks, developers would deal randomly with questions and approaches; instead, they select outcomes, content, questions, strategies, and various schemes relevant to the juxtaposition of their perspective with the social world (c.f., Kuhn, 1970:109,126). Though such perspectives tend to encapsulate reality, the developers' view of man in general and of the student in particular is what gives focus and direction to their ongoing act of program development.

Therefore, from the standpoint of a program developer's role, program development as an ongoing act is experienced as being perspective guided. This thesis can be supported by examining how the phenomenological structures of an ongoing act are guided by the actor's standpoints of Here, Now, and Thus from which he views man. Program development is initiated when an actor looks forward (in the future perfect tense) to a projected reality, and is completed when an actor realizes his project and looks back upon the reality constructed. The total act, therefore, includes the transformation of projected experience into past experience. Because this total act of program development (including projects, motives, and activities) is defined and guided within a perspective framework, the choice of perspective screens for interpreting man has consequences for how a program will be developed. Program developers with different perspectives on man engage in different program development acts and construct different social studies program realities.

The question still remains unanalyzed concerning how perspectives on man guide the ongoing act of program development. A relation of act (ongoing program development) and perspective can be analyzed phenomenologically in terms of Schutz's notion of an act comprising (1) a project of a desired future state chosen by an actor from among alternative projects, (2) motives used to justify that project, (3) ongoing actions and sub-projects designed by an actor for realizing the initial project, and (4) a context in which the ongoing actions occur and from which means are selected by the actor for facilitating the completion of the act.[2] Program developers are not impartial in the sense that they have no preferences and biases which prejudge the selection of their projects, motives, and activities in program development. Rather, acts of program development are based upon the taken-for-granted presuppositions about man, are guided by particular interests in man, and are influenced by the approaches taken for interpreting social reality.

Project of an Act

A project (aim, goal, end in view) is essentially an ideal image defined from someone's standpoint of Here, Now, and Thus of what man is and should be. An act of program development begins when program developers conceptualize a project (a desired state of affairs or reality projection as yet unrealized) concerning the nature and scope of the program to be developed and concerning actions appropriate for realizing that project. It would be impossible to begin any program development without initial intentions in the form of a plan: "I have to visualize the state of affairs to be brought about by my future actions before I can draft the single steps of my future acting from which that state of affairs will result" (Schutz, 1971:289). Although initially vague, this plan (intended program) is imagined by developers as an already completed act which then serves as their blueprint for program development activities. On the basis of the anticipated program, actions to realize the project can be undertaken. Consequently, the unity and meaning of program development activities are constituted by this initial project because "every action is carried out according to a project and is oriented to an act phantasized in the future perfect tense as already executed" (Schutz, 1972:87).

This project in social studies program development is related to a perspective on man in two ways. First, program developers establish a goal whose character depends upon their interest in man, their past experiences of man, their particular ideologies concerning what man and society should become, and their stocks of knowledge of similar projects related to man which have been realized in past program development acts. Especially when it comes to social studies, projects which are directed toward interpreting man and the social world must be defined in terms of someone's pre-understanding of man and of his being-in-the-world. The project is perspectivable because it is a scheme of interpretation and observation of man which has been selected from the developers' Here, Now, and Thus from among many possible projects. Second, once a project is established it determines an entire system of relevances concerning what knowledge and methods will be selected and utilized for understanding man within social studies programs. Therefore, the project makes the ongoing act of program development perspectivable.

Motives of an Act

Projects which guide program development activities are justified by interpretive schemes referred to within phenomenological literature as in-order-to and because-of motives. These motives are descriptions of the actor's intents inherent within his ongoing projects or his completed acts, and thereby define from the actor's point of view the meaning of the act for him.

An individual utilizes in-order-to motives when he ascribes meaning to present activity in terms of realizing future projects, to projects in relation to larger plans, and to plans as these relate to hierarchies of plans. On the other hand, he utilizes because-of motives when he gives reasons for his ongoing projects or completed acts in terms of his past experience. The former motive justifies an act in terms of the future, whereas the latter motive justifies an act in terms of the past. Together these two motives provide the reason for what he is doing or for what he has done, and thereby are the meaning context of his activities and projects. To illustrate, a student who takes books home tonight in light of an examination tomorrow uses an in-order-to motive for ascribing meaning to his homework activities. Success on the test is a project he has established for himself in-order-to fulfill a larger plan of passing the social studies course. His project and the activities he deems relevant for realizing it have priority over other possible projects and activities because-of his experience of failing a test in social studies last week. If one were to listen to how he justifies his activities, one would find an in-order-to motive describing the intent of his activities in terms of a project, and one would find a because-of motive describing the intent of his project in terms of his past experience. The meaning of any action in progress is to be found in the actor's justification of his anticipated future state of affairs. This justification is defined both by the project (in-order-to motive) and by the past experience (because-of motive) which gave rise to that project.

Similarly, in social studies program development the reasons for attempting the project are expressed by developers in rationales, intended outcomes, anticipated uses for the program, ideals concerning what the student should become, or an utopian view of society. These in-order-to motives give meaning to that which is presently being done in terms of a desired future state of affairs defined by the project. Because-of motives justify the project because they refer to such things as former experiences of the program developers, completed evaluation reports which suggested the need for a new program, conferences attended and journals read by the developers, and beliefs concerning societal trends which the developers feel need to be supported or redirected.

All motives are obviously perspectivable. One social studies (program development or program) can be justified over another social studies on the basis of what developers believe about man. The overall act of program development is linked to some perspective on man because the stocks of knowledge and the interests inherent within these two types of motives by which any act of program development is justified and made meaningful presuppose a view of man in general and of the student in particular. Social studies programs are developed in-order-to control, interpret, or change man, and in-order-to bring about a future state of affairs deemed necessary by developers for students; programs are developed because-of selected beliefs concerning man and students. Without a perspective on man and on the social world program developers could neither plan for nor justify an act which deals with man so explicitly as does social studies program development. Both motives are firmly rooted and are meaningful in some point of view concerning man.

Actions of an Act

> Now, even the same thing, seen from different points of view, gives rise to two entirely different descriptions, and the descriptions give rise to two entirely different theories, and the theories result in two entirely different sets of action. The initial way we see things determines all our subsequent dealings with it (Laing, 1965:20).

Without a perspective on man from which projects and motives are defined, an act of program development would not be possible in social studies because the ongoing actions and means are based upon and are designed to realize the preconceived project (Schutz, 1971:289). Having been selected in terms of the same point of view from which the project was defined by developers, actions are not randomly undertaken but are designed to fit the social world within the perspective framework. But these perspective guided activities can only be used to fit the social world into the proper schemes of interpretation and observation if social reality is predefined from some perspective position.

The perspectivity of program development activities can be brought into sharper focus by specifying four basic activities:

framing questions, problem defining, specifying methodology for bringing problem and solution together, and selecting aspects of the social world for inclusion within programs. These activities are only possible within some frame of reference (i.e., the perspective designated legitimate reality concerning man and the student) used as the background against which program development can occur. Every formulation of a question, problem, or project to guide an act of program development is made possible by someone's previous experiences of man which involved similar questions, problems, or projects; selecting of activities and phenomena as means in pursuing any project involves someone's criteria and viewpoint concerning the worth of one thing over another; someone's life-world experiences influence the direction in which questions, problems, or projects are developed; consequently, that which is created through program development activities cannot be separated from the experiences, viewpoints, and life-world contexts of the developers (c.f., Mannheim, 1936:268).

Questions. Questions posed in a program could not be framed by developers nor explicated concretely within classrooms in the absence of a perspective simply because a question "presupposes a world already perceptually and conceptually subdivided in a certain way" (Kuhn, 1970:129). For example, in asking to what extent individual worth in Afro-Asian societies should be maximized, as Responding to Change does (1974:24), a certain perspective on those societies and on individual worth is already presupposed. Rather than being random, such questions are framed from a particular vantage point on the social world, are specified within the language and in terms of relationships defined by some thought model, and presuppose a range of acceptable approaches to be employed in seeking answers (Goldmark, 1968:3). To ask a question is to focus one's self upon a certain aspect of the world and in a manner specified by the underlying perspective; hence, questions illustrate how one has orientated himself to an object and how he has ordered and interpreted the world. "Even in physical science," states Strasser, "the object of research is no longer nature in itself but nature as exposed to man's questioning, and to this extent man here also encounters himself again" (1963:230); similarly, in program development activities the questions directed towards the social world betray viewpoints.

Problems. Problem defining and solving activities in program development are perspective guided: problems only arise when individuals define discrepancies between their interpretations of an actual situation and their ideals or projects, whereas one's problem solving acts are attempts to impose ideal meanings upon actual situations (Dawe, 1970). There are no problems for study apart from a perspective within which phenomena are defined by program developers as problems and are considered by them to be of interest, significance, or legitimate for inclusion within social studies programs. Terms such as poverty, multiculturalism, moral dilemma, and affluent are definitions placed on social situations, not a situation itself independent of our point of view and values (Horton, 1970b:622). As such, problem descriptions depend upon the intentions, schemes of reference, and contexts that characterize someone's perspectives.

Similarly, that which constitutes an adequate solution is implied by the problem defined and by the perspective within which both problem and solution are unified. Since both problem and solution depend upon a perspective, a teacher who defines a problem for a group of students is able also to define when an adequate solution has been achieved—when the "yes, that's right" response is suitable—from among many possible alternatives. Success is achieved by fulfilling the criteria and expectations inherent within the same perspective from which the problem was framed. Solutions inconsistent with that which was expected from a particular framework are produced only inadvertently because such novelties violate the legitimate perspective view of reality. Consequently, novel solutions come as a 'shock' because these fail to fulfill that which is expected from a particular standpoint. Usually outcomes which do not fulfill the expected are considered to be a failure of method or of the actor rather than a question of perspective adequacy: students may be asked to "redefine your problem," "read the instructions again," or "stick to the topic" when they fail to produce outcomes within the program's expectational latitude.

Problems and solutions must both be consistent within a perspective, for without a perspective there would have been no problem in the first place, no anticipated solution, and no basis for defining methodology.

Methods. Methodology by which reality is to be apprehended or a problem is to be solved is implied from the defined problem and the anticipated solution. And since there are only problems and solutions from some perspective, a perspective is implicated directly in the design of any technique. For example, in science "the decision to employ a particular piece of apparatus and to use it in a particular way carries an assumption that only certain sorts of circumstances will arise" (Kuhn, 1970:59). Similarly, embedded within a program's methodology are some perspective induced expectations concerning appropriate solutions. Selection of methodology is governed by the purpose to be served, that is, facilitating anticipated results consistent with a perspective. To question a method may be to doubt the underlying perspective basis upon which it is meaningful, for only with confidence borne out of commitment to the taken-for-granted reality view can activities proceed in a nonproblematic fashion.

Selections. As in any human act, the particular projects, subprojects, motives, and activities which comprise an ongoing act of program development, as well as those aspects of the social world which are included or excluded in programs, have been selected from among alternatives according to the program developer's Here, Now, and Thus. For example,

> The scientist never grapples with all of the interrelated phenomena that confront him in a given situation. To do so would be to embrace the cosmos every time a sparrow falls. . . . The scientist must always abstract a certain segment of reality, a certain class of phenomena, from all others, and deal with it as if it existed by itself, independent of the rest (Handy, 1964:62).

Just as surely in constructing a social studies program as in doing science or in pointing a camera, selection activities are necessary and are based upon assumptions and criteria concerning the worthwhileness of some types of phenomena and knowledge over that of others. Program developers order and interpret reality by selectively describing certain aspects of man and the social world in terms of such perspective schemes of reference as interests, presuppositions, and relevances.

Context of an Act

For every act there is a Here and Now context in which the project is formulated, ongoing actions occur, motives are deemed acceptable, and from which means are selected by the actor for facilitating the completion of his act. The ongoing act of program development is perspectivable because the developer's social locations (group, symbolic, biographical, and body locations), reality coordinates, and plausibility structures within which he is situated are the milieu out of which both his perspective and his acts are developed and maintained (Chapter II).

The array of so-called curriculum models and theories (replete on paper with boxes or squares, arrows and counter-arrows, flow diagrams of steps and sequences, precise definitions and directions) often tend to standardize program development activities through metaphors which neglect the starting point and the background influences of all program development. It must be remembered in discussing social studies program development and programs that these always have their roots primarily in the experience, beliefs, and life-world of the actor, in the conditions of his socio-historical existence which influence his acts and thought, and in the multiple realities and roles which he inhabits. Programs rarely come out of the reconstructed logics, the clinically precise formulas, the systems and technological analogies, and the language of expertise as portrayed sometimes by textbook writers, but rather they have their starting point within the commonsense world of things, fellowmen, ideas, objects, and events. Program developers act upon and within this world by means of recipes for social roles (e.g., teachers, students, experts), practical techniques of teaching and handling students based upon past experience, of-course assumptions about subject divisions and contents, biases concerning what man should be and what should be done within the social world, and even prejudices concerning groups of fellowman. As long as this life-world is not problematic in terms of thwarted expectations, program developers accept it uncritically. Indeed, the very fact that social studies program development acts are rarely questioned in terms of underlying perspectives suggests that program developers share similar commonsense realities and starting-point views about man and the social world.

There are different social studies program development acts and programs possible because of the various contexts of developers. For example, projects and motives are defined on the basis of those beliefs about man accumulated from the developers' manifold experiences, group memberships, role interpretations, present relevances, and stocks of knowledge about man. Further, program development projects and motives are not chosen at random or in isolation from the developers' own personal meaning complexes referred to in phenomenology as plans. Program development plans (means-ends relations) are usually hierarchically related to each developer's network of immediate plans, shared plans, plans for leisure and work, plans appropriate for every social role assumed, plans for time-tabling today and for the next time, life plans, and professional plans. Since these larger or smaller schemes for today are influenced by plans already completed and are contingent upon plans for tomorrow, these networks of plans are reformulated constantly in the developer's ongoing experience (Schutz, 1971:12,16,94).

Therefore, the perspectivity of social studies program development as an ongoing act is derived in part from the context. Program developers interpret man variously through the projects, motives, activities, and interpretive schemes derived out of multiple socio-historical and existential contexts. In program development someone is interpreting his own past experiences and anticipating future ones from his biographical Here and Now. He makes immediate program development activities meaningful in terms of retrospection (a reflective looking back at his experience) and prospection (a devising of projects in advance) (Schutz, 1944:535).

Logic-in-use of an Act

> Curriculum development does not proceed through a clear cycle from a statement of objectives to an evaluation of the learning strategies used. It consists of interaction, accommodation and compromise. Horse trading and horse sense are the concrete curriculum scene, not the clinical alignment of means with ends that is the official wisdom (Shipman, 1972:147).

A relation among the structures of an ongoing act (project, motives, actions, and context) and with the guiding perspective on man is such that the perspectivity of program development changes. The logic-in-use experienced in program development is phenomenologically different generally from the reconstructed logic sometimes described in educational literature.[3] As an ongoing construction of reality, an act of developing a program is an interplay among ends (projects), means (activities), motives, contexts, and perspectives in a manner which is 'messy' when examined as experienced.

The relationship among projects, motives, activities, contexts, and perspectives in the ongoing act is dialectical in the sense that each one of these factors helps to shape the other and is in turn shaped by the other. Because it is a process over time, an act undergoes constant revision as project, motives, actions, context, and perspective are modified.

In other words, program development does not start with clear statements of objectives and rationales and proceed to the realization of these. Rather, these projects and motives are redefined as subprojects are realized, as questions and problems arise, and as groups interact and negotiate within their socio-historical contexts. "If . . . we are not merely conditioned by the events that go on in our world but are at the same time an instrument for shaping them, it follows that the ends of action are never fully statable and determined until the act is finished or is so completely relegated to automatic routines that it no longer requires consciousness and attention" (Wirth, 1936:xxii). An initially defined project (an act conceived in the future perfect tense) may be redefined many times over until realized in a completed act; initial justifications (in-order-to and because-of motives) shift as projects and activities change; activities deemed relevant depend not only on a project, but also on a context, on those activities either completed or anticipated, and on the experience an actor accumulates over the span of the act itself;

context is in part a defined situation in terms of the project at hand and the Here and Now. Essentially, then, an ongoing act of program development is a temporal interplay of thought, action, and context in which there is a progressive emergence of the completed act of reality construction which we refer to as a program.

This logic-in-use always makes sense to the actor at any moment of acting because the meaning of the entire act (including project, motives, activities and contexts) is perspective defined. However, the viewpoint itself will likely be shifted by the ongoing act. As actions are completed in the ongoing act and as the actor benefits from his own experience (of "growing older," says Schutz), his perspective may shift because of enlarged or clarified schemes of reference and changing contexts. The ongoing activity of interpreting man and the social world in terms of a project and from some perspective framework tends to act back upon the program developer's outlook. In this continuing dialectic between actions and the structures of one's perspective, both are mutually influenced and are seldom stable. The temporal realization of an actor's project may broaden his experience and may shift his viewpoint. As viewpoint shifts, the meaning of the project and of the entire act does as well.

A feature of this logic-in-use in program development is that developers engage in it without needing, or even being able, to define precisely the structures of the act or to integrate the various stocks of knowledge about man which they utilize over the course of time (c.f., Schutz, 1971:94,120). Developers can and do construct programs based upon their common-sense assumptions and ideas accumulated over experience concerning what social studies programs are, what the life-world of classrooms is like, and what man and the social world are in daily life. These views generally remain vague and implicit. If these taken-for-granted knowledges become problematic for them, and if they find that they need more specialized knowledges, then they assume that there are experts and books at hand from which potential problems can be solved and needed information can be available. If program developers were to start from well defined philosophies and psychologies, if they were to prespecify all the contingencies, if they were to inquire how it is that a program comes to be, then it is doubtful that many programs would be developed at all. Rather, on the basis of a common-sense project they go ahead and act accordingly, utilizing various means and assuming that things will 'work out' over time without their having to be concerned with the why and how.

The obvious consequences of this logic-in-use is that no two social studies programs, or the images of man within them, will ever be the same. The contours of relevance will differ in each act, and the consequent distribution of knowledge about man will not be homogeneous. In the interplay between ongoing act and perspective the immediate situation will be shifting zones of relevancy (i.e., objects, events, persons, ideas will vary in relevance to the changing project at hand) within which a program reality of man and the social world emerge.

In summary, by viewing program development phenomenologically as an ongoing act, it is possible for program developers to see explicitly how it is perspective guided. From someone's Thus and from the context of his Here and Now, projects are phantasized, motives are posited, and actions deemed appropriate are selected. Over the course of this act program developers orient themselves to man and to the social world on the basis of some perspective position simply because it is impossible to be standpointless. If program development as an ongoing act were not perspective guided, all projects, motives, and actions would be equally relevant.

In the next section of this chapter, perspectives on man are seen to be related to programs as completed acts. Because program development is an intentional act in which developers have related themselves to the social world and to man from a particular time, place, and purpose, the completed acts defined as programs are an expression of an individual's or a group's particular relationship to the social world. Inherent within the completed act is the man-world relationship which guided the ongoing act. Indeed, a completed program is a perspective.

B. PERSPECTIVITY OF PROGRAMS AS COMPLETED ACTS

From the standpoint of a program user's role, a program as a completed act is experienced as having an inherent perspective. The thesis that perspective is inherent within programs can be supported by analyzing briefly the phenomenological structures of any completed act: a completed act is the imposition of both (1) reality and (2) relevance upon a situation.

Imposition of Reality

Phenomenologists speak of reality always in terms of the subject-object relationship. Reality is not the world as it is somehow in itself apart from the subject, but is the object as experienced in this way or that way by the subject. The reality which characterizes any object of intention is obviously going to be linked to the structures of consciousness through which the object is apprehended. Consciousness (intentionality) is an active and selective imposition of meaning upon an object from the subject's standpoint, and therefore the same object can be experienced as real in various ways. The object always appears in perspective to the subject because the subject-object relation is bounded by a Here, Now, and Thus (e.g., Castaneda, 1972:8). The converse of the perspectivity of consciousness (including ongoing acts) is the perspectivity of reality.

Thus through ordering, interpreting, and acting upon the world in one way or another, reality is constructed and defined for the actor. And because reality is that which is constructed and defined through ongoing perspective guided acts, a program as a completed act is a reality construction. As completed acts, programs are definitions of reality as experienced by a group of developers and thereby represent the way in which they have interpreted their own experience of man and have oriented themselves within the social world. Programs are more than socially constructed artifacts which need only to be implemented and used, but as any other act, they are interpretations of a situation, a hermeneutic of what it is to be human and of man's being-in-the-world, and an attempt to translate these expositions of human experience and reality into a form that is acceptable to teachers and students.

More specifically, a question can be asked as to what it means to say that completed acts such as social studies programs are imposed reality definitions, and hence perspectives on man. This can be answered by examining the structures of reality itself. When reality is constructed or defined through an act (i.e., reality is a correlate of intentionality), that reality may be thought of as phenomena, profiles, horizons, experience, and meaning. Reality is that which appears (phenomenon), that which is experienced, that which is meaningful, that which is bounded by horizons and appears in profiles to consciousness.[4] Since a program as a completed act is a construction of reality, it imposes upon teachers and students particular phenomena, profiles, horizons, experiences, and meanings related to man and the social world, rather than other possible phenomena, profiles, horizons, experiences, and meanings. These structures of reality establish the perspectivity of completed acts (e.g., reality definitions such as programs).

Therefore, a social construction such as a social studies program is a definition of reality—a definition through someone's ordering, interpreting, and acting upon the social world—and an imposition of this perspective definition upon other actors. The embodied perspective inherent within a program is experienced by teachers and students as someone's power to control reality.

Imposition of Relevance

Not only is a completed act an imposition of reality (a definition from some subject-object relation of a situation), but more specifically an act is the structuring of that situation into varying zones of relevance in terms of the actor's project. Thus a social studies program represents an imposition of relevance upon man and the social world: certain aspects are selectively attended to in varying ways and degrees (Chapter II). The entire program is a perspective.

Schutz defines two types of relevance systems, intrinsic and imposed relevances, which are applicable to understanding how programs are perspectivable and to how actors experience programs as completed acts (1970a:113-114; 1971:126-127). The intrinsic contours of relevance established by teachers and students within a classroom are the outcomes of their chosen interests at hand:

> The intrinsic relevances are the outcomes of our chosen interests, established by our spontaneous decision to solve a problem by our thinking, to attain a goal by our action, to bring forth a projected state of affairs. Surely we are free to choose what we are interested in, but this interest, once established, determines the system of relevances intrinsic to the chosen interest. We have to put up with the relevances thus set, to accept the situation determined by their internal structure, to comply with their requirements (Schutz, 1971:126).

For example, a student contemplating a plan for a part-time job may find the ongoing social studies lesson occupying a zone of little relevance for him. If he were to shift this interest to that of raising his marks in social studies, then the intrinsic relevances to that choice would change, and his part-time job may come to occupy a zone of little relevance at the moment. As actor, he remains the center of these zones of relevance which structure his lived-world like contour lines of a topographic map; the contours intrinsic to his choice are restructured as he shifts his interest (Chapter II).

A social studies program as a completed act, however, represents someone else's relevances intrinsic to his chosen interests, of which the student now becomes a recipient. These imposed relevances are placed upon his own intrinsic relevances; that is, problems, goals, events, views, and questions are defined for him as being relevant even though not connected with his own chosen interests, views, or goals. This leaves the student or teacher with a difficulty which can be dealt with in various ways. He may, firstly, transform the imposed relevances into intrinsic ones, thereby aligning his interests with those of the program developer and choosing to do the social studies which he may have no power to modify anyway. Or, secondly, he may intermingle the two in varying extents, modifying the imposed system and accepting it as a necessary means to fulfilling his own intrinsic relevances. Thirdly, he may consider the program as an imposed act, as that which has little to do with his own chosen goals, and consequently consider it as uninteresting, difficult, or just not worth pursuing.

If developers are to make their acts more easily adaptable to students' own intrinsic relevances, then programs must be developed less in accordance with anonymous types and more in terms of real actors. Reciprocal anonymity between program developer and student means that each considers the other as a typical actor: student interprets on the basis of his own stocks of knowledge, biographical situation, and interests the imposed relevances of a program as the typical interests of the typical program developer or knowledge expert, whereas program developer carries out his act in light of his image of a typical student in a typical social studies classroom. By having students become co-actors with 'experts' in program development acts, the imposed relevances may be qualitatively changed in the direction of students' intrinsic relevances enough to facilitate a greater acceptance of a program. Obviously in a phenomenological sense, 'motivation' of students occurs when the imposed relevances are perceived by them as being related to their own interests, relevances, and experiences in some way; actors become interested when they attend to something which is related to their own perspectives and lives, and disinterested if not related to their own acts and purposes.

An implication of the fact that program developers impose their ordering, interpreting, and acting upon classrooms in terms of their own relevances and perspectives is that to other actors who do not share the same interests and perspectives, a program will always be somewhat incoherent and not at all free from contradictions (Schutz, 1971:93-95). The kind and the depth of knowledge deemed relevant, as well as the events selected for inquiry in the application of that knowledge, are determined by the interests of the actor; at any given moment the clarity of that knowledge need only be enough to accomplish his purposes at hand (Schutz, 1971:120). Further, the hierarchy of plans and other specific interests shift continuously with the actor's time and place, so that the structuring of his life-world by these interests is a changing contour. The program's imposed and static relevances will be experienced over time by teachers and students from their own changing intrinsic relevances in differing degrees of clarity and vagueness or strangeness and familiarity. The depth and clarity of understanding demanded by the program's intrinsic relevances may not match that which is deemed relevant by the student for his purposes at hand. However, the viewpoint transmitted within a completed program is generally accepted by students and teachers as being sufficiently coherent, clear, and consistent so that they can 'get on with the job' of social studies. The ready-made and standardized schemes of reference are accepted as being authoritative and are generally unquestioned as a guide for social studies activities. Only when a lack of coherence, clarity, and consistency is so great that social-studies-thinking-as-usual is disrupted, when the imposed and intrinsic relevances are too far apart to be merged, are programs considered to be totally irrelevant by teachers or students.

This discussion of relevance is not advocating that program developers accommodate the prevailing and immediate view of man which either students or the mass-media may deem relevant. These views generally change quickly and their relevance becomes obsolescent:

> Relevance and timeliness are defined for the society at large, primarily by the media of mass communication. These are afflicted with an incurable hunger for novelty. The relevances they proclaim are, almost by definition, extremely vulnerable to changing fashions and thus of generally short duration. As a result, the . . . intellectual (program developer) who seeks to be and remain 'with it,' in terms of mass-communicated and mass-communicable relevance, is predestined to find himself authoritatively put down as irrelevant very soon (Berger, 1969:38).

Rather, relevance in social studies has to be found in the long-term social interests of man. It is possible to give man meaning in terms of characteristics of timeliness which define the human condition:

work, suffering, injustice, meaning, death, hopes and fears, and so on (Phenix, 1974). These schemes for interpreting man maintain relevance because they are related to everyone's existence over times and places and help to illuminate man's condition in his world.

In summary, perspectives on man are related initially to social studies programs in terms of program development. By viewing program development phenomenologically in terms of the structures of an ongoing act one can argue that someone's Here, Now, and Thus guide the total ongoing act and that, consequently, perspective is inherent within the completed act. A completed act represents an imposition of reality and relevance because it is always the result of the way in which human consciousness was oriented to the situation of the ongoing act itself.

PART II. PROGRAMS AND CROSS-PERSPECTIVE RELATIONS

In Part I (A Phenomenological Relation of Perspective to Act) perspective was seen to be related to programs in two ways. First, the viewpoints of program developers guide their act of program development. This thesis was examined by tracing the phenomenological structures of an ongoing act in order to establish how program development occurs from someone's standpoint of Here, Now, and Thus. Program development, as with any act, is essentially a perspectivable subject-object relationship in which reality is constructed through selected schemes of reference. Therefore, the question is not whether program developers have perspectives or not, but what kind of outlooks, and based upon whose interests, for interpreting man and the social world within social studies programs. If the world is ordered differently with shifts in outlooks, then programs also will be constructed variously depending upon where they are developed and who is involved.

Second, a relation of perspective to programs was considered not in terms of an ongoing act of program development, but in terms of a completed act. Once a project is realized by means of ongoing program development activities, the program is no longer a phantasized plan in someone's mind, but is a completed and objectified act defined by Schutz as "the accomplished action or the state of affairs brought about by it" (1971:289). This accomplished action, having been brought about by the ongoing program development act, is a social reality (much as a tool, a political party, or a book) embodying the intents and perspectives of its designers. Because any ongoing act is biased by the perspective employed by actors, the reality constructed (the completed act) reflects the underlying perspective. Not only are developers' particular ways of ordering, interpreting, and acting upon the social world inherent within the program which they produce, but the program as a completed act is itself a perspective on the social world and on man which is now communicated to program users such as teachers and students. Simply put, within completed acts referred to as social studies programs a developer meets himself, as it were, because man as an object of his attention has emerged in terms of his own specific schemes of reference.

Considering social studies programs in terms of the perspectivity of acts raises some complex questions concerning what happens to a program's perspective once it is encountered by those actors who hold differing perspectives on man. How do they (A) interpret and (B) implement a program's perspective on man? The following discussion briefly relates a program perspective to the larger context of cross-perspective relations of which it becomes a part (Figure IV).

Premise: A program perspective becomes a part of a larger context of cross-perspective relationships in two ways.

A. Programs as Interpreted Acts
B. Programs as Implemented Acts

Figure IV

Summary of Programs and Cross-perspective Relations

A. PROGRAMS AS INTERPRETED ACTS

> Everyone who enters a school building does not see the same thing. The same objects, the same people, and the same actions may be observed, but these are seen in the light and within the limitations of a person's experience and are related to his interests and the reasons he has for being there (Dahlke, 1958:3).

From the standpoint of a program user's role, programs as completed acts embody a perspective which stands in need of interpretation within the varying situations of which the program becomes a part. As such, programs can be thought of as interpreted acts on the part of teachers, students, and parents who bring their own perspectives to the program, and on the part of program developers themselves as time removes their present viewpoints from that of either the ongoing or the completed act. This completed act is in need of interpretation by those who do not share its perspective on man.

How are program perspectives on man interpreted? Interpreting is not independent of the interpreter's own viewpoint (i.e., an object appears to the subject from a standpoint of Here, Now, and Thus) and consequently takes place in terms of the outlooks program users themselves bring to the program. Program perspectives are not understood by all in the same way, and may therefore gain multifaceted meanings as they are interpreted from various positions. Some incredibly complex questions concerning interpretation can be raised, for though interpretation of a program perspective is an attempt to grasp the developers' thought and viewpoint, yet the act of interpreting stands out against the interpreter's own relevances and preunderstandings which serve as his scheme of interpretation. Such questions can be left to phenomenologies of communication, of the reciprocal sharing of inner-time, and of the we-relationship which are beyond the scope of the present study. The structure of the relationship between program perspective and interpreter can be described in terms of the "hermeneutic circle."

As a general theory concerning how understanding of social phenomena occurs, the hermeneutic circle is here applied to perspective interpretation.[5] Every act of interpretation is an ongoing subject-object relation in which meaning emerges over time for the interpreter as he acquires new experience and attains changed vantage points. Understanding is cumulative as this subject-object relation changes over time. When reading a particular sentence for the first time, the reader interprets it in terms of his background experience, the stocks of knowledge he brings to it, and his total understanding of the author to that point. However, as he reads further, he places that sentence in an increasingly larger meaning context of the paragraph, the page, the chapter, and the book. As he reads the book for the second or third time the meaning which that particular sentence has for him is changed. Over time his ongoing interpretation of the phenomenon differs because of the changing interpretive framework he has. It is the temporal character of the subject-object relation which is the basis for cumulative human understanding that is referred to as the hermeneutic circle.

Similarly, the hermeneutic circle is operative when actors attempt to understand perspectives which differ from their own. The probability of misunderstanding and miscommunication is high initially because they may have very little common basis for interpreting the other. Definitions may have to be specified and schemes of reference made explicit during the ongoing interaction, thereby building up an intersubjective meaning context within which specific assertions can be understood.

As a teacher comes to a social studies program for the first time, his interpretation of its perspective will depend in part upon the program itself and in part upon the teacher's own outlook on social studies and on man, his intents and motives, and his immediate situation in terms of a particular class to teach. As he interprets the program many times, his understanding of its perspective is increased. The hermeneutic circle specifies that the understanding the teacher grasps is derived from the ongoing combination of his own situation (his definitions, experiences, and perspectives) and the perspective of the author inherent in the program (Dawe, 1970:216).

Within the ongoing hermeneutic circle there are several factors which influence the interpretation students and teachers have of a program perspective on man.

Subjective Standpoint

> Hermeneutics asks the question: "What do I bring to the situation?" In contrast to Descartes' ideal of removing all presuppositions, hermeneutics acknowledges the fact that a person's thinking is always situated. My existence is always presupposed. All my knowledge of the world . . . even my scientific knowledge is gained from my own particular perspective which resides in some experience of the world without which the symbol systems of science would be meaningless. My system of knowledge and relevancies is built upon the world as directly experienced by me. Thus, something is always presupposed in the phenomenological attitude, namely, my existence (van Manen, 1973:153).

During the hermeneutic circle the individual arranges the lived experiences and viewpoints of others within his own meaning context, always interpreting the others' experiences and views from his own Here, Now, and Thus (Schutz, 1972:106). He can never understand fully others' intended meanings because their perspectives and meaning contexts are the result of their previous lived experiences, and because he cannot acquire the same consciousness, live their intentional acts, experience their phantasies, and constitute meaning and reality from their Now and Here as they do. Constituted within the unique stream of consciousness of each actor, perspective is inaccessible in its totality to an interpreter and is therefore confined in principle to the self-interpretation of the actor who holds and experiences the outlook (Schutz, 1972:99). Just as perspectives and intended meaning are subjective in the sense that they belong to an individual, so any act of interpretation of perspectives and intended meaning is from someone's subjective standpoint.

Indeed, the hermeneutic circle is premised upon the subjective standpoint, for if it were possible to understand another's perspective as he experiences it, then interpretation would not be necessary. More specifically, there are factors which define the subjective standpoint and influence interpretations.

Preunderstanding. Everything that an interpreter knows about the life of other actors is based finally upon knowledge of his own lived experience (Schutz, 1972:106). He is a variable in the meaning he attempts to grasp because this preunderstanding which he brings with him to the reading of a book, the observing of an actor, the utilizing of a tool, and so forth, influences the ongoing relation between the interpreter and that which he is interpreting. Although Husserl's "to the things themselves" is an attempt to let social phenomena "speak for themselves" as much as possible rather than a forcing of such data into schemes alien to the actors who created the phenomena, this maxim does not imply that a study can be undertaken without presuppositions or foreshadowing problems. Social data do not speak for themselves apart from some perspective within which they are interpreted.

An interpreter does not stand above the situations of his own life-world when attempting to understand the perspectives and acts of another, but understands these through the framework of his own previous experience and the resulting knowledge at hand he has accumulated. Interpretation is anchored in a general scheme of reference defined by his Here and Now (Holzner, 1972:1).

Intents. Further, interpretation is influenced by the interpreter's Thus. He may see and interpret differently what another observer may consider to be the same perspective because intentions and relevances guiding their acts of interpretation are dissimilar. Understanding is based upon the project of the act of interpretation itself. For example, when a teacher approaches a program with such intents as teaching his second period grade ten class, formulating ideas for his own program development, defending the program to parents, or criticizing its assumptions with fellow teachers, his interpretations of the program may vary in response to these different purposes and to the questions he asks of the program, in the same manner as a poem may be read quite differently depending upon the intent of the reader. The intents and relevances he brings to any act of interpretation make the interpreter an integral part of the act and helps to determine in part the understanding derived from a program.

Style of concern. Another aspect of the subjective standpoint is the actor's style of concern for grasping the meaning of a perspective on man different from his own:

> What is required is not indifference, as positivism in its heyday believed—'Grey cold eyes do not know the value of things,' objected Nietzche—but rather an engagement of feeling, interest, or participation. . . . The will must be directed and oriented toward a constructive purpose. Neither idle curiosity nor a passion for annihilating whatever differs from one's own position is an appropriate motive for this task (Wach, 1958:12-13).

Although hard to define adequately, this precondition for understanding a perspective implies that a relationship of supposed detachment is not possible in interpreting human meaning in the same sense as a geologist would use when identifying quartz composition. An interpreter of social phenomena is not confronted with data to which he can impose meaning, but with data which is an expression of life and inherently meaningful. There needs to be an interest in entering into dialogue, in achieving some degree of consensual understanding, in responding to human meaning as it is expressed rather than as one would want it to be expressed, and in accepting a perspective on its own terms (c.f., Strasser, 1963:173-177; Perrin, 1974; Tracy, 1974).

The interpreter himself becomes a factor in the understanding he derives because of the various kinds of preunderstandings, intents, and styles of concern he brings to an object. The lived experiences and views of the other are interpreted on the basis of the interpreter's own lived experiences and views of the other. When attempting to grasp the perspective on man expressed in completed acts such as social studies programs, teachers and students cannot escape their own subjective standpoints. They apprehend a program in terms of their own experience contexts, interpretive schemes, and situations defined by their Here, Now, and Thus (Schutz, 1972:109-110).

Intersubjectivity

Although the hermeneutic circle operates always from the subjective standpoint, it is at the same time premised upon intersubjectivity. There is no basis for interpreting one another if actors could not assume the overlapping and sharing of intents, outlooks, contexts, and realities amongst themselves (Schutz, 1970a:163-184). For example, as a teacher orients his own perspectives and teaching acts to his interpretations of the perspective of a completed program act (including its because-of and in-order-to motives), he assumes that his individual understandings are not just personal (in the sense of being meaningful to the subject alone), but that the meaning a program has for him corresponds to a large degree with the meaning it also has for its developers and for other teachers. It is taken-for-granted by program developers and by teachers that because acts of program development are understood similarly amongst themselves, programs are teachable in a similar manner in various places and times.

Program developers take their fellowmen (teachers and students) for granted by assuming intersubjectivity on the basis of a common life-world, typicality of experience among alter-egos, and reciprocity of perspectives.[6] They assume that the viewpoint expressed in a program can be experienced and interpreted typically by teachers and students as intended by program developers. And by virtue of similar training and classroom experiences, shared journals and conferences, and common expectations concerning what a program should be, teachers and program developers uphold this natural attitude until faced with counter evidence to show that intersubjectivity is problematic.

Typicalities of Experience

No one can experience in the same way the meaning which another actor attributes to his experience from his Here, Now, and Thus; hence, the hermeneutic circle is premised upon a structural parallelism among the perspectives and acts of interpreter and those actors whom he is interpreting. The perspectives and meaning of acts as lived by the other person are accessible to an interpreter in terms of those interpretive schemes (e.g., ideal types, social recipes, standardized typifications) which allow him to grasp typical meanings and perspectives. For example, Schutz's hermeneutic of social acts is based upon an ideal type of an act which defines typical structures of a typical act, which when applied to any unique act, allows the interpreter to focus on the actor's meaning rather than upon the observable behavior (bodily movement) which is merely an outward indication of experience (1972). Similarly, the ideal type of perspective developed in Chapter II defines typical structures of a typical perspective. When applied to a social studies program, this type allows the investigator to grasp typically its unique perspective on man. Indeed, grasping the meaning of someone's field of expression (i.e., interpreting his outlooks) can be done in no other way than through types which specify the phenomenon in terms of its typicalities.

Programs as completed acts are interpreted by teachers and students not as artifacts devoid of inherent meaning, but as expressions of someone's life and meaning. Actors know that any act typically is meaningful in terms of its intent (e.g., typical structures of intent are projects, in-order-to and because-of motives) and meaning context (e.g., typical structures of meaning context are larger life plans, biographies, specific background experiences, and perspectives). Therefore, in asking what a program means, they are at least implicitly asking: What is the intent expressed in this act? In what meaning context does the act stand? In the classroom life-world, for example, if a student suddenly picks up his books and leaves, the rest of the people in that room do not simply see bodily movement and hear shuffling, but interpret that movement as an act based upon an intent and a context which make it meaningful to the actors. As interpreters they "imaginatively project the in-order-to and because-of motive of the other person as if it were their own and use the fancied carrying-out of such an action as a scheme in which to interpret his lived experiences" (Schutz, 1972:115). They try to discover what the actor intended by his act (the motive for the movement) and what it meant on that particular occasion and moment (the meaning context within which the movement occurred). They do not impose any meaning they wish upon his movements, but experience these external body expressions as indicators of his stream of consciousness, and attempt to infer his intended meaning from that which they overtly experience (Schutz, 1972:30). A typification which specifies the typical meaning structures (intent and context) of a typical act is their basis for interpreting.

In summary, programs are essentially social acts which stand in need of interpretation because they embody the meanings (intents, motives, plans, and outlooks) of one group (program developers) which another group (teachers, students, parents) attempts to grasp. As with any other social artifact (whether a drinking cup or a political party), programs are the products of someone's meaning making acts, and therefore need to be understood in terms of the intentionalities and definitions of reality inherent within them. Interpretation involves asking the question: In this program what does the social world and man mean for the program developers?

B. PROGRAMS AS IMPLEMENTED ACTS

From the standpoint of a program user's role, programs as completed acts embody a perspective which is implemented within the varying situations of cross-perspective relations of which the program becomes a part. That the hermeneutic circle and perspective may be factors in the success or failure of program implementation has rarely been researched and discussed within educational literature (Eggleston, 1972; Shipman, 1972). If programs are more than objects to be handed from one actor to another, then as definitions of man and the social world they will be interpreted variously from different situations (e.g., rural, religious, occupational, ethnic), by different categories of actors who do the interpreting (e.g., teachers, students, parents, program developers, community groups), and from different intents (e.g., critical or supportive).

Questions can be asked, therefore, about the meaning of the word implementation in terms of the complex relation between a program's perspective and the interpretations of that perspective by actors. Although beyond the scope of the present study, any phenomenological notion of implementation would need to be clarified on the basis of two questions: (1) When is program development completed? (2) What is program change?

When is Program Development Completed?

When viewing program development as an ongoing act (Chapter III), an important question arises concerning the time span imputed to the ongoing act. A distinction can be made between examining program development as an ongoing act which is initiated and realized over a definite period of time, and program development as an ongoing act which is initiated and constantly being realized over time by various actors such as teachers and students. Not only can program development be viewed as a concise unit (a total act), but it must also be seen as an ongoing act which is never completed by program developers themselves because of the nature of the project by which the act is guided. Program developers define a project or goal which is rarely attainable simply because it envisions an ideal society or man to be realized by social studies activities. The project as an end is always future and utopian as a view of what should be, otherwise there would be no reason to initiate program development in the first place. Consequently, program developers never complete the act, but rather establish the goal and initiate activities towards its attainment, and at some point turn the ongoing act over to teachers and students who are to continue the activities towards realizing the project. That which is given to teachers and students is much like a tool:

> A tool is a thing-in-order-to; it serves a purpose, and for the sake of this purpose it was produced. Tools are, therefore, results of past human acts and means toward the future realization of aims (Schutz, 1970a:292).

Programs are also a thing-in-order-to realize the ideal project (the perspective on man) which guides the entire ongoing act.

Viewing program development in this way raises a complex question concerning program implementation. What happens to this act of program development when it is taken over by teachers and students who hold various perspectives on man which may even conflict with that established by program developers? The project (ideal of man and society) which guides the act will be interpreted and shifted, which means that the ongoing act itself is now changed. What was once a homogeneous ongoing act for program developers now becomes splintered into various ongoing acts defined by different projects, motives, activities, and contexts of actors within multiple classrooms.

To say the least, implementation is the development of intersubjectivity among a variety of actors, for where the outlook of a program differs from those held by actors, the act of implementing a program would require that a degree of cross-perspective resonance be established among participants. They need to understand the reality which has been constructed and transmitted within the program. A negotiating of that reality definition occurs in which both the program is defined to some extent to fit the views of its users, and the views of those who use the program are modified towards that of the program.

It would seem that in implementing programs emphasis needs to be placed on the local meaning contexts and upon the perspectives of those involved, as well as upon making explicit the intents and perspectives of a program. Without this starting point, the ways in which the different parties involved in a program define what it is will reflect the various perspectives and contexts from which they individually work (Shipman, 1972:145). Teacher interpretations of a program perspective will vary over time from other teachers and from program developers because of changing situations (e.g., problems of local concern) and viewpoints. As a result of implementation, a program exists as different realities in the experience of the different actors involved.

Similarly, once the completed act referred to as a program is implemented at the classroom level of students, the hermeneutic circle is operative again. Teachers and program developers can become so immersed in their own roles and encapsulated by their own perspectives that they forget students also have their own roles and perspectives which cause them to interpret and act towards programs in various ways (e.g., Esland, 1971a; Cusick, 1973). On the basis of their own experience and from their own vantage points, students bring to social studies their own definitions of reality and their own understandings of man. Although these differences in the classroom situation are negotiated through conversation and are regulated within the restraints provided by the program, the reality constructed in such a setting cannot be predicted with any certainty (Cosin, et al., 1971:1).

What is Program Change?

> Curriculum change comes through the interaction of groups with different and changing perceptions of the same situation. The curriculum scene is a busy market place where bargains are struck between parties who interpret the contract through their particular circumstances (Shipman, 1972:152).

While there might be agreement initially during implementation concerning interpretation of a program perspective, each actor continues over time to define the program's project from his own changing contexts and points of view, with the result that the reality of a program is in constant change for them. What was implemented today in the minds of actors cannot be assumed to be static over place and time, and what may have been apparent common interpretations at one time easily become diverging views later on as redefining occurs. A program becomes vulnerable when placed in situations where no common frames of reference exist for interpreting it. The changes that occur in interpretation over time are largely unpredictable. Although it is true that any program still has within it the perspective of its developers, these reality definitions will be interpreted by teachers from varying points of view and will be implemented in varying ways within classrooms. At the classroom level a program is in constant change, for what was a completed act for program developers now becomes an ongoing part of the context and means for someone else's projects.

Similarly, as time, experience, and new acts separate the program developers from their own act of program development, they will in retrospection continue to reinterpret the program's perspective in terms of changing because-of motives. Meaning of their original project differs from that of the completed act because meaning is always grasped from a Here and Now, is changed over the course of experiencing the realization of the act itself, and is reflected upon through shifting perspectives. Consequently, programs undergo modification or are discarded over time by the program developers themselves.

A view of implementation needs to be worked out on the premise that the perspective of a program will be differently interpreted by actors situated in a Here, Now, and Thus not shared with program developers.

SUMMARY

That perspective is a phenomenon in all social studies programs was the premise investigated in this chapter. Not only is the ongoing act of program development perspective guided, but as a result, the completed act embodies the perspective of some group. The outlooks of program developers guide their acts of program development. The reality constructed by such acts reflects the underlying perspective because any approach taken by a group or by an individual to program development is biased by the perspective employed. Inherent within the programs which developers produce are their particular ways of ordering, interpreting, and acting upon the social world. By defining program development as an ongoing act it is possible to follow through how viewpoints are involved in guiding the development of a program, and by defining programs as completed acts it is possible to show how perspective is implicit within programs. In these two ways perspectives on man are related to social studies programs: they guide program development and they are embodied within programs.

This relation of perspective to programs has some implications, however, for how the program perspective is related to the larger context of cross-perspective relationships of which it becomes a part. Questions can be raised concerning how a program viewpoint is interpreted and implemented by actors who themselves have differing points of view on man.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1] Very little research on social studies programs and program development in terms of phenomenology is evident in educational literature. Programs as constructed social realities are described within phenomenology in terms of acts and meaning rather than in terms of systems, models, and theories which presuppose experience. By starting from life-world experience of program developers, phenomenologists attempt to clarify what program development and programs are in terms of certain structures of our humanness (acts, consciousness, purpose, realities, *weltanschauung*, commitments, fears) which tend to be neglected in other epistemological modes used for understanding programs. The relevance of *à priori* starting points apart from experience are bracketed by phenomenologists for the time being in order that their descriptions of programs may be a return to the things themselves as experienced. Following phenomenological method, therefore, it is inadequate to account for programs in terms of the reconstructed logics and schemes presented to us in the literature on program development; by momentarily suspending belief in the relevance of those taken-for-granted models, rationales, and theories that currently dominate the educational field, phenomenologists return to what program development is in the experience (the acts and perspectives) of men living within the world. Application of phenomenology to the study of programs is not done in the interest of prediction and control, but rather in the interest of understanding the structures of our program experiences.

There are no free perspectives in program development, for actors do not rise above their own group interests (whether political, economic, religious, or epistemological) and experiences. Their perspectives are not ahistorical or neutral in terms of man. That program developers have a stance has been recognized widely by educators: Aoki (1974b), Freire (1970a, 1973), Young (1971a), Goodlad (1973), Macdonald and Clark (1973). The thesis of Eisner and Vallance is that conflicting orientations do guide program development and can be identified in terms of goals, presuppositions, and approaches adopted by developers (1974:1-3). A completed program as a description of the social world is a product of those acts themselves directed from some perspective position (Blum, 1971).

General applications of phenomenology to programs can be found in the following authors: Greene (1967, 1973, 1974, 1975), Chamberlin (1969, 1974), Apple (1970), Cosin, *et al.* (1971), Esland (1971a, 1971b, 1973), Vandenberg (1971), Young (1971), Shipman (1972), Dale (1973), Greenfield (1973, 1974), van Manen (1973), Denton (1974), Needham (1974), Pinar (1974, 1975b), Friesen (1975), Riffel (1975), Boughton (1976), Willis and Allen (1976).

[2] For a discussion of the structures of an ongoing act see especially Schutz (1944; 1970a:125-159; 1971:3-19; 1972; 1973), as well as Natanson (1967) and Holzner (1972). In general, through acts the individual imposes meaning upon his socio-historical context and his experience within it. The meaning of an act for an actor is to be found in his projects, his forward looking in-order-to motives, and his backward looking because-of motives. Acts of evaluation, instruction, and program development, therefore, can be interpreted in terms of the meaning actors give to them through projects and motives.

Projects are discussed by Schutz (1970a:137-145; 1971:11,75, 77; 1972; 1973); c.f., Dewey (1950:189-198,223-237). Projecting as a structure of any act of program development is similar to the pre-active phase discussed by Aoki (1971, 1974a) and Keddie (1971:135) in which activity such as planning outcomes, display material, and strategies designed to realize a project is undertaken.

As to motives, Schutz explains that:

> . . . the in-order-to motive motivates the act which is itself being constituted on that occasion, using the project as its basis. In the in-order-to relation, the already existent project is the motivating factor; it motivates the action and is the reason why it is performed. But in the genuine because relation, a lived experience temporally prior to the project is the motivating factor; it motivates the project which is being constituted at that time (1972:92).

These motives are not isolated nor chosen at random, but are usually a part of larger meaning complexes such as hierarchies of plans and belief systems to which an actor subscribes (Schutz, 1970a:112-113; 1971:16). Although an observer may be able to infer another's motives from a knowledge of these larger interpretive schemes and from the typified motives associated with role based acts, in most situations it is enough to know "typical motives of typical actors which explain the act as a typical one arising out of a typical situation" (Schutz, 1971:13; c.f., 1970a:126-129).

[3] For a clarification of logic-in-use in program development and for examples of the interplay between ends and means in such acts, see Banks (1969), Caston (1971), Shipman (1972), Aoki (1973).

[4] An adequate phenomenological account for perspective on man within programs as completed acts can be given by describing these overlapping structures of reality which characterize the presentation of reality in consciousness.

Reality as Phenomena

> A phenomenon is esentially whatever appears to someone, that is to a subject. Such subject-relatedness does not involve the dependence of the phenomenon upon the subject. But it does indicate that [one] . . . cannot simply ignore the subject

(Spiegelberg, 1966:140).

Reality is simply that which appears to consciousness from the subject's particular standpoint. As a description of phenomena in the Greek sense of the word, phenomenology is a study (logos) of that which appears (phainemenon) or shows itself (phainein) to an observer. Populated with things and events, properties and interrelationships, self and other selves, feelings and desires, ideas and fantasies, choices and acts, the world of phenomena is for man at all times that which is simply there and that which he encounters in its givenness to him. Reality for the actor is the world which continuously presents itself to him.

However, a closer look at the nature of phenomena shows that all which appears in consciousness is inseparably linked with the structures of consciousness. He can relate to and experience some aspect of the world through sundry schemes of reference (Thus) and from varying contexts (Here and Now). At all times that which appears is not the world as it is somehow in itself but as it is apprehended through the structures of consciousness in this or that particular subject-object relation. Man as knower is essentially involved in his apprehending the world because he brings to it his intentions which are influenced by his standpoint and his biography. It is in recognition of this fact that man is always the instrument through which anything is known about an object that phenomenologists refer to the object as phenomenon. Phenomena are not independent of the subject because it is not possible to separate subject (consciousness) and object (reality).

As a completed act, a social studies program is a reality view of man in the sense of phenomenon. It represents that which appears concerning man and the social world to the consciousness of a program developer. As such, programs as completed acts are perspectivable.

Reality as Profiles

> . . . the difference between a lady and a flower girl is not how she behaves, but how she's treated. I shall always be a flower girl to Professor Higgins, because he always treats me as a flower girl, and always will; but I know I can be a lady to you, because you always treat me as a lady, and always will (Shaw, 1941:127).

Shaw's Pygmalion illustrates the sense in which phenomenologists have defined a structure of reality as the profile appearance of the world to consciousness. Because intentionality is directioned from and is bounded by a determined standpoint of Here, Now, and Thus, the world presents itself to an observer in profiles. He sees a building from a particular position and from one side only, not only in terms of his physical position and his eye-level, but also in terms of his role as a real estate agent, as a potential buyer, as a postman, or as the home owner. When an observer walks around and through the house, or as he changes his role and interest vis-à-vis the house, he views it from many points of view and in terms of some of its multiple aspects. What one sees depends in part upon where he is standing. Although he can change his position and thereby juxtapose various profiles, an actor's observation is incomplete because it is situated and tied to one point of view at a time (Gurwitsch, 1965).

The manner in which an object appears to an individual depends in part upon the acts of consciousness which relate him to that object. Whereas any one act of consciousness relates him to an object in a particular way, another act shifts the profile of an object experienced by a person. "For example, the same tree might be seen as something-to-climb by one person, as a source of firewood by another, as a sign of God's presence by another" (Byrne and Maziarz, 1969:7). Depending upon the interest or upon the value one places upon a certain profile over another, an object can be viewed primarily in a particular manner.

It is the reality (not existence) of object vis-à-vis subject that shifts in accordance with intentions. To say that consciousness is an active directedness to the world is not a denial of the world that we experience, that we are born into, that is the ground of our projects and knowledge, and that constrains our acts through its inherent structures. On the contrary, our experience and awareness is a correlate of referent ideas, objects, events, and persons. In other words, consciousness is not a fabrication but an apprehension of the world. Although man and social world can be apprehended from many different viewpoints in social studies, it is the reality of the referent experienced and not the referent itself that is changed with shifts in standpoint. Fellowman can be apprehended as person or object, as joint-actor or as one to be acted upon, as predecessor or successor, as brother or acquaintance, and as unique individual or as a representative of a label or case. Each mode of apprehending man in social studies defines a different subject-object relationship.

If the premise is accepted that consciousness can be directed towards something in a multitude of ways, then there are important consequences for the study of man and of any social issue. "The question about the essence of any being is reduced to that of the modes of consciousness in which the being had to manifest itself originally as 'this' or 'that'" (Kockelmans, 1966:41). That is, the profile appearances of man and of any social issue are dependent upon the perspective utilized. To acquire a series of profiles on a social situation, one must shift his point of view.

As a completed act, a social studies program is perspectivable because it presents profiles of man and the social world.

Reality as Horizonal

> . . . the thema of a particular act is that on which the subject at a given moment centers his attention. The corresponding

> thematic field is the complex surrounding the thema in this act, the total context in which this thema manifests itself in this particular act. . . . The thematic field is very important for a correct view of the thema, for the thema refers to the thematic field, and the field gives to the thema a certain color and shading or at least co-determines its complete concrete meaning (Kockelmans, 1966:45).

Metaphorically speaking, a horizon represents the limits of what is seen from any particular eye-level position. This visual boundary cannot be transcended because it moves as the individual changes his location, and it is extended or narrowed with change of standpoint. Similarly, intentionality has horizons beyond which it does not extend, thereby limiting what one attends to, the array of things of which one is knowlegeable, and the extent of one's projects. These horizons define a circle of reality which limits the extent of one's outlooks and acts.

Horizons are potentially open and constantly shifting rather than being determinate. Once an actor knows that the parameter of his viewpoint is limited by boundaries, he need only intend movement in order to realize what is beyond. As interest and experience change with time and place, his horizons shift or expand, allowing new realities to emerge or old realities to fade away. An object which may have been merely on the horizon of his consciousness may shift toward the center or disappear altogether as his interests change.

Horizons are always in reference to the individual who is the center of his lived-world. Any aspect of the world which is immediate to him is experienced as being clear and as having an overwhelming sense of reality because it is experienced directly (James, 1904:300). Those aspects of his world which are situated close to the outer limits of his horizons are experienced as being vague and undifferentiated. He is acquainted with the world that is beyond the reach of his interest or of his knowledge merely through conjecture or through the recognition that other actors do not share his own horizons.

A person's horizons are multiple, depending upon what his particular act or topic of interest is at the moment. Being situated suggests that thought and acts are encompassed always within larger or smaller horizons defined by such factors as the individual's biography, knowledge at hand, selectivity of interests, and those larger perspectives which are general in applicability (i.e., they have wider horizons relating to one's meaning of life, to one's attempt at a total world picture, or to one's principles held to be nonsituational). The overarching beliefs into which we are born are internalized and allow us to participate within a group as a member rather than as a stranger (Wagner, 1973:69-70). Under the umbrella of these large horizons that characterize a general world view there are the smaller horizons associated with separate realities and with our pragmatic acts. As a figure against a background, an object is set out from a context by our acts. To illustrate, any profile of man presented in a program appears in the light of a horizon (such as the details of the story, the display, the place, teaching strategies, the student's former experiences) in which that object of attention is situated and from which the profiles are in part established.

As a completed act, a social studies program is perspectivable because teachers and students are expected to orient themselves to the social world and to man within the imposed horizons which define legitimate reality and which guide reality constructing. The particular phenomenon and profile of man which appear to teachers and students are determined in part by the reality horizons of a program.

Reality as Experience

> Reality is that which is experienced. . . . Reality itself is strictly correlative to our experience of it. It is capable of being experienced and in so far forth it can be known. Moreover, our experience of reality is historical and always growing. Consciousness itself is cumulative. . . . All knowledge of reality depends on human activity and reality itself can be approached and defined only through experience (Edie, 1965b:120-121).

Reality consists of those aspects of the world as experienced and as made meaningful in our consciousness (Wagner, 1973:63). Experienced reality can be of anything which is present, past, anticipated, immediate, or remote. By attributing order, by interpreting, and by acting upon such things, an individual constructs reality (Schutz, 1970a:5). If the basic structure of consciousness is intentionality (to be actively conscious of something), then reality is always for the individual that which is an object of intention (that which he is conscious of). Schutz emphasizes, "To call a thing real means that this stands in a certain relation to ourselves" (1944:533). At no time can an actor define reality in terms of the world apart from himself, but only in terms of the world as it is experienced by him in a time and a place, and as it is accounted by him to be real in the way in which he experiences it (Combs and Snygg, 1959:22). Experience is directed and structured by his schemes of reference and the intentional acts of consciousness (e.g., thinking about, playing with, theorizing concerning, and so on) through which he encounters and imposes meaning upon an object or event at any given moment.

As a completed act, a social studies program is perspectivable because it presents the program developers' experiences of man and it prescribes experiences for teachers and students. The prescribed assignments and roles which direct experience, prescribed books and display material which provide vicarious experience, as well as the types of experiences neglected by program developers, are parameters which limit the reality of man and of the social world transmitted to teachers and students.

Reality as Meaning

> Man acts upon this something in such a way as to modify the figure of the given, whatever it may be, so that a field is structured which, to the individual actor, is a meaningful totality. The emphasis upon active structuring, the foundation of the idea of typification, is important. Man's activity is constantly structuring and restructuring his reality in some meaningful fashion. He structures his life-world into finite provinces of meaning, roles, for example, each of which is the scene for particular types of action. It is the individual, as a member of a concrete social group, who acts on the environment so that it has meaning for him (Apple, 1970:54-55).

"Man, the creature who desires meaning, who must have it at all costs, projects meaning upon the world" (Evans, 1971:55). That the world is made meaningful by ordering it into patterns and relationships, by acting upon it in terms of projects and motives, by interpreting it through stocks of knowledge and typifications at hand, by comparing it with both accumulated experience and expectations, suggests that human meaning is possible because of two things: intentionality and the perspective frameworks through which intents are directed. Fundamental to phenomenology is the premise that consciousness (intentionality) actively imposes meaning upon the experienced particulars of the world in terms of a Here, Now, and Thus (perspective). Meaning of an object is always a product of its relationship to the subject's intentionality and perspectives. Therefore, no matter how irrational or irrelevant his acts may appear to observers, "from his point of view at that instant, his act is purposeful, relevant, and pertinent to the situation as he understands it" (Combs and Snygg, 1959:18).

Similarly, social studies programs as socially constructed realities are an imposition of meaning upon man and his social world from someone's intents and schemes of reference. As a product of human intentionality (acts of consciousness such as ordering, interpreting, orienting, judging, choosing) guided from some perspective position, a program is an expression of meaning. As with any social object it embodies the intent and outlooks of its creators.

A program is perspectivable because it is an imposition of meaning upon man and the social world. What specifically is imposed?

First, relatedness is imposed within social studies programs upon man and the social world. An actor imposes meaning upon an object when he attempts to understand it in relationship to himself. As Frankl notes in Man's Search for Meaning, man encounters meaning when he asks the question "What is the meaning of this or that for me?"; the answer is given when a man recognizes that he asks the question. There are no neutral observers who simply face the world, but rather participants who are involved essentially in relating things as means or as ends to their acts. That something-is needs for man to be placed within a context of what-it-is-in-relation-to-himself. Though events simply happen, the subject links these events together into schemes of purpose and explanation that provide meaning in terms of himself. For example, an adventure is a category of meaning the actor imposes upon his experience of objects, a feeling which arises from the way he considers the event vis-à-vis himself. A man will invest meaning into an experience (such as climbing a mountain) by calling it an adventure and by feeling satisfied in the accomplishment, but the event itself is not adventure inherently. The meaning of events and objects is derived not from the things and sequences of time alone, but from the schemes, human relationships, and actions which relate the event to the subject in a web of meaningfulness. Meaning presupposes the pervasiveness of the human element (the subject-object relationship) in any event, whether it be mountain climbing or social studies program development.

Second, a more specific subject-object relatedness which is imposed within social studies programs upon man and the social world is purpose. Although meaning is a vague and confused term that implies various things to different people, for phenomenologists it includes as a minimum the presence of purpose (plan, motive, project) within which an act, event, or object is situated and which gives a reason or justification for these. Reality is that which actors make meaningful by their purposeful ordering, interpreting, and acting in a variety of ways depending upon the perspective framework adopted. The meaning of a chair depends upon the purposeful acts directed towards it. For an adult who is tired a chair's meaning may be its 'sit-upon-ableness,' whereas for a child in play a chair may be seen as something else. These two individuals place the chair within a meaning context consisting of their plans, motives, and activities at the time. To understand, therefore, the meaning that some aspect of the world has for actors, one needs to examine their acts (the projects that guide and the motives that justify those activities) which place subjects in various relations to an object. Any typification such as chair embodies not only general meaning shared by actors and defined in terms of typical activities that are related to the object and typical motives that accompany such activities, but also meaning specific to the actor and defined in terms of his unique plans.

Third, a sense of wholeness is imposed within social studies programs upon man and the social world. This notion of wholeness is based upon the premise that man is no idle spectator in the world but gives significance to his own life and to the aspects of the world he encounters in terms of larger viewpoints and beliefs. The meaning of an event is not just a question of its relationship to the immediate project and motives of someone's act, but also a question of the relationship of that experience to the existing organization of his phenomenological field—to the context of his larger realities and world views (Combs, et al., 1971:259). Meaning is given to experience when it is related to something else which is larger than the isolated experience itself, when it is comprehended in terms of those overarching models already in existence for the actor. Through these frameworks his individual acts and isolated events are tied together. Only as he is able to make such relationships between new experience and larger perspectives can it be said that his experience is meaningful beyond the immediate Here, Now, and Thus. In social studies programs, man and the social world are placed in context of larger interpretive schemes such as social and psychological theories, national goals, theologies, histories, and philosophies.

In summary, the overlapping structures of reality discussed above as phenomena, experience, horizons, profiles, and meaning show that the subject and object are essentially related. Consciousness is an active directionality towards some aspect of the world. As man attributes order, interprets, and acts upon an object variously, that which he experiences as real is dependent to some extent upon consciousness itself.

Further phenomenological descriptions of what reality is and how it is constituted are provided by James (1904:283-324), Schutz (1944; 1971:135-158; 1973), Combs and Snygg (1959), Esland (1971b, 1973), Holzner (1972), Castaneda (1968, 1971, 1972, 1974), Pirsig (1974).

[5] Because of the complexity of what an act of interpretation involves and how it should be conceptualized, the field of hermeneutics is currently undergoing debate among numerous competing positions. The current debate concerning interpretation can be focussed in Gadamar's emphasis upon 'preunderstanding' and Betti's emphasis upon 'objective' interpreting (Palmer, 1969). Any act of interpretation, however, is characterized by the hermeneutic circle through which one human grasps the meaning of another human (Wach, 1958:18; Schutz, 1972:212; Beittel, 1974). Programs as completed acts become interpreted acts and thus subject to the hermeneutic circle.

The major part of this section is based upon Schutz's discussions of understanding the other (1970a:168-188, 273-293; 1971:15; 1972:107-116, 207-214; 1973). Strasser (1963:166-180), Wach (1958:11-26), and Palmer (1969) identify various conditions for understanding another perspective. C.f., Bultmann (1955), Bantock (1969), Perrin (1974), Pinar (1975b), Ricoeur (1974), Tracy (1974).

Directions. Since the aim of phenomenological hermeneutics is to interpret social phenomena such as programs in relation to the meaning (the actor's motives and projects) and foundations (the actor's presupposed perspectives) of the actor's experience, the directions of such interpretation must be both emic and designative. In his concern for the actor's own explanations and meanings (emic), as well as with the foundations (the is-ness) of human phenomena, a phenomenologist consciously attempts to bracket his own norms and assumptions when interpreting social phenomena, thereby being designative (descriptive analysis of the things themselves on their own terms) rather than appraisive (judgemental analysis of the things on the basis of à prioris):

> . . . no matter how neutral or objective one may try to be, every person brings extrinsic standards into the process of selection, choice, and description. In other words, any observer of education views the phenomenon from the perspective of his own world view, his own optique. His basic philosophic stance will show through sooner or later. This point the phenomenologist admits, yet he believes that because he is particularly aware of the problem he can set aside or hold in abeyance his prior commitments in order that the process of description may be as neutral as possible (Chamberlin, 1969:20).

Further, in taking as his starting point the meaningful world organized in vastly complex ways, the interpreter does not assume that it can be understood as merely natural phenomena in terms of imposed interpretive schemes and theories which neglect inherent human meaning in social phenomena. This emic direction in phenomenological interpretation places stress on the everyday language and frames of reference used by actors in order to get at their own explanations:

> What is that woodcutter really thinking about? What is he up to? What does all this chopping mean to him? What does this person mean by speaking to me in this manner, at this particular moment? For the sake of what does he do this (what is his in-order-to-motive)? What circumstance does he give as the reason for it (that is, what is his genuine because-motive)? What does the choice of these words indicate? (Schutz, 1972:113).

Genuine understanding is always an interpretation that starts from the other, an attempt to find what his meaning is, what his perspective may be like, what the external expression of his stream of consciousness means in terms of his intents and context.

Field of Expression. The lived experiences of others are accessible and apprehended by an interpreter only through some field of expression for their experiences (Schutz, 1972:100). An interpreter can never know the meaning of an object or an act as it is experienced by someone else because the other is 'There' and he is 'Here.' They do not share the same stream of consciousness. Rather, he can only experience expressions of someone's consciousness, namely the acts, bodily movements, artifacts, and language produced by someone to express meaning. As a completed act, a social studies program is a field of expression of somebody's perspective. During the hermeneutic circle the individual infers perspective and meaning from observing the actor's field of expression.

Interpretation of someone's field of expression is an ongoing and uncertain event, an attempt to grasp the meaning of someone else expressed in his ongoing or completed acts. Because an interpreter cannot give to someone's field of expression the same understanding as does the actor who produces it as an expression of his own meaning, he only approximates in varying degree the other's intended meanings and meaning contexts. The hermeneutic circle, therefore, is a grasping of meaning expressed in some field of expression. This interpretation of someone's field of expression through the hermeneutic circle is an attempt to find what the actor means (motives) in his acting, to determine from what perspective he sees the world. In order to get to the subjective meaning of the acts and to the outlooks of actors in their life-world, second-order constructs are needed. Ideal types of acts and perspectives are constructed by phenomenologists, therefore, and are used for interpreting first-order subjective meaning and views.

In interpreting a program perspective by means of ideal types, one does not necessarily need to know the developer (his biographical situation, who he is, and so on) as more than an anonymous type (as one with typical motives for this typical act of program development) because the completed act (as with a completed book, work of art, song, or machine) embodies communicative intent and expresses meaning. It is a meaningful identity in itself apart from the personal life of its developer (Schutz, 1971:169-170). Since an act of program development involves language for expressing meaning and perspective, interpretation is simplified to some extent from that of interpreting other acts. The use of a common language has to a large extent "meaning-for-us . . . the same for each one of us" (Strasser, 1963:68). However, language does not have an absolute meaning shared by all individuals as a dictionary would dictate, but is used to express intent from a meaning context of the program developers' background experience and perspective.

[6]The natural attitude concerning intersubjectivity as a basis for interpretation is upheld by three assumptions. If these premises prove to be problematic in any particular situation in which the hermeneutic circle is operative, varying degrees of misinterpretation are evident among actors.

First, actors have a basis for inferring perspectives and meaning because they assume that they share the same common life-world. They assume

> . . . that they are confronted with the same things and objects as we are, though to each of us, depending upon his point of view, the objects and world at large may and do appear under varying aspects and perspectives. It is one of the unquestioned and even unformulated certainties of common experience that the world is one and the same for all of us, a common intersubjective world (Gurwitsch, 1966:352).

The everyday world is not experienced as private. Indeed, it is made possible to a large extent only because actors share similar points of view and meanings on its objects (e.g., tools), ideas (e.g., knowledge enclaves), time and space co-ordinates (e.g., history, clocks, calendars, timetables, directions), language (e.g., gestures, writing, schemes of interpretation), and social relations (e.g., projects, acts, sufferings).

Second, the life-world and understanding of other people is based upon the general thesis of the other self. This is an assumption that the other is an alter-ego who shares the same structures of consciousness and experiences the world typically in the same way as the interpreter does (Schutz, 1970a:166-168). There is structural parallelism between the lived experience and the stream of consciousness of the two actors because both experience temporality, both selectively attend to and interpret experience, both act and bestow meaning upon the world, both experience past experience in reflective acts, both construct multiple realities through intentionality. They grow old together knowing that because their experiences are constituted structurally in the same way, they can interpret one another in terms of typicalities (Schutz, 1972:98,103,114-115):

> The simultaneity of our two streams of consciousness, however, does not mean that the same experiences are given to each of us. My lived experience of you, as well as the environment I ascribe to you, bears the mark of my own subjective Here and Now and not the mark of yours (Schutz, 1971:104-105).

This is not a projection of one's own experience onto the other, not an attempt to know his subjective lived experience as he knows it, but an intersubjectivity based upon common structures of consciousness, acts, and perspectives. Though their individual biographical situations, relevances, motivations, and outlooks differ to some extent from one another, yet actors assume that typically they experience and interpret the world in a common way. On the basis of typical acts and motives assigned to typical roles, typical meanings imposed upon typical situations, and so on, they can communicate with one another for typical purposes at hand and experience intersubjectively the life-world in an unproblematic fashion. Because they can never know the consciousness of the alter-ego as he experiences the world, it is this structural parallelism which allows them to interpret fellowmen.

Third, the life-world is based solidly upon what Schutz refers to as assumed reciprocity of perspectives (1970a:183-184; 1971:13-15; 1973:315-316). Actors realize that the world in which they live often appears under different aspects and from varying perspectives to each one of them and that any individual's Here and Now does not fully overlap with those of others. They unquestionably assume that they all are confronted with the one and same world, and therefore that there is a basis for communication and interpretation:

> But we have learned in individual perception not to conceive our perspective views as independent of each other; we know that they slip into each other and are brought together finally in the thing. In the same way we must learn to find communication between one consciousness and another in one and the same world. In reality, other people are not included in my perspective of the world because this perspective itself has no definite limits, because it slips spontaneously into the other person's, and because both are brought together in the one single world in which we all participate as anonymous subjects of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:353).

And because of the common world, actors assume that their experiences of the world would be typically the same if they could change places (i.e., Here, Now, and Thus). An individual interprets other actors on the assumption that if he were in their place and had their situations, motives, and experiences, he would act and view the world similarly. By assuming this reciprocity,

> The interpreter puts himself in the place of the other person and imagines that he himself is selecting and using the signs. He interprets the other person's subjective meaning as if it were his own. In the process he draws upon his whole personal knowledge of the speaker, especially the latter's ways and habits of expressing himself. Such personal knowledge continues to build itself up in the course of a conversation (Schutz, 1972:127).

On the basis of assumed reciprocity, actors collaborate with one another in acts and build intersubjective realities.

Chapter IV

MANAGING PERSPECTIVE THROUGH PROGRAMS

How are the perspectives on man held by teachers and students managed through social studies programs? Reality is subject to management through programs because it is a human construction which does not have autonomous standing apart from the acts, knowledge , and perspectives through which it originates and is maintained. Although writers recognize that programs do manage acts, outlooks, and knowledge for actors, this management in social studies has been studied seldom in educational research (Davies, 1971:125). Lack of literature on perspective management is somewhat surprising because the intent of program developers is to manipulate someone's reality views through programs, and because program users experience this management when their own taken-for-granted views are restrained by the outlooks imposed upon them.

There are numerous ways in which actors' perspectives may be subject to management through programs. The points of view on man and on the social world of teachers and students are implicitly subject to management because programs represent the transmitting of selected outlooks (Part I), the shifting of the actor's own views towards those specified by the program developers (Part II), and the developing of perspective awareness (perspectivism) on the part of teachers and students (Part III) (Figure V). These three ways in which management occurs are selected here for discussion because they are experienced by teachers and students within the life-world of the classroom and of the street. No actor can avoid having his own outlooks

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Premise: The perspectives of teachers and students are subject to management through social studies programs.

Part I. Transmitting Perspective on Man
Part II. Shifting Perspective on Man
Part III. Developing Perspectivism about Man
  A. Uniperspectivism as an Awareness Level
  B. Multiperspectivism as an Awareness Level

Figure V

Summary of Perspective Management through Programs

managed in various ways through the media, the school, and other secondary socialization agencies, nor can he avoid developing some degree of perspective awareness when confronted with the outlook of someone else or with the pluralism of views which characterizes Canadian society.

PART I. TRANSMITTING PERSPECTIVE ON MAN

A major way in which social studies programs as completed acts manage the outlooks of program users is in terms of the transmission of selected perspectives on man. Very few views on man which a student may hold as a result of his previous experience in the life-world are going to be much more than vague outlooks based upon loose premises and even guesswork. A point of view is only clarified to the extent that an actor finds it relevant to do so in terms of his immediate purposes and interests. Most of those views which are to some degree distinct and clarified regarding man are transmitted to him by the inhabitants of various groups (e.g., religious) and by social studies program developers.

From the standpoint of a program user's role, programs as completed acts transmit perspectives on man. This transmission is experienced as real by teachers and students in those situations in which cross-perspective similarities and differences between themselves and the program are made explicit, as when these actors are in conversation about or are attempting to interpret a social studies program. During these times they may experience (A) cross-perspective resonance with another actor or with a program whose viewpoint is similar to their own or (B) cross-perspective differences when there is a lack of resonance experienced with those whose views are discrepant with their own. These two cross-perspective relations refer to the manner in which teachers and students experience the transmission of a program's outlook on man.

A. CROSS-PERSPECTIVE RESONANCE

> There is no happier fate for any man than to live his life in a culture never challenged, a culture he is never called upon to justify; to eat and speak and dress and pray without ever realizing that there are other ways of doing these simple things (Seeman, 1970:452).

Resonance is a feeling of mutual solidarity among individuals who perceive themselves as sharing to some degree the point of view on man transmitted by a social studies program. As Schutz graphically illustrates, such individuals feel at home with one another and with the program because they orient themselves to the social world through similar interests and relevances, knowledge and logics, roles and routines, and other frames of orientation, on the basis of which they assume that they can predict to some extent the activities and views of one another and can communicate unproblematically (1971: 106-119).[1]

Teachers and students can construct and maintain a reality concerning man in a taken-for-granted manner when there is cross-perspective resonance with a program and with one another. To the degree that program developers have monopolistic control over the sources of information about man to which teachers and students are exposed within a program and a classroom, to that degree does their opportunity for perspective control and for maintaining cross-perspective resonance increase (Bruner, 1962:133). Obviously, though, the degree of control which program developers have to shape the conception of man and of the social world which teachers and students develop is limited because of the many other agencies which also shape perspectives. The transmission of perspective through a program cannot be seen simply as an "input-output" model, a "producer-consumer" paradigm (Aoki, 1974a), or a "banking" situation (Freire, 1970d) in which program developers transmit outlooks through programs to actors. Achieving this degree of control is exceedingly difficult because cross-perspective resonance among actors is rarely unified in a pluralistic society.

Total resonance among perspectives on man of teachers and students in terms of a program is rarely experienced, if ever, because actors do not share the same consciousness and history. The experience of resonance with the program's transmitted views is one of degree at those points where the actor's perspective structures intersect with the perspective structures of the program. For example,

> People who have common experiences tend to have common characteristics in their phenomenal fields. . . . We feel more comfortable with persons whose phenomenal fields have much in common with our own. Because we see alike we also behave similarly and we can thus predict more easily what the other will do and how he will be likely to react to our own behavior. It is through the area of overlap in our respective fields that communication becomes feasible (Combs and Snygg, 1959:32).

There will be a degree of resonance between the program's transmitted interests, presuppositions, and approaches directed to man and that of the student on most social issues. If the resonance is high (i.e., the perspective structures intersect), then the student experiences the program as being relevant and interesting. On the other hand, at times there may be very little experienced resonance, and the student may consider what a program transmits to be irrelevant and uninteresting (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:45).

B. CROSS-PERSPECTIVE DIFFERENCES

Experience of a program's transmitted perspective is most evident when there is a lack of resonance between actors in the classroom and the program. Lack of resonance accounts partially for why teachers experience frustration at times with the apparent dissatisfaction, disinterest, and uncooperativeness of students when confronted with a program, and for why students are often frustrated by program developers' apparent inability to appreciate their views. At such moments when frames of reference do not overlap and intersubjectivity becomes problematic, cross-perspective differences between student and program may be experienced in a number of differing ways by the student.

Disorientation

Within situations encountered in the life-world, an actor establishes continuously schemes of coordinates with which to orient his thinking and acting. To orient oneself, says Schutz, is to take a bearing and to set a direction in terms of such coordinates as one's intents, perspectives, and those objects which are familiar, which are related to one's intents, or which help to further or hinder the realization of one's plans (1971:99). Orientation is always an ongoing man-world relationship in which a direction set not only influences what is to be defined as relevant within the world, but is in turn modified by the demands of that world.

An actor may experience temporary disorientation when he encounters a situation which hinders the realization of his acts, when he is placed within a situation in which the specific referential points used for orientation have shifted, when he is faced with values, beliefs, and reality definitions which are discordant to his own, or when he no longer feels at home but has become a stranger with those whose views have become different from his own (Schutz, 1971:91-105; van Manen, 1973; Maruyama, 1974c). To illustrate, a student who is called upon suddenly to leave the reality of his day-dreaming and to join a classroom discussion is a stranger to the situation he now encounters. As stranger, he searches frantically for clues concerning the intents and perspective of the group to which he must orient himself. A lack of perspective resonance between himself and the other actors occurs until he is able to intersect his outlook with theirs. If this is not possible, he continues to experience being 'left out' of the discussion.

Social studies programs represent the developers' orientation within the social world and to man. Their intentional acts of organizing that world and interpreting man's acts within it are not random but coordinated within a perspective which sets a particular direction to which teachers and students must orient themselves. Unless a student can 'tune in' to that outlook, he may experience the transmitted perspective in terms of disorientation.

Restraint

> Imposed upon us as relevant are situations and events which are not connected with interests chosen by us, which do not originate in acts of our discretion, and which we have to take just as they are, without any power to modify them by our spontaneous activities except by transforming the relevances thus imposed into intrinsic relevances. While that remains unachieved, we do not consider the imposed relevances as being connected with our spontaneously chosen goals (Schutz, 1971:127).

Another way in which a program's transmitted perspective on man is experienced as real by teachers and students occurs when they experience the restraining influence of that point of view.[2] Programs communicate to program users definitions which are considered by some social group to be legitimate interpretations of man. This transmission is an attempt to impose the meaning of someone upon classroom situations, the assumption being that the experience and the views of program users are probably inferior in some way to the expertly defined realities of program developers.

For a student, therefore, a social studies program contains transmitted "patterns of thought which organize reality by directing and organizing thinking about reality and by making what he thinks thinkable for him as such and in the particular form in which it is thought" (Bourdieu, 1971:167). That is, the framework and the language of a program constrain student thinking about man, and hence by implication, govern the reality constructed within classrooms in the direction of the program's perspective. Metaphors, questions, problems, methods, subject organization, prescribed observations, exemplars, standards for evaluation, and various schemes of interpretation, all mould the reality images of teacher and student by providing a form to their thought and action (Davies, 1971:124). By defining the nature of the social world and by defining what constitutes relevant social studies activity within that world, programs regulate the direction of reality constructing and the expression of doubt within classroom communities. Consequently, social studies initiates may come to observe and to respond as program developers intended because of the perspective transmitted through the prescribed activities, outcomes, materials, and schemes of reference of the program.

Significantly, though, the images of man and of the social world which are defined by teachers and students are directed in such a way as to fulfill and to serve the program's interest in man. A program organizes aspects of a student's life-world into various regions or zones representing degrees of relevance, familiarity, obscurity, strangeness, accessibility, and immediacy in terms of the transmitted and imposed projects, interpretive schemes, and interests.

Objects and ideas have meaning in terms of the place they occupy within these various regions defined by the imposed relevancy system. A student who is engaged in a study of Tanzanian socialism has his world divided spatially into regions of high relevance such as particular sections of the library or the office of certain teachers. Certain objects attain meaning in terms of the place they occupy in reference to his project, whereas other objects become irrelevant; certain ideas gain familiarity and immediacy, whereas other ideas fade into obscurity or are inaccessible. This organizing of his life-world into various zones is an imposition upon his world as already organized, because a program is based upon the perspectives and consequent relevances of its developers. The relevances of a student who is concerned with a position on the football team structure his life-world quite differently than do the program developers whose concerns relate to other interests. That which may be of primary relevance to the one may be relatively irrelevant to the other, for each one arranges his phenomenological field into contours of different relevance according to his current interests and plans (Schutz, 1967:467). This organizing of one's life-world in terms of his Here, Now, and Thus not only shows the perspectivity of experience as each actor applies his own horizons and views in ordering, interpreting, and acting upon the world, but also shows the restraining character which one's own perspective can have when imposed as an extrinsic relevance system upon the intrinsic relevances and outlooks of someone else.

In summary, students may experience momentary restraint of their own perspectives on man in the face of the imposed reality definitions and relevances of a program which structure the life-world in a particular way. Unless a student is willing to shift his own perspective or unless he deliberately chooses to go along with the theoretical perspective of a program, he is the recipient of an imposed point of view and relevancy system which may not match his own intrinsic viewpoint and relevances.

Competition

> The world is known through many different orientations because there are many simultaneous and mutually contradictory trends of thought (by no means of equal value) struggling against one another with their different interpretations of "common" experience. The clue to this conflict, therefore, is not to be found in the "object in itself" (if it were, it would be impossible to understand why the object should appear in so many different refractions), but in the very different expectations, purposes, and impulses arising out of experience (Mannheim, 1936:269).

Another way in which cross-perspective differences with a program are experienced by program users is in a feeling of competition. Competition among actors occurs when each one attempts to legitimize and extend his perspective to others (Mannheim, 1936:270; 1952:191-229; Dawe, 1970; Metcalf and Hunt, 1970). Perspective differences within a classroom group reflect the various group memberships students bring with them, groups which often tend to compete with one another for the power to define reality.

Student outlooks on man may be developed in the collective experiences, interpretations, interests, and acts of a particular group. For example, age groups that share a common location and experience tend to develop similar modes of thought, feelings, and interpretations of their world.

The members of any cohort are entitled to participate in only

> one slice of life—their unique location in the stream of history. Because it embodies a temporally specific version of the heritage, each cohort is differentiated from all others (Ryder, 1965:844).

Students from the same district of a city, who attend the same school, who participate in similar education streams (e.g., academic, vocational), who are members of similar status groups or clubs (e.g., football teams, cheerleaders, fraternities, churches), may share similar group experiences concerning man which foster certain ways of interpreting the social world. Even within one classroom, the shared experiences, purposes, interests, interpretations, and discussions among students may develop a group perspective over time. As such, a third period social studies class may develop a group perspective on man which is slightly unique from that of the fourth period class (c.f., Kuhn, 1970:180). The number of generation-specific viewpoints and the degree of discontinuity among them increases in a society in which pluralism and social change is widespread (Mannheim, 1952:276-322; Ortega, 1962; Yamamoto, 1969:8; Shane, 1970: 390). Therefore, students may experience a program's perspective on man as being in competition with the group perspectives they already hold.

Such competition can be beneficial. An actor not only becomes aware of views discrepant with his own, but also with the taken-for-grantedness of his own position when he is in contact with perspectives dissimilar with and even threatening to his own. Debate among individuals who hold different perspectives allows the complexity and subtlety of social issues and of man himself to be made more explicit for actors (Apple, 1974:4). The importance of experiencing cross-perspective differences in social studies needs to be stressed because variability is essential for any change of ideas (e.g., Maruyama, 1960a, 1967a, 1971, 1975; Kuhn, 1972b:262).

Distrust and Manipulation

> Individuals who are in resonance can derive mutual gratification and appreciation from their interaction. When there is no resonance the interaction may cease, become boring, artificial, phony or even explosive (Maruyama, 1971:12).

A transmitted perspective of a program can be experienced with distrust by program users.[3] The co-existence of competing perspectives may lead to an active and reciprocal distrust among actors and even to an experienced manipulation of one another (Merton, 1949:218; Maruyama, 1973c, 1974c). Unable to escape one another within the classroom, each actor may feel that the existence of other positions challenges the legitimacy of his own views and may consequently foster an illusion of relevance in the other actor's perspective. In such situations, communication is no longer open as each actor engages in counter-exploitation, thereby establishing an illusion of consensus among themselves within a discussion, even though the basic presuppositions of the competing perspectives are at cross-purposes. Students may respond to a social studies program as if its perspective were relevant to them in order that social-studies-as-usual may go on.

In summary, social studies programs as completed acts are the products of someone's method for describing man and social reality. Once these descriptions are accredited by program developers' colleagues (e.g., department of education and university 'experts') as legitimate interpretations of man and his world, then teachers and students experience in various ways the management of their own perspectives through the program's transmitted viewpoint on man. They may experience cross-perspective resonance and differences with the transmitted point of view.

PART II. SHIFTING PERSPECTIVE ON MAN

> If we encounter in our experience something previously unknown and which therefore stands out of the ordinary order of our knowledge, we begin a process of inquiry. We first define the new fact; we try to catch its meaning; we then transform step by step our general scheme of interpretation of the world in such a way that the strange fact and its meaning become compatible and consistent with all the other facts of our experience and their meanings. If we succeed in this endeavor, then that which formerly was a strange fact and a puzzling problem to our mind is transformed into an additional element of our warranted knowledge. We have enlarged and adjusted our stock of experiences (Schutz, 1971:105).

One of the most obvious ways in which social studies programs as completed acts are experienced as management acts occurs when program users experience their own outlooks on man being shifted towards that of the program. Program developers implicitly (and sometimes deliberately) control the perspectives of other individuals either by shifting their schemes of reference in a predetermined direction, or by making the other's outlook problematic so that a shift in some direction can occur. The phenomenon of perspective shift is itself in need of clarification because the intent in part of a program is that of having students and teachers shift their taken-for-granted views on man to those specified within the program.

The naturalness of a particular reality is substituted for another when a perspective is shifted either suddenly or slowly. Sudden transitions from one reality to another require immediate perspective modification and a reorientation on the part of the individual, such as happens when a student experiences a film break while watching a movie or when the bell rings unexpectedly to signal the end of a class period. Schutz likens such transitions to experiences of shock because in each case the student suddenly leaps, as it were, from one reality and frame of reference into another which is forced upon him (1944; 1970a:254-255). In the experience of shifting perspective more slowly, he may be able to recognize definite changes of orientation when he reflects back upon his former outlooks or when he moves into those specialized perspectives of science, religion, or social studies in which the frames of orientation suited to the natural attitude of the life-world are substituted for new horizons and schemes of reference. Whether the shift from one reality to another is experienced as sudden or as slow, any cross-perspective shift involves adopting to some degree a different set of coördinates for orienting ourselves and for interpreting the social world.

From the point of view of an actor a shift of perspective is experienced by him in terms of (A) contradiction and anomaly, (B) doubt, and (C) resolution of anomaly and doubt.[4] Although a perspective shift is conceptualized here in terms of these three ideas, the phenomenon is not experienced as a neat pattern of steps, but rather as interrelated and overlapping anomaly, doubt, and resolution. However, when an individual reflects back upon his experience, he may be able to describe a shift of perspective in terms of these three notions.

A. CONTRADICTION AND ANOMALY

A basic premise of James' analysis of reality is that as long as one's belief about an object remains uncontradicted, that object "is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality"; conversely, objects are disbelieved if they are in contradiction with those presuppositions that one holds strongly (1904:298; c.f., Schutz, 1971:135-158). In either case, belief and disbelief are both stable senses of reality. Perspectives shift only if some experience or idea clashes with them to such an extent that the actor can no longer hold his views as taken-for-granted.

An actor cannot assimilate within one perspective all of the reality views which he encounters and yet retain consistency among his own schemes of reference. At some point he will experience contradicted and competing reality definitions, violated expectations and assumptions, a resistance of phenomena to being encompassed within his present outlook, and even metaphysical terror in the face of fractured reality. Awareness of anomaly is a recognition that the life-world has somehow violated the perspective induced expectations of the taken-for-granted, that other orientations are inconsistent with his own structuring of reality, or that competing realities are strong enough to threaten his own position (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:52-53; Schutz, 1971: 135-158). Such awareness is not subject to denial if the anomalous information confronts him day after day.

How do program developers initiate anomaly within social studies programs? "As long as the routines of everyday life continue without interruption they are apprehended as unproblematic" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:24). Anomaly is introduced when the material, questions, and views of a program on man somehow threaten and contradict a student's taken-for-granted views and give to him an experience of perspective inadequacy for making sense of some social phenomenon. For example, don Juan's method initially for teaching Castaneda to view reality from different standpoints—"to change his idea of the world"—was to confront the student with explicit and conflicting reality definitions and assumptions designed to challenge his taken-for-granted position (Castaneda, 1972:11). In such experiences,

> . . . the reality of everyday life is altered because the flow of interpretation, which ordinarily runs uninterruptedly, has been stopped by a set of circumstances alien to that flow. . . . One had to learn the new description in a total sense, for the purpose of pitting it against the old one, and in that way break the dogmatic certainty, which we all share, that the validity of our perceptions, or our reality of the world, is not to be questioned (Castaneda, 1972:14).

Don Juan constantly manipulated Castaneda's experience in order to shake his natural attitude toward the world. It would appear that increased contact with other perspectives threatens "the security of our well constructed, well hidden models of the universe"; program developers utilize various points of view within programs to facilitate this contact with anomaly (Belth, 1965:102).

B. DOUBT

Once contradiction and anomaly have been recognized—"the awareness that something has gone wrong" (Kuhn, 1970:181)—an actor may do one of two things: he may deny the anomaly and thereby attempt to maintain his own perspective intact, or he may begin to question those schemes of reference which do not allow him to resolve the anomaly. Simply because reality is always the object of belief, an individual's sense of reality is loosened when he encounters a contradiction of belief or a discrepancy of reality expectation. When faced with contradictory views or with the failure of his own views to account adequately for something, the anomaly raises questions about his accepted beliefs and acts (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:99; Schutz, 1971:157).

Doubt (experienced as a questioning of the certainty of belief, and as a sense of reality malfunction when confronted with discrepant reality beliefs) is basic to a shift of perspective.[5] Doubt is not the same as disbelief, for belief and disbelief are both stable senses of reality. James illustrates that when a proposition about reality is believed, then the proposition doubted formerly is held in disbelief by the actor:

> If I merely dream of a horse with wings, my horse interferes with nothing else and has not to be contradicted. That horse, its wings, and its place, are all equally real. That horse exists no otherwise than as winged, and is moreover really there, for that place exists no otherwise than as the place of that horse, and claims as yet no connection with the other places of the world. But if with this horse I make an inroad into the world otherwise known, and say, for example, 'That is my old mare Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall,' the whole case is altered; for now the horse and place are identified with a horse and place otherwise known, and what is known of the latter objects is incompatible with what is perceived with the former. 'Maggie in her stall with wings! Never!' The wings are unreal, then, visionary. I have dreamed a lie about Maggie in her stall (1904:289).

Although doubt is a questioning of that which is believed or disbelieved, the reality established by this belief or disbelief is not rejected unless there is another stable sense of belief or disbelief to replace the former.

In coming to terms with disparate schemes of interpretation which cast doubt upon reality, actors will have arguments for explaining away initially the discrepancies (Schutz, 1971:143). Over time, though, associated with unresolved doubt may be an experience of disorientation: a momentary sense of displacement, discomfort, or estrangement because that which was once taken-for-granted now no longer fits one's interpretive schemes (van Manen, 1973:186).[6] Doubt may further develop into a sense of reality crisis when an actor finds his world threatened with meaninglessness because his cognitive universe is no longer a useful framework for ordering and interpreting experience (Berger, 1969:31). If these unresolved doubts continue in the actor's experience, they

> . . . often produce what appears to be disorder, sometimes even chaos, to those whose lives are entirely bound by a prevailing type of order by which they have come to be dominated. For it is possible to be so absorbed by a model that a challenge to abandon it seems a threat to one's very existence (Belth, 1965: 133).

Regardless of the degree of doubt experienced, an actor's initial response to any question of his belief is to clarify to some extent those routines of everyday life and belief that are now experienced as problematic. He may consider alternatives which would resolve the doubt without renouncing his present outlook, even though the anomaly is clearly calling into question some aspect of belief. Alternative outlooks are treated initially as simply "articulations and ad hoc modifications" of his belief in order to eliminate apparent discrepancy raised by the anomaly (Kuhn, 1970:82,78). However, his doubt may be further deepened by this active search for new plausibility structures and views. For example, when a student evidences such activity as staying after class to continue discussion or such activity as seeking information from diverse sources concerning his view on man, the numerous partial solutions and conflicting interpretations he encounters not only further loosen his own reality view, but also may be tolerated increasingly by him.[7] In all this activity his perspective becomes blurred further as he questions his natural attitude in the face of divergent ideas. He seeks new reference points in order to establish a stable sense of reality as his attempts to assimilate anomaly into his outlook continue to fail.

C. RESOLUTION OF ANOMALY AND DOUBT

Loss of perspective plausibility due to anomaly and doubt can be resolved by an actor in at least four typical ways, although the choice is basically between either maintaining or surrendering his viewpoint when perspective pluralism threatens (Berger, 1969:31).

First, a perspective may be maintained typically by shifting the context rather than the schemes of reference in the face of anomaly and doubt. By isolating oneself from competing viewpoints and by strengthening one's communicative and relevance resonance with those who share similar views, an actor may be able to maintain those reality definitions which are deviant in terms of a program or a classroom majority. For example,

> Only in a countercommunity of considerable strength does cognitive deviance have a chance to maintain itself. The countercommunity provides continuing therapy against the creeping doubt as to whether, after all, one may not be wrong and the majority right. To fulfill its function of providing social support for the deviant body of knowledge, the countercommunity must provide a strong sense of solidarity among its members . . . (Berger, 1969: 33).

Secondly, a perspective may be maintained typically by shifting the object of intention, for if an experience cannot be interpreted within the existing perspective framework (i.e., if it contradicts the schemes of reference) an individual may ignore or deny such experience rather than attempt to harmonize it. In other words, he does not make that which is anomalous and doubt producing an object of his intention.[8]

Third, a perspective may be maintained by means of a limited modification and a consequent clarification of the schemes of reference which may be inadequate to account for minor disruption of everyday routines and reality beliefs, such as occurs when one meets the unexpected in a familiar setting or when one encounters positions dissimilar to his own.[9] In these situations the perspective undergoes minor alterations in order to account for anomaly and to resolve doubt, yet "the basic outlooks and beliefs of the person in question are not affected" (Wagner, 1973:73). Rather, the alteration represents a degree of accommodation to another view threatening the naturalness of one's own, a compromise involving a bargaining process in which some limited aspect of one's schemes of reference are surrendered and others are kept, or an expansion of one's original schemes in order to maintain them by accepting descriptions from other perspectives (Belth, 1965:102; Berger, 1969:36). This is basically a clarification of the viewpoint itself by articulating and extending the schemes of reference utilized. Anomaly is thus taken care of by fitting it into the existing, though expanded, framework. Information and experience are interpreted in terms of a clarified and enlarged perspective rather than a drastically changed outlook.

A fourth way in which anomaly and doubt can be resolved is through the surrendering rather than the maintaining of a viewpoint.[10] When information cannot be ignored or fitted into a present perspective, the extent of anomaly encountered and doubt experienced may force a student to reconsider and to reconstruct his perspective, thereby fundamentally shifting the manner in which he interprets the social world. "A recipe for successful alteration has to include both social and conceptual conditions," such as a different plausibility structure (especially new conversation partners and significant others who mediate and maintain the changed outlook) and a new or modified set of schemes for defining man and the social world (Berger, 1963:54; Berger and Luckmann, 1967:157-163). An important characteristic of this type of perspective shift is the extent of change effected, for in adjusting or replacing components of a conceptual matrix through which reality is interpreted, the actor sees his world differently. To say that reality changes when such a perspective shift occurs is not to argue that the object under observation in any way changes, but rather that the basis for perception has shifted. Perceptions and actions presuppose a world conceptually organized in a particular way according to one's perspective schemes. To restructure a perspective is to change reality in the direction posited by a shifted outlook. Objects of intention are perceived through a different matrix of perspective components, and hence what is considered by an actor to be significant data, what are their relationships with other data, and how they are to be interpreted are influenced. Every interpretation necessarily presupposes a perspective within whose context and structure meaning is provided. In so far as an actor's only recourse to the world is through some framework, when there is a change of framework the world is ordered, interpreted, and acted upon differently from before (e.g., Maruyama, 1965; Kuhn, 1970:111). Such perspective shifts do not necessarily result in more accurate observation, but rather in different perceptual possibilities, for even though the individual confronts the same world as before, and knows that he does so, he finds its reality changed in some degree for him (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:122).

The end results of any one of these four ways of shifting a perspective are primarily that the anomaly is no longer anomalous and the doubt has become either belief or disbelief. Necessary changes in the perspective have been made in order to satisfactorily account for (i.e., to be perspective defined and expected) that which was formerly anomalous.

In summary, although perspective shifts do not occur in a neat pattern of steps as is described here, program developers may initiate perspective shifts on the part of teachers and students by introducing anomalies within programs. Teachers and students may experience a sense of perspective inadequacy and doubt when presented with different reality definitions or with phenomena which contradict their taken-for-granteds. Prerequisite to a shift of outlook is the defining of a problem (i.e., a discrepancy between perspective defined reality and anomaly) which induces a sense of perspective malfunction. In this way the perspectives on man and the social world held by teachers and students are subject to management through a program.

PART III. DEVELOPING PERSPECTIVISM ABOUT MAN (PERSPECTIVE AWARENESS)

Perspectivism refers to an actor's awareness of the phenomenon of perspective itself in his apprehending of man and the social world. A continuum of this awareness can be defined with (a) uniperspectivism and (B) multiperspectivism representing the two polar ends. At one of these two levels, or somewhere between them, a completed social studies program may give evidence of the viewpoint awareness of the program developers themselves. Teacher and student understanding of points of view brought to any social issue or to man himself will be influenced by the degree of explicitness with which a program utilizes the phenomenon of perspective. Program developers thereby manage the perspectives of other actors by defining the level of perspective awareness at which they are to interpret man.

A. UNIPERSPECTIVISM AS AN AWARENESS LEVEL IN UNDERSTANDING MAN

> . . . the difficulty is that it does not occur to them that there are other paradigms. They are quite logical in not seeing other paradigms, because if they have "the" truth, all they have to do is to interpret everything in terms of that truth. They are sincerely trapped in their own paradigm (Maruyama, 1974c:25).

Dependence in social studies programs upon one taken-for-granted perspective for understanding man tends to facilitate transmission of a controlled reality view deemed to be legitimate by program developers. The relation of subject (teachers and students) to object (man or any issue of the social world) is in terms of the one outlook provided in the program. Such lack of awareness of the existence of other possible viewpoints, or else a denial of the legitimacy of other positions, is referred to here as uniperspectivism. Certain characteristics of this level of perspective awareness may be evidenced and identified within social studies programs.[11]

Dependency upon One

Maruyama uses the term monopolarization to refer to an individual's dependency upon one point of view for interpreting and acting upon the world (1966, 1971, 1973d, 1974c, 1975). The actor judges all he encounters in terms of the one truth, one authority, one method, and one set of schemes for interpretation and observation conceived by him as being universally applicable. He assumes that everyone holds to the same perspective on man. Because a monopolarized individual is not aware of cross-perspective differences, he imposes his own world descriptions upon other actors and interprets their assertions and outlooks in terms of his own point of view. When he finds that this imposition is not possible, he considers the other actors to be guilty of such things as uncooperativeness, vagueness, ambiguity, indecisiveness, lack of commitment, or irrationality (Chapter II). Either unaware that others do not always share the same perspective or else believing that there is only one possible or legitimate position, he rarely questions the certitude of his particular reality view or of its givenness for other actors. Such dependency upon a uniperspective which is assumed to be shared and self-evident to others besides himself, provides little basis for reflecting upon his own point of view and for questioning his dependency upon one standpoint.

Similarly, a program may evidence a dependency upon one perspective for apprehending man and the social world, or one viewpoint may dominate a program to such an extent that other views are not even acknowledged as existing alternatives. For example, if a social studies program interprets the experience of some ethnic group on the assumption that there is only one perspective for doing so, then the meaning intended from that group's point of view may be misinterpreted when translated into different schemes of reference (c.f., Aoki, et al., 1974). A monopolarized program encourages monopolarization in the classroom because students are made dependent upon one framework within whose boundaries reality is to be constructed.

Taken-for-Granted

A second characteristic of uniperspectivism (a lack of awareness of the phenomenon of perspective) is the taken-for-grantedness of an actor's dependency upon one perspective. This taken-for-grantedness that often characterizes subject-object relations means that the actor assumes that his own particular ways of experiencing and seeing the world are natural (i.e., shared by most everyone else) and therefore not in need of question, critical reflection and clarification, or validation (Chapter V). Born into a prestructured and objectified world of events, objects, people, and issues which appear to the individual to be self-evident and independent of him, he need not question generally the reality of what he encounters. The world is 'there' at all times to be experienced, shared, remembered, and acted upon rather than questioned; it supports his practical hypotheses, inferences, predictions, and projects and therefore does not require further verification; its coerciveness upon his attention and its imposed spacio-temporal structures cannot be ignored or reversed; its structures compell him and influence his acts to such an extent that he knows it is real. Within its boundaries he must orient himself according to different intentions, intervene in it by his acts, and trust its continuity to support his experience (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:23; Schutz, 1967:465). Consequently, because of the life-world's giveness and primacy in the actor's experience, both his viewpoints and his experience within it are taken by him often to represent the world as it is somehow in itself apart from both his experience of it and his viewpoints through which he orders, interprets, and acts upon it. It is because of and within this domain of unquestioned experience that actors develop and hold what phenomenologists variously refer to as the 'natural attitude' toward reality or the thesis of the natural standpoint (Chapter II). Since "the reality of our day-to-day life," observes Castaneda, "consists of an endless flow of perceptual interpretations which we, the individuals who share a specific membership, have learned to make in common," our perspectives and our experiences "are rarely, if ever, open to question" (1972:9). When an individual accepts his own reality view as self-evident, without questioning its giveness or acceptance for other individuals, and without recognizing that his view is socially constructed, his level of perspective awareness is that of uniperspectivism.

Indication that a program's perspective(s) for making sense of man and of the social world is implicit and not open to criticism may suggest that the program developers take-for-granted their own viewpoints. Uniperspectivism is thus the level of perspective awareness transmitted through the program to students.

Encapsulated

As an effect of his being isolated from other perspectives because of his taken-for-granted dependency upon one outlook, an actor may make his own world of thought absolute (Mannheim, 1936: 279). This absolute attitude is the unquestioned belief that his life-world is the only reality that can be experienced and that the perspectives shared within a particular group are the only definitions of reality possible. He thereby becomes encapsulated within one point of view, unable to break out of his dependency upon one taken-for-granted perspective. Radnitzky suggests in comparing scientific perspectives that there may be a self-imposed restriction inherent within any one perspective. The individual attends to that which is of interest within his framework, and thereby encapsulates his experience within a very limited reality (1969:189). Providing an internally consistent interpretation of some aspect of the world, his point of view becomes its own legitimizer because it allows him to see what it defines. Consequently, this encapsulating effect keeps him from recognizing other perspectives and even to resist such a possibility.

Individuals with encapsulated outlooks may increasingly have to offer dogmatic answers to new questions, generalized solutions for emerging problems, and rigid explanations for shifting situations. Such actors may

> . . . develop methods for screening out information that does not

> conform with their first approximations; they overlook inconsistencies in their reasoning process; they account for discrepancies between believed predictions and observed events by increasingly complicated series of ad hoc explanations or by ignoring the difficulties. The pattern of explanation is increasingly force-fitted (Kaplan, 1971:83).

This lack of awareness of other perspectives, even to the point of being encapsulated within a viewpoint absolutized by the actor, represents uniperspectivism.

A characteristic of a social studies program may be its encapsulating effect upon a student's interpreting of the social world. The program viewpoint may provide him with an internally consistent interpretation of the social world and with an apprehension of fellowman which tends to exclude competing perspectives. Expressions of doubt may be regulated by those plausibility structures which maintain the reality views inherent within a program (Chapter II). Implicit in his commitment to a program's perspective is a restriction of vision, and, consequently, a recognition of only those aspects of a situation which are directly related to the outlook in which he is encapsulated, a failure to accept standpoints which may differ from the program's, and a suspension of doubt concerning the interpretations of man provided to him by program developers (c.f., Kuhn, 1970:64; Barnes, 1972:62).

Program developers can adopt various (and even conflicting) viewpoints for clarifying social issues within programs rather than be encapsulated by one taken-for-granted orientation upon which students and teachers may depend exclusively. Development of an awareness of perspective pluralism and an utilization of the phenomenon explicitly is referred to in the next section as multiperspectivism.

B. MULTIPERSPECTIVISM AS AN AWARENESS LEVEL IN UNDERSTANDING MAN

> Modes of questioning that plumb qualitatively different aspects of the subject matter, that systematically probe different perspectives and different points of view, provide us, not with a single coherent explanation or a single interpretation . . . but with a much wider comparative framework within which to formulate a perspective from any particular point of view (Kaplan, 1971:93).

Another level of perspective awareness which can be demonstrated within social studies programs and fostered in the experience of students is multiperspectivism: (1) the recognition of viewpoint pluralism, (2) the development of a metaperspective on the phenomenon of perspective itself, and consequently (3) the experience of demonopolarization (i.e., the breakdown of dependency upon one taken-for-granted perspective for interpreting man and the social world). The relation of subject to object is in terms of many viewpoints. The following characteristics of multiperspectivism may be evidenced and identified within social studies programs.[12]

Recognition of Viewpoint Pluralism

Pluralism is "any situation in which there is more than one world view available to members of a society" (Berger, 1969:59). An actor is thrown out of the self-sufficient and complacent state of taking himself for granted, and is forced to maintain his ideas in the face of heterogeneous ideas, as he encounters the world of thought of other groups (Mannheim, 1936:280). The two available options for maintaining his own ideas are to either develop strong uniperspectivism in which he disregards the multitude of views on man which threaten him, or to recognize and understand perspective pluralism as basic to the social world.

To work from a premise that there are multiple viewpoints on man available in the life-world 'market-place' has numerous consequences for the actor. First, he encounters a measure of liberation from his natural attitudes. Multiperspectivism frees him from attributing an absolute, ahistoric, and acosmic status to his Here and Now. He begins to realize that he

> . . . is not an acosmic spirit, hovering above the course of history and raised above social reality, who is capable of comprehending the universe of being in a single glance. No matter how painful it may seem to him, he has to recognize that it is possible to attempt different . . . interpretations, flowing from different historical situations, different existential experiences, different philosophical temperaments (Strasser, 1963:231).

Second, he accepts perspectives on man as being partial, tenuous, and useful in varying degree for interpreting the social world (Berger, 1969:59-61; Laszlo, 1972:15-16). Recognizing that in situations of pluralism many of the cognitive options available are contradictory and competing ideas about the social world, the student does not take one outlook to be inevitable and totally compelling. Third, while he recognizes pluralism around him, he may recognize also that his own positions are pluralistic. He never knows something fully at any one time because objects are examined always from various vantage points over time as his biography changes. Meaning emerges for him as his perspectives merge and confirm one another over time (Greene, 1974: 72-74). He comes to see that social issues can be explicated by him only through adopting multiple viewpoints because it is impossible to know anything completely from one angle of vision:

> I never exhaust its manifold depths and aspects. No matter what

> I find, I know that there is something further to be revealed beyond what is momentarily appearing. My grasp of it is always incomplete and open (Wild, 1964:26).

He makes his understanding of man less perspectivable only by relating himself variously to man. Acceptance of pluralism involves a recognition that aspects of the social world are apprehended from different methods of knowing, social locations, interests, and cultural assumptions (Wach, 1958:17).

Social studies programs which provide various standpoints from which students may construct reality and be aware of different aspects of the world do help students and teachers to develop multiperspectivism. For example, a program can help make students recognize and understand pluralism in studying any contemporary human event. The Lebanese villager on whose house a bomb falls may see the Middle-East conflict as one producing destruction of civilians; the P.L.O. soldier may see it as a struggle against imperialism; the supporter of the government in Jerusalem may see it as a curbing of terrorism; the executive in Washington may see it as part of an effort to impede the progress of another country's interest and to protect American strategic interests (Kaplan, 1971:85). In so doing, a program can help students recognize and understand pluralism by adopting various models and vantage points from which to study social situations. In this way programs manage the perspectives of teachers and students.

Development of a Metaperspective

Besides the recognition and utilization of pluralism, a second characteristic of multiperspectivism is the development of a metaperspective: a perspective on the phenomenon of perspective itself. To have a metaperspective, an actor need not develop explicitly an ideal type of perspective as is done in the present study, but he does need to attempt to reflect explicitly upon his own perspectives and those of other actors. Skills which facilitate his doing so are detachment from the immediate subject matter under debate, particularization of the debate to perspectives, and the translation of one perspective into another.[13]

Detachment from subject matter. A possible source of disagreement among individuals may never be uncovered unless actors are able to detach themselves from the immediate subject matter of debate in order to make explicit the frameworks concerning man from which they talk and interpret one another. Without such detachment they would not recognize whether disagreements are due partially to perspective differences (and hence whether they are talking about the same thing), or merely to limited or incorrect information. Detachment from the content under discussion is difficult because in any debate the focus tends to be strongly on the subject matter in dispute and because in such situations perspectives tend generally to be taken-for-granted.

Particularization of subject matter. Particularizion is a placing of ideas in context, or as Mannheim explains,

> . . . going behind the immediate subject of debate to the total basis of thought of the assertor in order to reveal it as merely one basis of thought among many and as no more than a partial perspective. Going behind the assertions of the opponents and disregarding the actual arguments is legitimate . . . wherever, because of the absence of a common basis of thought, there is no common problem (1936:281).

Having detached themselves from the immediate subject matter under debate, participants can then distinguish among various perspectives (e.g., urban, rural, occupational, religious, political, geographical) and relate the content of what is being said partially to these locations. This particularizing of thought to underlying interests, presuppositions, approaches, and this locating ideas to their sitz im leben, are based upon premises that thought is influenced situationally, that statements have limited rather than universal applicability, and hence that any point of view is just that, a partial view of the larger whole.

Indeed, the premise of particularization is that the life-world context within which a viewpoint is located is a necessary component for identifying and for interpreting an outlook on man. Whether one examines the literature of phenomenology, sociology of knowledge, or hermeneutics, the fundamental theses of each approach are similar. Rather than being random and isolated, all experiences are contextual in the sense that for the actor they are interpreted in relation to other experiences and are made meaningful to him in terms of the larger whole consisting of his accumulated experience. As no human thought ever arises and operates within a social vacuum, all beliefs are developed, transmitted, and maintained within some identifiable social milieu (Mannheim, 1936; Berger and Luckmann, 1967:3). The situational outlook of someone located in a time and a place different from our own is distorted if translated into and interpreted through our own context without regard for the rootedness of all thought and experience in the life-world (Bultmann, 1955). Only if it were possible for an individual to order, interpret, and act apart from his immediate situation of Here would context be an irrelevant consideration as a component of someone's point of view. In disregarding context one would imply the absoluteness of consciousness and would deny its perspectivableness. Perspective includes as a component the life-world context of time and place in which consciousness is located and from which actors view the world (Cusick, 1973:8-40). As such, consciousness is influenced by this situation so fundamentally that a change in location makes various perspectives possible. How one orders, interprets, and acts upon the world from one context may not be the same as from another context.

Particularizing an outlook's scope and the extent of its relevance to a context (Here and Now) and to the interests (Thus) upon which it is based is a first step to establishing truth value of a viewpoint (Chapter V). Particularization is not a substitute for critically clarifying and validating views on man.

Cross-perspective translation. A student is still left with the task of translating cross-perspective differences once he has applied detachment and particularization to his experience of another's perspective. The attempt in this translation is to understand the other person in terms of his own perspective position rather than through the interpreter's taken-for-granted position; such translation is similar to that which occurs among linguistic communities (Nida, 1964). If translation is to occur, the particular points of difficulty (e.g., interests, presuppositions, approaches, word meanings) need to be specified explicitly, and the source of these differences ascertained.

However, in defining points of difference between two perspectives on man, students may agree on what their differences are but may not be able to translate literally the meaning involved. Reese and Overton suggest that

> Theories built upon different world views are logically independent and cannot be assimilated to each other. They reflect different ways of looking at the world and, as such, are incompatible in their implications (1970:116).

For example, the meaning of a notion such as 'freedom of man' depends often upon the total perspective context within which it is used, and, consequently, the meaning of this word cannot be literally translated into another frame of reference without acquiring a changed meaning. Meaning is transformed in varying degree through translation from one outlook to another. Schemes of reference such as connotations, idioms, jargon, nuances, and fringe meanings are often group and context-specific and hard to translate, whereas other schemes such as assumptions cannot always be translated because of little equivalence in the new frame of reference (Schutz, 1971:100-101). In the translation from one perspective to another, schemes of reference change their conditions of applicability and words change their meaning in subtle ways because of the larger perspective context in which they are located (e.g., Kuhn, 1972b:266-267). For example, Castaneda found

> . . . that don Juan's knowledge had to be examined in terms of how he himself understood it; only in such terms could it be made evident and convincing. In trying to reconcile my own views with don Juan's, however, I realized that whenever he tried to explain his knowledge to me, he used concepts that would render it 'intelligible' to him (Castaneda, 1968:9).

To avoid this error of literalness in translation, second-order comparisons (i.e., meta-level comparisons) may be necessary in order to go beyond the subject matter under debate to the structures of the perspective itself.

The ideal type specified in Chapter II specifies structures upon which second-order comparisons are possible. Having defined points of difference generally at a first-order level (i.e., the immediate discussion level), actors cannot always make a point-by-point comparison of their perspectives, for this would require a 'neutral language' into which both perspectives could be translated without loss or change of meaning (Kuhn, 1972a:266). This does not mean that they are incomparable, but rather that they may have to be compared on a meta-level in terms of ideal types which serve as this 'neutral language.' Types help to bring out the varying implicit schemes of reference which may be implied in the perspectives as a consequence of different social situations (Mannheim, 1936:280). Often disagreements over conclusions, premises, and definitions at a first-order comparison cannot be resolved except by going to second-order comparisons and by isolating the perspective on the social world and man. When the dispute is no longer on first-order specifics, but about the perspective employed, resolution is more easily attained at the second-order level (Belth, 1965:86). The source for actors talking past one another in their concern for the immediate subject matter under discussion is made explicit and uncovered by going to the underlying components of their perspectives. This translation requires the development of a perspective on perspective, a meta-perspective which allows for second-order comparisons to occur.

Social studies programs do facilitate the development of metaperspectives by having students reflect upon and utilize explicitly the phenomenon of perspective in their study of man (e.g., Laing, 1970). Teaching students detachment, particularization, and translation not only helps them to develop metaperspectives, but is essential often for their interpreting of display material (e.g., newspaper, cartoons, speeches, films) which represents someone's point of view on man. Unless the assertions and inferences made in display material are interpreted in relation to the broader perspective and contextual milieu in which they are located, the student may misinterpret the other's viewpoint by imputing his own situation in life to that of someone else. Detachment and particularization help the student to be no longer a homogeneous participant who deals only with the specific content of what is being said in material. He attains a metaperspective when he understands that there are various possible modes of interpreting the social world, and when he can relate and interpret various contents in terms of underlying perspectives and contexts (Mannheim, 1936:282).

Experience of Demonopolarization

How can programs be developed in order to make students and teachers aware of pluralism (i.e., recognize that there are multiple ways of interpreting the social world) and to help students and teachers develop metaperspectives (i.e., to detach themselves from the immediate content, to particularize the various cognitive options available, and to translate points of difference)? The breakdown of dependency upon one taken-for-granted way of apprehending the world is referred to by Maruyama as demonopolarization (1966, 1974c, 1975).

If social studies programs are to help students and teachers experience multiperspectivism, then methodologies need to be developed for encouraging encounters with pluralism and for understanding the phenomenon of perspective itself. Although beyond the scope of the present study, methods to facilitate demonopolarization in social studies could be developed from such reported approaches as emics and etics, dialectics, walk-in exposure, and cross-perspective comparisons.[14]

Underlying any method for demonopolarization, though, is the experience of cross-perspective communication.[15] Any method designed to facilitate demonopolarization must provide students and teachers with the experience of having their cognitive worlds contrasted, criticized, and even shifted in discussion with those whose point of view differs from their own. In any methods based upon cross-perspective communication, however, it is important that participants be aware of the types of misunderstandings which may arise and be experienced by actors in various ways. If there is little awareness of possible misunderstandings, students and teachers may experience themselves talking past one another, as it were, when attempting to facilitate demonopolarization.

There may be experienced misunderstanding through mistranslation. Difficulties in translating a word from one perspective framework to another framework result because words have contextual rather than fixed meanings which are defined by the situation in which a word is used or by the point of view in which it is located. If word meanings are inevitably colored by the perspective and context within which they are situated, then a concept such as man which an individual has in mind can be mistranslated by other people into their own contexts and perspectives. Probability of mistranslation is high especially for connotative words (e.g., man, conservative, true, freedom), the meanings of which depend upon an actor's socio-historical context, background experiences, and total outlook:

> Not only does each of the conflicting factions have its own set of interests and purposes, but each has its picture of the world in which the same objects are accorded quite different meanings and values. In such a world the possibilities of intelligible communication and *à fortiori* of agreement are reduced to a minimum. The absence of a common apperception mass vitiates the possibility of appealing to the same criteria of relevance and truth, and since the world is held together to a large extent by words, when these words have ceased to mean the same thing to those who use them, it follows that men will of necessity misunderstand and talk past one another (Wirth, 1936:xxiv).

When teachers and students translate words encountered in a program into their own meaning frameworks developed from prior experience within various communities (e.g., religious, political, occupational, ethnic), the communicative intent of a program concerning man and his social world may be changed simply because the contextualness of meaning is dependent upon one's own experience. In viewing events, objects, or ideas, two actors can employ the same terminology, though with different meanings, because of different perspectives; consequently, the difficulty in cross-perspective communication is not that actors use different words, but that they speak often from different outlooks.[16] Often unaware of these differences, each person perceives and interprets the other's message and motive not in terms of the other's own perspective. The ensuing frustration, distrust, manipulation, and attributing of illogicality, incoherence, insincerity, lack of intelligence, and unpracticality to the other actor results in further misunderstanding (Maruyama, 1969b:236-241; 1974c). For example, students deadlocked in an argument find that communication breaks down and accusations such as "You don't know what you are talking about," "That is stupid," "But I thought you said . . .," "Isn't that irrelevant?" become more evident as communicating parties speak from different points of view on an issue.

There may be experienced misunderstanding in cross-perspective communication through a lack of shared presuppositions concerning the object of intention. Implicit schemes of reference rarely questioned by actors may result in irreconcilable differences among participants in discussions, for if they cannot assume and start from common background beliefs in their respective views, then there is little common basis for conversation unless they explicitly uncover and identify that which each is taking-for-granted.[17] Apart from this straightforward lack of shared presuppositions, whether epistemological, ontological, or whatever, teachers and students may perceive presuppositional incongruencies within a social studies program. Communicational intent of program developers can be countered by the situations which a program helps to define within classrooms, in which case, that which the sender thinks he is communicating may not be what the receiver perceives is being communicated because the explicit subject matter and the hidden presuppositions within the context or means of a program are interpreted as contradictory. For example, the view of man presented in the explicit propositions and content of a program may counter and be negated by the unexamined presuppositions implicitly reflected in the program's strategies (Gerbner, 1968:26). Program developers may communicate explicitly some definition of man, yet appear to students and teachers as not treating them in the same fashion. A program which espouses freedom of choice for man, yet structures situations in such a manner that students do not perceive freedom of choice, may be interpreted by students as contradictory. Presuppositions which are implicit may make cross-perspective communication problematic in our experience.

Further, there may be experienced misunderstanding in cross-perspective communication through comparisons. What one actor says to another is interpreted in terms of what is already known and understood. It is inevitable, for example, that a program's profile on man will be compared with those profiles a student already knows. By means of this implicit comparison in cross-perspective communication, a listener may lose the author's communicative intent.

In conclusion, social studies is an ideal context for gaining perspective awareness on the level of multiperspectivism: a recognition that everyone is perspective bound in his assertions, that there are many perspectives which can be brought to the study of an issue, that the world has many aspects depending upon the orientation brought to it, that the same perspective is not shared at all, that no one outlook has ahistorical, absolute, and acosmic status, that it is easy to reify a viewpoint rather than recognizing it as just one view, or as Castaneda found, that "what I had in mind as the world at hand was merely a description of the world; a description that had been pounded into me from the moment I was born" (1972:9). To that end, it is important that a social studies teacher be able to identify student perspectives and "be trained to see the world with the eyes of his students" (Metcalf and Hunt, 1970:359; van Manen, 1973:146), that he be able to develop increasingly wider frameworks for interpreting the social world and for defining interrelations within it, and that he be able to maintain a more open-ended view that is less limiting upon the perceptions of students. Perhaps this awareness in social studies of multiperspectivism and of the idea of perspective occurs for teachers and students only in the actual encountering of competing perspectives, through debating with those who hold differing outlooks, by disagreeing with one another in a manner which makes taken-for-granted structures of one's viewpoint explicit and problematic, and by having to account for alternative positions (Horton, 1970b:623; Kuhn, 1972b:262; Apple, 1974). Indeed, the importance of experiencing cross-perspective differences in social studies cannot be over stressed if one is to break out of the limiting and encapsulating parameters of one point of view and if the complexity of the social world is to be better understood.

SUMMARY

The perspectives on man and the social world of teachers and of students are subject to management through social studies programs in a number of ways. Programs transmit and distribute selected outlooks on man, they facilitate the shifting of teacher and student viewpoints, and they help social studies actors to develop a particular level of awareness of the phenomenon of perspective itself. In these ways teachers and students may experience their own points of view being managed through a program.

A social studies program presents a partial view of man and provides limited horizons within which students and teachers are to experience the social world. Since meaning in a phenomenological sense does not have an independent existence apart from individual actors who give purpose to events "within the contexts of the matters that have importance for them," there is no one perspective that can be used as the criterion for interpreting the social world and man within social studies programs (Kaplan, 1971:99). Indeed, it is misleading to attempt to account for any social issue from any one framework because of the many partial outlooks possible on any issue. Though program developers may utilize many profiles and horizons within programs, these are still partial perspectives and represent an imposition of meaning from some position located in time and space. A program then serves as a basis from which students and teachers are to reflect upon and interpret the meaning of someone else who may be located in a different socio-historical context.

Identifying perspectives, relating them to programs, and explicating how they are managed is not sufficient for social studies. Not all perspectives on man can be accepted as homogeneous because some views have better justification than others. In the next chapter an important question is raised concerning the validation of perspectives on man within social studies programs.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1] A non-phenomenological analogy of resonance is provided by Taschdjian:

> This response occurs when the frequencies of the responding system and those of the disturbing system are the same. For instance, if one sings a c-note into a piano, all the c-strings as well as other harmonics will start to resonate, but the other strings, which have a different frequency, do not respond (1970:39).

Although Schutz's notion of "feeling at home" is what is meant phenomenologically by resonance (c.f., "The Homecomer" 1971:106-119, and "The Stranger" 1971:91-105), it is in the writings of Maruyama that various possible resonances among perspectives are defined: relevance resonance (1961a, 1968a, 1969b, 1971, 1974c), experiential resonance (1969b, 1971), existential resonance (1969b), commitment resonance (1969b), and intellectual resonance (1971). C.f., Yamamato (1969:8-9), van Manen (1973:192).

[2] Writers such as Merton (1949:170), Schutz (1967:469), and van Manen (1973) have discussed the feeling of restraint which may be experienced initially when confronted with alternative perspectives. Berger and Luckmann's discussion of competition between 'expert' and 'practitioner' in attempting to impose their perspectives upon one another is applicable to the relationship often between program developers and teachers, evaluators and teachers, teachers and students, and teachers and parents (1967:117-128). Theoretician-practitioner competition has implications for program implementation and evaluation. Because reality definitions are imposed often by 'experts' in evaluation and implementation acts, these experts need the support of argumentation, certification, institutional affiliation, and even law to provide superiority to their perspectives. Canadian departments of education hold a virtual monopoly over defining perspectives within the classroom, although these perspectives certainly are not always implemented by teachers and are challenged by skeptics. The feeling of being constrained by another's perspective is evident certainly in the practice of education. C.f., Peddiwell (1939), Mannheim (1936, 1952), Dawe (1970), Geer (1971).

[3] For example, Maruyama has concluded from his own studies that when there is a lack of relevance resonance between an out-culture researcher and the in-culture subject, the latter may give restrained or disguised information simply to establish an illusion of relevancy to the researcher (1969b:245; 1970; 1971; 1973c; 1974c). Similarly, students may respond to the instructional activities of the teacher as if these were relevant, in order to receive a better grade or mark, even though they do not perceive what the teacher is doing to be particularly relevant. Teachers who are unable to avoid a particular group of students considered to be potential trouble-makers can appear interested in their reality of part-time jobs, cars, or

whatever, all for the sake of classroom order. A further source of experienced distrust may occur after "all communicating parties . . . fall into a collective illusion of mutual understanding," assuming that they understand what each other is saying, but then "may wonder later why other parties do not live up to the 'agreement' they have reached" (Maruyama, 1974c:3). This common classroom occurence may also be seen in relations between the school and segments of the supporting community or between teacher and administrator. Schutz also discusses relations amongst out-group and in-group views (1970a:85-95).

[4] Various authors have discussed briefly how perspectives shift: Belth (1965), Kuhn (1970), Schutz (1971:133-158), Wagner (1973:73-81), Maruyama (1973d, 1974c), Castaneda (1972, 1974). Although beyond the scope of this study, a relationship between perspective shift and the phenomenon of 'learning' as discussed by educational psychologists could be the focus of another study. It appears that regardless of their theoretical framework, nonphenomenological psychologists generally define learning as observable 'behavior' changes due to experience; they use 'behavior' observations to justify their inference of learning and to posit various learning descriptions. The differences among these authors rest in their descriptions concerning the inferred mechanisms of 'behavior' change. From a phenomenological framework, however, 'learning' would be described in terms of the actor's increased scope to order, interpret, and act upon the world in ways new to him. Consequently, any change in a perspective, whether by clarification or by total restructuring, could be considered to be 'learning,' for the actor has come to see and to describe his world in a new way. Changing figure-ground differentiations within his phenomenological or perceptual field occur when his perspective is either clarified or restructured (Combs and Snygg, 1959). Such shifts occur constantly for a student in his ongoing conversation with teachers and other students, and as he encounters other perspectives in programs. As perspectives shift the actor 'learns,' or in phenomenological terms, he experiences the world differently and constructs reality. An act of teaching is manipulative in that its intent is to shift the perspectives of students and to help them to intersubjectively construct reality through new ways of interpreting and ordering the world.

[5] One of the best descriptions of doubt which is consistent with phenomenology is to be found in James (1904), although Kuhn's description of the breakdown of a scientific perspective is also useful (1970, 1972a,b,c). No perspective can escape anomaly. The doubt and crisis which are incurred through anomaly are the basis for perspective shifts. Kuhn argues that for scientists the breakdown of their pre-established outlooks because of anomaly, and the consequent doubt and crisis which occur, is a prelude to perspective shifts and is the basis for development and discovery which occur in "extraordinary" science as opposed to the puzzle-solving of "normal" science (1970:82; 1972c:98).

[6] Schutz's discussion of the stranger is a good description of disorientation (1971:91-105). Anomaly causes apprehension on the part of an individual, referred to by various authors as a sense of conflict (Maruyama, 1971), a feeling of being a foreigner in a foreign environment (Kuhn, 1970:204), dissonance (Cohen, 1964; Platt, 1970:50), disorientation (van Manen, 1973:185-189), and doubt (James, 1904:289). In discussing the loss of confidence in taken-for-granted reality, Esland states that:

> . . . certitudes become opaque, and the paradigm is seen as a relative, humanly-produced construction. For some, this experience is anomic, in that it produces a disruption of cognitive order, and a breach in the unity between subject and object (1971a:82).

An excellent description of this experience is provided by Castaneda's feeling of disorientation, disdain, anguish, frustration, confusion, disbelief, and opposition which resulted from the anomalies his teacher, don Juan, provided: "My difficulty in grasping his concepts and methods stemmed from the fact that the units of his description were alien and incompatible with those of my own" (1972:7; c.f., 1972: 179,276,283).

[7] When a reality crisis is precipitated for the actor by a breakdown of his perspective in accounting for anomaly, the activity a student undertakes is analogous to the random experimentation within the area of difficulty undertaken by scientists in their effort "to discover some effect that will suggest a way to set the situation right" (Kuhn, 1972c:100). For example, in a class discussion a student may further reflect upon, question, and debate his perspective with the purpose of pushing its problematic components to see "just where and how far they can be made to work . . . and thereby magnifying the breakdown" (Kuhn, 1970:87). The symptom of this loss of confidence in his perspective defined reality is a proliferation of alternatives for explaining the anomaly. Resolution of the crisis occurs when one such alternative is capable of assimilating the anomaly and thereby resolving the doubt. In such activities, the focussing on anomaly and the consequent questioning of the taken-for-granted outlook may trigger further anomalies and self-reflection, thereby further blurring the viewpoint and eroding a sense of confidence in reality (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:84,88).

[8] Kuhn notes this denial technique in normal science:

> Normal science . . . is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like. Much of the success of the enterprise derives from the community's willingness to define that assumption, if necessary at considerable cost. Normal science, for example, often suppresses fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments (1970:5).

C.f., Cohen (1964), Festinger (1967:81), Combs, et al. (1971:89), Schutz (1971:105), Castaneda (1972).

[9] This fitting (interpreting and ordering) of experience to the actor's existent perspective framework is similar to Piaget's notion of assimilation and analogous to Kuhn's notion of normal science. For both of these writers, the fitting of experience to a framework further enlarges and clarifies that framework itself for the individual, whether he be a developing child or a scientist. Experience is made meaningful over time by being assimilated to or by being interpreted within the existent outlook, even though in so doing there may be minor changes in the perspective itself in order to make experience conform better to the perspective. Only when it is no longer possible to make experience conform in this manner is a greater perspective change warranted. C.f., Bruner (1962:123), Kuhn (1970:100), Combs, et al. (1971:260), Laszlo (1973:197-232).

[10] For a discussion of this fourth type of perspective shift, see Belth (1965:103), Platt (1970), Laszlo (1973:197-232).

The restructuring of perspective schemes of reference and context is similar to Piaget's notion of accommodation and is analogous to Kuhn's notion of paradigm revolution in science. In either case, an actor's perspective undergoes a major shift before the experience which is analogous can be assimilated within his perspective framework. The actor now has a new framework for interpreting and ordering his experience, although there is always a continuity with the former perspective. Bruner observes that "change always requires a reference point and that even violent change bears the mark of what was before" (1962:135). In reference to scientists, Kuhn observes that this type of perspective change is similar to a change in visual gestalt, for "when the transition is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods, and its goals" (1970:85). This shift is not to be described merely as the adding of

> . . . one more item to the population of the scientist's world. Ultimately it has that effect, but not until the professional community has re-evaluated traditional experimental procedures, altered its conception of entities with which it has long been familiar, and, in the process, shifted the network of theory through which it deals with the world. Scientific fact and theory are not categorically separable, except perhaps within a single tradition of normal scientific practice. That is why the unexpected discovery is not simply factual in its import and why the scientist's world is qualitatively transformed as well as quantitatively enriched by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory (Kuhn, 1970:70).

In these "non-cumulative developmental episodes an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one" (Kuhn, 1970:92). The new perspective defined relationships which have snapped into focus allow for a more general explanation and integration of information, thus resolving the anomaly and crisis. Because of this shift, scientific actors can now "account for a wider range of natural phenomena, or account with greater precision for some of those previously known" (Kuhn, 1970:66). The interpretation of reality is more precise, detailed, systematic, and comprehensive as a result of the shifted perspective matrix used as his epistemology.

Similarly, Castaneda described his experience of shifting plausibility structures and schemes of reference in order to interpret the anomalous and doubt inducing experiences provided by his teacher, as "stopping the world" or as changing his "idea of the world" (1972: 11). Don Juan described this shift in the following manner:

> What stopped inside you yesterday was what people have been telling you the world is like. You see, people tell us from the time we are born that the world is such and such and so and so, and naturally we have no choice but to see the world people have been telling us it is. We looked at each other. Yesterday the world became as sorcerers tell you it is (1972:299).

[11] For program developers, evaluators, or teachers, uniperspectivism is to remain "indifferent to the necessity of consulting the world in which their subjects existed" (Blum, 1971:126). Characteristics of uniperspectivism are discussed by Mannheim (1936), Merton (1949), Maruyama (1966, 1971, 1973d, 1974c), Radnitzky (1969), Kuhn (1970), Morgan (1970:81-93), Kaplan (1971), Barnes (1972), van Manen (1973).

[12] Meaning of perspective pluralism and of perspectivism is discussed by authors within sociology of knowledge (Mannheim, 1936; Wirth, 1936; Willer, 1971; Berger, 1969; Berger, et al., 1974:63-82), hermeneutics (Wach, 1958:13; Lonergan, 1972), psychology (James, 1904:294-295; Narramore, 1960:78-80), general systems theory (Laszlo, 1972:15-16), sociological method (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973), philosophy (Pepper, 1942, 1966, 1970, 1972; Kilgore, 1972; Ortega 1968), and history (Kaplan, 1971). These authors stress the importance of multiple perspectives for understanding issues and situations. Their assumption is that problems have many sides.

[13] Detachment and particularization are discussed by Mannheim (1936:283-292), primarily, but also by Kaplan (1971) and Maruyama (1974c). These methods are similar to historical criticism within hermeneutics: "the attempt to understand the meaning of a text in its specific and original historical context, the endeavor to recover, so far as is possible, the meaning intended by the author and understood by the first readers or hearers" (Perrin, 1974:4). C.f., Mickelson (1963), Ladd (1967).

Kuhn's discussion of translation among scientific perspectives is of interest. He starts with the assumption that:

> The stimuli that impinge upon them are the same. So is their general neural apparatus, however differently programmed. Furthermore, except in a small, if all-important, area of experience even their neural programming must be very nearly the same, for they share a history, except the immediate past. As a result, both their everyday and most of their scientific

> world and language are shared. Given that much in common, they should be able to find out a great deal about how they differ (1970:201).

Translation is possible on the basis of the shared life-world, language, and history:

> Given what they share, they can find out much about how they differ. At least they can do so if they have sufficient will, patience, and tolerance of threatening ambiguity, characteristics which, in matters of this sort, cannot be taken for granted (1972b:276-277).

Attempts to isolate components of a perspective and terms which prove to be problematic in communication are further possible when

> . . . the participants in a communication breakdown . . . recognize each other as members of different language communities and then become translators. Taking the differences between their intra and inter-group discourse as itself a subject for study, they can first attempt to discover the terms and locations that, used unproblematically within each community, are nevertheless foci of trouble for inter-group discussions. (Locations that present no such difficulties may be homophonically translated.) Having isolated such areas of difficulty in scientific communication, they can next resort to their shared everyday vocabularies in an effort further to elucidate their troubles. Each may, that is, try to discover what the other would see and say when presented with a stimulus to which his own verbal response would be different. If they can sufficiently refrain from explaining anomalous behavior as the consequence of mere error or madness, they may in time become very good predictors of each other's behavior. Each will have learned to translate the other's theory and its consequences into his own language and simultaneously to describe in his language the world to which that theory applies (1970:202).

As increased cross-perspective resonance and communication occur, the translation act not only "allows the participants in a communication breakdown to experience vicariously something of the merits and defects of each other's points of view," but also to "begin vicariously to understand how a statement previously opaque could seem an explanation to members of the opposing group" (1970:202-203). Since only one perspective (paradigm) can guide a scientific community, Kuhn suggests that as extended comparisons become available through translation, individuals can be persuaded that one of the perspectives is superior and can make it their own, thereby working and thinking within a perspective that used to be foreign to them. This is no longer merely translation of one world view into one's own language, but a 'conversion' experience:

> . . . at some point in the process of learning to translate, he finds that the transition has occurred, that he has slipped into the new language without a decision having been made. . . . The conversion experience that I have likened to a gestalt switch remains, therefore, at the heart of the revolutionary process. Good reasons for choice provide motives for conversion and a climate in which it is more likely to occur. Translation may, in

> addition, provide points of entry for the neural reprogramming that, however inscrutable at this time, must underlie conversion. But neither good reasons nor translation constitute conversion (1970:204).

The world in which he does research will at certain points seem incommensurable with the one he formerly inhabited (1970:112). C.f., Nida (1964).

[14] Emics and etics. Pike's differentiation between emics and etics as general approaches to the social world is applicable for studying perspectives of various groups within social studies programs (1967). Emics "helps one to appreciate not only the culture or language as an ordered whole, but it helps one to understand the individual actors in such a life drama—their attitudes, motives, interests, responses, conflicts, and personality development" (Pike, 1967:37). Phenomenological investigation as demonstrated by Schutz is emic in that the investigator attempts to describe a group's reality from the 'insider's' point of view. The focus of emics, therefore, is upon the actor's descriptions of his own life-world. It is a return to the world in which man lives and dies as an actor. It is a seeking to understand the frames of reference through which he constructs and experiences reality. Emicly oriented social studies programs would focus upon the views and acts which characterize various groups and which underlie social issues, the way in which phenomena appear to actors rather than to the investigator, the various man-world relationships constituted in the experience of different groups, and the multiple realities which are constructed and maintained within groups (e.g., Cusick, 1973).

An etic standpoint is an attempt to describe a group's reality and experience from the outsider's point of view and experience; in terms of the metaphors and models adopted from his theories, systems, theologies, or whatever; on the basis of his own relevances, presuppositions, criteria, classification schemes, and categories of meaning. Such accounts 'about' another's reality views are often distorted because of a disregard for the actor's own relevances and categories of meaning, because of an imposition of order upon him rather than a grasping of his own organizing principles. The approach is reductionist in that similarities and differences among groups are determined according to criteria whose relevance is external to those groups under study, with a result that isolatable particulars are stressed in themselves apart from the larger socio-historical context in which the particulars have meaning. Examination of many Canadian social studies programs shows a predominately etic standpoint to perspective pluralism (Aoki, et al., 1974).

More extensive than Pike's emic and etic standpoints in terms of specified methodology are Maruyama's inculture and outculture approaches (1968a, 1968b, 1971, 1973a, 1973c, 1974a, 1974c). Much work needs to be done in social studies in developing methodologies based upon an emic or inculture approach to the social world. C.f., Wilson (1976). For a criticism of emics and etics see Harris (1964).

Dialectics. Dialectics is explicated in Chapter I as a methodology for dealing with perspective pluralism. A program utilizes a dialectic approach if students are encouraged to clarify an issue such as poverty from the contradictory and competing viewpoints and situations of various actors who experience poverty differently, rather than from an a priori scheme provided by a program or by a student's own situation. In examining many stances on poverty, students discover similarities and differences among definitions of poverty, uncover possible relations of these views to social contexts and interests, and so on, in an attempt to clarify their own perspectives and to gain a larger viewpoint on poverty. Taking on various outlooks makes clear that social issues and situations are interpreted variously by actors.

Walk-in exposure. Developed and utilized by Maruyama, the 'walk-in exposure' method is designed to have a student encounter and negotiate perspective differences, as well as to experience trust and sincerity in an unfamiliar social environment, by going into a community or a situation where the perspectives differ markedly from his own. Guided by "an attitude of an apprentice being initiated into a new culture," a student's purpose is to understand the other individual's or community's point of view, feelings, and philosophy (1973a:62). Maruyama explains that:

> The student chooses an environment in which people tend to relate to outsiders with mistrust or polite formality while concealing their true feelings. . . . The student enters the environment as an individual without institutional position, organizational function or agency label, and works out a personal rapport with those who live in the environment. The student learns (1) to think in logics and ethics of those who live in the environment; (2) to be accepted on the level of true feelings and acts; (3) to relate on person-to-person basis across social and cultural differences; (4) to discover himself as a person, not as a position or function. When requested by the people in the environment, the student may participate or assist in activities initiated by them. But the student should not consider himself or act as a do-gooder, a reformer or a politician. His attitude should be that of a learner of an unfamiliar culture and an apprentice in personality enrichment (1970:261-262).

Through such experience students clarify and revise their feelings and attitudes which had been developed by lack of contact with different perspectives. Viewing from a different perspective and context fosters demonopolarization (1970; 1971:45; 1974a).

Transpection. Transpection is defined by a student temporarily suspending his own taken-for-granted standpoint (i.e., suspending the natural attitude) in an attempt to take on the perspective of another, thereby assuming the other's schemes of reference and context to be one's own. Naturally, it is impossible to leave one's own viewpoint in an attempt to 'get inside' and 'to see from' another perspectival position. Rather, this refers to an approximating the other's point of view, an imaginatively reliving the feelings and values of another time and place, an attempt to find the outlook of underlying another reality (Kaufman, 1960:16). This is described as

> . . . an effort to put oneself in the head (not shoes) of the inculture person. . . . One tries to see what the inculture person sees in the inculture perspective and with the inculture epistemology. One tries to feel what the inculture person feels, and to believe what the inculture person believes. One takes on, as his own, the assumptions of the inculture person (Maruyama, 1969a:241; c.f., 1971:23; 1973d:92).

In this "understanding by practice" (Maruyama, 1973d:92),

> One erases as much of his/her own paradigm as possible from his/her own head, and gets into and thinks in the paradigm of another person. Instead of disagreeing, one tries to think exactly like the other person (Maruyama, 1973b:63).

Similar to Maruyama's transpection is Kaufman's "internal relativism" (1960:15-17), Spiegelberg's "imaginative self-transposal" and "cooperative encounter" (1964), Laing's "transposing" (1965:26-35), Schutz's attempt to "put ourselves in the place of the actor and identify our lived experiences with his" (1972:114), van Manen's "co-orientational grasping" (1973:189-193). Such authors could be studied with the purpose of developing methods for understanding perspectives in social studies.

In-culture literature. The use of autobiographies, novels, inculture poetry and song, as well as simulations for the purpose of grasping other perspectives, and for understanding the phenomenon of perspective itself, needs more development for social studies. C.f., Maruyama (1973d).

Cross-perspective comparisons. Methodologies for comparing perspective similarities and differences could be developed from Mannheim (1936:280-286), Kaplan (1971), Geertz (1972).

[15] Maruyama's studies dealing with cross-perspective communication have focussed primarily upon cultural groups (1959; 1960b; 1961a,b,c,d; 1962a,b; 1963a,b), inculture-outculture research (1968a; 1969b; 1970; 1972a; 1973c; 1974a,c), and selected theoretical concerns of misunderstanding (1959; 1960b; 1961a,b,c,d; 1962a,b; 1963a; 1969b; 1972a). Maruyama further identifies various modes of communication such as factural, insinuative, deceptive, metamorphic, overstating, and understanding (1961a,b,c; 1963b; 1972a), and purposes of communication (1961d; 1969:242; 1972a:55), which are relevant to cross-perspective communication, but are outside the boundary restraints of the present study.

[16] That the same word can mean different things when used by differently situated persons, because the contextualness of meaning is dependent upon one's own experience, is observed and argued by Mannheim (1936:273). For example, Kuhn states that although in a

scientific revolution much of the terminology and conceptual tools of the traditional paradigm are incorporated into the new paradigm, these borrowed elements are conceived of in a new relationship with one another and from a new set of experiences, thereby resulting in inevitable misunderstanding between proponents of the two paradigms (1970:149):

> The practice of normal science depends upon the ability . . . to group objects and situations into similarity sets which are primitive in the sense that the grouping is done without an answer to the question, "Similar with respect to what?" One central aspect of any revolution is, then, that some of the similarity relations change. Objects that were grasped in the same set before are grouped in different ones afterward and vice versa. . . . Since most objects within even the altered sets continue to be grouped together, the names of the sets are preserved. Nevertheless, the transfer of a subset is ordinarily part of a critical change in the network of interrelations among them. . . . Not surprising, therefore, when such redistributions occur, two men whose discourse had previously proceeded with apparently full understanding may suddenly find themselves responding to the same stimulus with incompatible descriptions and generalizations (1970:200-201).

Unfortunately there is no neutral language to which they can resort, for "such problems are not merely linguistic, and they cannot be resolved simply by stipulating the definitions of troublesome terms," because the implicit meaning of a term depends always upon the perspective framework within which it is used, and in the background experience, conditions, and exemplars from which the perspective itself was developed (Kuhn, 1970:201). To assume that words have fixed and static meanings and that all participants in a discussion use the words in the same manner is referred to by Samovar and Rintye as the "fallacy of the fixed referent" (1970), and by Johnson as the "uncritical assumption" (1970). Because language is a key way of representing experience, the relationship between our arbitrary sign systems and referents is never static (Britton, 1970:19; Katz, 1970:243). To communicate unproblematically, individuals must share the same referents, signs, and meanings.

[17] For example, debate occurring during a scientific revolution is characterized by what Kuhn refers to as incompleteness of logical contact between communicating parties because the presuppositions underlying the arguments brought by both sides to the debate are mutually unacceptable (1970:110; 1972b:232). A perspective is consistent generally internally and therefore can be justified in terms of its own presupposition and logic. Consequently, arguments used for convincing the other side of a debate may be perspective bound and unconvincing:

> Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other needs in order to make its case. . . . Though each may hope to convert the other to his way of seeing his science and its problems, neither may hope to prove his case. The competition

> between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs (Kuhn, 1970:148).

Cross-perspective communication depends upon an understanding of those presuppositions concerning reality upon which depends each side's definition of what constitutes science (i.e., its problems, standards, and solutions). They fail to make complete contact with the other's point of view as long as perspectives are slightly at cross purposes due to underlying presuppositions (Kuhn, 1970:112):

> . . . they will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms. In the partially circular arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and so fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponents (Kuhn, 1970:110).

This talking through each other which may characterize cross-perspective communication does not mean that actors are simply in disagreement over something, but are at cross purposes because of different presuppositions (Kuhn, 1972b:232).

Similarly, Mannheim identifies the same difficulties in cross-perspective communication among individuals representing various social groups in a pluralistic society. Inevitably they talk past one another because their presuppositions are relevant to different social contexts and positions. "Two persons, carrying on a discussion in the same universe of discourse—corresponding to the same historical-social conditions—can and must do so quite differently from two persons identified with different social positions" (Mannheim, 1936:279). For example, a program's use of the word freedom is from some perspective, and since the meaning of such words differs often according to the socio-historical situation and presuppositions underlying, the consequent communication within the classroom may become problematic. If actors do not realize this, then

> . . . they speak as if their differences were confined to the specific question at issue around which their present disagreement crystallized. They overlook the fact that their antagonist differs from them in his whole outlook, and not merely in his opinion about the point under discussion (Mannheim, 1936:280).

An illusion of understanding may occur in a discussion even though the basic presuppositions upon which the outlooks rest are at cross purposes.

Chapter V

VALIDATING PERSPECTIVE IN PROGRAMS

How can perspectives on man be validated in social studies? Because there are so many different experiences and views of the world possible, social studies teachers and students are left with some difficulties concerning validating the claims made by actors for their various perspectives. Are some perspectives on man more legitimate than others, and if so, on what basis is legitimacy to be defined? Can man be experienced in social studies in any way program designers wish, or are there boundary conditions beyond which experience no longer corresponds to the phenomenon of man? Is there a circumference for reality which can be identified and applied to reality claims? In the life-world of social studies classrooms and of the street teachers and students must at least act as if man stands in a circle of reality bounded by some criteria which help to define differences among realities (e.g., madness, illusion, hallucination, fiction, opinion, outright error). They do not act as if every experience of man and every assertion from some perspective position concerning the social world (whether reported in newspapers, programs, religions, or whatever) are equally legitimate representations of man. Therefore, a question of validating claims made for a perspective is important because what is at stake is one's very idea of what is true, real, rational, and objective. The perspective on man inherent within a program as a completed act may be problematic from the standpoint of a program evaluator's role (whether the evaluator be a student, teacher, parent, or someone else) because his interest is not just that of interpreting the outlook in a taken-for-granted manner, but in holding it up for reflective and critical question.

An attempt is made in this chapter to suggest criteria which can be useful in part for justifying an outlook on man and the social world adopted in social studies. The observations are presented as preliminary and as tentative, and are intended to raise for further study this important issue of validating in social studies the choice of certain perspectives over that of other outlooks. Indeed, the notion of perspective validation needs a much larger study than is presented here to be explored adequately. Part I of the chapter is a ~~brief~~ discussion of a notion of validation, Part II presents some difficulties which may be encountered in validating perspectives, and Part III deals with criteria for justifying specific claims which actors may make for their perspectives in social studies classrooms or programs (Figure VI).

PART I. A NOTION OF VALIDATION

> Representations and descriptions are never independent of standards. And the choice of these standards is based on attitudes that require critical consideration by means of arguments, because they cannot be either logically deduced or empirically demonstrated (Habermas, 1971:312).

In validating a perspective a question of the form "What reasons (evidence, criteria) do you have for holding that viewpoint on man?" is generally asked. Though such a question is difficult to answer and can signal the end of discussion, the question is

Premise: Perspectives on man in social studies are subject to validation.

Part I. A Notion of Validation

- A. Experience as a Basis for Validation
- B. Life-world as a Basis for Validation
- C. Relevance as a Basis for Validation

Part II. Selected Difficulties Encountered in Validation

Part III. Validation of Selected Claims

- A. Truth Claims
- B. Rationality Claims
- C. Hierarchy Claims
- D. Objectivity Claims

Figure VI

Summary of Perspective Validation

possible and important in social studies once an outlook has been identified and clarified by teachers and students (Chapter II). Validation refers to justifying an outlook in the sense of giving reasons for its worth, usefulness, appropriateness, or accuracy (Taylor, 1961:68-188; Mavrodes, 1970; Daniels, 1971; Borhek and Curtis, 1975:111-134). The giving of reasons is not to be construed as 'proving' an outlook, since the demand for proof implies usually a degree of justification which is not possible to give when applied to views on man. Perspectives on man cannot be proved to the satisfaction of all actors in the same sense that a rock climber can prove to his companions that he can tie a belay knot by actually tying one. Rather, validation refers to a justifying argument which presents evidence and reasons in support of a point of view. One can do no more than give reasons for the perspectivable claims he makes regarding man and the social world. The in-order-to motive of giving reasons and evidence is to convince the questioner, to have him believe what he now disbelieves or doubts. Just as one changes spacial location in order to see from another position, so in validation one attempts to have the other person see from a different vantage point by presenting to him reasons which help him to 'come over here' from his 'there.' To be sure, the giving of reasons in support of an outlook is perspective bound because validation is itself based upon someone's motives, project, meaning context, and entire perspective.

Though the use here of validation refers to the giving of reasons for a particular perspective on man, a question remains: What is the basis for justification? In other words, one needs a source or basis from which to give reasons. From the phenomenological literature there would appear to be three sources from which the giving of reasons, criteria, or evidence in support of a viewpoint may be selected. The bases and parameters for justification are (A) experience, (B) the life-world, and (C) relevance.

A. EXPERIENCE AS A BASIS FOR VALIDATION

> Apart from experience, I have no way of knowing how things are; hence the test of a framework will be its power to satisfy all aspects of my experience, particularly those areas which I regard as most valuable and important (Evans, 1971:129).

It is hard to argue against the premise of phenomenology that a basis for knowing the world ultimately rests with intentionality and the standpoint taken. Apart from experience or consciousness an actor has no way of knowing how things are, whether his concern be that of man, acts, objects, or any other encountered phenomena. There would seem to be two options available as to possible sources for criteria in justifying a perspective: phenomenologists base and confine knowing to the subject-object relation (i.e., the actor's experience, as well as actors' historical and collective experience), whereas philosophers of religion and historical theologians argue the possibility of knowing based upon some kind of revelation which is external to man's experience of the world. Since the latter basis is considered generally to be irrelevant for social studies, criteria used for justifying viewpoints on man may be taken from intersubjective, historical, and personal experience.

A basis for justifying an outlook on man is experience itself.[1] Perspectives are in part validated as they fit with (i.e., they are not contradicted by) the intersubjective and cumulative experience of men. That is, points of view are more or less validated to the degree that they are consistent with the range and multiple aspects of collective experience. Perspectives cannot be arbitrarily applied and artificially constructed, but most relate to what man experiences in the world and to the characteristics of his existence (e.g., man is confined to time and space coordinates, man suffers and dies, man finds meaning-making necessary). Though it is beyond the scope of the present study to explicate structures of experience, it is sufficient here to ask the question: Are the viewpoints used in social studies honest in their characterization of what happens in everyday life, or do they describe a fictitious world having little reference to common experience? (Schutz, 1971:4). The premises that human knowing is based upon experience (on that which one is conscious of) and, therefore, that knowledge should not be counter to human experience, are a basis from which to give reasons and present evidence for an outlook (Bonner, 1965:23).

B. LIFE-WORLD AS A BASIS FOR VALIDATION

> All theoretical truth—logical, mathematical, scientific—finds its ultimate validation and justification in evidences which concern the Lebenswelt (Gurwitsch, 1966:251).

Another basis for justifying an outlook on man is the life-world.[2] All of man's activities and views stand within this universal horizon, all men are beings-in-the-world, all knowledge and lived experience are grounded in this pre-given and ever-present context (Strasser, 1963:65-74; Bonner, 1965:23; Gurwitsch, 1966:350-351;

Schutz, 1967:456). The structures of the world are imposed upon man as his most basic frame of reference to which he must either orient himself or else take the consequences. He is forced to come to terms with its structures because of its continuous presentness, because it acts back upon him by placing limitations upon his lived-body, and because it provides both the means and the obstacles for his projects. Therefore, a view on man must be consistent with man-in-the-world or else be phenomenologically unbelievable. Perspectives cannot contradict or be incompatible with the structures of the common-sense world which are inescapable for everyone and are experienced by them as the primary reality. In social studies, actors can check their views at those points where they touch upon the world accessible to all.

As such, experience and the life-world provide a basis for justifying a view on man. Reasons given in support of a perspective must be based upon experience and be compatible with the paramount life-world reality shared with fellowmen, rather than be taken from theoretical systems which have little relation to the world in which actors must live and as experienced daily by them. The check points (reasons, criteria, evidence) against which an actor in social studies subjects his outlooks and those of others are phenomenological only if consistent with the life-world and the experiences of men.

C. RELEVANCE AS A BASIS FOR VALIDATION

> The final judgment that a person makes over the whole range of the experience of his life and of those testimonies that seem to him to have 'the ring of truth' is, of course, both subtle and complex. I do not know of any algorithm for such a judgment. But I suppose that the judgment in the end should answer the question: What is it that, in the light of my whole range of

> experience and thought, makes the best and the fullest sense? (Mavrodes, 1970:80).

A basis for justification is the questioner himself. Presenting evidence to him in support of a viewpoint depends upon that which he is willing to accept as relevant evidence. In a phenomenological sense an outlook is validated in part if the justifying reasons given are accepted by the questioner as relevant and if he is convinced or satisfied in some manner. However, being convinced depends upon the kind and the extent of evidence one accepts, for criteria are satisfactory and sufficient in terms of someone's interest. Relevant answers differ for questioners with varying intents.

What the questioner who demands justification is willing to accept as reasons depends upon the intent of his question. For example, if the questioner is supportive of the perspective in general, he will accept evidence which he deems relevant for his particular question at hand. However, no reasons may be sufficient to justify an outlook for someone who holds that viewpoint in disbelief. Unless he is willing to accept certain premises as starting points, an infinite series of reasons may be required, each one being a reason for the succeeding reason, because premises often cannot be justified without getting into an endless series of justifications. Most reasons will be considered irrelevant by him unless he is initially willing to accept the outlook as somewhat valid, useful, or appropriate for certain endeavours. Further, what is accepted as evidence by him depends upon the degree of importance he imposes upon justification in terms of his purpose and the situation at hand. A viewpoint may not be initially problematic and in need of justification if validation is not important in terms of his interest, or if it is not related to someone whom he deems important and credible. In the end, acceptance of a position depends upon the answer deemed relevant for purposes at hand to the question: What is it that, in the light of my interests, experience, and prior belief, makes the best sense to me, and am I willing to accept as relevant? (Mavrodes, 1970:80).

In summary, the validating of a perspective on man in social studies involves justifying it in terms of reasons, evidence, or criteria of various sorts. A question of validation is related primarily to the reasons an actor has for holding a particular outlook. What are the sources phenomenologically to which one can go in seeking reasons? The giving of reasons must be compatible with experience, must be consistent with the life-world of both the justifier and the questioner, and must be relevant to the one who is questioning the outlook. The sources in experience and the life-world are expanded in Part III. In Part II some difficulties are suggested which may be encountered when attempting to justify claims which an actor may make concerning his particular viewpoint on man.

PART II. SELECTED DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN VALIDATION

The multitude of perspectives possible on man and the social world in social studies makes validation important. It is the viewpoints of actors in social studies which are at stake in asking questions of validation. Here then is the crux: criteria are needed against which perspectives on man in social studies can be validated. The finding of such criteria for perspective validation may be difficult within a social studies classroom for at least four reasons.

First, outlooks in social studies are to some extent metaphysical and appraisive stances concerning the nature of man and social reality. They are presupposed on certain beliefs about man and the kind of world man finds himself within. These beliefs about the ultimate nature of things are not subject to the same kind of testing as are hypotheses concerning the composition of a rock sample within a laboratory. As Evans states, "There seem to be no facts which can conclusively decide metaphysical questions, no experiments which can be performed, no proofs which can be constructed to finally decide the matter" (1971:66). Rather, when it comes to fundamental points of view toward reality within social studies, actors must think of validation criteria not in terms of proofs, but rather as evidences or reasons which may be useful for judging alternative positions on man.

Second, the finding of criteria (evidence and reasons) for validating a perspective is difficult because writers within phenomenology, sociology of knowledge, and hermeneutics in general tend to avoid establishing validating criteria, although they do not deny standards for truth or ethics (relativism), nor do they hold that all beliefs are of equal worth in terms of truth and usefulness (arbitrariness). In accounting for perspectives in terms of sociohistorical conditions (relationism), they make it possible for the question of validation to be raised (Mannheim, 1936:28; Berger, 1969: 59; De Gré, 1970). However, in an appraisively based social studies, teachers and students are asked to go beyond what most of these writers do, and are called upon not only to describe what some men believe is a right outlook, but to attempt decisions as to why something is right. For example, if one is to take the Alberta Social Studies Program seriously, then judging some beliefs as more valid than other beliefs is not an optional luxury. No study of perspective which fails to account for the worth of orientations described can be adequate when tested in the court of human experience and in the life-world of social studies classrooms.

Third, the justifying of a perspective on man may be difficult because of the manner in which actors often hold and experience their perspectives. They generally experience outlooks in unreflective ways; they naively assume and take-for-granted that which is for the most part "cloaked by the veils of the obvious" (Wild, 1964:12). Through primary socialization by significant others (e.g., family and friends) or through various secondary socialization agencies (e.g., schools, universities, inservicing activities) program developers, teachers, and students are introduced to and develop points of view which they take as appropriate and self-evident. Therefore, justifying a perspective may be difficult because actors may find it hard to transcend the unreflective ways in which they impose meaning and accept perspectives. Besides this taken-for-grantedness of their experiencing and holding of outlooks, it is not always possible for individuals to give reasons for an outlook because of its tacit character: actors utilize a perspective without being able always to state explicitly why, how, or what they are using.[3]

A concomitant characteristic of the taken-for-grantedness and tacitness of an outlook is the absolutizing of the perspective, that is, making it either the world as it is in itself, or else the only possible legitimate interpretation of the world (Chapter IV, Part III). This absolutizing of a viewpoint not only causes actors to fail to recognize other perspectives, but also to resist such a possibility. Assuming that all other actors hold to the same outlook, an individual judges everything in terms of his own truth, authority, method, and schemes of reference conceived by him as being universally applicable. In such a case, it may be difficult for a person to give reasons for his outlook if he does not recognize perspective as an aspect of the life-world. Further, because the relationship between a perspective and the group in which it is developed and maintained is intrinsically circular (i.e., a perspective is what group members share, and the group is characterized by those who share a perspective), it may be difficult for an actor to distinguish between outlook and group when called upon to give reasons for the viewpoint. In a sense, he is being asked to justify the character of the group or groups of which he is a member.

Fourth, the justification of a perspective may be difficult if actors do not distinguish between validation (presenting reasons in support of an outlook) and particularization (linking statements made about man to socio-historical contexts or other underlying schemes of reference; Chapter IV, Part III). In accounting for a point of view in terms of time and place, authors do not imply that the observations and statements made are suspect necessarily because these are based upon underlying interests, presuppositions, and approaches, or because these stand in relation to socio-historical contexts. That is, "A statement is not proven false if one points out its author was expressing his group perspective, vested interests, or personality characteristics" (Lieberman, 1970:574; c.f., De Gré, 1970). Since every social fact is established from some point of view, is based upon the investigator's own interests and background, and is influenced by what he considers to be appropriate methods and interpretations, it would be an erroneous conclusion to say that these underlying or background factors make research unreliable or ideas somehow false (Berger, 1967:179-185; Horton, 1970a:602; Walton, 1970:637). Fromm makes it very clear that

> . . . the fact that an idea satisfies a wish does not mean necessarily that the idea is false. . . . Indeed, there are many true ideas as well as false ones which man has arrived at because he wishes the idea to be true. Most great discoveries are born out of interest in finding something to be true. While the presence of such interest may make the observer suspicious, it can never disprove the validity of a concept or statement. The criterion of validity does not lie in the psychological analysis of motivation but in the examination of evidence for or against a hypothesis within the logical framework of the hypothesis (1967:12).

Similarly, in social studies programs and classrooms, the fact that ideas about man can be socially located and linked to specific interests, wishes, or whatever, does not mean necessarily that the ideas are themselves false. "We cannot emphasize too much," argues Mannheim, "that the social equation does not always constitute a source of error but more frequently than not brings into view certain interrelations which would otherwise not be apparent" (1936:5). Indeed, by understanding a relation between the views of men and their socio-historical location, one may be able to develop a larger perspective which embraces various points of view on man.

In summary, the giving of reasons for a perspective may be difficult at the best of times because perspectives on man are to a certain extent metaphysical, because authors shy away generally from providing criteria which may be useful in social studies, because the manner in which actors hold their perspectives often makes it difficult for them to give reasons, and because of a possible misunderstanding of what is particularization. In Part III some criteria are suggested for justifying selected claims which an actor may make concerning his particular viewpoint on man.

PART III. VALIDATION OF SELECTED PERSPECTIVE CLAIMS

There are various claims made by actors for their perspectives on man and the social world: (A) truth claims, (B) rationality claims, (C) hierarchical claims, and (D) objectivity claims. Reasons or evidences are needed when justifying such claims in social studies. The following discussion concerning validation of such claims is not intended by the investigator to be dogmatic, but merely to suggest some possible criteria which may be applicable to this important area of justifying perspectives.

A. TRUTH CLAIMS

> "That rock is a rock because of all the things you know how to do to it," he said. "I call that doing. A man of knowledge, for instance, knows that the rock is a rock only because of doing, so if he doesn't want the rock to be a rock all he has to do is not-doing. . . . The world is the world because you know the doing involved in making it so," he said. "If you didn't know its doing, the world would be different" (Castaneda, 1972:227).

The notion of truth is difficult in social studies, to say the least.[4] In validating the truth of reality claims made from a perspective position, one must first substantiate what is the meaning of truth phenomenologically in reference to perspectives, and secondly delineate criteria on which truth claims can be justified in experience.

First, phenomenologists do not advocate a relativistic notion of truth based upon criteria of individual feeling, choice, or standards (on a relativistic grid of premises one is left with a large degree of epistemological uncertainty because one can only speak of what is true for you or for me[5]), nor do they advocate that a perspective can be considered true on a criterion of social acceptance. Perspectives are not to be supported in social studies necessarily because they represent the status quo or are linked with a ruling ideology. Truth in a phenomenological sense refers to the correspondence between the subject's claims about an object and the object of his claims. In other words, truth is a characteristic of a perspective's fit with experience and the life-world. Validation criteria are needed for checking this correspondence.

Second, criteria on which truth claims made for a perspective can be justified need to be delineated. Just as Descartes appeals to a "divine guarantee" for his "clear and distinct ideas" (1955), various authors have sought standards by which the truth of reality claims could be made more certain and by which relativity could be overcome in part (Mavrodes, 1970:73-89; Evans, 1971; Schaeffer, 1972; Guinness, 1973:316-392; Middelmann, 1974). A point of view may in part be justified phenomenologically in social studies by asking three overlapping questions: (1) Is there correspondence with intersubjective, historical, and life-world experience? (2) Is it livable? (3) What are its consequences for present and future experience? Although choice of perspective depends doubtlessly upon a multitude of factors beyond the scope of this study, these three questions can be applied to such choices. Where a perspective touches on the life-world, on man as experienced, and on man's cumulative experience, these stand as counter-evidence for justifying an outlook. A decision for a perspective must be one that fits with the world in which we live, as well as one that we can live with. It must be livable and believable in the experience of men.

These questions are merely suggested guides for choosing and justifying a perspective in social studies. They provide actors with criteria for intersubjectively testing truth claims (they do not provide either absolutes to which the truth claims of any perspective may be compared, nor do they provide certainty in the sense of proving rightness or wrongness of a choice), with grounds for justifying a choice or for maintaining a position, with checks which help actors to bring their outlooks closer to a world which they can never know exhaustively as it is in itself, with controls which allow them to accept with some confidence a viewpoint as reasonable and sufficient (in the sense that object and subject are brought into closer correspondence). These phenomenological checks upon a viewpoint do not preclude error. There are no proofs when it comes to an orientation toward man and the social world.

Is there a Correspondence?

> The fact is that if we are going to live in the world at all, we must live in it acting on a correlation of ourselves and the thing that is there, even if one has a philosophy that there is no correlation. There is no other way to live in this world. . . . He lives in this world on the basis of his experience that there is a correlation between the subject and the object. . . . All men act as though there is a correlation between the external and the internal world, even if they have no basis for the correlation (Schaeffer, 1972:69-70).

Phenomenologists assume a unity between subject and object because this correlation appears to be a basic structure of human experience. Men must live on a premise that the categories with which they order and interpret an object do in fact relate to something that is there. As such, a criterion for validating the truth of a reality claim relates to the degree of correspondence between perspective and that to which it refers (Schutz, 1970a:278-282; 1971:16-19,81-88). The truth of a perspective is that it is faithful "to the things themselves," that it allows one to describe with some degree of accuracy what appears to men. Not all orderings and interpretings are equally as accurate because the schemes of reference applied to the world are not always equally appropriate. As long as the object is there and the subject is in correlation with it, he can have confidence that he knows in part that thing truly and accurately without knowing it exhaustively. He does not embrace a particular outlook and then believe that it helps him to perceive and speak of things without also continuously asking himself whether that framework is merely invented without any correspondence to the world.

How can this correspondence be checked? A perspective must stand in a system of coordinates (intersubjective correspondence, historical correspondence, and life-world correspondence) which together provide a check upon the truth of reality views and propositions generated from these viewpoints. Whenever a perspective touches upon that which is external to the subject (e.g., the world, man, history), the truth of its content in terms of correspondence can be checked. These outside checks tend to assure the actor that his perspectives are not just fabrications of consciousness without a relation in some way to that which is external to him (Laing, 1967:118).

Emphasizing correspondence of a perspective with external checks is a reiteration once again of the subject-object relation as a basic premise of phenomenology.[6] In this subject-object relation, the observations and propositions arising out of some perspective framework must correspond to the object in question in a way that is consistent with the experience of men-in-the-world both intersubjectively and historically. Knowledge neither has its sole basis in an individual's consciousness autonomous from the world (else propositions derived from some perspective would be freed from any correspondence to something outside of consciousness or from the experience of other men through time and in different places), nor is knowledge there in the world to be uncovered by consciousness. Rather, knowledge represents categories of observation and propositions imposed upon the world by consciousness. These categories can be judged by the way they correspond to the world in which man must live.

Coordinate of intersubjective experience. Perspectives on man can be validated partially in terms of their correspondence with the intersubjective experience men have of themselves. Reality is experienced intersubjectively because all men live bodily within an external world, and because that world as a given places similar restriction upon one man as upon another. As such, the observations and propositions concerning man which arise out of individual subject-object relations are open to criticism by other men (associates and consociates) and can be checked with their shared experience of the world. Does the reality view in question hold up for other men in their experiences in similar situations? To accept that an outlook on man is to some degree true is also to accept that it corresponds not just with an individual's experience but with intersubjective experience. Intersubjectivity is a coordinate for perspective validation (Schutz, 1971:18).

Not all points of view are equally honest to what Evans calls "the facts of our existence" (1971:67). A perspective in social studies has validation to the extent that it accounts for and makes sense of those facts of existence which men everywhere experience. For example, Strasser observes that

> . . . despite all kinds of historical, cultural and social differences, human beings understand one another when they speak of their most fundamental experiences, such as their experiences of time, space, body, sexuality, death and morality. They understand one another, even though there are secondary differences with respect to the particular way in which, e.g., the body, time, or death are experienced (1963:268).

Strasser's observation can be turned around into some important questions for justifying a viewpoint on man within social studies:

> What is man to make of his own observation of himself expressed in his history, drama, poetry, love-making, war-making, cave paintings, funeral rites? Is the significance—freedom, love, individuality, personality—real or is it illusionary? Can these all be explained as mechanistic? Is it all such a metaphysical hassle that dissolution of personality is the only

> solution? (Guinness, 1973:351-352).

Regardless of how man describes himself in his theoretical schemes, in the life-world man experiences freedom, choice, anxiety, hope, surprise, guilt, art, responsibility, praise, blame, affirmation, rejection, hate, suffering, love, a sense of individuality, and so on; he experiences himself in the world as being somehow different from non-man (i.e., he does not experience himself just as a machine, system, or process); his observations of himself show him to be personal (i.e., he can choose, act morally on the basis of constructed ethical systems, construct his own realities and meanings, join acts on the basis of shared projects, set goals and define problems) in an otherwise seemingly impersonal universe (Laing, 1965, 1967). In a phenomenological sense a viewpoint on man is inadequate and in some measure lacks validity if it ignores the observer himself, and if it does not allow for basic human experiences which define in part our existence as men. A perspective which does not account for some of the fundamental and common structures of living does not correspond to the man as experienced in the life-world. Even more specifically, if views of man do not fit with what actors' experience of human distinctiveness, then such perspectives

> . . . are not satisfactory because they do not base themselves on an ontology which recognizes man as qualitatively different from non-human matter. They see people as objects to be studied, classified, manipulated, developed—even in 'their own interest' (Marquardt, 1972:1).

Any ontology which disregards man's experience of himself and of fellowmen is an inadequate basis from which to work in phenomenology. An image of man can be phenomenologically justified only if it is consistent with what man experiences himself to be within the world in which he must live daily. As such, a perspective corresponds if it fits with the observations man has of himself over time and if it accounts for the basic experiences man shares with one another in the life-world. The categories of validation are the categories of experience.

Coordinate of historical experience. A view of man can be justified in part in terms of its correspondence both to the accumulated experience of an individual over time (personal history) and to the collective experience of groups in various times and places. Observations and propositions made from some perspective can be checked against the wider experience of men in other times (predecessors) and places (consociates) to see if there is continuity through time and concurrence over place for a view of man. If history as the accumulated experience of men is ignored, then outlooks on man in social studies are based upon actors' immediate experience alone. Continuity over time is a coordinate for perspective validation.

Coordinate of life-world experience. A perspective on man can be validated partially in terms of its correspondence with the life-world. A point of view in social studies cannot be contrary to one's-being-in-the-world nor be inconsistent with the way men must live in the world. If one accepts the subject-object relation as a basis of perspective, then observation and those propositions derived from it must be limited by their correspondence to the object of intention. Knowledge is not to be based upon consciousness alone (e.g., acts of observing, imagining, relating) apart from an intentional relationship to an object. This relationship remains a check upon consciousness because an actor can test his perspectives in terms of their fit with his experience of the external world. A loss of this essential subject-object relationship in epistemology is to place the source of truth and knowledge in either subjectivity or in the external world apart from man. In the former case there is a loss of checks placed upon knowing by that which is external to the knower, whereas in the latter case there is a tendency to forget that knowledge is not there to be uncovered, but is the imposition of categories upon the world by consciousness. These categories (observations and propositions) can be judged by their correspondence to the world in which the knower has to live. The question, then, relates to the accuracy of an outlook for allowing one to describe things as they appear to be: Is this how the life-world is experienced?

Therefore, perspectives in social studies can be justified in terms of their fit without experience of the world itself (De Gré, 1970; Kaplan, 1971; Kuhn, 1972a). A perspective on man should not violate the form of the world which is given to man in consciousness. The structures of the external world remain always the background context within which specific perspectives are directed to individual phenomenon, including man. Definitions of man are not valid in social studies unless they apply to man-in-the-world who is really there rather than as projected poetically. For example, Castaneda's view of man portrayed in his novels is phenomenologically unbelievable because it violates the structures of the world within which all men must live (e.g., which disallows lived-bodies to fly, to walk on cloud bridges, or to speak with coyotes); man not only experiences the limitations placed upon his being-in-the-world (existence) by the world's form, but must also reckon and live in accordance with these structures, or else take the consequences (1971, 1972, 1974). Statements made about being-in-the-world can be judged in terms of their correspondence with both the man, the world, and the relationship between them which can be observed. Correspondence to the external world is a check upon one's perspectives.

Is it Livable?

Another criterion for validating the truth of a reality claim requires that descriptions of man provided from some perspective must be livable and believable in experience. Perspectives are not merely academic definitions which stand apart from the lived-world of men, but are fundamental attitudes toward the world, and as such are frameworks within which actors must live. Basic questions in validating any outlook, therefore, refer to the livableness of any viewpoint: Can man live with his metaphysical premises? Or is there a cleavage between his experience in the world in which he must live and the beliefs he holds concerning it? Can he live within the boundaries of his framework? Because "each man must continue to live within the boundaries of the external world in spite of his own interpretation of the world and its boundaries," the extent to which he can live with his position in the varied experiences of life (e.g., joy and sorrow, birth and death, acting individually and jointly with others) is a validation check upon his perspectives (Middelmann, 1974:68).

For example, Schutz argues that the premises upon which some approaches to man rest are not livable either by the actor carrying out his study of interest nor by men in general. The assumption that mind or consciousness of fellowmen is a "weak fact" and, therefore, not a useful starting point for understanding man, is contradicted in the interpreter's own experience:

> Yet, it is not then quite understandable why an intelligent individual should write books for others or even meet others in congresses where it is reciprocally proved that the intelligence of the Other is a questionable fact. It is even less understandable that the same authors who are convinced that no verification is possible for the intelligence of other human beings have such confidence in the principle of verifiability itself, which can be realized only through cooperation with others by mutual control. Furthermore they feel no inhibition about starting all their deliberations with the dogma that language exists, that speech reactions and verbal reports are legitimate methods of behavioristic psychology, that propositions in a given language are able to make sense, without considering that language, speech, verbal report, proposition, and sense already presuppose intelligent alter egos, capable of understanding the language, of interpreting the proposition, and of verifying the sense (1971:4).

Premises must be appropriate and livable in terms of the world in which we daily must live rather than in terms of a world of our imagination. To illustrate further, some existential writers have presented a picture of the meaningless character of human existence (i.e., man has no meaning because he is superfluous and his life does not fit into any overall order or structure) which as a perspective on man does not compel assent because it is not livable and believable in experience (e.g., Gardner, 1971). They portray man living in a world in which everything is permitted: there are no moral values, no actions to disprove of or to forgive, no disgust at the beating of either helpless animals or soldiers, no concern beyond a detached attitude to pointless murder. Such a view of man is incomprehensible in the world in which we must live. Can a man live without believing that some actions are right and that others are wrong, that everything is not permitted, that some conception of ethics is needed? Is it possible to live without a framework which is indifferent to any moral notions? Man is not able to live generally within the confines of such descriptions. The activities of other actors seem often to be meaningful to him and he acts generally on the basis that his own activities have meaning and that there are moral notions. Evans observes that

> From such simple occasions as a noon meal to the solemnity of a state funeral, men clothe their activities with form and ritual to recognize and emphasize the importance of what they are doing. Though from these particles alone no overall framework can be grasped, they do seem to be clues or pointers, evidences of meaning. If the world is truly devoid of meaning, all these evidences are merely trappings, illusions of meaning. But they are there and must be explained, even if they are illusions. Things seem to happen as if they were related to other things, as if one thing meant another (1971:63).

An outlook on man can be questioned phenomenologically if an actor is not able to live within the confines of his own belief system in daily life, if he cannot be consistent with the presuppositions of his perspective in the various situations of which he is a part, if his outlook is not practicable and believable in experience, and if his views stand apart from the life-world of action. A perspective is authentic to the extent that it is livable by actors.

What are its Consequences?

Another criterion for justifying partially the truth of a reality claim is to be found in its implication for the actor's own experience. In deciding whether one's outlook is livable one must also ask what are the consequences of living it now as well as the implied consequences for future experience. Where does the perspective lead to if pushed to its conclusion in terms of man? What are its implications for future experience, and are these implications consistent with the perspective as presently defined? There is a relationship between the perspectives actors use for seeing man and the consequences in their experience of that seeing, between the outlooks they think with and the consequence of that thinking (Belth, 1965:105).

Consequences for present experience. A perspective on man does have implications for present acts by allowing one to infer, anticipate, predict, avoid, and in various ways plan for life-world activities with fellowmen. If presuppositions held about man do not provide one with powers to infer and predict repeatable consequences in human relations over time, then the perspective is questionable. In other words, an outlook can be judged on its practical utility within the life-world. One perspective is not as good as another in accuracy, scope, fruitfulness, implications, and approach for all purposes which an actor may have in social studies. There are various ways of looking at man and his world, some ways better than others, depending upon the interest, question, or other purpose at hand which one may bring to his study (e.g., Kuhn, 1972b:261-265; Laszlo, 1972: 15-16). One must consider consequences of a perspective in terms of his purpose at hand.

Consequences for future experience. Perspectives on man can be validated in terms of their implications for future human experience. Harman argues that many of the belief and value outlooks on man currently prevalent in North America are not equally valid because of their consequences for alternative future experiences; therefore, one should judge a particular view of man on the basis of its possible consequences (1972). Although a decision concerning which alternative future is best does depend upon one's prior values concerning what man should be and upon one's conception of the future, these premises must themselves be open also to validation. When a viewpoint on man is pushed to its conclusion methodologically or ontologically, the consistency between one's belief and the implied outcome of it, between one's present values and the implied reality, between one's intent and the consequences of holding to a particular position, all need to be considered.

In summary, claims made by actors in social studies concerning the truth of their perspectives on man and the social world may stand in need of justification. Criteria which are consistent with phenomenology and which may be useful for validating such claims were discussed under three overlapping questions: Does it correspond to experience and to the life-world? Is it livable? What are its consequences? As such, a perspective is not in total an indefensible belief or an untestable hypothesis, for it can be checked out at those points where it makes claims concerning man and the world. In a metaphorical sense, an outlook is much like a map of a geographical area. The map consists of a grid of various schemes of reference which are partial and selective in what they portray, rather than being like a complete photograph of an area. However, where the map touches upon the area under question, it must fit with what one finds there in order to be true. Similarly, where a perspective impinges upon intersubjective and historical experience of man-in-the-world, a point of view is shorn of claims to be true if correspondence is not deemed by actors to be important. If such checks were not possible, one would be left with a "Kierkegaardian leap of faith" as the ground of truth. Claims made concerning the truth of a perspective on man in social studies can be justified on the phenomenological grounds of experience and the life-world.

A discussion of the truth of a perspective does not imply all or nothing, obviously, but degrees of correspondence between outlook and object of intention. Man's views are always partial rather than universal, and as such, a claim that a perspective is true does not imply an absolute truth in the sense that it corresponds exhaustively to things as they are in themselves. Rather, this implies that outlooks can correspond truly (without being exhaustively true) to that which is external to consciousness. Indeed, the partialness of a viewpoint is what makes validation an important principle in social studies. Without a universal perspective, teachers and students are left with a multitude of partial viewpoints from which to observe man. Each of these points of view is important, though, "because it determines what one sees, not necessarily what there is to be seen" (Guinness, 1973:338). As such, what one sees must have correspondence to the life-world and to the experience of men, and must be livable within that life-world, or else that outlook is phenomenologically suspect. A word of caution is in order. The notion of truth implied by the three questions discussed in this section is one which fits with common-sense experience, and is not meant to imply that other notions of truth may be irrelevant in social studies when dealing with perspectives on man.

Another claim which needs justification in social studies relates to the reasonableness or rationality of an outlook on man. Actors may not make direct truth claims, but may argue the rationality of their positions. Reasons are needed to justify such claims.

B. RATIONALITY CLAIMS

What is meant by a claim that a perspective on man is rational or reasonable, and how may such claims be validated in social studies? Though the term may be used variously, rationality does not refer here to a perspective itself so much as to the manner in which a viewpoint is selected and held by an actor. A perspective on man may be held rationally and be experienced as reasonable by someone (1) if he has selected it from amongst clarified alternatives, (2) if it is adequate for his purposes at hand and appropriate for the phenomenon under study, and (3) if it is consistent.

Is it Selected from Clarified Alternatives?

> Selection is . . . a cardinal function of human consciousness. Interest is nothing else than selection, but it does not necessarily involve conscious choice between alternatives which presupposes reflection, volition, and preference (Schutz, 1971:78).

Key to understanding rationality within a phenomenological framework is a notion of choice or selection (Schutz, 1970a:131-137, 279-282; 1971:64-88). An actor may hold a perspective on man rationally if he selected it from amongst clarified perspective alternatives. It is in the nature of this choice that an actor's claim to rationality may be justified in part. Because choice is basic to rationality in a phenomenological sense, it is necessary to explicate a difference between daily-life choice and rational choice.

Rationality of choice is not a characteristic in general of the everyday world. In daily-life choices the actor does not need to search and make explicit the alternative perspectives available for guiding his acting; rather, immediate interests at hand make certain stocks of knowledge and approaches relevant to achieving his projects. His interest is that of fulfilling his plan rather than identifying and comparing the options possible. He chooses viewpoints in accord with that which seems most readily available and with that which is immediately suited for his task. For example, in changing from role of program developer, to church goer, to father, and to alpine club member over the course of one day, an actor's specific interests, presuppositions, and approaches towards man may shift, but these schemes are clarified only to the extent necessary for carrying out role-specific activities. He shifts outlooks as the immediate situation requires, yet does so without specifying and clarifying alternatives explicitly. Further, he selects views without carefully comparing them and without deliberation because his perspectives are taken-for-granted generally in daily-life, because he has accepted them unquestioningly as they have been presented to him, because he was born into a world already organized according to the outlooks of contemporaries and predecessors, and because he was provided with typifications which render life routine and which allow him to interpret his fellowmen in terms of typicalities (Schutz, 1971:78). Even when a particular outlook becomes problematic in daily experience, other viewpoints are pursued only after repeated modifications and clarifications of the present vantage point continue to be ineffective for him. Although alternatives are a prerequisite of any choice, an actor considers the range and clarity of these alternatives only to the extent that such activities are immediately relevant. His interest at hand may require no more than vague premises and recipes, and may require only general knowledge concerning the limits and possibilities of various alternative positions. The practical interests men pursue do not require that for realization of plans men always choose perspectives rationally. As such, daily-life choice and rational choice are generally different phenomenologically.

In social studies, however, the interest is no longer the carrying out of one's daily activities, but an understanding of those activities on a level different from that demanded within common-sense experience. Social studies (e.g., a reflective study of taken-for-granted social life) does require that one choose and hold perspectives rationally for interpreting the social world. The choice of one's outlook becomes problematic because this understanding of the social world requires that, before a choice can be made from among alternatives, the perspectives need to be more clearly articulated, the competing outlooks need to be more critically reflected upon, and the limits and possibilities of a framework for interpreting man need to be more carefully considered than may be necessary in the everyday life. As the shift from common-sense to social studies realities occurs, the interest in the social world changes fundamentally from that of a participant to that of an observer. If students are not made aware of differing and alternative views on man, and if these alternatives as well as the student's own outlooks are not clarified, then the level at which they acquire and utilize a viewpoint in their study of the social world is not much different from that of common experience. Unless an actor takes time to clarify in some degree the alternative perspectives which may be available to him, he cannot be assured that his choice is appropriate for his problem at hand nor for the phenomenon under study. Therefore, a choice of perspective is rational if alternatives have been made explicit and a selection made concerning the appropriateness of some outlook for the social studies task.

Is it Adequate and Appropriate?

Every perspective has its limits and its possibilities as a framework for interpreting, ordering, and acting upon the world. A useful outlook in one field of endeavor may be inappropriate in another because each point of view circumscribes the aspects of the world capable of being described within the chosen schemes of reference. Therefore, these schemes need be adequate in terms of both the subject's interest and object of intention. A perspective is held rationally to the degree that it has relevance adequacy with respect to the subject's chosen interest, and phenomenon appropriateness with respect to the subject's object of intention. Perspectives on man are more or less adequate depending in part upon the degree of congruence with these two factors.

Relevance adequacy. Although man has the capability to utilize many perspectives for interpreting the social world, not every point of view is adequate equally for the interest at hand (i.e., for the actor's chosen purpose manifested in his question, problem, plan, or goal). This chosen interest structures the actor's life-world in terms of a relevance contour topography in which one set of knowledges and approaches may be more suited or preferable in terms of his purpose than would be other schemes. To illustrate, the usefulness of an "action" or of a "behavior" framework for interpreting man depends upon whether one is guided by the question "What is the meaning of the event experienced by the actor?" or by the question "What is the meaning of the event imposed by the observer?" This choice of schemes adequate to the problem or interests is an obvious methodological postulate basic to any social studies program (Schutz, 1971:8). Not surprisingly, however, schemes inadequate in terms of their relevance to stated interests may be utilized because actors do not reflect always upon the degree of congruency, unless difficulties are encountered over the course of their actions which place such congruence in question. Similarly, the language and the schemes of reference employed within a program may be to varying extents contradictory with the stated interest of the program and with its implied relevances (Chapter II).

Phenomena appropriateness. Relevance adequacy is not sufficient by itself for establishing perspective adequacy. In any subject-object relation congruency of schemes with the subject's interest must be extended to include congruency of schemes with the object under study. What may be appropriate schemes, interests, and approaches to one class of phenomena may not be equally appropriate for interpreting another class. For example, because natural things (i.e., objects independent of human action) and social things (i.e., objects as products of human activity) are different in terms of inherent meaning, they must be understood by means of different schemes (Schutz, 1971:9). What is appropriate for ordering the non-human may be inappropriate for interpreting the human, and vice versa, because certain aspects characteristic of the one may not be characteristic of the other. Descriptions of phenomena may be distorted either through imposition or through neglect of that which is or is not inherent to them. To illustrate, this fallacy occurs when non-human phenomena are personalized and when social constructions such as institutions are reified and given goals and needs, or when man himself is viewed as a machine devoid of mind and personality. In such cases a fictitious reality is constructed simply because the perspective utilized is not appropriate to the phenomena themselves.

Is it Consistent?

> . . . in terms of the person's cognitive system . . . there is a continual striving for consistency, a push toward congruous, harmonious, fitting relationships between the cognitive elements or between the thoughts, beliefs, values, and actions that make up a structure of cognitions about some object or set of events. Thus, when inconsistency occurs, some psychological tension is presumably set up in the individual, thereby motivating his behavior in the direction of reducing this inconsistency and reestablishing harmony. In effect, the cognitive process constantly strives toward cognitive balance (Cohen, 1964:63).

The reasonableness of a perspective on man can be validated in part in terms of consistency among the various schemes of reference of which it is composed (Willer, 1971:7).[7] Perspective inconsistency and error are recognized by an actor generally after the fact. When viewed from within the perspective itself, the position which he holds appears to him to be coherent and truthful, and "other positions appear either as outright errors, or, at best, as relative truths which have to be taken up into his own position" (Kaufman, 1960:18). His activities, thoughts, and feelings seem to him to be reasonable, correct, and consistent at the moment in which the subject experiences the object (Combs and Snygg, 1959:22). Only when the taken-for-grantedness of a particular experience and way of viewing the world is threatened does the actor attempt to modify his outlook so that reality maintains its stability and predictability for him. For example, from the individual program developer's position at the time of developing a program, his perspective is conceived by him as being internally consistent and corresponding to the way the social world is. Since it is unlikely that any program developer would hold to a position which he regards as erroneous, there may be frequent modifications in his outlook over the course of an act of program development in order to reduce what he believes to be inconsistency. Various schemes of reference may have to be modified or harmonized so that he experiences his own outlook as being consistent both internally and in relation to his life-world. Consistency, though, among all components of a perspective is never complete, even though the individual strives for this, because experience is ongoing and cumulative.

If an actor does not believe it is possible to achieve consistency while holding to one position, he may develop more than one viewpoint on the same issue, keeping these perspectives separate through compartmentalization. For example, what beliefs concerning man a program developer holds from his various group memberships, or what a student encounters concerning man from his social studies class, church, or part-time job, may appear to them to be irreconcilable or competing. Unable to maintain one perspective on man, they may develop various views thought to be suitable for different contexts.

Degree of perspective consistency, clarity, and coherence which is attained by an actor depends upon his purposes and interests at hand (Schutz, 1971:120-134). Points of view on those situations or issues which are important to us tend to be more explicitly clarified for ourselves, whereas for those situations or issues which are not immediately relevant, our perspectives may be vague and even inconsistent. In comparing the perspectives of the expert, the well-informed citizen, and the man on the street, Schutz argues that the expert's viewpoint is "based upon warranted assertions; his judgments are not mere guesswork or loose suppositions" in comparison to the perspective on the same issue held by the man on the street (1971: 122). Similarly, a program developer's position on man may be that of an expert, having been explicitly and consistently established in policy statements, in educational philosophy, or in psychological rationale, whereas a particular teacher who is utilizing the program may have a position on man equivalent to the well-informed citizen who knows where to go to get expert knowledge if he should so desire. A social studies student's perspective on man sufficient for his interests and purposes may be vague and inconsistent in comparison with that of a program developer or a teacher. Perspective consistency, therefore, depends upon the level of clarity deemed suitable for fulfilling an actor's purpose at hand. Terms and other schemes used for interpreting man within a social studies program derive their consistency in meaning with one another through the unifying perspective framework in which they are located. When this framework shifts, the meaning of terms also changes generally. Consequently, unless a program developer is reflective during the act of program development and attempts to bring consistency into his perspective, a program may be based upon incompatible assumptions, interests inconsistent with approaches, and so on. Especially if a number of program developers are jointly developing the same program, or if one developer is developing the same program over an extended period of time, it is possible for a program perspective to contain contradictory aspects.

In summary, a viewpoint is held rationally to the degree that it has been chosen from among clarified alternatives as being appropriate for the task and the phenomenon at hand, and to the degree that it is consistent within itself. Another claim which needs justification in social studies relates to the superiority of one perspective over another.

C. HIERARCHY CLAIMS

Within social studies programs there may be a hierarchical view which assumes superiority of one perspective over another. Depending upon what is implied by the use of hierarchical terms, such a view may or may not be justified. A distinction can be made between (1) levels of intrinsic superiority and (2) levels related to purpose.

Levels of Intrinsic Superiority

Slogans such as "consciousness raising" may be misinterpreted by students as an ontological hierarchy in which some groups have a "higher" or "lower" consciousness on an innate or an intrinsic basis (Berger, 1976:125). Students may place groups and life-styles on a stratified scale which represents a prescribed order or "the nature of things," as well as utilize values of elitism and paternalism in studying the ideas of others. Consciousness is selectively attentive in one way or another to an object, and different actors are conscious of different things and in different ways; hence consciousness itself is not intrinsically higher or lower, but only directed differently (Kockelmans, 1967:137-146). If students understand a hierarchical view of consciousness in an epistemological sense, then there is phenomenological support. As Schutz shows, there are levels of information on specific topics, every awareness is not equally relevant for all purposes, and beliefs are not equally valid (1971:91-158). Perspectives do not give equal access to the social world, nor are they equally appropriate for all purposes. Groups may be superior in the particular views they hold on specific topics and for certain purposes, whereas other groups hold superior outlooks on other things.

Levels Related to Purpose

If claims to superiority are related to specific purposes at hand, then there is phenomenological support. Different levels of perspectives on man can be adopted in social studies; not only can man be observed and interpreted from various points of view, but within each viewpoint there are various levels at which the perspective schemes of reference can be held and utilized. In terms of one's specific purposes, there are levels of perspective clarity and vagueness, abstractness and concreteness, strangeness and familiarity, intimacy and anonymity, implicitness and explicitness, consistency and usefulness, generality and specificity, emphasis and reflectivity, as well as larger or smaller horizons defined by background experiences and content (Schutz, 1971:283-284; Berger, 1976). For example, actors engaged in their life-world activities need a particular level of perspective clarity for their purposes at hand (e.g., one need only know generally that to achieve certain typical ends, under typical conditions, certain typical means and stocks of knowledge related to man are needed). For some purposes it is not necessary to have a consistent conception of man beyond loosely held premises, broad typifications, vague conjectures, rules of thumb and recipes, unquestioned beliefs and analogies, which can be used as schemes of interpretation. On the other hand, social studies students and teachers contemplating the activities of actors in the life-world presumably may need a greater degree of perspective clarity suitable for their task of interpreting man. Further, the schemes of reference applied to man can be utilized at varying levels of intimacy and anonymity: man may be viewed as a fellow-man, as a "thou" in Buber's sense (1970), or at varying levels of anonymity representing typical functions and typical relations within typical social situations. A case study of a particular family in its time and place, and in terms of its plans and hopes is quite a different level than the anonymous types which may be used by some social studies programs as schemes of interpretation (e.g., Afro-Asian man, Indian, lower class, fundamentalist, salesgirl). Also, there are levels of understanding group realities: the "insider" (inhabitant) of a group knows that reality better than an "outsider" (observer or expert) can hope to (Maruyama, 1968a, 1969b, 1970, 1973c, 1974a; Berger, 1976:128).

Each of these levels of perspective is itself an aspect of one's hermeneutic suitable for purposes at hand for interpreting man. With change of a purpose, one can increasingly transform his world to a less random and a more predictable one, one can interpret the activities of fellowmen less in terms of general typical activities for typical ends under typical situations and more in terms of better clarified types, and one can reflect upon what was formerly taken-for-granted.

The important thing, though, is that any of these levels at which one may hold a perspective on man depends upon the interest one holds: depending upon what the plan or purpose is, a particular level is deemed relevant. Schutz gives the example of the different levels of perspectives toward the same city held by three persons: the man brought up in the town and who considers it his home, the stranger who comes looking for work, and the cartographer who is interested in mapping it (1971:65-69). The same object has different appearances to them because the city is an object of different interests (plans): the native is interested in the city in so far as it is his home, the foreigner in so far as it is a place to fulfill his specific purposes, and the cartographer in so far as it is an object to draw typically. Because of his chosen project, each subject interprets the city in terms of himself and through different levels of strangeness, familiarity, vagueness and clarity, and so on: in short, though faced with the same city, all three individuals interpret and utilize it from different levels of perspectives. With a shift from one level to another, schemes of reference and meanings are shifted:

> But the simple fact that new problems and aspects of facts emerge with the shift in the point of view, while others that were formerly in the center of our question disappear, is sufficient to initiate a thorough modification of the meaning of all the terms correctly used at the former level. . . . Each of our concepts has its fringes surrounding a nucleus of its unmodified meaning. . . . Relation to our topic or interest is constantly felt in the fringe of our concepts. Each word in a sentence is felt not only as a word, but as having a meaning. The meaning of a word thus taken dynamically in a sentence may be quite different from its meaning if taken statically or without context. . . . The connection in which a concept of a term is used and its relation to the topic of interest (and this

> topic of interest is in our case the problem) create specific modifications, of the fringes surrounding the nucleus, or even of the nucleus itself (Schutz, 1971:67-68).

Similarly, levels of perspectives on man in social studies depend upon the purpose at hand, and must be judged as adequate in terms of the requirements of that interest. As the level shifts, so does the perspective appearance of man.

In summary, if perspective superiority is assumed to be relative to purposes at hand rather than to intrinsic factors, then such claims can be justified in social studies. Further, claims concerning the objectivity of a view on man also need to be clarified and justified in social studies.

D. OBJECTIVITY CLAIMS

> As a scientist—not as a man among other men, which he is too—he is not party in social interrelationship. He does not participate in the living stream of mutual testing of the in-order-to motives of his own acts by the reactions of others, and vice versa. Strictly speaking, as a pure observer of the social world, the social scientist does not act. . . . To become a social scientist the observer must make up his mind to step out of the social world, to drop any practical interest in it, and to restrict his in-order-to motives to the honest description and explanation of the social world which he observes (Schutz, 1971:16-17).

A question can be raised concerning what is objectivity in social studies, especially if perspectives are essentially subject-object relations and if there are various possible perspectives which may be brought to focus on man and on any social issue. What does it mean phenomenologically when actors claim objectivity for their views on man?

Objectivity can be of different kinds and degrees because it is essentially a human norm and because it always remains a meaning complex imposed upon a situation or a viewpoint.[8] What may be considered objective in the life-world may not be considered objective in the multiple realities defined by science, religion, or social studies (Strasser, 1963:16,85,147). Therefore, objectivity must be thought of as different levels of observation and interpretation suited for different purposes (Schutz, 1971:64-88; Strasser, 1963: 65-242). Everyday observation and interpretation of the social world and of man is objective for actors' purposes at hand because language allows them to name and objectify things. Words ratify the reality of an object because actors understand one another when referring to an object with a particular sign system. Words give an object consistency over time, make it shareable in different times and places, and put it above the direct experience level and out of its situational context. The level of objectivity in observation and interpretation sufficient for life-world activities is provided by everyday language through which an object is affirmed and shared by actors in dialogue.

However, the level of observation and interpretation suitable for social studies is generally different from that of the life-world because the observations and the interpretations are of the life-world itself. Objectivity is thus a shifted orientation (Schutz, 1970a:275-278). A social studies actor becomes a "disinterested onlooker" only in the sense that he "intentionally refrains from participating in the network of plans, means-and-ends relations, motives and chances, hopes and fears, which the actor within the social world uses for interpreting his experiences of it" (Schutz, 1971:92). To be objective in observing and interpreting the social world is to "step back," as it were, from those immediate interests and unquestioned schemes used in the life-world,in order to reflect upon how actors interpret and structure that world in their daily activities. In so doing, one no longer acts as with fellow-actors in a taken-for-granted manner, no longer organizes that world around his former relevances, no longer gives meaning to objects in terms of his everyday actions, and no longer participates in the social world as an actor but as an observer. He substitutes his pragmatic interests and unclarified stocks of knowledge for theoretic interests and schemes. Understanding the social world in terms of realizing his daily interests and fulfilling his recipe knowledge is deliberately substituted for understanding the social world in terms of theoretic interests and conceptual schemes (e.g., interests in explaining, predicting, generalizing, and describing in relation to larger discipline perspectives, principles, theories, and models). Models of selected aspects of the social world are constructed which have little pragmatic value in everyday acting because they are removed from the arena of common-sense life. Such reconstructions in conceptual terms are open to criticism by those actors who share the same interest and schemes for observation and interpretation.

The point is that an object is always related to a subject, and hence to speak of subjectivity and objectivity is to refer to different kinds of subject-object relatedness. A greater degree of dependence of object upon the subject's personal wishes, interests, and projects (e.g., daily-life activities, illusion, fantasy, and dream) is subjectivity; a lesser degree of dependence of object upon the subject's own individual wishes (e.g., descriptions of man and of his world in social studies programs) is objectivity. The character of this latter relationship is not dependent upon the subject's 'merely personal' wishes as is the case in apprehending objects of fantasy. Every object is related to a subject, although the character of this relatedness differs. Emphasis cannot be placed just upon the subject or upon the object because this breaks the essential subject-object relation that consciousness constitutes. To say that subject and object are mutually interdependent as far as man is concerned is not to imply relativism or solipsism, for man's world is not created through his outlook, nor is his outlook a replica of the world. All knowing finds its starting point in this relationship, not in the subject or the object alone, because an object cannot be known and described independent of the subject.

Therefore, when actors claim objectivity for their views of man they may be referring to a level of objectivity above that demanded by actors in the common-sense world. One can define from phenomenology some minimum conditions and validation criteria for establishing in part the objectivity of observations and interpretations of man in social studies: (1) explicit intentionality, (2) multiperspectivism, and (3) intersubjectivity. These conditions may be applicable to justifying claims made by an actor concerning the objectivity of a perspective on man.

Explicit Intentionality

> . . . the search for and discovery of knowledge is socially organized. Philosophically, this has often constituted a dilemma. Sociologically, it is not a dilemma as an inescapable fact of inquiry. The implication is this: if objective knowledge is taken to mean knowledge of a reality independent of language, or presuppositionless knowledge, or knowledge of the world which is independent of the observer's procedures for finding and producing the knowledge, then there is no such thing as objective knowledge (Blum, 1971:128).

Objectivism is a belief that method can be applied and knowledge defined without consideration for human factors such as guiding interests and other biases. Phenomenologists reject this belief as an illusion which is based on an assumption of a fixed and lawlike order which may be discovered somehow apart from a perspective and the limitations of human instrumentality. Contrary to the subject-object dichotomy which objectivism implies, phenomenologists recognize the importance of understanding the subject-object relation and of making explicit the interdependence between human thought and context. No subject can know the world without making an effort and taking an interest, for only by bringing a particular interest and perspective to an issue can certain aspects of that issue be noticed and defined: "the object emerges for the subject when, in the course of experience, the interest of the subject is focussed upon that particular aspect of the world" (Wirth, 1936:xvii). Humans are not impartial when apprehending an issue. They are inevitably biased by the preferences, preconceived values, background experiences, judgments, career interests and advancements, and norms of inquiry which together influence the choice of problems to study and the way in which the facts themselves are perceived (Wirth, 1936:xv; Kaplan, 1964:381; Horton, 1970a; Nash, 1970:468; Blum, 1971:131; Kaplan, 1971). Objectivity, therefore, is obviously not to be construed as holding a neutral position or as having no prejudices in the presence of facts, for values are always a part of practice, thinking is always situationally bounded, and perception is based on presuppositions and social backgrounds. As such, Polanyi argues that "into every act of knowing there enters a tacit and passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this coefficient is not mere imperfection, but a necessary component of all knowledge" (1958:312). It is therefore a false ideal to attempt to reduce all knowledge to impersonal terms, for in all knowing there is commitment necessary on the part of the knower and there is his tacit ("personal") knowledge of the world. Any implied claim to perspective objectivity on a basis of theoretic or methodological detachment from a time, place, and interest is unacceptable from a phenomenological point of view.

Objectivity in a phenomenological sense does not imply that a non-perspective view is possible or even desirable in apprehending man and the social world, but rather that those perspectives and underlying factors which direct any view be made explicit. Since objectivity is enhanced by clarifying the essential involvement of the subject, a critical self-clarification in which one's evaluations and conceptions are placed out in the open so that they are visible to himself and to others is necessary in social studies (Mannheim, 1936:47). Man holds generally his views at an unreflective level within the life-world. For most purposes at hand he need only act in a taken-for-granted manner, accepting and manipulating that which appears to him at the level of his immediate plans. However, claims to objectivity in social studies are suspect if the schemes of reference of a perspective are left taken-for-granted and implicit (Chapter II). Objectivity is enhanced to the degree that the Here, Now, and Thus from which intentionality is directed to man are made explicit.

Multiperspectivism

> It is not a source of error that in the visual picture of an object in space we can, in the nature of the case, get only a perspectivistic view. The problem is not how we might arrive at a non-perspectivistic picture but how, by juxtaposing the various points of view, each perspective can be recognized as such and thereby a new level of objectivity attained. Thus we come to the point where the false ideal of detached, impersonal point of view must be replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point of view which is within the limits of a human perspective, constantly striving to enlarge itself (Mannheim, 1936:296-297).

Objectivity is enhanced by describing the social world and man through various perspectives (Chapter IV, Part III). Multiperspectivism helps actors to transcend their individual perspectives, to foster a critical self-awareness in interpretation, to utilize many standpoints for looking at the object's many sides, and to uncover the richness of meaning and variety of social facts.[9] This view of objectivity recognizes the partialness of any one perspective and hence the necessity for many outlooks in attaining a more comprehensive view of things. Multiperspectivism frees the observer from uncritical dogmatism and enables him to develop broader vantage points on man and the social world (Kaufmann, 1960:4). These various views help to correct and clarify one another, as was discussed in Chapter I in terms of dialectics (Part IV). Even though objectivity aims at transcending individual viewpoints, the social world always remains perspectivistic in relation to the observer. The more points of view obtained, therefore, the greater the degree of objectivity.

Intersubjectivity

Subjectivity tends to include that which is merely personal in the sense that it is idiosyncratic, subject to one's own preferences, and therefore varying from person to person and from situation to situation (Spiegelberg, 1966:137). To claim objectivity for a view is to say that it is not subject to mere personal wishes and variation, but rather that it is intersubjective. Even though objective interpretations are relative to someone's perspective, to someone's biography and interests, these interpretations can be corroborated by fellow-observers. Objectivity is in part intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity as a condition for objectivity has two important aspects to it.

First, intersubjectivity refers to the public character of assertions and views. Any claim to objectivity for a perspective implies either that this reality view is accepted and accredited as legitimate by some community, or that this view has been constructed in regular (i.e., standard and repeatable) ways according to some group's shared rules (referred to by them as method). Though all experience is described and interpreted from some perspective, the premise underlying this notion of intersubjectivity is that objectivity is enhanced when classification and description are in terms of consensually held schema and methods. Objectivity thus becomes a group consensus, a commitment to a particular definition of objectivity, and an open criticism according to socially constructed standards thought to be useful for correcting individual bias and subjectivity. A difficulty with this view of intersubjectivity, however, is that as a group history changes, so may the consensus and standards. Horton argues that to locate objectivity in the standards of the community represents a

> . . . confusing consensus with objectivity; there is also collective as well as individual bias. For example, our functional models and our methods of testability may reflect our agreement on a way and method of looking at reality, and not reality itself (1970a:599).

Appealing to a consensual basis (e.g., standardized method and community acceptance) does establish in part a condition for objectivity, but does not of itself establish a basis for such consensus. Method and accreditation themselves rest upon someone's common-sense assumptions concerning their experience of the world. In other words, rules of inquiry and standards of accreditation are successful because actors involved share a common life-world; this generally unanalyzed and taken-for-granted set of beliefs about the world is the silent background against which investigation and cooperation can occur. Objectivity is rooted finally in common sense knowledge of the life-world which is there at all times (Polanyi, 1958, 1966; Blum, 1971).

Second, a basis for objectivity and for consensus rests ultimately upon actors' experience that the life-world is a given and shared world, that it cannot be wished away or created arbitrarily, that it is not a private world inaccessible to other actors (Berger and Luckman, 1967:1; Schutz, 1967:456). That the world is there for all (i.e., that it is independent of the actor and that it presents itself to him) provides a basis for sharing assertions concerning it and for checking consensually those assertions against that common world. Despite all kinds of historical, social, cultural differences among actors, despite secondary differences in the way they experience the world, and despite the fact that perspectives from which they apprehend objects differ in varying degree, yet actors understand one another when they speak of experiencing time, space, body, death, sexuality, ideas, objects, and other fundamental aspects of the life-world (Strasser, 1963:268). Underlying all experiences, perspectives, knowledge, and differences among these, is the common world. It is given to all intersubjectively, and their sharing of it is presupposed in all they do. Though projects may be dependent upon a subject, the life-world in which that project must be realized is not. Consequently, phenomenologists reject a solipsistic philosophy in which an individual creates his own reality and lives in a personal and private world unique to himself, in which phenomena are entirely individualistic, in which the object is dependent upon a subject who defines the world as he wishes, and in which methodology is based on introspection. The life-world provides a basis for intersubjectivity, which in turn is a basis for consensus and for justifying a claim to objectivity. There is a common basis from which to work.

Thus, to say that objectivity refers to intersubjectivity means that there is mutual agreement among individuals that the outlook agrees with the object of intention. There is agreement of an individual's thought with other individuals' thoughts concerning man and the social world (Strasser, 1963:16). Objectivity of the world is not derived from intersubjectivity simply because the world is presupposed for intersubjectivity; that is, language, communication, and agreement among actors presupposes a world that is there (Schutz, 1975:86).

In summary, claims made in social studies concerning the objectivity of views of man can be justified in terms of conditions which define objectivity. Evidence for objectivity of views can be argued if they reflect intersubjectivity, explicit intentionality, and multiperspectivism.

SUMMARY

By making intersubjective experience and relevance a basis of reality and a starting point for describing man and the social world, phenomenologists leave actors within an appraisively oriented social studies with certain difficulties, not the least of which concerns how to choose among multiple perspectives on man which are possible. Naturally, for teachers and for students any perspective finds its utility in the elucidation of otherwise chaotic events in the natural or social world because an outlook allows them to order a range of phenomena in a consistent and unitary manner (Laszlo, 1972:15). The use of various outlooks helps them to notice and account for different aspects of phenomena; however, this perspectivism is not a view that allows them to hold all orientations as being of equal validity (i.e., backed up by reasons concerning their worth, usefulness, appropriateness, or accuracy) for describing man and the social world, because no one point of view is exclusively or universally valid for all purposes at hand and for all phenomena. Nor are perspectives to be supported in social studies necessarily because they represent the status quo or are linked with a ruling ideology. If the premise is to be accepted that all perspectives on man within social studies are not of equal validity, and if it is impossible to be without some framework in which the events and things of existence are made meaningful, then teachers, students, and program developers are faced with questions concerning how to justify any choice of perspective on man. Merely to describe perspectives on man and to account for why men hold them leaves anyone in social studies with some immensely practical questions: What guides or criteria can be relied upon in choosing a perspective? Though teachers and students may be aware that there are different outlooks possible and that some of these viewpoints are not held by all social groups to be of equal value, how are they to judge one position with another? How is one view to be justified as better than another? Against what criteria can the claims made by actors for their points of view be validated? Here then is the crux: actors need criteria against which perspectives on man in social studies can be validated for it is their own viewpoints which are at stake in asking such questions.

In this chapter validation was defined as the giving of reasons, evidence, or criteria for justifying a particular perspective.

Selected and limited criteria were suggested briefly whereby truth, rationality, hierarchy, and objectivity claims actors may make for their views on man and the social world could be justified in part. To be compatible with phenomenology, such criteria must be consistent with the experience of men in the life-world. Much more research would appear to be needed in terms of perspective validation because this is an important and necessary concern of appraisively oriented social studies actors.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1] Unless experience as a subject-object relation is stressed as a basis for knowing (and hence for justifying), the world can be treated by the actor as either dependent upon man for its form or else as that which can be known in itself apart from the observer. Though the observer is always in a subject-object relation to the world, the world is not dependent upon consciousness for its existence as this or that; the world is there to be acted upon by consciousness, and to be made humanly meaningful through various orderings and interpretings. He encounters its time and space continuum no matter how he explains them; he cannot go against its form and structures without suffering the consequences; he perceives through various categories and from different times, places, and interests a world that has form apart from man's ordering and interpreting activities. On the other hand, a presupposed separation of man from his world could lead program developers to order and interpret the world on the basis of a naive objectivism and ethical neutrality, and to an epistemology which detaches the knowing subject from that which is known and from his life-world context (Esland, 1971a:71).

Phenomenologists would agree only in part with Descartes' method. They agree that the presuppositions brought by an individual to the subject-object relation need to be clarified; however, they disagree with making the individual's reason (consciousness) the first principle of knowing. By distrusting his experience and observations of the external world, Descartes severed the subject-object relation as his epistemological starting point:

> . . . it is sometimes requisite in common life to follow opinions which one knows to be most uncertain, exactly as though they were indisputable. . . . But because in this case I wished to give myself entirely to the search after Truth, I thought that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain. Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be. . . . I resolved to assume that everything that entered into my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth 'I think, therefore I am' was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I am seeking (1955:28-29).

By starting with consciousness ("I think") rather than with intentionality ("I think this or that"), Descartes made his "clear and distinct ideas" rather than correspondence of idea to an object in an indivisible subject-object relation a criterion for validation:

> . . . I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true—remembering, however, that there is some difficulty in ascertaining which are those that we distinctly conceive (1955:30).

Severing subject from object means that consciousness becomes its own reference point without external checks, that man has no controls on relativism and subjectivity, that he is unable to distinguish "madness" from "non-madness" and "dreams" from "non-dreams," and even that he tends to lose confidence in knowing the world as it is given to him. Descartes set forth his loss of criteria for checking perception and propositions:

> How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place . . . whilst in reality I was lying . . . in bed! At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper. . . . But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream (1955:90-91).

[2] Schutz's analysis of the foundations, construction, and structures of the life-world in his sociology (1944:533-551; 1970a: 72-85; 1971:9,20-63; 1972; 1975:116-132) is applied variously by Berger and Luckmann (1967:19-46), Filmer, et al. (1972), and Holzner (1972). C.f., James (1904:293), Combs and Snygg (1959), Merleau-Ponty (1962), Strasser (1963:65-97), Natanson (1964), Wild (1964), Gurwitsch (1966), Solomon (1972:348-386), Geertz (1973), van Manen (1973:194-195). Ethnomethodologists utilize Schutz's sociology of the life-world: Cicourel (1964), Garfinkel (1962, 1967), Douglas (1970), Filmer, et al. (1972), Turner (1974).

[3] Actors may take-for-granted the underlying framework which guides their experience in any subject-object relation, and may not be able to describe their orientations because these are to varying degrees more implicit than explicit to them. Polanyi's distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is applicable for discussing this characteristic of some subject-object relations; the basis upon which a subject relates himself to an object may be tacit (1958, 1964, 1966). What specifically within the experience and outlook of a program developer may be held tacitly?

First, there is an implicit "knowing why" dimension of experience and perspectives. Program developers may not be able to describe why they hold their particular views on man, to justify these in terms of what their assumptions and interests are, to present reasons as to why they hold them, or even realize perhaps that they do have a perspective starting point. The grounds upon which a particular view of man and of the social world is accepted and justified by educators remain for the most part implicit; the explicit rules of program development operate because those who adhere to and use those rules share a tacit set of beliefs (ontological, epistemological, or whatever) which legitimize their explicit work and keep program development activities unproblematic for them. If asked why they hold to a particular view and not to another, developers may not be able to formulate a clear answer apart from a shrug of shoulders and an expression of their position in such forms as "That is the way I feel is best," "It makes sense to me," or "How else can programs be developed?" To paraphrase Polanyi, a program developer's account of the nature and justification of programs includes his biography and unformulated personal knowledge:

> But the ultimate justification of my scientific (or educational) convictions lies always in myself. At some point I can only answer, 'For I believe so' (1964:9).

In a discussion between two program developers holding differing perspectives on man, each individual may bring up accounts of man which appear to them to refute the other's thought; yet each perspective may remain stable because its implicit grounding in the individual's total experience extends further than explicit articulations pro or con. Since the point of view is upheld in the actor's entire experience of what the social world and man are, he may not be able to make explicit why he holds one perspective and not another.

Second, there may be a tacit "knowing what" dimension of experience and perspectives. Within programs every interpretation of man and the social world is based upon some conception of the general nature of things presupposed by program developers. Unless these taken-for-granted premises are questioned, they remain unformulated even though the influence of these premises on social studies program development is great: they indicate to developers the kind of questions to ask, the concepts and relationships to apply, the display materials to select, and the outcomes to expect within programs (e.g., Kuhn, 1972a:11). Program developers may be able to articulate and formalize certain stocks of knowledge in the maps they draw, the formulae they apply, and the readings they include in programs; these explicit schemes of reference can be critically reflected upon and consciously changed by teachers. However, underlying such explicit knowledge lies a non-articulated world-picture composed of unformulated interests, presuppositions, and approaches upon which a view on man in programs rests. This aspect of a perspective is held for the most part a-critically on the level of unformulated or "personal knowledge" (Polanyi, 1959:12). That which is expressed about an object, as well as any experience related to it, is grounded in the tacit "knowing what" dimension of the subject's perspective. The subject-object relation is influenced by the unquestioned, largely because they are tacit, interests, presuppositions, and approaches upon which a view of man rests.

Third, there is often a tacit "knowing how" dimension to experience and perspectives. An individual interprets, acts, orders, and discusses within the parameters of his perspective without necessarily knowing explicitly how he does so. For example, in the "grasping of disjointed parts into a comprehensive whole," as in a gestalt experience, a scientific discovery, the seeing of new relationships, a writing of a poem, or even in the making of a program, an actor tends to see things in one way rather than another without knowing the logic, rules, or implied ontology by which he did so, simply because the framework of his outlook is not explicit to him (Polanyi, 1959:25,12; 1964:14-15). Just as a geologist through former experience can identify mineral physiognomies which are not fully describable through language or pictures, or as a skier through practice can traverse a slope without being able to delineate explicitly the rules and steps of so doing, so a program developer can interpret social situations on the basis of a belief concerning man which has been acquired implicitly from various sources. Program developers are not always able, nor is it necessary for them to be able, to systematically conceptualize the underlying perspective on man in order to successfully practice program development and social studies within it (e.g., Kuhn, 1970:47). They may be able to generate hunches or hypotheses, to select social events as significant over other events, to classify social facts together, to define and agree upon social problems and solutions for inclusion within programs, and so on, without being aware of the basis which allowed these to be selected, defined, classified, and generated in the first place (Polanyi, 1959:17). The particular perspective on man developed through prior experience allows them to see consistently the social world in a certain way and to practice in a non-problematic fashion the application of reality definitions within program development. This implicit viewpoint is in part demonstrated by their being able to see things as being like something else, without recourse to or being specified in terms of explicit images of man, and thereby to get on with the job (c.f., Polanyi, 1964:14-15; Kuhn, 1970:47).

The giving of reasons for a perspective, therefore, is sometimes difficult because the why, what, and how of an outlook may be tacit. Actors may agree with the premise that a view of man underlies their activities without being able, or even attempting to produce, an identification or rationalization of that viewpoint (c.f., Kuhn, 1970:44). They do not need to know what constitutes the point of view in order to function within it. From their view of man, a set of rules and pragmatic applications are abstracted for guiding social studies activity. And as long as this underlying basis does not become problematic in some way, actors may not even be aware that they do hold a perspective.

[4] For discussions of the character of truth, see for example: Mannheim (1936), Wirth (1936:xviii), Kaufman (1960), Kaplan (1964), Belth (1965), Laing (1965:36-38), Berger (1967:179-185), De Gré (1970), Lieberman (1970), Popper (1970), Wolff (1970), Kaplan (1971), Guinness (1973:331-349). In one sense, a perspective is phenomenologically true inasmuch as it is experienced by someone (i.e., it is a phenomenon which can be described). A phenomenologist could restrict himself to describing the phenomenon of viewpoint, to the fact that there are various perspectives on man possible, as distinguished from making any judgments about particular points of view in terms of the question as to whether such views are true or false. This view of phenomenological truth aims at nothing more than describing the reality of perspective in general rather than validating the specific claims of those points of view.

[5] Relativism (i.e., a belief that all views are of equal worth because every individual lives within his own perspectives) leads to skepticism concerning the very possibility of objectivity, shared knowledge, and standards of truth. No act of consciousness is completely arbitrary, for it is always consciousness-of-something and is always tied to some object of intention (Byrne and Maziarz, 1969:113). Rather than being relativistic, perspectives are relational to a time, place, and purpose; they are tied to a Here, Now, and Thus which can be examined and criticized. Man is finite (i.e., socio-historically located and geographically circumscribed) and his views are partial rather than universal and absolute. He cannot know something in its entirety, but only in relation to himself (i.e., to his Here, Now, and Thus). This does not imply arbitrary relativism of thought and perspective, but rather a relationism between man and his context at all times. The premise of relationism is illustrated by Guinness:

> Imagine that I am on the phone, speaking simultaneously to someone in the Sahara and someone in the Arctic. If my friend in the Sahara were to ask me, "What's the weather like in Switzerland?" and I replied, "The weather is warm," my statement would not be absolutely true. In relation to the Arctic it would be true, but in relation to the Sahara it would be false. In short, the statement would be only relatively true; it would need qualification. On a far more sophisticated level because finite man starts from his own point in history and is limited by the understanding of his own mind and the scope of discovery of his own generation and tradition, any knowledge he gains of the universe beyond him can be only relatively true because he cannot relate his statement of truth to all the factors which he has not yet discovered. All finite human knowledge is only a slice of the larger cake of discoverable truth. Such a philosophic quest is like the old story of blind men describing an elephant after feeling its various parts. Reliability is severely limited by relativity. Absolute truth is the monopoly of infinite knowledge (1973:336).

Perspectives can be accounted for in terms of the actor's concrete situation—whether social, historical, or existential—because intentionality is always located. Without a universal perspective man is left with a multitude of partial viewpoints, each of which is important because it influences what one sees, not necessarily what there is to be seen. Standing in relation to a time, place, and purpose, perspectives are partial rather than comprehensive in their viewpoint. That the world appears to man only in a time and place bound perspective, allowing man to see only a sector or aspect of the whole from any particular Here, Now, and Thus, is not to be construed as relativistic, but as perspectivistic (Schutz, 1975:138).

[6] This postulate of correspondence between one's stock of knowledge about man and one's experience of man in the everyday life-world is necessary because knowledge itself is grounded in experience (Schutz, 1970a:271-273). Knowledge of man in social studies thinking involves constructs and organizations of these typifications in various ways, yet these concepts are abstractions from, and originate in, common-sense experience of the social world. Therefore, there need to be checks on the correspondence of the propositions used in social studies with the social world itself, to see if they are honest descriptions of that which is experienced by everyone. Views cannot be arbitrary, but are accountable to that which they relate, otherwise they are fictitious constructions having little reference to one's daily experience. The knowledge categories (observations and propositions) which are imposed by consciousness upon the world can be judged by the way they correspond to the world in which we have to live and that we experience.

This postulate of correspondence presupposes the sufficiency of human reason to establish the credibility of any proposition. Reason refers to

> . . . the capability of the human mind to proceed rationally in the continuity of categories, to judge a proposition by the way it corresponds to the world in which the proposer has to live independent of his propositions; it is simply the capability of the human mind to establish relationships of correspondence between individual experiences or propositions much in the same way a child strives and struggles to classify its environment in continuous categories and will from experiences in the past evaluate the present and anticipate the future. The necessity of reason relates to that phenomenon of the human mind that constantly strives . . . to establish a grid of propositions that mutually support each other. It is the basis of such notions as truth, right and wrong, antithesis, and the very nature of language itself, in that it refers to an objectively existing reality that can be perceived and accurately described in language because that reality does not play tricks but is continuous (Middleman, 1974:68-69).

If one does not assume reason, or if one does not trust reason sufficiently to establish correspondence between proposition and object of intention, then this section on correspondence is irrelevant for justifying perspective reality claims.

[7] This discussion of perspective consistency is an application primarily of Cohen's non-phenomenological (systems theory) principle of consistency (1964:62-80). All stimuli are perceived by the individual as being related to the total system structure (the configuration or components or the gestalt at any moment) of his perspective. If this were not so, the individual's phenomenological field would have no stability or predictability for him (Combs and Snygg, 1959; c.f., Schutz, 1967:468-469). That actors experience their own outlooks as consistent internally for purposes at hand is demonstrated by ethnomethodological studies in which social reality is disrupted purposefully in order to describe how actors attempt to harmonize novelty and inconsistencies. When some aspect of their experience is inconsistent with what they have come to expect, they may become disoriented temporarily before attempting to make reality familiar by shifting the perspective framework through which they were interpreting the situation which had come to be problematic.

[8] For discussions of objectivity, see for example: Mannheim (1936), Kaplan (1964), Laing (1967:24-25), Morgan (1970), Schutz (1967:31-37; 1970a:316-323; 1971; 1975), Filmer, et al. (1972), Hesse (1973), Schatzman and Strauss (1973). The distinction between subjective meaning and objective meaning applied to the study of social phenomena is to a certain extent confusing. Subjective meaning refers to the meaning which an act or a situation has to the actor himself; objective meaning refers to the meaning which the act or situation has to observers who are not involved directly in the act or situation as is the actor (Schutz, 1971:275). Objectivity may be a characteristic of the observer's observation and interpretation of an actor's subjective meaning and acts.

[9] Phenomenologists are not reductionist in the sense that they seek for simplicity by making social facts essentially equivalent to natural facts (Spiegelberg, 1965b:656). They do not assume that the life-world is studied more objectively through the use of models, methods, formulae, classifications, and measurements which tend to neglect the variety and richness of human meaning that make social facts different from natural facts (Schutz, 1967:463). Abstracted systems, universalistic explanations, quantifiable properties, mechanistic models for predictive purposes, and standardized schema tend to be objective primarily because a community is willing to define and maintain them as such. Concern with clear-cut and abstractable variables, standardized methods and routine classificational systems, sharply drawn boundaries, and a dependency upon one perspective tends to reduce and to cover over the messy and the unique which characterize human meaning making in the social world (Morgan, 1970:83). By reducing the social world through a uniperspective, the actor may encounter only that which tends to be defined within his one outlook rather than encountering the diversity that is there through many perspectives.

Especially when it comes to the study in social studies of another person, objectivity is not to be found in reducing him to a 'case' or 'object,' but to apprehending him as a unique being-in-the-world and attempting to understand him from his own context and perspectives as much as is possible, as well as through other viewpoints. Laing warns that, "If it is held that to be unbiased one should be 'objective' in the sense of depersonalizing the person who is the 'object' of our study, any temptation to do this under the impression that one is thereby being scientific must be rigorously resisted" (1965:25). In seeing the other as person rather than as object, one does not distort the other's own meanings and outlooks either through reductionist models or through one's own feelings, but in a variety of methods that do greater justice to understanding the other person from many different angles of vision.

Chapter VI

SUMMARY, GENERALIZATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCERNS

We obtain different profiles of an object when we see it at varying distances, angles, and elevations, when we see it under changing lighting effects, contextual conditions, and time periods, and when we see it through our selected interests, feelings, and experiences. The view of an object remains a product of the perspective which we have adopted. In a metaphorical sense, if we wore the same blue spectacles, all observations might lead to a conception of a blue world (Willer, 1971:7). In a similar manner, the view of man gained from the perspective of a social studies program affects our observation, interpretation, and consequent action upon the social world. When using a program, therefore, we could ask a question concerning the point of view from which man and the social world are pictured.

Perspective is an elusive phenomenon to identify and observe, as well as a large topic to discuss. The complexity of perspective pluralism is recognized, and its relevance to Canadian education argued, but it does not appear to be clarified conceptually (e.g., Kitchen, 1967). Although the notion is referred to variously by writers, there is an apparent lack of clarity in educational literature concerning what it means to have a point of view, how viewpoints can be identified and validated, and how they are related to social studies programs. This lends support to van Manen's recommendation that the phenomenon of orientation be studied more extensively because its implications "in educational research and specifically in the study of instructional phenomena have rarely been discussed" (1973: 16). What appears to be needed are various clarifications of perspective from different theoretical contexts.[1] Phenomenology is one such context from which to describe what it means to have an outlook on man in social studies programs.

The present study has been one possible account of perspective. This final chapter contains a summary (Part I) followed by some generalizations (Part II), recommendations (Part III), and concerns (Part IV) relating to the phenomenon of a viewpoint and its application to social studies activities.

PART I. SUMMARY

The intent of the study was to clarify conceptually the phenomenon of perspective on man and its relation to social studies programs from a theoretical and methodological context of phenomenology. There is evidence from the literature that individuals and groups interpret man and the social world according to different perspectives. Though the phenomenon of viewpoint is referred to variously by authors and is experienced by teachers and students, it is difficult to find social studies writers who account for perspective. Instead, its implications (possibilities and limitations) seem to be taken-for-granted for social studies program development and instruction, even though educators encounter a plurality of ideologies, interests, assumptions, and values cast in diverse historical, political, religious, and socio-economic frameworks related to man and the social world. Indeed, one can hardly study social "facts" without encountering perspective differences (c.f., Wirth, 1936; Berger, 1969; Kaplan, 1971:85; Lonergan, 1972:154). Because views on man and the social world are central in social studies, an account of what it means to have a point of view was deemed necessary in order to help educators and students identify, clarify, and compare outlooks in classrooms and programs.

To be compatible with phenomenological literature (and especially with the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz), the idea of perspective developed in the study was grounded in the standpoint structures which characterize consciousness. That is, consciousness is perspectivable because intentionality is directed towards an object from the standpoints of the subject's Here, Now, and Thus. With a shift in standpoints the subject places himself in a different relationship to an object, and the reality of an object appears in changed perspective to him. Essentially, then, a perspective can be defined as a subject-object relationship in which the subject selectively apprehends an object from the standpoints of Here, Now, and Thus.

The study was developed around the following four major questions. Under each of these questions a brief summary of the study is provided.

1. How can perspectives on man be identified in social studies programs? (Chapter II)

A premise of the study was that perspectives of social studies programs (as well as the outlooks of individuals and groups) could be identified. In order to identify perspectives, however, the phenomenon needed to be clarified conceptually in terms of selected structures. Ideal type construction was used as a method for specifying some of the components of a perspective. This conceptual tool may be used for identifying and comparing outlooks on man within social studies classrooms and programs.

The components or structures which the ideal type specifies were developed primarily from the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. He argued that an individual is oriented to the world by means of the coordinates of a Here, Now, and Thus. The actor's entire phenomenological field (i.e., all that he is aware of at the moment) is organized in terms of his unique context (Here), time (Now), and purposes (Thus). In the study, therefore, three structures of a perspective were specified which correspond to the Here, Now, and Thus standpoints of consciousness.

First, consciousness is perspectivable because intentionality is directed to man and the social world from the standpoint of the subject's Thus. Man is observed and interpreted through a framework of schemes such as interests, presuppositions, and approaches. Varied frameworks can be imposed upon the social world. Second, consciousness is perspectivable because intentionality is directed to man and the social world from the standpoint of the subject's Here. The schemes of reference which are applied to man are developed, transmitted, and maintained within the horizons of various contexts. Third, consciousness is perspectivable because intentionality is directed to man and the social world from the standpoint of the subject's Now. Schemes of reference are applied in ongoing acts through which man is apprehended and social reality is defined. The continuous stream of lived-time defines perspective as a process of constructing and negotiating reality. The individual selectively and actively interprets, orders, and acts upon the world from his contexts and in terms of his frameworks.

2. How are perspectives on man related to social studies programs? (Chapter III)

It was argued that perspective is a phenomenon in all acts of program development and in all programs. This relation of perspective to social studies programs was clarified in terms of Schutz's notion of an act. By examining the phenomenological structures of an act it was possible to show that the ongoing act of program development is perspective guided, whereas the completed act referred to as a program embodies a perspective. Because any approach taken by a group or by an individual to program development is biased by the outlook employed, the reality constructed by their acts reflects the underlying point of view. A program is a hermeneutic on man and his being-in-the-world because inherent within programs are the program developers' particular ways of ordering, interpreting, and acting upon man and the social world.

3. How are perspectives on man held by teachers and students managed through social studies programs? (Chapter IV)

An additional premise was that the perspectives of teachers and students are subject to management through social studies programs because programs represent the transmitting of selected outlooks. Programs also facilitate the shifting of views towards that specified by the program developers, and the developing of a perspective awareness on the part of program users. No social studies actor can avoid having his own outlooks managed in some way through secondary socialization agencies such as the school, nor can he avoid developing some degree of perspective awareness when confronted with the outlooks of programs and other actors in social studies classrooms. Although the viewpoints of programs are taken-for-granted generally, they have consequences for how teachers and students observe, interpret, and act towards man and the social world.

4. How can perspectives on man be validated in social studies programs? (Chapter V)

Identifying perspectives, relating them to programs, and explicating how they are managed are not sufficient for appraisively oriented social studies. Not all perspectives on man can be accepted as homogeneous because some views have better justification than others. This justification refers to the giving of reasons or evidence for the truth, rationality, hierarchy, and objectivity claims actors may make for their views on man and the social world. As such, some criteria were suggested for validating the perspectives which may be encountered in social studies. To be compatible with phenomenology, these criteria were developed to be consistent with the experience of men in the life-world. A perspective can be justified if it fits with the world in which men must live. For example, Castaneda's novels present a view of man which is contrary to our experience of the structures of the world which disallow our bodies to fly, to walk on cloud bridges, or to speak with coyotes (1971, 1972, 1974). This chapter on validation was designed primarily to raise the question of perspective validation, and secondarily to provide some tentative suggestions which may be studied further.

PART II. GENERALIZATIONS

Our common-sense, professional, and even our dream realities, are lived on the basis of implicitly held images of what our social world is like and of how we can achieve our projects within it. These pictures comprise a constellation of beliefs and interests of varying sorts, such as the presuppositions upon which our models of the world are based, the knowledge by which we approach and interpret it, the commitments which guide our acting upon it, and the contexts which shape those beliefs and interests. Everything which is done under the name of social studies represents in part the development, transmission, and maintenance of these reality images. Perspective, therefore, is central to all social studies activities. Certain generalizations can be made concerning the perspective predicates of such social studies activities as (A) program development and (B) implementation.

A. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The following generalizations refer to the place and influence of perspective in social studies program development and programs.

1. Man can take a perspective on himself. As Byrne and Maziarz state:

> Not only is man seen to be in the world, man sees the things in the world, including himself, is affected by what he sees, attempts to correlate the seen into an orderly pattern. In short, not only is man an object to be studied like other

> objects; man is also the subject who does the studying (1969: 94).

He can hold simultaneously several perspectives on himself, each of these outlooks depending upon his interests, knowledge , and experiences. As new situations arise, he can modify and construct still other ways of viewing himself. These viewpoints allow him to observe, interpret, and act towards himself in a multitude of ways (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973:5).

2. Program developers (as well as teachers and students) have a perspective on man and the social world as their hermeneutic for practicing social studies. They cannot come to a study of man with a "blank mind," with a presuppositionless method, or with an interest-free stance. Each participant in a metaphorical sense has his own spectacles which color what he sees and his own ear-filters which select what he hears. Inevitably his expectations and beliefs are shaped by his experience within some socio-historical location. Social studies actors have to be born somewhere and are influenced by the situations of their lives. As such, they bring to social studies their viewpoints on "the most humanly relevant question of all: What does it mean to be man, what is the lot of man in cosmos?", because as Tennessen says,

> . . . more human than any other human endeavour is the attempt at a total view of man's function—or malfunction—in the Universe, his possible place and importance in the widest conceivable cosmic scheme, in other words: the attempt to answer, or at least to articulate, whatever questions are entailed in the dying groan of ontological despair: What is it all about . . . (n.d., 271).

A view of man and his relation to the world is a fundamental philosophic question to which social studies activities give an implicit answer. It can be no other way because the subject matter is man himself.

3. Perspectives on man are partial in two senses of the word: they are neither complete, nor are they disinterested (Dale, 1972:13; Laszlo, 1973:15-16). That outlooks are partial is not a defect. Metaphorically speaking,

> You see things vacationing on a motorcycle in a way that is completely different from any other. In a car you're always in a compartment, and because you're used to it you don't realize that through that car window everything you see is just more TV. You're a passive observer and it is all moving by you boringly in a frame. On a cycle the frame is gone. You're in the scene, not just watching it anymore, and the sense of presence is overwhelming (Pirsig, 1974:4).

Program developers need not confine themselves to one perspective. Many viewpoints can be used explicitly in program development to facilitate an understanding of man's multiple facets. Each outlook on man represents a different approach, it has its own possibilities and limitations, it allows a person to ask certain questions and not other questions, to see and interpret in one way and not in another way, to perceive certain relationships, to describe differently, and to focus attention on selected aspects of phenomena. "It is completely legitimate, for instance, for the chemist's view of a chair to differ from that of a philosopher or, indeed, from that of the man who is about to sit on it . . ." (Silverman, 1970:216). The more viewpoints on man utilized in social studies program development, the greater the possibilities for understanding, and the lesser the limitations on studying, the many sides of the social world.

4. There are various possible perspectives on man which may be brought to social studies program development. These many positions

can be accounted for not just in terms of differences in the object, but in the standpoints of consciousness and in the socio-historical and lived-world experiences of program developers. Therefore, program developers choose (implicitly or explicitly) among perspectives which are available to them. Deciding what they adopt, as well as why they adopt a particular outlook, depends largely upon their interests. For example, a management view of man is relevant to an interest in efficiently processing students through particular knowledges, whereas a phenomenological view of man is relevant to an interest in understanding the experiences and views of students. Each perspective chosen has its blind spots and biases.

5. Completed programs are perspectives on man and the social world. They transmit to teachers and students a selected image of what it is to be human, of what man should be, or of what should be done concerning the social world. These perspectives can be identified, clarified, and critically reflected upon. Program developers, teachers, and students need not order, interpret, and act upon the social world in a taken-for-granted manner. The nature of perspective bias can be made explicit by examining the underlying structures of the outlooks they adopt in social studies (van Manen, 1973:9).

6. Programs tend to serve the underlying perspectives. Teachers and students may define and construct reality within the classroom based upon the program's interests, presuppositions, and approaches. Choice of perspective on man in developing a program has consequences for how program developers may view the student, and for how students may view other man. For example, by internalizing

the technological metaphors upon which the various techniques and procedural processes of the Alberta Social Studies Program tend to be based (Responding to Change, 1974), students may view themselves and treat others in these terms, and also define the social world simply as problems to which technical activity and solutions can be applied (Downey, et al., 1975:66-87). Individuals interpret, order, and act upon man and the social world in accordance with the outlooks they hold. It gives shape to their thinking about the world and guides their actions in relation to it.

B. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Certain generalizations based upon this study of perspective can be made concerning the implementation of social studies programs.

1. Groups of students, parents, teachers, and program developers may not share the same perspective on man and the social world. Differences in goals, assumptions, and experiences among groups contribute to perspectives shared primarily within the group, but only in degree with other groups. Social situations and phenomena are not interpreted in the same way by all, for the nature of understanding depends upon the perspectives of the individuals or groups involved. For example, within a particular school the interpretation which students, teachers, administrators, program developers, and evaluators have of a social studies program may differ both individually and collectively as groups. Actors understand a program's viewpoint from their own outlooks. Those who encounter a program may experience its perspective quite differently than do

program developers because of role and group-specific outlooks. Therefore, perspective variations among groups of students, teachers, parents, evaluators, and program developers may influence the acceptance and implementation of programs.

2. Implementation is an ongoing construction of reality through conversation among group members and through their interaction with programs. Perspectives become problematic for communication to the extent that they are not shared by members of groups. Strained communication may reflect more than a disagreement on the point under discussion, but a breakdown of the of-course assumption that all group inhabitants see, approach, and interpret the issue under discussion in the same manner. At such times, actors may view one another as being illogical, stubborn, or stupid, not realizing that what seems obvious and reasonable to them is not shared by other participants because the underlying framework, the way of seeing, the gestalt, is problematic. Interpretation differs because they may work from differing, or even from incommensurable, perspectives.

3. Therefore, implementation as a minimum includes the development of intersubjectivity on the interests, presuppositions, and approaches which underlie a program, for if actors understand these, then they have a basis for rejecting, accepting, or modifying a program. The reality constructing which occurs during implementation cannot be predicted with any certainty, not only because there are various (and sometimes conflicting) viewpoints brought to programs, but also because these perspectives change over time.

PART III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The study was an account of perspective in social studies: how viewpoints are identified, managed, validated, and related to programs. The value of such investigation is primarily heuristic—its power to suggest new directions for describing social studies phenomena—because it provides a basis for further application of perspective and for generating foreshadowing questions for social studies education and research. Certain recommendations for further study or application of perspective can be made.

A. CONCEPTUAL BASES

Social studies actors may need rationales which encourage and facilitate multiperspectivism within programs and classrooms. It is not enough to recommend that social studies activities accommodate multiple perspectives, that students be allowed to examine, compare, and utilize the outlooks of various Canadian groups on issues related to man and his social world, without also developing a conceptual understanding of what it means to have a perspective and why perspectivism is desirable. The issue relates to an exclusive dependence upon one viewpoint which helps actors to internalize a single set of interests, presuppositions, and approaches to man, rather than a variety of orientations suitable for different purposes. Man can be related to differently depending upon the schemes of reference one utilizes. Regretably, students may be provided with one approach for apprehending the social world, thereby simplifying its many and conflicting aspects within an all-encompassing and clear-cut outlook.

Manifold experiences are made neat and simple by reducing to one mode (usually that of a discipline or disciplines) the many possibilities which are open to actors, and then by celebrating that mode as being a more legitimate and superior way of apprehending the social world than are other approaches (Kaufmann, 1970:9). This reduction denies to students what they constantly experience: that man has, as it were, many faces depending upon the perspective from which he is viewed. Instead of dependence upon a uniperspective, social studies needs to recover "the never-final-discord-and-risk-embracing, living unity of different approaches to the world and of the many facets of the human being" (Morgan, 1970:xv). Without a recognition of the variety of standpoints possible within social studies, a program or a classroom may reflect an inadequate image of man. As such, the development of conceptualizations and rationales which encourage understanding and use of multiperspectivism may be facilitated in part in the following ways.

1. Because of Canadian pluralism, rationales are needed to develop new directions for inservice and preservice social studies education in order to acquaint teachers with the phenomenon of perspective, with the use of multiperspectivism, and with some difficulties encountered in cross-perspective communication. A study of Canadian social studies recommends that because of pluralism, workshops designed to help teachers to understand perspectives appear to be needed:

> Preservice and inservice training needs to be developed for personnel using, preparing to use, or assisting in the developing of ethnic and multicultural studies. Such workshops or courses should be based on a clear rationale as to how personnel are to

> be demonopolarized so that they can begin to understand the perspective of the ethnic group to be studied. This is essential if teachers/developers are to control their cultural bias and circumvent the fallacy of interpreting and judging another value and belief system and life style in terms of the standards of their own taken for granted value and belief system (Aoki, et al., 1974: 95).

Workshops are needed to acquaint teachers conceptually with the importance and the implications (possibilities and limitations) of perspective for social studies activities (c.f., Aoki, 1974b). Perspectives currently available for developing programs and for interpreting the social world need to be brought to the attention of teachers (e.g., Morgan, 1970; Habermas, 1971; Apple, 1974; van Manen, 1974b). Little attention appears to be given to the phenomenon of perspective within texts designed for preservice and inservice education of social studies teachers (c.f., Goldmark, 1968:55-82,209-219; Lee, et al., 1973:75-84).

2. Articles on phenomenology should be simplified and put together for students and for teachers, much as has been done by the Open University Press (e.g., Esland, 1971b, 1973; Dale, 1972; Seaman, et al., 1972). If published by departments of education, monographs could supply new theoretical contexts and modes for apprehending the social world. Such readings may help to make social studies actors acquainted with phenomenological method and ideas in order to understand and to critically reflect upon the common-sense realities which are often taken-for-granted.

3. Programs need to be developed on the basis of concepts suited to the facilitation of multiperspectivism. For example, it has been suggested for Canadian social studies that programs should

not be developed primarily to focus on the idea of heritage or the contributions of a group's heritage to the larger society, but that program development is needed which emphasizes the contemporary ethnicity of groups and contemporary issues related to pluralism (Aoki, et al., 1974:94). This recommendation was based upon a noted lack of concepts within programs for understanding the present experience of ethnicity and the views of various groups; consequently, a wider repertoire of concepts may be needed on the part of program developers for organizing and interpreting the social world. Particularly relevant to a study of Canadian pluralism would be an extension of the notion of perspective in terms of such phenomenological concepts as stranger (Nash, 1970; Schutz, 1970a:85-95; 1971: 91-105), life-style, reality (Chapter II, Part II, Footnote 16; Chapter III, Footnote 4), experienced history (Schutz, 1971:56-62,179), equality (Schutz, 1971:226-273), life-world (Chapter V, Footnote 2), and homecomer (Schutz, 1971:106-119). Further studies of key phenomenological ideas would be warranted to provide an expanded conceptual base for social studies program development.

B. METHODOLOGIES

Educators need more than conceptual bases for encouraging multiperspectivism within social studies programs and classrooms. They need methods in order to deal explicitly with identifying and utilizing the many outlooks which may be brought to social issues. An examination of selected social studies literature shows that there is some concern evident for the explicit utilization of viewpoints (e.g., Roden, 1973:14-31; Fersh, 1974); however, though reference is made to points of view, such literature does not in general provide rationales or methods for utilizing the phenomenon in classrooms. Similarly, an examination of social studies program guides published by the various provincial departments of education shows that methodologies are not suggested to teachers and students for understanding or using perspective pluralism (Aoki, et al., 1974).[2] Therefore, it would appear that thinking needs to be directed towards methods for facilitating the explicit utilization of views in various ways. This recommendation can be facilitated in part in the following ways.

1. The development or identification of teacher and student materials designed to encourage perspectivism is needed. Bibliographies of novels, songs, poetry, art, and film which identify or contrast perspectives should be compiled and made available to teachers who have to deal with contemporary Canadian social issues. Words commonly used in social studies content and discussion, such as man (Nash, 1968), work (Tilgher, 1958), and freedom become controversial because of a variety of perspectives through which they are interpreted and applied. Readings which contrast viewpoints on such terms could be selected and made available to teachers and students utilizing "problem-issues" approaches which require contrasting and conflicting views.

2. Programs could be developed on the basis of teacher and student methods suited to facilitating multiperspectivism. A number of directions for developing methods to encourage multiperspectivism in ethnic studies, and to use a diversity of viewpoints for

understanding social issues, are suggested in Chapter IV (Footnote 14). Ways of helping students identify, compare, and interpret perspectives may be designed around political posters, advertisements, television newscasts and programs, and so on. Further, ideal types of perspective and acts (Chapters II and III) could be simplified for students to use for interpreting issues, for guiding studies of social realities within their own homes and peer groups, and for describing how actors define situations differently. New modes of inquiry could be developed from phenomenology for social studies.

3. Since perspective validation is relevant particularly to an appraisively based social studies, the development of validating methods may be useful to teachers and students. No one perspective is absolute, but remains relative to socio-historical and other conditions. It is because of this partialness that a question of validation is important and is in need of further study.

C. RESEARCH

Because of a paucity of reported research, research appears to be needed on accommodating viewpoints in the instruction and implementation of social studies programs. Following are some suggestions concerning further research on the phenomenon of perspective.

1. The relationship between communication and perspective could be examined because both are central to the construction of reality within the classroom. For example, how do members of a social studies class experience cross-perspective communication?

What makes it problematic for them? How do they negotiate these difficulties? What types of illusions are fostered and what kinds of conflicts are encountered among communication partners? How do students intersubjectively negotiate reality concerning any issue which is put to them? How do they experience the shift among multiple realities and perspectives? Are students aware of various perspectives, and if so, how does this awareness occur? What instructional factors help them to adopt various viewpoints for discussing and examining an issue? Ethnomethodology, currently gaining the interest of educational researchers, may be a suitable approach for describing how teachers and students identify, interpret, and manage the outlooks of one another, for describing the taken-for-granted rules of cross-perspective communication in the various situations of classroom contexts, and for describing how realities are constructed and maintained. The writings of Maruyama appear to be helpful for explicating studies on cross-perspective communication (Chapter IV, Footnote 15; Bibliography).

2. How to enhance intersubjectivity in perspective implementation needs research because a major difficulty appears to be the implementation of social studies programs. For example, it was concluded for Alberta "that a great many teachers do not have a deep familiarity with the Master Plan [program] that would be required for effective implementation" (Downey, *et al.*, 1975:[illegible]). Part of this difficulty may be due to the lack of awareness on the part of teachers, parents, and students of the perspectives underlying programs and the realities they define on man and the social world. Cross-perspective

differences among program users in terms of the program's outlook may disallow implementation to the extent desired by program developers. How can the viewpoints of programs and that of various program users (teachers, students, parents) intersect to a greater degree? How is a program perspective interpreted in contexts of cross-perspective differences? Is it even desirable to implement a program outlook, or should program users be encouraged to interpret and use a program in terms of their own perspectives and situations? In any case, implementation of programs may need to be based on a greater understanding of perspectives, and on a lesser dependence upon plausibility structures (Chapter II, Part II).

3. Further research on the perspective predicates of social studies realities and acts from other theoretical and methodological contexts would be justified. We cannot suggest that phenomenology represents the sole valid approach to perspective. Indeed, phenomenology allows one to grasp certain aspects of experience which other theories neglect, yet as an approach it remains just one perspective, one more type of "world hypothesis" (Pepper, 1942). Various research viewpoints could supplement one another in studies of perspective simply because,

> . . . it is impossible to know everything from a single perspective. All social scientists are forced, both by . . . their ignorance and by the limited range of their concepts, to adopt a course that alternates between perspectives. This may be humiliating to those who expect everything in a monolithic solution, though they often escape this embarrassment by strenuous efforts to nullify all evidence from other perspectives (Schermerhorn, 1970:236).

Symbolic interactionism may be a useful theoretical perspective to study what happens to viewpoints during the interaction between actor and social studies program. Symbolic interactionists generally use the term perspective to refer to the ideas and actions a person uses in dealing with some aspect of a social situation he encounters (e.g., Mead, 1964; Shibutani, 1967; McHugh, 1968; Dale, 1972:15-16; Phillipson, 1972a:126-127; Cusick, 1973:3). The general critical theory of such writers as Habermas and Apple could be used to explicate a relation of perspectives in social studies to larger social interests and ideologies (Bibliography). In short, we can recommend with Walker that "We need research which examines the strengths, weaknesses and noteworthy features of particular curricular phenomena in ways that permit any and all valid points of view or perspectives to be brought to bear" (1974:6). No less can be said for a study of perspective in social studies activities.

PART IV. CONCERNS

Questions can be raised which are relevant to an appraisively oriented social studies from a phenomenological study of perspective.

A. A QUESTION OF CONSEQUENCES

> . . . Any theory not founded on the nature of being human is a lie and a betrayal of man. An inhuman theory will inevitably lead to inhuman consequences (Laing, 1967:45).

"So what?" is a difficult question to experience while undergoing a study of perspective on man. However, this question is important because of possible consequences which images of man in programs have for social studies actors. A basic sociological and phenomenological premise is that people act on their beliefs concerning what is real: "If people define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences" (Berger, 1976:130).[3] What actors believe concerning man—his nature and potentialities—is significant because of the human capacity for self-fulfilling outlooks. The perspectives they hold of themselves contribute to what they become, to the realities they construct and live within, and to the manner in which they treat one another and interpret the life-world. Only by examining the underlying perspectives they adopt can social studies actors critically reflect upon the nature of their own biases and liberate themselves from the encapsulating power of their own ideas. A question of viewpoints on man is of central importance in social studies because of its possible consequences for educational practice and interpretations of fellowman.

B. A QUESTION OF VALUES

> If we believe in nothing, if nothing has any meaning, and if we can affirm no values whatsoever, then everything is possible and nothing has any importance. There is no pro and con: the murderer is neither right nor wrong. We are free to stoke the crematory fires or to devote ourselves to the care of lepers. Evil and virtue are mere chance or caprice (Camus, 1956:5).

Perspectives on man in social studies not only deal with beliefs and claims concerning who is man, but also with whom he should be, or with what should be done concerning man and his social world. However, on what basis are these values to be held?[4] Phenomenology leaves social studies actors with a silent universe in the area of values and morals—the appraisive and prescriptive areas of social studies—because it focuses upon the designative, and because descriptive studies of phenomena do not imply what should be or should be done. From a phenomenological standpoint, when one goes "to the things themselves" rather than to à priori positions in search of values, one is left only with intentionality (consciousness) as a basis for values. Man is left with his experience and the realization that

> Ultimately, there is no reason for any action, for any decision. The agony of man's freedom lies here. For though man is totally free to choose, there is no reason why he should choose one thing over another. . . . there is nothing to help man choose. The responsibility is awesome, but the decision is totally arbitrary. There are no values which man finds embedded in the nature of things, no knowledge of good and evil, to tell man that this thing is right and that thing is wrong. He himself decides what is right and what is wrong, and it is this knowledge which fills the chooser with anguish, the terrible anguish of a man who must make a decision for the whole world, yet who has no basis for his decision (Evans, 1971:17).

But if there is no basis and circumference for values outside of one's own experience, then everything is permitted and man can treat himself as he individually and arbitrarily wishes. Decisions made in program development and in classrooms are ultimately arbitrary and with little justification apart from one's own intentionality. For an appraisively oriented social studies, however, this may not be a sufficient basis for values. Without standards in which social studies actors can have confidence, they have no ground for defining social injustice and for defining who man should be or what he should do. They are left with pessimism in the area of values.

C. A QUESTION OF POWER AND CONTROL

> [Program development] consists in seeking to control men by shaping their conception of the world in which they live. Once we have determined how men shall perceive and structure the world with which they have commerce, we can then safely leave their actions of them. . . . This is cognitive control,

controlling men's minds (Bruner, 1962:132).

Program development is a political act because transmission of selected reality definitions and interpretive schemes within programs is a mechanism through which reality and perspective concerning man are socially distributed (c.f., Berger and Luckman, 1967: 46; Schutz, 1970a:236-242; Young, 1971c:27). Some groups and individuals have the power to control the perspectives of others because educational acts (e.g., instruction, evaluation, program development) are reality constructing and managing enterprises, and are essentially manipulative by moving students from their commonsense perspectives to acceptance of the outlooks and realities marked out by those in power (Esland, 1971a).[5] Man's ability to treat himself as he will in his metaphors and definitions implies that, if some men have the power, they can make other men what they please (Lewis, 1965:72). That programs are an application of power to define social reality for teachers and students is often recognized, but what is neglected are questions implied by power and control: Control by whom? Control for whom? Control for whose benefit? Control based upon what image of man? Control for what purpose? Control within what normative boundary conditions? Educators need to make clear the interests, presuppositions, and approaches they adopt toward man because their perspectives guide the acts and influence the thinking of so many other actors.

Implications of power and control for social studies within a multi-perspective society such as Canada are not simple. Groups in Canada, whether religious, occupational, ethnic, or whatever, who have access to program development have the power to construct realities and to impose their acts upon other actors. The groups who have power over development and distribution of programs choose to make available selected definitions of man. For example,

> The choice of ethnic groups to be studied does not reflect the character of Canadian multiculturalism. At the elementary level there is almost exclusive coverage of Indians, Inuit and such small yet visible minorities as the Hutterite or Doukhabor; at the middle and secondary level, concern is focused on those two groups which represent the majority. Numerically significant groups such as the German, Italian, and Ukrainian are neglected. From examining program guides, one would conclude that Canada's population consists primarily of Indians, Inuit, British, and French. Those minority groups which represent one-quarter of Canada's population are conspicuously absent (Aoki, et al., 1974: 90-91).

Though Canadian schools are in general a meeting place of diverse viewpoints on man and on social issues, it appears that the perspectives of certain ethnic groups are selected and transmitted within social studies programs to the exclusion of other possible realities and views. Because educational acts involve selecting, classifying, and distributing particular knowledge and outlooks, educators are gate-keepers of reality definitions. They legitimize certain perspectives to the exclusion of other viewpoints. Such gate-keeping represents an unequal distribution of power among actors within educational contexts because only certain groups have the power to control the viewpoints of programs and hence in part the perspectives through which teachers and students construct reality. Students may be shifted from their own orientations to those selected by program developers. Some frameworks are established as more legitimate in programs than are other positions for interpreting man and the views of other social groups. Completed programs, therefore, represent a social distribution of perspective within school situations defined by a plurality of groups and views. Especially within the present Canadian context of multiculturalism and pluralism of various kinds, there is not only need to recognize the phenomenon of perspective within programs, but also to make explicit the power function of programs to control reality within multifaceted society.

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

To clarify a view of man and of the social world inherent within their programs, program developers and teachers may appropriate a phenomenological attitude in the place of the natural attitude. Phenomenological method is an attempt to bracket the natural standpoint so that the foundations of social phenomena as constructed and maintained in acts and perspectives may be questioned explicitly and examined critically: "The central effort of phenomenology is to transcend the natural attitude of daily life in order to render it an object for philosophical scrutiny and in order to describe and account for its essential structure" (Natanson, 1966a:3). Applied to social studies programs, phenomenological method may be an attempt to describe the structures of a program's view of man, and of how that view is maintained as natural for teachers and students.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1] In his exploratory study entitled *Toward a Cybernetic Phenomenology of Instruction*, van Manen recommended not only that the phenomenological literature be searched for insights applicable to clarifying educational phenomena in terms of their experiential foundations, but more specifically that the phenomenon of orientation be studied extensively and that applied phenomenological studies be brought to the attention of teachers (1973). Selected phenomenological and non-phenomenological literature has been searched relevant to the phenomenon of perspective, and it can be concluded that within educational literature specifically there is little evident concern currently among educators and researchers for explicating this fundamental basis of human experience and reality. This conclusion is surprising because the literature related to perspective is particularly relevant and needs application to any social studies education in which concern is evident for social criticism, for understanding how the social world is possible, and for interpreting the values and reality definitions of various groups in Canadian society. With some notable exceptions, little attention has been given to the underlying bases and to the function of these hidden predicates in program development (Aoki, 1974a; Ledgerwood, 1975; Macdonald, 1975), evaluation (Speizman, 1974), and educational goal-setting (Harman, 1972; Worth, 1972; Apple, 1974, 1975). Literature on the underlying perspectives of social studies reality is scarce (e.g., Goldmark, 1968; Metcalf and Hunt, 1970; Simpson, 1971; Oswald and Spitzer, 1973; Aoki, 1974b; Toffler, 1974; van Manen, 1974b).

[2] This examination of the status and the approaches taken toward ethnic groups in prescribed elementary and secondary provincial and territorial social studies programs across Canada revealed an overwhelming monocultural orientation within all programs except that of the Northwest Territories. Religious, ethnic, occupational, regional, and other social groupings are interpreted within these social studies programs in terms of the program developers' uniperspectives rather than the realities and outlooks of the groups themselves; consequently, those groups who do not have the power to control, or at least to participate in program development, are not interpreted in social studies via their own experiences, meanings, and modes of apprehending Canadian issues. Emphasizing the unique, static, and isolable artifacts of a group rather than the perspectives within which objects and acts have meaning for them, social studies programs tend to present the life-world primarily as material rather than as cognitive, and the ongoing experience of a group as "heritage" rather than ideas and acts in dialectical relation with changing situations. Because the points of view of other groups are interpreted by the majority of social studies programs from an implicit framework of ethnocentricism and paternalism, and because the programs do not usually reflect the meaning or develop implications of such terms as pluralism and multiculturalism, it was concluded by the authors of the study that in general "program developers appear to be culturally

monopolarized, developing programs from their own taken-for-granted and natural perspective; there is little attempt to encourage students to see from more than one cultural perspective" (Aoki, et al., 1974: 92).

[3] A paradox of man's ability to define and construct reality is that the ideas and phenomena which he creates in turn modify his own experience and outlooks. This is referred to by Berger and Luckmann as a dialectical relationship between man and reality:

> . . . the relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man (not, of course, in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each other. The product acts back upon the producer (1967:61).

A perspective on man is objectified and legitimized within social studies programs. In turn, programs become a part of the life-world of teachers and students, and act back upon their consciousness through the system of relevances imposed upon them. Program developers externalize their ideas in the program development acts they undertake, objectivate these beliefs in the completed acts, and then internalize and are restrained by their own social creations. Their actions and thought are influenced and constrained by the program reality parameters, for they tend to perceive themselves and the social world through the categories and standpoints of a program. As Esland states clearly, "the objective existence of new knowledge structures acts back on, and transforms, the teacher's and pupils' subjectively apprehended reality" (1971a:72).

[4] Phenomenology leaves social studies educators and students with a dilemma concerning values: although in daily experience they are called upon to hold values, yet experience is not in itself always a sufficient basis for deciding what should be or should be done because this leads to arbitrariness. Man holds values and becomes enraged at certain situations—in experience he is called upon to judge these as evil, inhuman, immoral, cruel, unethical—yet such judgements are arbitrary unless there is some standard. Ethical notions are premised upon a basis—whether in principles, traditions, sociological majorities, situational ethics, normal curves, ideals, standards imposed by a state—from which deviance and normality, right and wrong, better and worse, or good and bad can be determined. Without some standard of worth there is nothing beyond mere arbitrariness to uphold distinctions between cruelty and non-cruelty, and to keep meaning to such words as right and wrong.

How are the value claims either stated explicitly or else implied within a perspective on man to be validated phenomenologically? One encounters considerable difficulty in going to phenomenology for criteria which can be used in validating the value claims of a perspective. If the subject-object relation is accepted by phenomenologists as their basis for describing phenomena, and if there is nothing inherently within the subject (e.g., biologically determined morals or theological imperatives) or the object (e.g., natural law, historical or divine purpose) to guide the relationship between the two ethically, then there is a difficulty concerning validating the worth of a perspective. Phenomenology provides a means for describing values the life-world is premised upon, but not for determining what values are to be accepted in social studies or elsewhere. One can describe what a group holds to be valuable, but not what the norm should be; one can state that men have moral notions and that they experience things as being right or wrong, but not judge those notions and experiences themselves; one can uncover the taken-for-granted values directed towards man within programs, but not provide a standard for judging those values or a basis for determining what should be done. If program developers' experience is the basis and starting point for their praising and blaming, then their value statements applied to man within a program can only be described in terms of their experience, but not in terms of their worth. They are left with the possibility of describing values only, but not with a standard grounded in anything outside of the subject-object relation as a basis for judging those values.

[5] Man is capable of social criticism because he defines a discrepancy gap between the "is" and "ought," the "actual" and the "ideal." Dawe argues that

> . . . the attempt to transcend the gap is essentially an attempt to impose ideal meanings on existing situations. Hence the linking concepts of meaning and action; the concepts of ends as desired future states, and of the existing situation as providing conditions to be transcended or overcome and means to be utilised; and the notion of actors defining their own situations and attempting to control them in terms of their definitions (1970: 212).

Acts are attempts to change historical situations and social constructions in accordance with one's goals. As such, the project of an act is an attempt to define an ideal; the actions of an act are attempts to implement this ideal upon the actual; the motives of an act are justifications for imposing the ideal upon the actual. Man's acts "constitute an unceasing attempt to exert control over existing situations, relationships and institutions in such a way as to bring them into line with human constructions of their ideal meaning" (Dawe, 1970:212). From this point of view, a central feature of acts of program development are the notions of "control" and "power."

First, control of a situation by an actor refers to his attempt to define meaning by acting upon the situation in accordance with his own project, and by imposing this definition upon other actors in that situation (Dawe, 1970:213). Actors impose their definitions upon situations and their ideal meanings upon phenomena by acting upon them. Since this acting is designed to change a situation in the direction of the actor's project, imposing ideal meaning (i.e., meaning defined by a project and by in-order-to and because-of motives) on an actual situation is an attempt by an actor to close a perceived actual/ideal gap. Consequently, control is inherent within programs because developers by their acts of program development are imposing their particular perspectives and ideal meanings concerning man and the social world upon teachers and students.

Second, related to the notion of control are the notions of power and authority. Since "the capacity for control will, in the typical case, be differentially distributed," certain individuals or groups have the power to impose their meaning upon a situation, thereby directing the actions of others (Dawe, 1970:213). By virtue of legal role educators have the authority, and through their acts of program development demonstrate that they have the power, to manage the perspectives and reality constructing acts of various groups within the school. Completed programs are acts of reality management because they represent the power of some group to control the selective definition and distribution of perspective within society. Only those definitions of reality will be imposed upon the various groups of Canadian society which that group who has the power over the production and dissemination acts chooses to make available. Program development is an act of reality control based upon power.

That programs are acts which represent the differential power of groups to control the perspectives of other groups can be substantiated by various sociology of knowledge writers (Dawe, 1970; Geer, 1971; Keddie, 1971; Young, 1971a; Eggleston, 1972; Apple, 1976). Indeed, Young suggests that one study programs on the presupposition that "those in positions of power will attempt to define what is to be taken as knowledge, how accessible to different groups any knowledge is, and what are the accepted relationships between different knowledge areas and between those who have access to them and make them available" (1971:32). Further, one of Bernstein's most quoted conclusions is that: "How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits, and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control" (1971:47). Although this focus on power and control in programs is comparatively recent in educational literature, the implications of unequal power among groups to impose their reality definitions upon other groups are important for a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-political society such as Canada. The perspective of some group can control the selection and structuring of ideas, the presentation and availability (when and to whom) of these ideas, and the interpretation and assessment of situations within programs (Eggleston, 1972).

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